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Foreword 
 
The Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology (NSfK) convened its 58th re-
search seminar in beautiful surroundings of Borgarnes Iceland from 1st to 4th of May 
2016. Borgarnes and its conference hotel Bifröst is located about 70 km north from 
Reykjavik. Altogether 74 researchers from all the Nordic countries, United Kingdom 
and United States took part in the seminar. 
The main theme of the 2016 Research Seminar was ”New challenges in criminology; can 
old theories be used to explain or understand new crimes?” The concept behind the title 
was that modern society is facing new challenges, and concerns have been voiced 
whether conventional theories and criminal justice systems are adequately equipped 
to tackle new forms of crime and victimization.  
The seminar started with two excellent plenary presentations late at the night of ar-
rival. Jón Gunnar Bernburg (IS) gave a presentation with very topical issue of mass 
protest and the global crisis in Iceland. Bernburg was followed by Björn Þorvaldsson 
(IS) with a theme of challenges in prosecuting cases regarding the financial crisis in 
Iceland. These presentations gave a very good overview of the magnitude of the fi-
nancial crises in Iceland and of the problems the criminal justice system is facing cur-
rently. Worrying is that the authorities seem to have a tendency to repeat the same 
mistakes all over again. The next day Steve Tombs (UK) supplemented these presen-
tations with his sophisticated analysis of the changes of the business regulation after 
the crises in UK. The picture became even more complete after Janne Flyghed (SE) 
and Isabel Schoultz (SE) presented what kind of techniques of neutralizations the 
spokesmen of the corporates in Sweden use when explaining misconducts of their 
company. Furthermore, our understanding of new types of crimes was broadened 
with Inger Marie Sundes (NO) analysis of crime in the digitalized society and Karin 
Creutz (FI) presentation about violent extremism. 
The seminar interacted between plenary sessions related to the conference’s main 
theme as well as parallel sessions with all together 50 presentations with top quality. 
It is noteworthy that the discussions within the workshop were vivid and with high 
intellectual content.  
A feedback was requested from the participants. The response was extremely posi-
tive. The participants appreciated the top quality of keynote speakers and the possi-
bilities for networking.  They valued to hear what other Nordic criminologists are 
working on and the opportunity to present ones project to an international audience. 
The participants were very satisfied with the organizational matters of the seminar. 
As a downside it was mentioned that the tight schedule of the seminar left a lot of 
promising discussions (and indeed entire presentations) cut short. 
  
Most of the presentations of the seminar are published in this report. NSfK do not 
hold property rights to the presentations and results of the papers can also be pub-
lished elsewhere.  
Finally, I would like to express my greatest gratitude to NSfK’s executive secretary 
Laura Mynttinen and Icelandic board members Kolbrun Benediktsdottir and Ran-
nveig Þórisdóttir and contact secretary Snorri Arnason for remarkable well done or-
ganizations of the seminar. Several respondents to the feedback formula praised the 
supportive atmosphere of the seminar. Indeed, this is something all the participants 
should be thanked for! 
 
Aarne Kinnunen 
Helsinki, July 2016 
Chairman 
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Program for NSfK’s 58. Research Seminar 
Hotel Bifröst, Iceland 
 
Sunday May 1st  
18.00 – 19.30 Arrival at Hótel Bifröst. Check-in and dinner. 
19.30 – 19.45 Welcome by NSfK Chairman Aarne Kinnunen (FI) 
19.45 – 21.00 Plenum – Hrifla auditorium  
Mass protest and the global crisis: the case of Iceland 
Jón Gunnar Bernburg (IS)  
Too big to jail? – Challenges in prosecuting cases regarding 
the financial crisis in Iceland 
Björn Þorvaldsson (IS) 
Chair: Hedda Giertsen (NO) 
Monday May 2nd  
 
07.00 – 09.00 Breakfast  
09.00 – 10.00 Plenum– Hrifla auditorium 
 Regulating Business ‘After’ the Crisis: some observations 
from the UK. Steve Tombs (UK). 
 
Chair: Natalia Ollus (FI)  
10.00 – 10.15 Coffee break   
10.15 – 12.15 Parallel sessions 
Workshop A Prison and Probation studies – Glanni seminar room 
1. Fra trommesang til samfundstjeneste – 
sanktionssystemets udvikling i grønlandsk kriminalret. 
Hans Jørgen Engbo (GL). 
2. Den grønlandske fangebefolkning. Annemette Nyborg 
Lauritsen (GL). 
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3. ‘We don’t want you to think criminal thoughts’ – a socio-
logical exploration of prison-based cognitive-behavioural 
programs in Denmark. Julie Laursen (DK). 
4. Når lokalsamfundet rykker ind – et socialt forsøg i et 
åbent fængsel. Marie Herping Abrahamsen (DK). 
5. Tværfagligt samarbejde om prøveløsladte i lyset af 
Luhmans systemteori. Anette Storgaard (DK) Chair.  
Workshop B Gender related studies – Vikrafell seminar room 
1. The female offender as a social problem. Erika Hedlund 
(SE).  
2. Desistance – From What? A Theoretical Contribution to 
the Understanding of Women’s Desistance. Robin 
Gålnander (SE). 
3. Validity of the gender gap theory on a substance-abusing 
population with previous prison sentences. Teemu 
Kaskela (FI). 
4. Straffa, utvisa och utbilda: Lösningsförslag i den svenska 
debatten om människohandel för sexuella ändamål. Anita 
Heber (SE). 
5. Exploring the links between human trafficking and sham 
marriages. Minna Viuhko (FI) Chair.  
12.30 – 13.30 Lunch 
13.30 – 15.15 Parallel sessions 
Workshop C Police studies – Glanni seminar room 
1. ”Together against domestic violence”:  New approach to 
an old problem. Marta Kristín Hreiðarsdóttir and 
Rannveig Þórisdóttir (IS). 
2. Nationale strategiske analyse / dansk politi. Mia Lund 
Ørting (DK).  
3. Doing the Right Masculinities Right: The Police Force as 
Gendered Practices. Ingrid Lander (SE). 
4. Én ud af hundrede ved noget om det – En kvantitativ 
dokumentanalyse af Østjyllands Politis datakvalitet med 
udgangspunk i indbrudsjournaler. Cecilie Vivienne At-
termann and Pernille Søgaard Tolstrup (DK). 
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5. Hot spot-politiarbejde i en dansk kontekst. Maria Bislev 
(DK) Chair and Cecilie Vivienne Attermann. 
Workshop D Legal reform and social control – Vikrafell seminar 
room 
1. Begrebet voldtægt i nordisk perspektiv. Ragnheiður 
Bragadóttir (IS) Chair. 
2. Does age and gender have an impact on public attitudes 
towards drug use and buying of sexual services?  Helgi 
Gunnlaugsson (IS).  
3. Social control and the debate over crime. Social problems 
and social change in the public debate over the total re-
form of the Finnish Criminal Code from the 1960s to the 
millennium. Aura Kostiainen (FI). 
4. From a parenting measure to a crime? – Criminalisation 
of parental corporal violence in Finland. Riikka Kotanen 
(FI). 
5. Jane Addams (1860-1935) arbete i början på 1900-talet i 
Chicago samt 100 år senare på 2000-talet i Finland och i 
övriga nordiska länder. Regina Järg-Tärno (FI). 
15.15 – 15:45 Coffee break  
15.45 – 16.45 Plenum – Hrifla auditorium 
 Using techniques of neutralisations to understand corporate 
crime. 
Janne Flyghed and Isabel Schoultz (SE)  
 
Chair: Anne Julie Boesen Pedersen (DK)  
16.45 – 18.00 Parallel sessions 
Workshop E Economic and environmental crime  – Glanni seminar 
room 
1. Corporate and organised crime: a study of criminal liabil-
ity of executives and leaders. Þorbjörg Sveinsdóttir (IS).  
2. Green Activist Criminology and the Epistemologies of the 
South. David Rodríguez Goyes (NO). 
3. Security for the profitable: The case of insurance fraud. 
Anders Stenström (SE) Chair.  
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Workshop F Sexual offences – Hrifla auditorium 
1. Sexual harassment in public spaces in India. Mahesh 
Nalla (US).  
2. Rape victims in small town: Case studies in Iceland. 
Guðrún Katrín Jóhannesdóttir and Jón Gunnar 
Bernburg (IS). 
3. Cause-effect-responsibility? The parties of sexual crime as 
responsible actors discussed in the opinion column of a 
Finnish newspaper. Johanna Kronstedt-Rousi (FI) 
Chair.  
Workshop G New challenges related to extremism and counter ter-
rorism – Vikrafell seminar room 
1. Authority responses and public reactions to radicalisa-
tion. Karin Creutz (FI).  
2. Political Effects upon Criminal Law. Tasnime Akunjee 
(UK).   
3. Preventing Radicalization in Prisons. Aarne Kinnunen 
(FI) Chair. 
19.30  Dinner  
 
Tuesday May 3rd  
 
07.00 – 09.00 Breakfast 
09.00 – 10.00 Plenum – Hrifla auditorium 
 A new thing under the sun? Crime in the digitized society 
Inger Marie Sunde (NO).  
 
Chair: Felipe Estrada (SE)  
10.00 – 10.15 Coffee break 
10.15 – 12.15 Parallel sessions 
Workshop H Youth studies – Glanni seminar room 
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1. Young people’s conceptions of trust in public and private 
policing. Elsa Saarikkomäki (FI).  
2. Etnisk bias i genoprettende processer? - En undersøgelse 
af adgang og udbytte for unge gerningsmænd med etnisk 
minoritetsbaggrund. Katrine Barnekow Rasmussen 
(DK) Chair. 
3. Cannabis sales and immigrant youth gangs – an explora-
tory study of the intersection between market structure 
and youth gang evolution. Kim Møller (DK). 
4. Kriminalitet og uddannelse blandt unge. Mette Foss 
Andersen (DK).  
5. Det vanskelige arbeidet: Å omforme Cowboymaskulinitet 
til en passende maskulinitet. Nina Jon (NO). 
Workshop I Criminal justice challenges and trends – Vikrafell 
seminar room 
1. The unequal crime drop. Anders Nilsson (SE).  
2. Symbolic Politics in Swedish Crime Policy Debate. Klara 
Hermansson (SE) Chair. 
3. Dramatic Subtlety: Exploring Emotions and Emotion 
Management in the Courtroom. Lisa Flower (SE). 
4. Scaling Penalty: In Pursuit of a Global Sociology of Pun-
ishment. Kjersti Lohne (NO).  
5. Access to legal assistance in civil cases under the ECHR. 
Olaf Halvorsen Rønning (NO).  
Workshop J Emerging crime risks – Hrifla auditorium 
1. Virtual punishment in the making: When citizen journal-
ism enables processes of shaming and online victimiza-
tion. Agneta Mallén (SE).  
2. Social media as a platform for crime. Hanne Stevens 
(DK) Chair.  
3. How Widespread is Cybercrime? Types and Volume of 
Public Victimization in Iceland. Jónas Orri Jónasson 
and Helgi Gunnlaugsson (IS). 
4. Homicide as a culmination of social marginalization. Ka-
roliina Suonpää (FI).  
5. Governing security in spaces of flows. Martin 
Nøkleberg (NO).  
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12.30 – 13.30 Lunch 
13.30 – 14.30 Parallel sessions 
Workshop K Theoretical perspectives – Glanni seminar room 
1. Theoretical challenges in contemporary hate crime stud-
ies. Mika Andersson (SE).  
2. Connecting structure and emotions, connecting Bour-
dieu’s field theory with cultural criminology. Annick 
Prieur (DK) Chair.   
3. New challenges in criminology; can old theories be used 
to explain or understand environmental harms and 
crimes? The case of illegal wildlife trade. Ragnhild Sol-
lund (NO). 
Workshop L Collective efficacy and Sub-culture studies – Vikra-
fell seminar room 
1. Collective efficacy and arson. Manne Gerell (SE).  
2. Collective efficacy and crime in Finnish suburbs. Petri 
Danielsson (FI).  
3. “For some other reasons?” – Ethnographic study of an 
international outlaw motorcycle club. Jussi Perälä (FI) 
Chair.    
14.30 – 14.45 Coffee break 
14.45 – 15.45 Plenum – Hrifla auditorium 
 Violent extremism, moral panics and social problems - When 
counter measures become counterproductive. 
Karin Creutz (FI).  
 
Chair: Aarne Kinnunen (FI).  
18.00 – 20.00 Sightseeing 
20.00  Festmiddag at Hotel Hamar 
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Wednesday May 4th  
 
07.00 – 09.00 Departure by bus to Keflavik Airport 
 
Breakfast will be arranged before departure
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PRESENTATIONS IN PLENARY 
 
Regulating Business ‘After’ the Crisis: some observations from 
the UK 
 
Steve Tombs 
The Open University, United Kingdom 
 
 
Introduction: Regulation as Social Protection 
 
Regulation is widely derided, a dirty word now equated with red tape, rules, burdens and 
bureaucracy. Yet we would do well to recall that regulation of business emerged ostensi-
bly to provide some levels of ‘social protection’ for citizens, consumers and communities 
from the worst excesses of the industrial revolution. Thus, from the 1830s onwards, a rap-
idly industrialising Britain became the site of the earliest forms of social protection, won 
through inter- and intra-class conflict and compromise. The regulatory agencies formed in 
Victorian Britain formed the basis of regulatory regimes through to the present day. In 
outline, we can trace key dates in the emergence of the social protection state in Britain 
relatively clearly:  
 In 1802, the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act was designed specifically to reg-
ulate the working conditions of 'Poor Law' apprentices in the textile industry. Then, 
from 1831 onwards, a series of Factories Acts were passed – regulating the hours 
and conditions of young workers and women, extending across industries and 
workplaces of different sizes, until the consolidation of existing legislation in the 
Factory Act of 1878. 
 In 1842, Chadwick's Government-commissioned report into sanitation – The Sani-
taryConditions of the Labouring Population - was published. It directly linked living 
and working conditions with illness and disease. Chadwick’s report was imple-
mented via the Public Health Act of 1848, and was to prove “a powerful catalyst for 
the development of local government”. (Fee and Brown, 2005: 887) 
 1863 saw the first thoroughgoing attempts to install and enforce environmental pro-
tection regulation, through the Alkali Act of 1863 (and, subsequently, of 1874, 1881, 
and 1892).  
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 In 1875, the passage of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, to be enforced through the 
Local Government Board, was the culmination of the struggles of social movements 
for pure food, drugs and drink.  
 
In sum, this was a key period in the emergence of key pillars of social protection, at least in 
the context of public health. (Tombs, 2016a) The nature and level of business regulation 
has since been a site of contest; the Victorian regime was chronically under-staffed, while 
social protection through regulation probably reached its high point in the 1970s/80s. 
Then, the emergence of neo-liberalism provided the context for a concerted attack on regu-
lation in the name of freeing business from the burdens of red tape. It is this context which 
is the backdrop for the concerns of this paper. 
 
I begin, in the following section, by outlining the emergence of a political initiative in the 
UK, under the rubric of ‘Better Regulation’, from 2004 onwards, three years after which 
the UK, as with much of the capitalist world, was the site of a seismic financial crisis, fol-
lowed by recession. I discuss some of the ways in which this crisis was narrated, and what 
these framings implied for regulatory reform. Then, in a following section, I chart the pro-
gress and effects of Better Regulation, before concluding with some general observations. 
 
The Emergence of Better Regulation 
In 1997, after 18 years in opposition, an incoming Labour Government set itself on a con-
certed effort to prove itself as the party of business in a way the Conservative Party, as capi-
tal’s natural representatives, have never had to do. Integral to this effort was New La-
bour’s approach to the regulation of business under the over-arching rubric of ‘Better 
Regulation’, a concept which can be traced back to the 1990s, but which in the UK and in 
the EU received particular impetus from the first Blair Government.  
Blair emphasised the bases for ‘Better Regulation’ in 1998 in the context of Britain’s Presi-
dency of the EU, committing that Presidency to ensuring that better regulation became “a 
priority for Europe.” (Blair, 1998) In fact, it was to be Blair’s second Presidency of the EU 
in 2004 which was to prove one of the pivotal moments in advancing Better Regulation 
through the EU. (Wiener, 2006) So much so that, by 2007, one commentator was able to 
note that, “Better regulation has become ‘one of the most fashionable terms circulating in the 
corridors in Brussels’” (Allio, 2007: 82, cited in Smith et al, 2014, emphasis in the original). 
In the UK, the watershed moment for regulatory strategy came in 2004 when the Labour 
Government launched the Hampton Review, which sought no less than to reconstruct the 
“regulatory landscape”. (Hampton, 2005: 76).  The Review was charged with considering 
‘the scope for reducing administrative burdens on business by promoting more efficient 
approaches to regulatory inspection and enforcement without reducing regulatory out-
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comes”. (Hampton, 2005)  Its  remit encompassed 63 major regulatory bodies - including 
the Environment Agency, the Food Standards Agency, the Health and Safety Executive, 
and not to forget the Financial Services Authority (Hampton 2005: 13) – as well as 468 local 
authorities (Hampton, 2005: 3); in other words, every agency which played a role in the 
mitigation of and response to corporate crime and harm.  
 
Hampton’s subsequent report – Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and 
Enforcement, published in 2005– called for more focused inspections, greater emphasis on 
advice and education and, in general, for removing the ‘burden’ of inspection from most 
premises. Specifically, Hampton called for the reduction of inspections by up to a third - 
across all regulatory agencies, this would equate to one million fewer inspections - and 
recommended that regulators make much more ‘use of advice’ to business. The report 
drew upon risk-based claims as the basis for withdrawing regulatory scrutiny from those 
that, in the terms used in the Hampton report, had ‘earned’ their ‘autonomy’.  The ‘con-
sensus’ established in and through this review and report (Vickers, 2008: 215) marked the 
consolidation of the era of Better Regulation, the triumph of the policy shift from enforce-
ment to advice and education, a concentration of formal enforcement resources away from 
the majority of businesses onto so-called high risk areas, and the consistent efforts to do 
more with less, bolstered by (somewhat Orwellian) claims that ‘less is more’ (Vickers, 
2008).  
 
Responses to the UK Financial Crisis  
In September 2008, one issue presented itself as “an unconditional imperative which must 
be met with immediate action”: the “banks”, for which read finance capital in particular 
and the global neo-liberal order in general, had to be saved (Zizek 2009b: 80). In the UK, 
‘golden parachutes’ (Žižek, 2009a: 12) were handed out to the UK banking system: a Na-
tional Audit Office (2009) “overview of the government’s response to the crisis” which 
showed that “the purchases of shares by the public sector together with offers of guaran-
tees, insurance and loans made to banks reached £850 billion [€1100 billion], an unprece-
dented level of support”. The financial commitments made by Governments since Sep-
tember 2008 have included purchasing shares in banks to enable re-capitalization, indem-
nifying the Bank of England against losses incurred in providing liquidity support, un-
derwriting borrowing by banks to strengthen liquidity, and providing insurance cover for 
assets. The Government “cash outlay” is said to have peaked “at £133 billion, equivalent to 
more than £2,000 for every person in the UK”. (House of Lords and House of Commons, 
2013: 14). Subsequent financial commitments by the UK Government to the sector includ-
ed: purchasing shares in banks to enable re-capitalisation; indemnifying the Bank of Eng-
land against losses incurred in providing liquidity support; under-writing borrowing by 
banks to strengthen liquidity;  providing insurance cover for assets; creating £375bn [€500 
billion] of new money via Quantitative Easing programmes between 2009 and 2012. This 
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financial outlay marked the beginning of a new “age of austerity” characterized by sover-
eign debt, where the already most vulnerable within, and across, societies are targeted as 
the price worth paying for capitalist recovery.  
Amongst the mass of literature which has sought to explain the aetiology of the crisis in 
the UK, and elsewhere, one of the most common elements has been to cite a failure in the 
nature and level of regulation of the financial services sector prior to 2007. However, de-
spite this there has emerged in the UK a dominant set of consensual political responses 
which have obscured or ignored the question of regulation. Indeed, these responses may 
provide the basis for the further march of neo-liberal ways of organising and seeing the 
world. It is to some of the ways in which this remarkable outcome could be achieved that 
this paper now turns.  
Here I consider some of the ways in which the crisis has been politically and popularly 
framed. The focus is upon various discursive initiatives and narratives which were con-
structed and utilised as, and since, the crisis unfolded. My rationale is the claim that, 
“Narratives are important instruments … because they co-construct and legitimize re-
gimes by framing the way we see the world. Narratives are not author-less discourses, but 
represent specific, powerful interests” (Hansen, 2014: 636). 
Identifying Blameworthy Subjects 
 
In the aftermath of the crisis, several types of blameworthy subjects were identified. 
First, there emerged a series of morality plays which had their origins in regarding indi-
vidual bankers as “villains that brought down the world” (Whittle and Mueller, 2012: 119). 
Whittle and Mueller’s (2012) analysis of the UK Treasury Select Committee hearings of 
2009 into the banking crisis and in particular the questioning of four senior bankers therein 
demonstrates clearly that these were processes of moral condemnation. The conduct and 
substance of the Select Committee is typical: within these generalised morality plays, sen-
ior individual figures at the head of financial services companies – prime examples being 
Fred Goodwin, Stephen Hester, Andy Hornby and Tom McKillop1 - were identified and 
vilified, often over very long periods of time. Moreover, such processes took place on both 
sides of the Atlantic (Froud et al, 2012: 44-5). Indeed, these were effectively quasi ‘degrada-
tion ceremonies’ (Garfinkel, 1956) - quasi because although there were clearly for a were 
clearly ceremonial, and certainly involved formal denunciation, not least in moral terms of 
blame and shame, lacking was either any formal calling to account nor, crucially, any 
                                                 
1 The appearance of bankers before the Select Committee prompted a stream of vitriolic press headlines, 
most infamously in The Sun which ran the front-page headline ‘Scumbag Millionaires’ alongside images of 
Sir Tom McKillop, former Chairman, and Sir Fred Goodwin, former Chief Executive of RBS Group. (Stanley, 
2012) 
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transformation of the identities of those vilified (see, for example, Harris, 2012). A varia-
tion of this ceremonial denunciation of specific, named individuals involved intermittent, 
less focused, much broader swipes at the guilty men of the City or Wall Street. This in turn 
drew upon distinct, but not entirely unrelated and hence utilisable, discourses of rogue 
traders (Pludwin, 2011: 470-2), itself a common discursive mechanism for separating out 
harms and crimes perpetuated in the corporate world from the normal functioning of that 
world.  
In any case, what emerges from this generalised framing of specific - or a ‘class’ of - indi-
viduals is that, if there were ‘lessons to be learned’, they were about eliminating bad ap-
ples, or ‘tricksters’, (Kelsey, 2014) and not, therefore, about the necessity of the external 
restructuring of markets, sectors or fundamental practices within them through re-
regulation. Thus, for example, reflecting upon the causes of the global credit crisis and the 
international recession, Lord Myners, the then Financial Services Secretary in Gordon 
Brown’s Labour Government was able to state,  
The failures have not been failures of the market economy. They have been failures 
of men and women who forgot that market discipline meant that they had to be dis-
ciplined in order to get results out of the marketplace. Too many people got compla-
cent and lazy – and the market responded as we should have predicted ... (Myners 
2010). 
That this was a protracted process of blaming is indicated by the fact that ‘banker bashing’ 
entered the popular lexicon. Indeed, some sought to call it to a halt: in January 2011, with-
in days of taking over as CEO of Barclays, Bob Diamond told a parliamentary committee 
that he thought “There was a period of remorse and apology for banks and I think that 
period needs to be over." (Treanor, 2011) As Werdigier put it, he argued that it was time 
“to move on from criticizing and to let banks and the private sector create jobs and eco-
nomic growth” (Werdigier, 2011). For Diamond, the question was “how do we put some 
of the blame game behind” (cited in Werdigier, 2011). It has become a common refrain by 
the industry and its apologists. Fraser Nelson, editor of right-wing magazine The Spectator, 
lamented in 2013 that "It has been almost five years since the crash and still the guilty men 
are being tracked down and subjected to what seems like a never-ending trial for financial 
war crimes"(cited in Cohen, 2013), while Anthony Browne, chief executive of the British 
Bankers' Association and his former hatred of rent-seekers has vanished. "We need to put 
banker bashing behind us” (ibid.)  
As intimated, this generalised opprobrium took some dangerous (from the point of view 
of capital) turns. At a most general level, there was a long term popular and political out-
rage at ‘executive pay’ – an issue that has certainly erupted from time to time in the UK, 
not least under conditions of neo-liberalism in which the UK has experienced widening 
levels of income and wealth inequalities, trends exacerbated under conditions of post-
crisis austerity which the Government was attempting to impose under the rubric ‘we’re 
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all in this together’. Government responses to this both sought to acknowledge, even to 
claim at times to share, the popular discomfort but to represent such levels of remunera-
tion as unavoidable in a globalised market – UK Plc had to attract and retain the best peo-
ple at the head of their largest companies in order to continue to compete effectively in 
globalised market-places, and thus to facilitate recovery from recession. This latter claim 
appears to hold considerable sway – perhaps through repetition and a simplistic under-
standing of labour markets – despite there being absolutely no evidence for it (Bolchover, 
2013). Were this actually to be the case, then it might be noted that, compared to its Euro-
pean counterparts, the City of London must have some exceptionally talented people: a 
2013 report by the European Bankers’ Association found that there were 2,400 bankers in 
the City paid over €1m in 2011 – a total which was more than three times as many as in the 
rest of the EU put together (Treanor, 2013). 
A second moral dichotomy which has circulated widely in the UK has been between retail 
(good) versus investment (bad) forms of banking, a discourse which gained such power 
that it sits at the heart of the major reform to the sector which has resulted from the crisis, 
the so-called ring fence to be erected within banks to protect the former from the risks of 
the latter (see below, on Vickers). This rather conveniently obscures the fact that the three 
major waves of consumer victimisation that have occurred in the sector in the past three 
decades – private pensions, then endowment mortgages, then payment protection insur-
ance ‘mis-selling’ – all occurred within the retail sector (Tombs, 2013).  
A third way in which blame has been apportioned is via the construction and use of a se-
ries of further moralistic dichotomies – notably, between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ borrowers (the 
latter being the sub-prime borrowers in particular) and predatory as opposed to responsi-
ble lenders (Brasset and Vaughan-Williams, 2012; 35). Such divisions have class-based 
and, in the US, racialised and gendered dimensions – and, while pernicious, these also 
have resonance as they bear an (albeit distorted) relationship to reality, since saturated 
markets for mortgages saw less financially able groups exploited as a new, untapped 
source of super-profit for business. 
While there are elements of the bad apple claims here, this applies to wider populations, 
so that this resort to endless victim-blaming discourses (Weissman and Donahue, 2009: 9) 
created the basis for a wider encompassing of “suspect citizens” and their “culture of 
debt” (Pludwin, 2011: 472). In some ways this used the suspect lending practices of finan-
cial services forms and turned responsibility on its head. As Dymski et al have noted of the 
post-2007 exposes of sub-prime lending in the US, “The defining aspect of the crisis was 
not that subprime loans and other forms of predatory lending disproportionately victim-
ized minorities and women, but that borrowers were myopic, overly greedy, or both.”  
(2013: 125). This also created the basis for a further, useful slippage, one that then allowed 
moral blame to be attached to many of us, itself related to a slightly wider claim that ‘we’ 
were all somehow personally responsible for borrowing too much, enjoying easy credit, 
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living beyond our means, and so on (Brasset and Vaughan-Williams, 2012).  Thus, in gen-
eral, 
The relationship between individuals, their houses/homes and their investment and 
saving habits was suddenly produced as a category of moral analysis in the public 
sphere. Fear, guilt, shame and anger were mobilised and sovereign responses, typi-
cally couched in the humanitarian vocabularies of salvation and helping victims, as 
we have seen, were not only justified but seen to be necessitated. (Brasset and 
Vaughan-Williams, 2012: 41) 
The emphasis upon bad borrowing as opposed merely to bad borrowers also opened up 
discursive space for the emergence of the ‘credit card analogy’ (Broome et al, 2012: 5), 
which was to prove crucial in the institution of the idea that nation-states had overspent. 
In 2008, whilst in opposition, Cameron used the News of the World2 to claim that the Labour 
Government “has maxed out our nation’s credit card—and they want to keep on spending 
by getting another. We believe we need to get a grip, be responsible and help families now 
in a way that doesn’t cost us our future." (Conservative Home, 2008) Thus, although such 
an analogy is empirically (Reed, 2012) and conceptually (Pettifor, 2012) ludicrous, it had 
power since it resonated with the relatively successful balanced household budget analogy 
deployed over thirty-five years ago by both Thatcher and Reagan as they ideologically 
softened up their respective populations for monetarist experiments. Such a claim proved 
pivotal in the very quick shift from the construction of the crisis as one of private, capital-
ist institutions to one of national debt, especially debt incurred through public sector and 
welfare spending, and thus a more general, public lassitude (Robinson, 2012). More gener-
ally, then, this renewed attention to a diet of good monetary and fiscal governance via belt 
tightening on behalf of a gorged population helped to make austerity not just palatable but 
necessary, both economically and indeed morally (Blyth, 2013: 1-15).  
Such discourses also segue into a further group of morally-condemnatory frames, namely 
those which we can reduce to the claim that everyone and everything was to blame for the 
crisis (McLean and Nocera, 2011). Thus, “Who’s not to blame? The mortgage brokers were 
out of control. Regulators were asleep. Home buyers thought they were entitled to Corian 
counters and a two story great room … This was an episode of mass idiocy.” (Pludwin, 
2011: 472). If there was idiocy, claiming that this was ubiquitous is important:  if we were 
all to blame, then no-one or nothing in particular was to blame; and if we were all to 
blame, then it follows we should all share the pain of ‘recovery’ – hence, again, the UK 
Government’s easy refrain that we are all in this together, albeit a claim always somewhat 
vulnerable in the context of clear empirical evidence as to the distribution and effects of 
austerity measures. The ubiquity of blame coupled with the facile credit card analogy are 
                                                 
2 In 2009, the News of the World had a readership of just under eight million people. 
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double movements under-pinning the representation of private as public debt and ideo-
logically fuelling the legitimation of austerity.  
Beyond Blame Discourses 
A distinct discursive response to the crisis, one which transcends the paradigm of blam-
ing, entailed the generalised use of the language of the tsunami, a force of nature which in 
fact made victims of individual bankers just as much as financial institutions, governments 
and taxpayers (Brasset and Vaughan-Williams, 2012, Broome  at el., 2012, Whittle and 
Mueller, 2012). This invoking of the tsunami was so strong and generalised that it became 
metaphorical – the financial crisis was a tsunami. Thus, giving evidence to a Congressional 
Committee in 2008, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve until 2006, while 
acknowledging a long list of “regulatory mistakes and misjudgements”, referred to the 
crisis as  a "once in a century credit tsunami" (BBC 2008). As Greenspan spoke, fears were 
expressed that the tsunami which had started in the US and “rolled across the UK” would 
then move on to “the Continent” (Priest, 2008). Within a year, political leaders of develop-
ing countries were telling the G20 that “All the warning signs suggest that the financial 
crisis has produced a tsunami heading directly towards some of the most vulnerable parts 
of the world.” (Woods, 2009) Months later, within the Eurozone, the crisis in Greece, for-
mally defined as one of national debt, was generating fears of a “Lehman-style tsunami” 
as the crisis was seen to threaten Spain and Portugal (Evans-Prichard, 2010). More latterly, 
within the UK, the Coalition Government has sought consistently to represent the UK as a 
safe haven from the after-shocks of the tsunami affecting Eurozone states – after-shocks 
now represented as storms, presumably because of their longevity and creating the idea 
that some protection could be offered by nation-states. At the same time, of course, demon-
strating that ideological frames need not be consistently drawn upon, the failures of the 
UK economy to ‘recover’  were consistently explained, at least partially, by the Coalition 
Government via references to external, uncontrollable shocks upon the UK economy as a 
result of ‘the crisis in the Eurozone’. 
This metaphor has several related effects and elements, albeit not necessarily, at least on 
face value, consistent with eachother. First, it renders us all as victims – and this status as 
victims in the face of uncontrollable external events was one of the moral appeals made by 
UK bankers to evade responsibility (Whittle and Mueller, 2012: 126-129). Second, it depicts 
that which has victimised us as somehow both natural but also unnatural – it was a force 
of nature but also something that could not have been expected nor prevented, and some-
how aberrant in the normal workings of the world of finance. Third, it is plausible since it 
is entirely consistent with the ways in which markets, market forces, economic outcomes 
and so on are and have long been represented, as if natural, literally a product of nature, 
which of course at the same time “severs the economy from political life” (Pludwin, 2011: 
467) and thus any form of human agency – representations which dominant forms of aca-
demic economics have been crucial to upholding. (Jackson, 2013) Fourth, the analogy with 
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the tsunami also provides the basis for a ‘state of exception’ since, as is the case following 
any natural or other, specific ‘disasters’ (such as 9/11), these justify, in fact necessitate, 
states instituting emergency measures – albeit ones for which we would all have to pay, 
both now and in the future, in exchange for some future state-promised if not state-
delivered protection (see Broome et al, 2012, Brassett and Vaughan Williams, 2012). Thus, 
the financial tsunami allows  
the government to justify incredibly large interventions to recapitalise the banks on 
behalf of such anxious citizens; the trick of course being that it was actually the citi-
zens who were to subsidise the protection of the very banks that created the exces-
sive lending in the first place  (Brassett and Vaughan Williams, 2012: 27).  
In general, across nation-states, bailouts, bail-ins, emergency budgets, state nationalisation 
of banks, have all taken place as executive acts - which in effect have liquidated democracy 
and exist in a space beyond the rule of law (Agamben, 2005).  
The Emergence of a Political Consensus 
Everywhere the crisis of the private financial system has been transformed into a 
tale of slovenly and overweening government that perpetuates and is perpetuated 
by a dependent and demanding population. This is an amazing transformation of 
the terms in which our circumstance is to be understood. For about 10 days the cri-
sis was interpreted as a consequence of the ineptitude of the highly paid, and then 
it transmogrified into a grudge against the populace at large, whose lassitude was 
bearing the society down to ruin. (Robinson, 2012) 
In 2008, even as the Government was in the midst of bailing out the financial services sec-
tor, Prime Minister Gordon Brown was keen to adopt the tone not of regulation nor crimi-
nalisation, but of moral re-energisation. In doing so, he was able, crucially, to draw upon 
the moral capital of private capital which had been developed and strengthened over the 
previous decades. This latter “common sense” – and all that it implied for the gamut of 
potentially available regulatory strategies - was remarkably un-dented by the financial 
collapse and international recession (Crouch, 2011). Thus, despite having overseen an un-
precedented bailout of the banking system – a massive state subsidy funded by the tax-
payer that effectively socialized the consequences of long-term, systematic private greed 
and possible (albeit never to be uncovered) illegality – the UK’s Labour government under-
scored their commitment to the ‘free-market system’ and ‘light-touch regulation’, while 
again declaring their continued faith in business morality and corporate social responsibil-
ity:  
Our government is pro-business; I believe in markets [and] entrepreneurship, and 
there are many areas of the economy that need the spur of more competition. But the 
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events of the past months bear witness, more than anything in my lifetime, to one 
simple truth: markets need morals (Brown 2008). 
On one level the claim that ‘the markets’ – a purely reified, fictitious entity – need morals 
(not, note, regulation) is just non-sense; on the other hand, the fact that such a statement 
can be made attests to the power of the hitherto constructed common-sense. This formal 
political response was soon to form the basis of a consensus,3 one accepted by all major 
political parties in the UK as they ‘fought’ the General Election of 2010 (and, indeed, one 
common to most Governments across the capitalist world).4 Specifically, senior political 
figures frequently espoused the need for improved regulation’ of the financial services 
sector – albeit what this meant was never (and never-to-be) specified. In fact, the “main 
parties competed only to represent themselves as the most competent to foster the health 
of the city”. (Froud et al., 2012: 53)  
 
More generally, by this time, the financial crisis had been transformed into a national debt 
crisis – the logical response thereby being to reduce public expenditure significantly whilst 
re-creating the conditions in which private capital could flourish. Thus, in the UK, 
Rather than regard finance as broken, the politicians have chosen to regard gov-
ernment as broken. New Labour set out a blueprint for an assault on the state; the 
Coalition has merely intensified this assault. The financial sector demanded a fiscal 
consolidation, and the Government has pledged itself to deliver. The ease with 
which our politicians have attacked civil servants and the social benefits that have 
been the birthright of UK citizens since the Second World War contrasts markedly 
with an almost non-existent approach (so far) to financial sector reform (Simms and 
Greenham 2010, 53). 
It was a fiscal crisis from which only private business could ‘rescue’ us, the conclusion 
generated by the combination of the key elements of the political consensus that emerged: 
Government needed to reduce expenditures; Government and the public sector had in any 
case proven themselves inefficient as compared to the private sector; thus private capital 
was the only route of out recession. This in turn fuelled an ironic end-point – that regula-
tion had to be minimised in order to allow private capital to perform its rescue act for all 
our sakes. Better regulation had to get better. 
Better Regulation, 2003/04 – 2014/15: some quantitative and qualitative indicators 
I now shift registers to focus on trends in regulatory enforcement in three key areas of so-
cial protection – environmental protection, food safety and worker health and safety – in 
                                                 
3 Just as there had been an all-party consensus on the virtues of ‘light touch regulation” in the years prior to 
the crisis (Straw, 2011), albeit that this was of course denied and caused fleeting embarrassment for many 
senior political figures in the later years of the decade. 
4 This is not to make any claim about contexts beyond the UK; see White, 2013. 
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the period 2003/4-2014/15. The beginning of this period is marked by the roll out of Better 
Regulation, and it is also marked by the 2007 crisis, fallout and political imposition of aus-
terity through central Government from 2010 onwards.  
Regulation in these areas here is something of a patchwork of national and local responsi-
bilities, albeit most businesses across these areas are regulated at the Local Authority level. 
Food Safety enforcement in the UK operates almost entirely at the local level, overseen by 
the national body, The Food Standards Agency (FSA). Local functions are divided be-
tween Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) and Trading Standards Officers. Food EHOs 
oversee food safety and food hygiene, enforcing law across all forms of retail food busi-
ness organisations (restaurant, shops, and so on), as well as food processing and food 
manufacturing outlets. Occupational health and safety regulation is divided between a 
national regulator, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), and Health and Safety EHOs at 
a local level; the division is based on the main activity of any premises. Pollution Control 
is also divided between a national regulator, the Environment Agency, while at local level, 
pollution control EHOs enforce regulation of businesses operating ‘Part B’ premises, as 
well as significant areas of non-business activity such as littering and fly-tipping. 
 
Food safety and food hygiene regulation and enforcement is undertaken by Local Environ-
mental Health Officers (Food). Between 2003/4-2014/15: 
 food hygiene inspections fell by 15%  
 food standards inspections fell by 35%  
 food prosecutions fell by 35%  
Occupational health and safety regulation and enforcement is divided between a national 
regulator – the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) – and local regulators, Environmental 
Health Officers  (Health and Safety) 
Between 2003/4-2014/15, on the part of the national Health and Safety regulator: 
 inspections fell by 60% (to 2013/14) 
 prosecutions fell by 35%  
Between 2003/4-2014/15, on the part of Local Environmental Health Officers enforcing 
health and safety law, there were: 
 total inspections fell by 69%  
 preventative inspections fell by 96%  
 prosecutions fell by 60%  
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On the part of the Environment Agency officers engaged in national pollution control, be-
tween 2003/4-2014/15 there were: 
 inspections fell by 52%  
 prosecutions fell by 54%  
On the part of Local Environmental Health Officers enforcing local pollution control law, 
between 2003/4-2013/145 there were: 
 inspections fell by 55%  
 notices fell by 30%  
Now, taken in isolation, perhaps no one individual data set on any specific of enforcement 
activity data relating to any one regulator over a ten year period is particularly surprising. 
What is remarkable, certainly for a set of social scientific data, is that each set of data reveals 
precisely the same trend: that is, notwithstanding variations across regulators, the form of 
law being enforced, and indeed within regulators and specific forms of enforcement activi-
ty by year, each set of data unequivocally indicates a long term downwards trend in every form of   
enforcement activity.  
 
Of course, this ten year period is also marked by the 2007 financial crisis which was used, 
by the Coalition Government from 2010 onwards, to justify austerity – so it is likely that 
within this data there is evidence of both politics and economics at play. And, indeed, 
‘austerity effects’ are confirmed if we drill down to local authority level. Thus a case study 
of five local authorities’ regulatory efforts in these three areas of social protection reveals: 
 
 Considerable reductions in staffing in these regulatory functions 
 Declining enforcement activity 
 An increasing reluctance to prosecute 
 A widespread perception that enforcement capacity has been dangerously under-
mined.  
 
(Tombs, 2016b) 
 
On the issue of resources, the following quotations, drawn from interviews with local en-
forcement officers, were typical: 
 
“at present, we can’t meet our statutory duties” 
“to be honest we're now doing statutory stuff only”  
                                                 
5 The most recent data available. 
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“there’s nothing left to cut now”  
“there is no padding left, we’re below the statutory minimum … there are no 
areas of discretion left”  
“there’s nothing else to be cut”  
“Where we are now, we’re at the point where worker safety is being jeopard-
ized” 
“It’s going to come to the point where it going to affect the residents, the local 
population, in many ways we are at that point now, public health and protec-
tion is being eroded”  
“We’re at the point where there is no flesh left, this is starting to get dangerous, 
a danger to public health” (ibid.) 
 
A further, worrying finding from the qualitative research reveals significant push factors 
towards contracting out or even wholesale privatisation of regulatory services – some-
thing which a handful of Local Authorities have now embraced. Taken together, these 
changes may mark the beginning of the end of the state’s commitment to, and ability to 
deliver, social protection.  
Discussion: How much ‘Better’ can Better Regulation Get? 
Once regulation is successfully cast as a problem, to be reduced, a drain on state resources, 
private entrepreneurship and economic growth, and once that view is furthered through 
regulatory, legal and institutional reform, then the momentum against regulation becomes 
virtually unstoppable – if less state regulation and enforcement is always to be preferred, 
then how little is little enough?  
This issue emerged in interviews with two staff at the Better Regulation Delivery Office, 
the Government body responsible for overseeing the implementation of Better Regulation 
at local Government level. For each of these, they were clear that Better Regulation was 
established to “restore trust” on the part of business with regulators, a relationship which 
one described as having been “broken”. Of interest was the view, even after over a decade 
of Better Regulation initiatives, that regulators failed to understand that ”regulation and 
economic development and prosperity go hand in hand”, rather viewing the former “as a 
matter of enforcement” – and claiming that this was especially problematic at the level of 
local regulation. Thus, for each, the Better Regulation message had not been effectively 
received at local level: “Most [EHOs] didn’t know and many still won’t where their local 
Economic Development programme sits within the authority”. Thus the task was still to 
get regulators “to see themselves in a different light in relation to business, to reposition 
themselves in terms of businesses”. This “requires a commercial mindedness that most 
local authority regulators simply do not have” – albeit there was optimism that newer re-
cruits were more likely to be imbued with this attitude, and thus to embrace Better Regu-
lation. Such view found echoes amongst some of my interviewees.  
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“We need to be more business friendly and get our customer focus right”  
“I am in the business of collaborative regulation … there must be growth, and 
that is the context in which we must support business to comply with the law.”  
“Increasingly we’re told that our main job is to facilitate business, industry and 
so on”  
 
The ‘search’ for Better Regulation has continued, and will continue. It is a long-term politi-
cal initiative, effectively designed to break the link between regulation on the one hand 
and inspection or external oversight on the other. To paraphrase Fooks’s prescient analysis 
of financial regulation of the City of London in the 1990s (Fooks, 1999), what we are wit-
nessing is a shift from the regulation of business to regulation for business. As one analysis 
of the effects of spending cuts on Local Authorities has concluded, these will lead to a “re-
positioning” of authorities in relation to “individual well-being and quality of life as well 
as economic leadership”, (Hastings et al., 2013: 3) with   
 
A renewed emphasis on developing and managing economic growth as a means 
both to generate income and to develop the economic competitiveness of the local 
authority and its region in the longer term. (ibid.: 4)  
 
There is good reason to suggest that regulatory functions will likely be increasingly re-cast 
as part of growth initiatives – that is, as part of permissive and facilitative regulatory re-
gime (Bernat and Whyte, 2014).  
 
In 2007, the Regulators’ Compliance Code –which governs the work of regulators both na-
tionally and locally – had already been amended under the Labour Government in a way 
that made clear the new realities of Better Regulation as they were then unfolding, so that 
“ [r]egulators should recognise that a key element of their activity will be to allow, or even 
encourage, economic progress and only to intervene when there is a clear case for protec-
tion”’ (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2007, para 3). A new, 
2014 version made the so-called growth duty its first principle: that is, ‘Point 1’ of the new 
Code emphasised that, “Regulators should carry out their activities in a way that supports 
those they regulate to comply and grow.” (Better Regulation Delivery Office, 2014, 3) 
 
What we are witnessing is the transformation of a system of social protection which, for all 
of its limitations, has existed in the UK since the 1830s. Under conditions of advanced neo-
liberalism, recent UK Governments of all political stripes have sought to roll out a politics 
of Better Regulation – via ceaseless initiatives on a range of mutually reinforcing political, 
institutional, legal, and discursive fronts – which effectively entails creating regulatory 
regimes from which enforcement is increasingly absent. Moreover, at national level, all 
major regulators face a statutory review every three years of their existence and mandate, 
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and all are likely to face further reductions in Government funding. This may be hands-off 
government as far as business goes, but it’s hardly hands-off as far as regulatory agencies 
are concerned. They are under constant, critical scrutiny. 
 
Indeed, according to the political logic of Better Regulation, perhaps no better captured by 
its ‘less is more’ leitmotif, there is no logical end point to this drive towards regulation with-
out enforcement. Once regulation and enforcement are defined as ‘too much’, and once the 
argument that regulation can proceed without enforcement is won, it is    
impossible to perceive when there will be ‘little enough’ of either or both.  
 
The process of Better Regulation continues apace. Far from being halted by the financial 
crisis, responses to that crisis have fuelled the Better Regulation agenda. Private business 
is now less subject to regulation than pre-2007; the UK is witnessing a dismantling of The 
‘Social Protection’ State. This is not a story about rules, regulations, red tape. It is a story 
about social harm and social inequality - lives lost and shortened, the health of communi-
ties, workers, consumers made poorer. And, quite remarkably, it proceeds, daily – met 
only by academic, political and popular silence. 
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Abstract 
 
In recent years, two Swedish companies have been a focus of substantial media attention: 
TeliaSonera and Lundin Petroleum. The defensive strategies employed by the businesses 
will be analysed on the basis of Stanley Cohen’s (2009) theoretical work on processes of de-
nial and neutralisation techniques. This paper will focus on a particular form of denial 
whereby the businesses try to explain why they have been doing business despite the risks 
that this has involved. The paper links together the companies’ communications with the 
contexts in which they occur and the structures that might be expected to influence how the 
companies choose to frame their communications. The presence of the corporations in areas 
where crimes have been committed is not denied, but implicatory denials are employed to 
justify the corporations’ operations by referring to a higher good. When the corporations 
frame their businesses as contributing to development, democracy and peace in the coun-
tries in which they operate, the corporations use well-known discourses that underline 
Swedish or Nordic generosity, helpfulness and decency. The analysis 
draws on post-colonial theory and the image of the Nordic countries as being particularly 
“good” in relation to the rest of the world. 
Introduction 
Over recent years, a number of Swedish businesses have been accused of engaging in crim-
inal activities both in the media and via legal proceedings. From a criminological perspec-
tive, the strategies employed by these businesses when defending themselves against alle-
gations of crime are interesting, since they provide knowledge about the concrete reasoning 
of businesses with regard to the boundaries of their responsibility for human rights and the 
environment. We use the crime concept to refer not only to actions covered by the penal 
code, but also to non-punishable violations of human rights and the environment. This type 
of extension of the crime concept is often employed as the point of departure in studies of 
harms to people, animals and the environment that have been caused by states or business-
es, since a stricter definition of crime excludes many forms of behaviour that are damaging 
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to society (Hillyard et al. 2004; Lynch 1990; Michalowski and Kramer 2006; South and 
Beirne 2006; Tombs and Smith 1995).  
In a period when the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become well-
known, businesses have become increasingly concerned about appearing to be ethical and 
responsible (Muchlinski 2003; Ruggie 2013). For businesses, legitimacy is not only about 
having a good reputation but is rather also linked to a company’s profitability, and by ex-
tension, its survival. Legitimacy functions as an organisational resource that is regarded as 
being necessary to a company’s continued existence (Hearit 1995; Vaara and Tienari 2008). 
Given the Swedish context, this becomes particularly interesting, since Sweden has enjoyed 
a reputation for being a leading nation in the field of human rights (Ruggie 2013; Silander 
2007).  
In recent years, two Swedish companies have been a focus of substantial media attention: 
TeliaSonera and Lundin Petroleum. In 2012, the so-called Uzbekistan affair was uncovered, 
involving senior officers at TeliaSonera who are currently under suspicion of having com-
mitted bribery offences. Lundin Petroleum was accused by several international NGOs of 
participating in crimes against humanity in Sudan, which led to the initiation of an ongoing 
police investigation in Sweden into violations of international law. These businesses have 
been chosen for study in part because they have ties to Sweden and have been publicly ac-
cused of engaging in criminal activities, and partly because they differ from one another 
with respect to ownership structure, sector, and the types of crime of which they have been 
accused. The point of departure for the analysis is how these businesses’ defences are ex-
pressed, primarily in the media but also in press releases and other official information 
produced by the corporations themselves.  
The defensive strategies employed by the businesses will be analysed on the basis of Stan-
ley Cohen’s (2009) theoretical work on processes of denial and neutralisation techniques. 
The businesses’ strategies for responding to allegations of crime are not viewed as respons-
es to individual incidents but rather as an ongoing process whose objective is to legitimise 
their actions (Cohen 2009). This paper will focus on a particular form of denial whereby the 
businesses try to explain why they have been doing business despite the risks that this has 
involved. Cohen (2009) distinguishes one particular form of denial that may be highly ap-
plicable here, which involves justifying events by referring to a higher good, e.g. the “na-
tional interest” or the “war on terror”. One higher good that may be relevant in relation to 
businesses may be the societal benefits associated with new investment and corporate ex-
pansion aimed at increasing market share.  
Thus the article aims to answer the following questions: In what ways do the two compa-
nies accused of crimes appeal to higher loyalties? How might the Swedish social and cul-
tural context affect the ways in which this particular defence mechanism is used?  
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The paper thus links together the companies’ communications with the contexts in which 
they occur and the structures that might be expected to influence how the companies 
choose to frame their communications. Defence mechanisms do not arise in a vacuum but 
may rather be assumed to be accepted within a social and cultural context (Cohen 2009; 
Scott and Lyman 1968). From an international perspective, Sweden’s positive human rights 
reputation makes the Swedish context particularly interesting. A society’s institutional and 
social structures constitute a central foundation for the defence strategies utilised by busi-
nesses. Structures of this kind may in themselves make it easier for businesses to commit 
crimes and at the same time provide support for the defence strategies that they employ.  
The two Swedish transnational corporations 
Lundin Petroleum  
 
The Swedish Lundin Oil (later Lundin Petroleum) corporation signed a contract with the 
Sudanese Government to extract oil from an area that at the time was not under govern-
ment control. The area had been in the grip of civil war for a number of decades and the 
land was primarily under the control of a rebel group known as the SPLA (Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army). This rebel group was now standing in the way of Lundin’s drilling oper-
ations and thus making it impossible both for the company and the Sudanese regime to 
make money out of the as yet unexplored oil field. In order to make continued prospecting 
work possible, those living in the area had to be moved. The Sudanese regime stated that 
the resettlement only related to those parts of the civilian population that could be viewed 
as having links to the rebels, although in reality the focus was directed at all those living in 
the area. Militias were armed (which in several cases included child soldiers) and, together 
with the Sudanese army, these groups expelled people who happened to be in what would 
subsequently be labelled “Block 5A” as soon as this area was taken over by Lundin Oil. The 
evacuation of Block 5A became violent, and resulted in both the rape and murder of indi-
viduals who found themselves in the area. A number of human rights organisations were 
present on the ground and documented the mass expulsions and the violence that was ex-
ercised against the Sudanese population. Over the following years, several human rights 
organisations reported on violations of international law in Sudan and on the involvement 
of the Swedish oil company (Amnesty International 2000; Christian Aid 2001; Human 
Rights Watch 2003).  
It was not until 2010, when the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS), an umbrella 
organisation for around 50 voluntary organisations, presented a report entitled “Unpaid 
Debt – the Legacy of Lundin in Block 5A, Sudan 1997-2003” (ECOS 2010) that the accusa-
tions against the company resulted in a substantial amount of media attention. Since that 
time, the Swedish International Public Prosecution Office has been investigating whether 
any Swedish citizen may have committed violations of international law in connection with 
the genocide and expulsions in Sudan. The reason underlying the initiation of this criminal 
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investigation is stated as being the ECOS report, but to date no individuals have been noti-
fied that they are suspected of having committed offences (Swedish Prosecution Authority 
2010).   
When Lundin Petroleum was confronted with the allegations, the company first denied any 
involvement. Two individuals figured in central roles in the context of the media reporting. 
One of these was one of the sons of the company’s founder, Adolf Lundin. This son, Ian 
Lundin, was at the time, and remains today, the chairman of the company’s board of direc-
tors. Another of Adolf Lundin’s sons, Lukas, who also sits on the board of directors, also 
participated in the media debate that followed the publication of the allegations to some 
extent. The other person who was assigned a central role in this debate, however, was the 
well-known Swedish politician, Carl Bildt, who had been a member of the company’s 
board of directors for a while, but who had resigned his position upon being appointed 
Sweden’s Foreign Minister in 2006.  
TeliaSonera 
 
The public monopoly Televerket was transformed into a public sector joint stock company 
in 1993 and was renamed Telia. In 2002 the company merged with the Finnish company 
Sonera. At the present time, the Swedish government remains the company’s principal 
shareholder with almost 40 percent of the company’s shares. Since 2007, TeliaSonera has 
been conducting business in Central Asia. A large part of these operations have been locat-
ed in Uzbekistan, a country that according to Transparency International (2015) has one of 
the highest levels of corruption in the world. Uzbekistan has been controlled by the author-
itarian President Islam Karimov and his family since 1990, and has over the years shown 
itself to have very little respect for human rights (Human Rights Watch 2015). As a result of 
the regime’s human rights record, TeliaSonera’s presence in Uzbekistan has been criticised 
by both human rights organisations and parts of the Swedish media since as early as 2008.  
In 2012, one of Sweden’s leading investigative journalism TV-shows presented a number of 
revelations about TeliaSonera’s activities in Central Asia. To begin with, these revelations 
focused on how the company was participating in the regime’s interception of communica-
tions among individuals opposed to the regime. They then moved on to look at the 3G-
licensing process in Uzbekistan. Information was presented describing extensive monetary 
transactions to a letter-box entity, Talikant, which was linked to the Karimov family. Tali-
kant was owned by an assistant to Gulnara Karimova, the president’s daughter, and is cal-
culated to have earned over 200 million Euros between 2007 and 2010 as a result of the li-
censing deal (Uppdrag granskning 2012). Hundreds of millions of Euros that are linked to 
the deal have been frozen in accounts in Switzerland into which money had been paid by 
TeliaSonera. Over 21 million Euros have also been frozen at the Swedish bank Nordea in 
Stockholm, as have other assets in the form of luxury properties in France. 
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TeliaSonera’s dealings in Central Asia, and in Uzbekistan in particular, have attracted a 
substantial amount of media attention and have led to demands for the company to present 
answers. Suspicions regarding corruption offences and money laundering have become 
increasingly powerful and in 2012, prosecutors decided to class the activities as bribery. A 
criminal investigation has been initiated to examine suspected bribery offences among for-
mer TeliaSonera staff and the investigation is still ongoing at the time of writing.  
Previous research 
 
Following a rediscovery of the criminologist Edwin Sutherland’s (1949) pioneering work on 
white-collar crime, the literature on corporate crime developed from the mid-1970s 
(Braithwaite 1984; Coleman 1985; Conklin 1977; Pearce 1976). At this time, the research was 
primarily focused on the effects of corporate behaviour on the physical environment. It was 
not until the beginning of the 1990s that attention came to be directed at the human rights 
consequences of corporate actions (Chandler 2003). Since then, there has been an increase in 
the amount of attention focused on the human rights records of businesses, and in particu-
lar those of large multi-national corporations. The reason for this increased attention can be 
traced to both an increasingly globalised economy and media coverage of corporate behav-
iour around the world (Muchlinski 2003). The areas of Sutherland’s research that touched 
upon crimes committed in the interests of businesses, and upon organisational aspects of 
crime, subsequently came to be labelled corporate crime (Clinard and Yeager 1980; Friedrichs 
2007), crimes committed by businesses that have caused enormous harm and costs for both 
people and the environment (Green and Ward 2004; Michalowski and Kramer 2006; Rothe 
et al. 2009; Slapper and Tombs 1999).  
Despite the improved research situation, research on the strategies employed by businesses 
in connection with allegations of crime is limited. There are however a number of crimino-
logical studies that are of relevance to the current research. A number of scholars have 
studied how individuals employ different types of neutralisation techniques in order to 
motivate white-collar crime (Benson 1985; Piquero, Tibbetts and Blankenship 2005; Slapper 
and Tombs 1999; Stadler and Benson 2012; Vieraitis et al. 2012). These studies differ from 
the current paper however, in that they focus on processes associated with the individual 
offender.  
Other studies have had a more organisational focus. Proceeding from the research on neu-
tralisation techniques, Benoit (1995) studied how two corporations (Exxon and Union Car-
bide) defended their reputations in connection with catastrophic accidents they had caused. 
Mathiesen (2004) has identified different forms of insulation techniques that have been 
used by oil companies in connection with disasters. The techniques, which are intended to 
“pulverise” the incident, follow a path of different stages. The first stage involves present-
ing the incident as unusual, while the second stage involves normalising the incident by 
noting that it is the result of an inbuilt risk in the industry concerned. In the third stage, the 
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incident is reduced to a series of complicated technical details, while in the fourth, respon-
sibility for the incident is shifted into the future, while the present focus is directed at sav-
ing lives. The fifth stage involves displacing the incident into the past, e.g. by stating that 
the responsible technology is no longer in use, and a sixth stage relates the incident to hu-
man history, in which we have constantly been exposed to risks. White (2013) has described 
how businesses have dealt with criticism from environmental activists by means of: denial, 
delay, shifting the problem by e.g. dumping waste in other countries, or by deception in the 
form of so-called greenwashing, i.e. using active marketing to establish an image of a com-
pany that conducts environmentally harmful activities as being environmentally friendly. 
Machin and Mayr (2013) have studied how the media formed its message about corporate 
crime in a specific case relating to a rail crash that cost several lives. The news and the crash 
were initially presented as a catastrophe, by emphasising the elements of tragedy, heroes, 
hope and grief, which removed the focus from the company’s responsibility. Subsequently, 
the media reporting changed somewhat and directed more focus at the issue of responsibil-
ity, although there was hardly any mention of concepts such as crime.  
An interesting study by Whyte (2012) that had originally intended to focus on how corpo-
rate leaders defended and neutralised their businesses becoming established in occupied  
Iraq, and how these justifications were communicated to the surrounding world, came in 
practice to take a different turn. In the context of interviews with the corporate leaders, 
Whyte discovered that they did not feel there was anything that needed either to be de-
fended or neutralised, that they were “just doing business”. What Whyte’s study reveals is 
that, in order for neutralisations to become necessary, the business’s representatives must 
first perceive that there is something that they need to defend themselves against, allega-
tions of some kind – which is the case in connection with the two companies that this paper 
intends to study.  
Theoretical framework  
 
In the classic article Techniques of Neutralisation, Sykes and Matza (1957) explain how neu-
tralisations are employed by young offenders in order to deny the immorality of certain 
actions. Offenders utilise these techniques prior to committing offences in order to neutral-
ise reprehensible actions and to reduce their sense of culpability. Neutralisation techniques 
can be used to explain how individuals evade the social control that would otherwise re-
strain them from committing offences. Proceeding from Sykes and Matza’s work, Stanley 
Cohen (2009) describes the use of neutralisation techniques in relation to state violations of 
human rights, and uses these techniques as a tool to deconstruct official discourses that 
have been produced in connection with allegations of crime. Cohen’s framework, unlike 
Sykes and Matza’s, primarily focuses on the use of neutralisation techniques as an official 
response subsequent to crimes having been committed and allegations made. Cohen (2009) 
argues, however, that the use of neutralisation techniques can also be seen to some extent 
prior to crimes being committed, where they function as a means of making it possible to 
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commit violations while at the same time reducing culpability. In a similar way, the defence 
mechanisms identified in this paper will not only be viewed as neutralisations of individual 
events, but also as an overarching and continuously ongoing process intended to legitimise 
the continuing work of the business as a whole. The defence mechanisms that are em-
ployed are situated in a broader context and are utilised precisely because they are per-
ceived as being publicly accepted (Cohen 2009). Certain types of defence mechanism are 
thus expected, routinely used and accepted in a specific cultural and social context (Scott & 
Lyman, 1968). In this sense, the defence mechanisms employed by Swedish corporations 
constitute part of a public discourse on businesses, the conditions for business activity and 
corporate responsibility.  
Cohen (2009) identifies three overarching strategies that may appear separately or in se-
quence. In the first, literal denial, the event itself is denied, e.g. by the state claiming that 
“nothing has happened”. For companies, the same strategy might involve similar state-
ments, or claims that “we haven’t used bribes” for example. In situations of this kind, those 
in power depict journalists and human rights organisations as being selective in their re-
porting and as working on the basis of a hidden political agenda. The second form of deni-
al, interpretative denials, occurs when the media and human rights organisations show that 
the event really has taken place. In these situations, the state must retreat and admit that 
the event has happened, but it then defends its actions by attempting to reformulate the 
description of the problem in various ways and by denying the extent of what has hap-
pened. Similar strategies might be identified in relation to businesses. Another strategy 
found in this phase involves attempting to shift responsibility to something else, such as 
civil war, a drugs war or ethnic conflicts. The third form of denial implicatory denial, which 
this paper will focus on, involves the state justifying the event by referring to a higher good 
(Cohen 1996; Cohen 2009). Cohen (2009) points out that in practice the three forms of denial 
seldom run in sequence, and that they more often appear simultaneously.  
The theoretical framework provided by Cohen, will here be elaborated on. On the one 
hand, the defensive strategies may function differently for businesses than for states, and 
on the other, the Swedish context may define boundaries for the types of response to allega-
tions that are possible. Allegations and responses should be viewed as a dynamic process, 
in which what it is that needs to be neutralised and defended is constantly changing 
(Whyte 2012). Thus, it will be necessary to situate the defence mechanisms used by the 
Swedish corporations in a social and cultural context. For example, the corporations refer 
directly and indirectly to the self-image of  Sweden, which is usually associated with politi-
cal democracy, social welfare and economic equality (Lundberg and Tydén 2010). One of 
the core components of the Swedish self-image (which is shared by Sweden’s institutions 
and companies) is a strong focus on social justice and human rights. (see Mulinari and 
Räthzel 2009).  
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Method and material  
 
Manifestations of defence strategies will here be approached by means of frame analysis, 
i.e. an analysis of how the phenomenon in question is framed. Frame analysis was first pre-
sented by Goffman (1974), but its current forms bear little resemblance to the original 
(Koenig 2006). The method has primarily been used in research on social movements 
(Benford and Snow 2000; Oliver and Johnston 2000) media studies (Entman 1993; Iyengar 
1991; Scheufele 1999) and policy analysis (Bacchi 1999; Joachim 2003; Schön and Rein 1994). 
Frames can be understood as “underlying structures of belief, perception, and apprecia-
tion” (Schön and Rein 1994). The struggle over the naming and framing of a situation in-
cludes not only the way problems are represented but also the solution (Schön and Rein 
1994). 
Frame analysis involves a focus on discourses, which may be described as the language, 
key concepts and categories that are used to frame a given issue (Bacchi 1999). Discourses 
are viewed here as not only including language use, but also social practice (se Bergström 
and Boréus 2012) – in the current case not only what the businesses write and say but also 
how they act within the discourse. By contrast with more customary analyses of discourses, 
frame analysis focuses on capturing the conscious formulation of statements (Bacchi 2005).  
The material in which the businesses’ defences are expressed is mainly comprised of domi-
nant national newspapers, radio and TV-interviews, but also includes press releases and 
other official information produced by the corporations.  
First, an initial sample of material was obtained by means of a systematic search in Me-
diearkivet, a digital news archive which contains all of the major Swedish daily newspa-
pers, provincial newspapers and magazines, journals and periodicals, and also Swedish 
media content that has only been published online. Mediearkivet has a manual search da-
tabase, and our searches were specified using keywords and dates. For both of the corpora-
tions, the keywords employed were the name of the corporation, the crimes of which they 
have been accused and the countries in which the alleged crimes have taken place.1 The 
searches were limited to a two-year period from the time at which suspicions of criminal 
activity were first made public in relation to each company.2 Only articles in which the  
companies themselves make statements of some kind were chosen.  
 
                                                 
1 The search terms employed for TeliaSonera were: TeliaSonera AND Uzbekistan AND mut*. Muta is the 
Swedish word for bribe. The asterisk (*) enables the search engine to find various different endings of the 
word. The search terms employed for Lundin Petroleum were: Lundin Petroleum AND Sudan AND folkrätt*. 
Folkrättsbrott is the Swedish term for crimes against international law.  
2 For TeliaSonera, the systematic search included news articles published between 18/09/2012 and 17/09/2014. 
The corresponding period for the search conducted in relation to Lundin Petroleum was from 07/06/2010 to 
06/06/2012.  
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Second, during the reading of the media content generated by the systematic search in Me-
diearkivet, additional relevant material was identified. This included, for example, refer-
ences to company press releases, letters to shareholders, radio reports, television clips, oth-
er forms of interviews with company representatives and also news articles published prior 
to and after the period covered by the systematic search. We decided to locate and include 
this material in the analysis for two main reasons. The first of these was that it would make 
our sample less dependent on the search words used in the systematic search (search words 
always involve a risk that relevant data will be excluded); the second was that the sample 
would be broadened to include other forms of text than the news articles that had been 
identified in Mediearkivet. In total, approximately 200 texts have been included in the 
analysis. The sample is far from exhaustive with regard to published articles or other forms 
of texts that include statements made by the companies in defence of their businesses. 
Nonetheless, the texts that have been analysed constitute a robust documentation of state-
ments made by the two companies following the allegations of criminal activities.   
The analysis has been conducted in two stages. In the first, the companies’ defence strate-
gies and their framing have been analysed on the basis of Cohen’s theoretical framework 
with a focus on the “appeal to higher loyalties”. We asked how the companies have de-
fended themselves against allegations of criminal activity. How are language, key concepts 
and categories used to frame the companies’ statements? In the second stage of the analysis, 
the corporate framings have been located in a social context, with the point of departure 
being that the way issues are framed is grounded in social structures.  
Corporate accounts – framing the higher good  
 
The public image of the Swedish transnational corporations Lundin Petroleum and Teli-
aSonera was significantly impaired by the accusations of criminal activities. Following the 
disclosures, the companies were under considerable pressure from both the media and the 
public to defend themselves against the accusations. The defensive strategies employed by 
the businesses have been analysed on the basis of Stanley Cohen’s (2009) theoretical work 
on processes of denial and neutralisation techniques. Several forms of denial identified by 
Cohen (1996); Cohen (2009) within a context of gross human rights violations have also 
been identified in this study focused on the responses of the Swedish corporations. The aim 
of these accounts can be understood as that of presenting legitimisations in order to re-
establish social acceptance for the businesses. These accounts were focused on denials of 
the crime, vindications of the companies’ activities in the regions concerned and on the le-
gitimisation of the relevant industries as a whole.  
The defence mechanisms identified will not only be viewed as neutralisations of single 
events, but also as examples of an overarching and continuously ongoing process intended 
to legitimise the continuing work of the businesses as a whole. The accounts are situated 
within a context and are drawn from an “acceptable pool of accounts available in the wider 
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public culture” (Cohen 1996). As has been emphasised by Scott and Lyman (1968), certain 
types of accounts are expected, routinized and accepted in certain contexts where someone 
has to explain the gap between actions and expectations. In this sense, the accounts used by 
the Swedish corporations are situated within a broader social and cultural context and 
within a public discourse on businesses and their prerequisites. The discourses includes the 
public understanding of Sweden and its corporations as  providing social justice and hu-
man rights (see Mulinari and Räthzel 2009). To be able to understand the accounts used by 
the corporations and the frames in which they are embedded, the analysis draws on post-
colonial theory and the image of the Nordic countries as being particularly “good” in rela-
tion to the rest of the world (Mulinari et al. 2009; Palmberg 2009).  
Framing a higher good as responsible capitalism  
 
The accounts used by the representatives of the two Swedish transnational corporations 
may, to use Cohen’s (2009) terminology, be interpreted as forms of interpretative denial.  The 
CEO of TeliaSonera respond to the accusations by stating, “I’ve said it before and I’ll say it 
again: TeliaSonera has not bribed anyone” (TeliaSonera, press conference 2012-10-17) and 
the chairman of the Board of Lundin Petroleum commented on the accusations by stating 
that “…there has not been any proof, there is no substance at all” (Radio interview with Ian 
Lundin 2012-03-21). In some sense, these and similar accounts by the corporations could 
have been interpreted as constituting examples of literal denial since the accusations of 
crime are denied. However, the events themselves are not denied, neither the business deal 
in Uzbekistan nor the oil explorations conducted at the time of the conflict in Sudan. In-
stead, what is taking place, in Cohen’s terms, is a denial of responsibility. In the case of Teli-
aSonera, the company denies that the transactions could be perceived as a bribe and also 
denies any connection with the dictator in Uzbekistan. In the case of Lundin Petroleum, the 
company denies that its presence in the region had any negative effect on the conflict in 
Sudan (and instead claims that it had a positive effect, as will be discussed below). In addi-
tion, Lundin Petroleum use what Cohen (2009) would describe as a denial of knowledge in 
relation to crimes against humanity in Sudan. The company does, to a varying extent, 
acknowledge that international crimes were taking place in Sudan at the time, although it 
does not necessarily frame the incidents as crimes. However, the following statement, in 
which the chairman of the Board of Lundin Petroleum comments on the report by ECOS 
(2010), could be interpreted as a form of denial of knowledge: “...I have definitely not seen 
any of the mass expulsions that are being talked about. I wonder whether those who have 
written the report have really been there and seen how things are.” (DN 2012­03­21).  
In the case of Lund Petroleum, the very clear denials of the corporation’s involvement in 
the alleged crimes are persistent over the time period studied. When it comes to TeliaSon-
era, a change in the accounts that are used becomes visible following the replacement of the 
CEO and certain members of the board of directors. Thereafter, the new representatives 
start to distance the company from its former leaders, framing the responsibility as lying 
48 
 
with a small number of managers who no longer work for the company. The new chairman 
of the board of TeliaSonera describes these former mangers in the following way: “Even if 
people have been thinking of the company’s best interests, our assessment is that poor 
judgement has been shown in relation to acquisitions made in a number of markets in Eur-
asia” (Dagens Industri 2013­11­30). The statement can be interpreted as constituting a form 
of denial of responsibility by creating a scapegoat, and in this way trying to create the op-
portunity for a fresh start for TeliaSonera as a company.  
The crimes the companies are accused of are closely related to their presence in the regions 
in question, and this fact is not deniable. Journalists and human rights organisations por-
tray the crimes, particularly those related to corruption in Uzbekistan, but also to some ex-
tend Lundin Petroleum’s involvement in crimes against humanity as a result of its oil ex-
ploitation in Sudan, as being a more or less inevitable result of doing business in these 
countries. Thus the representatives of the corporations also have to defend why they are 
doing business in these regions. In Cohens terms, interpretative denial is expressed simulta-
neously with implicatory denial, which can involve the justification of an event by referring 
to a higher good (Cohen 1996; Cohen 2009). However, when Cohen refers to appeals to high-
er loyalties he is referring to an ideology that rejects universal human rights standards 
(Cohen 1996). In contrast, as will be shown here, the Swedish corporations justify their ac-
tions by using human rights as an appeal to a higher good. Representatives of both compa-
nies express that they are proud of their company and of what they have managed to 
achieve for people in the regions in which they operate. This form of righteousness is ex-
pressed in the following statement, in which a representative of Lundin Petroleum de-
scribes the company as a responsible actor:  
“I am convinced that these countries need investors, such as Lundin Petroleum, that are 
responsible and that invest in a way that is sustainable over the long term. The only chance 
for these countries to resolve the problems they face is through economic growth.” (SvD 
2014-02-24) 
In another statement, Lundin Petroleum describe their operations in Sudan as a “force for 
good” that “contribute[d] to the improvement of the lives of the people of Sudan” (Lundin 
Petroleum 2015). While similar accounts, referring to the societal benefits of the operations 
of the businesses, recur in the statements from the two companies, the emphasis on profit 
and shareholder value is not as apparent. Instead of highlighting profit maximisation, the 
Swedish companies highlight their social responsibility as a means of gaining credibility. 
However, in the texts that are primarily addressed to shareholders, profit-making can be 
discerned as constituting the core value of the operations in question. For example, Ian H. 
Lundin states in an Open Letter to Lundin Petroleum’s Shareholders, on March 2, 2010: “At all 
times our objective in Africa has been to find oil and gas in the most sound and efficient 
manner but always being responsible from a social and environmental perspective.” This 
self-presentation can be interpreted within a frame of responsible capitalism, the idea of pur-
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suing both profit and social good in a competitive free market in a globalised economy. In a 
similar manner, TeliaSonera’s aim to maximise profits is framed as part of a primary mis-
sion to do good: 
“The operations [in Central Asia] have made a powerful contribution to the group’s growth and 
profitability, and foreign investments in infrastructure have played an important part in the mod-
ernisation of these countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union.” (Press release 2013-02-
01).  
TeliaSonera’s business in Central Asia is highlighted as contributing to the development of 
democracy and human rights. When questions are asked about whether TeliaSonera should 
withdraw from these “risky markets” in Central Asia, the human rights aspects are under-
lined:  
“Leaving countries is a difficult issue that can also have consequences for human rights in the coun-
try in question. Looking at the situation as it is just now at TeliaSonera, we believe that the best 
thing we can do appears to be to stay in the countries where we have a presence.” (TT 2013-06-04) 
Instead of withdrawing, the company will do more good by strengthening its presence in 
Central Asia. The accounts used here by the corporations, which frame their businesses as 
responsible corporations, may function as a way of avoiding moral censure. The corpora-
tions try to frame themselves as being engaged in “good corporate citizenship” (see Shamir 
2011). This is expressed distinctly by the communications manager of Lundin Petroleum in 
a newspaper interview: “We have tried to strive to be good citizens” (DN 2011-01-07). By 
their use of this framing, the corporations aim to transform the accusations of crime into an 
opportunity to describe the companies as being responsible and providing opportunities 
for development in the countries in which they operate. In this sense, the defence mecha-
nisms employed by Swedish corporations constitute part of a global public discourse on 
businesses, the conditions for business activity and corporate responsibility. Another aspect 
of this that will be further discussed below is that of how the appeal to a higher good might 
be interpreted within a post-colonial discourse.  
Post-colonial tendencies – contributing to development, democracy and peace  
 
Post-colonial theory has, among other things, demonstrated how the language of colonial-
ism still shapes western ideas about other parts of the word, as well as providing criticism 
of the assumption that countries of the global North can “solve development ´problems´” 
(McEwan 2009). The notion of “exporting civilisations” from the global North to the global 
South has been an important part of colonialism (McEwan 2009; Mulinari et al. 2009). In the 
same tradition and self-image, the Swedish corporations try to frame their exploitation of 
foreign markets as a civilising mission. Consider the statement of the former foreign minis-
ter of Sweden, who was a member of the board of Lundin Petroleum for a time:  
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“I believe that when you have a presence, when they (the regimes) have western eyes on them, 
whether it’s aid workers, companies or something else, then you’re helping the people in these areas. 
Violations don’t occur there.” (SVT 2007-04-17) 
 
In this quote, the former foreign minister refers to “western eyes” as constituting a protec-
tion against abuses and violations of human rights. This form of framing not only denies 
the brutal experiences of colonialism, but also constructs an image of what is “western” as 
being something more civilised (than the “non-western”) (see McEwan 2009). Other repre-
sentatives of Lundin Petroleum legitimise the oil industry by stating that there is a need for 
this industry. In the following example, one of the board of directors of Lundin Petroleum 
also expresses an understanding of “western” corporations as being better than “non-
western” corporations, in this case Chinese companies:  
 
“If the oil industry were only to do business with democracies, you’d be cycling to work. Imagine 
being without oil from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran or Venezuela. In the case of Sudan, I believe we 
have helped the country to achieve stability. Our reasoning was that if we aren’t there, someone else 
will be. Is it better that it’s the Chinese? I don’t believe you can allow these countries to end up in 
the hands of ruthless people – and the Chinese are ruthless.” (Veckans Affärer - News clip 
2011-10-27) 
 
Another form of account that is significant is the framing of the companies as “helpers” that 
enable social progress and improve people’s lives in the areas where they operate. In a de-
bate article authored by the Lundin brothers, they defend the business by referring to how 
they have helped the Sudanese people:  
 
“The wealth that has been created as a result of the Lundin group’s oil and mining projects has been 
of benefit to countless men, women and children and will continue to give them the chance of a better 
life. … In areas that are subject to extreme poverty, economic development has to be initiated with 
the help of foreign investments in infrastructure and the development of natural resources.” 
(Dagens Nyheter 2012-03-18) 
The exploration for oil is here described as a mission to provide help. The corporation is 
framing their operations in Sudan and other “developing countries” in a narrative in which 
economic development is synonymous with foreign investment: “You have to help these 
countries develop their natural resources, because natural resources are a catalyst for eco-
nomic development.” (Interview, Ian Lundin, Aktiespararna – Stora analysdagen 2012).  
The company goes even further by framing the business as contributing to peace in Sudan. 
In an open letter to the shareholders, Lundin Petroleum states:  
“The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the 
Southern Sudanese representatives in 2005 validated our view that oil could be used to achieve a 
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sustainable peace.” (Open Letter to Lundin Petroleum’s Shareholders, June 8th 2010) 
 
The contribution of oil companies to the peace in Sudan is more directly expressed in a ra-
dio interview with the chairman of the Board of Lundin Petroleum: “You cannot ignore the 
fact that peace only came after the production of oil had started. So I think that the produc-
tion of oil in Sudan had an influence on the peace agreement that was signed in 2005” (Ra-
dio interview with Ian Lundin 2012-03-21). 
 
In a similar manner, statements by TeliaSonera frame the business as providing economic 
development and democracy: “Telecommunications are enormously important to both 
economic development and democratisation” (Dagens industri 2013­06­05). In an earlier 
interview for the same newspaper, the newly elected chairman of the board of TeliaSonera 
refers to the UN millennium goals of decreasing poverty as a means of situating the busi-
ness in a frame in which telecommunications is portrayed as providing economic develop-
ment (Dagens Industri 2013-04-04).  
 
While Lundin Petroleum frames its business activities as contributing to the peace agree-
ment in Sudan, TeliaSonera’s business in Uzbekistan is framed against the backdrop of the 
Arab Spring: 
“Five years ago we invested in a licence to provide telecom services in Uzbekistan. Why did we do 
so? First and foremost in order to create growth and value for our shareholders, but that was not the 
only reason. We at TeliaSonera would argue that telecommunications are a power for good. Every-
one who has followed the far-reaching developments witnessed during the Arab Spring will under-
stand what we mean. It is an irrefutable fact that modern telecommunications play an important role 
when a country starts along this long journey towards democracy.” (TeliaSonera, press confer-
ence 2012-10-17). 
 
The accounts presented here can be interpreted as attempts to bolster and defend the legit-
imisation of the corporation and its public image. The corporations frame their exploitation 
of foreign markets as a civilising mission. These framings constitute part of a larger public 
discourse on businesses in which foreign investment is assumed to contribute to develop-
ment, democracy and peace in “developing countries”. As will be discussed below, these 
post-colonial tendencies are also related to assumptions about the nature of the Nordic 
countries and to conceptions of “Nordic values”.   
Emphasising “Nordic values” 
 
The Nordic countries have been associated with development aid, international coopera-
tion and peace building rather than colonialism and imperialism (Mulinari et al. 2009). 
However, post-colonial theorists from the Nordic countries argue for an understanding of 
the Nordic countries as being part of the "colonial complicity" by defending the value sys-
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tem linked to the Enlightenment ideals (Mulinari et al. 2009). In the examples above, in 
which the corporations frame their businesses as contributing to, or even providing, devel-
opment, democracy and peace in the countries in which they operate, the corporations use 
well-known discourses that underline Swedish or Nordic generosity, helpfulness and de-
cency. Framing the company as a friendly corporation (which is understood as being the 
opposite of exploitative) is very much in line with the image of the Nordic countries as rep-
resenting “the good helper” (see Palmberg 2009).  
While telling the story of how TeliaSonera has made sure “that one-third of the population 
of Uzbekistan uses TeliaSonera’s network to surf and read and to be able to hear about 
what is happening in the world”, the CEO of the time expresses how proud he is of the 
“Nordic company with the values we have” (SR 2012-09-20).  
By framing the corporations as having certain Swedish and Nordic values, the Swedish 
transnational corporations Lundin Petroleum and TeliaSonera try to associate themselves 
with an understanding of the constructed image of the Nordic countries as exceptional and 
exemplary in relation to the rest of the world (see Palmberg 2009). The separation between 
“Swedish culture” and the culture of the countries in which the corporations operate is vis-
ible both in the questions that are asked by several journalists and in the answers and 
statements given by representatives of the corporations. The understanding of the Nordic 
countries as “good” and “advanced” also contains an embedded understanding of the 
“other”, either in the form of the Sudanese or Uzbek people being in need of the businesses’ 
help or in the definition of Chinese corporations as ruthless exploiters.  
The emphasis placed on Nordic values is more obvious in the case of TeliaSonera than in 
that of Lundin Petroleum. This is hardly surprising since TeliaSonera, along with Volvo, 
has historically been “placed at the core of Swedish nationhood” (see Mulinari and Räthzel 
2009).  
In contrast, Lundin Petroleum appears to struggle with its “Nordic identity”. Newspapers 
have referred to the company’s handling of the accusations of crime as being ‘unswedish’. 
One journalist used the following description of how the company chairman had attempted 
to silence one of his critics during the company’s annual general meeting: “the annual gen-
eral meeting clearly shows that Ian Lundin does not have the ability to behave like a nor-
mal listed Swedish company’s chairman”. The perceived unswedishness can also be under-
stood in relation to how Lundin Petroleum dealt with the accusations. While TeliaSonera 
made extensive use of press releases intended for the public to respond to the allegations, 
Lundin Petroleum announced its response to the allegations primarily in communications 
directed to its shareholders. While the CEO of TeliaSonera stressed the importance of an 
independent investigation, Lundin Petroleum communicated a clear rejection of the ap-
pointment an independent investigation. The fact that the Chairman of the Board, Ian 
Lundin, prefers to conduct interviews in English rather than Swedish further enhances this 
difference between the two companies. In a seminar organised by the Swedish Sharehold-
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ers' Association, the chairman of the board of Lundin Petroleum was asked: “How do you 
handle the balancing act of being a “Swedish”, or at least being listed on the Swedish stock 
exchange, ethically responsible company, and working in countries that in no way apply 
the same basic values?” Here, the interviewer used virtual quotation marks formed in the 
air with his fingers when calling the company “Swedish”. To this question, the chairman of 
Lundin Petroleum chose to give a long exposition on how economic development is related 
to foreign investment and to ignore the fact that the interviewer had called the Swedishness 
of the company into question. Perhaps, in the absence of a strong “Nordic identity”, Lundin 
Petroleum frames the company as a family-owned business. The two Lundin brothers tell 
the story of the company by emphasising family values and frame themselves and their 
father, the founder of the company, as “good guys”. 
“Depicting we who work at the Lundin group as opportunistic, dictator-hugging businessmen is to 
display a complete lack of understanding for Adolf Lundin and the values he stood for – and for the 
values that we continue to stand for today. The accusations that among others Aftonbladet and cer-
tain internationally active voluntary organisations have directed at Adolf Lundin and the members 
of the family, and at the men and women who work at companies within the Lundin group, are quite 
simply groundless, unfair and in some cases even absurd.” (Dagens Nyheter 2012-03-18) 
Here, the corporation uses a family narrative to distance the company from the image of a 
transnational corporation exploiting natural resources in the global south.  
We would suggest that the accounts used by the two Swedish corporations may tell us 
something about the relevant public discourse on the basis of the understanding of ac-
counts presented by Cohen (2009) and Scott and Lyman (1968). The accounts employed by 
the corporations may be viewed as being acceptable within the broader public culture. 
However, to our understanding, Lundin Petroleum had a harder time finding acceptance 
for their strong denial of responsibility. They did not adapt to the public demands for 
transparency and independent investigation to the same extent as TeliaSonera.  
Conclusions  
 
To understand the accounts employed by the businesses when defending themselves 
against allegations of crime, Cohen’s (1996; 2000) framework on denials and techniques of 
neutralisations has been applied and extended to the field of business. The presence of the 
corporations in areas where crimes have been committed is not denied, but implicatory de-
nials are employed to justify the corporations’ operations by referring to a higher good.  
In the context of this higher good, there is an inherent contradiction that is never addressed 
in the companies’ statements. Our material shows a somewhat ambiguous argumentation 
on the part of the two companies. On the one hand, their arguments focus on creating good 
profitability and returns for the company’s owners on the basis of the premises of the free 
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market economy, “business as usual”. On the other hand, they focus on contributing to 
wealth creation and encouraging democracy in the countries in which they operate, which 
we could label the philanthropic argument. By closing their eyes to the potential conflict 
that these arguments contain, they succeed in producing a causal chain whereby the inher-
ent dynamics of the market, with their demands for profitability, in principle automatically 
result in producing wealth and improving democracy, along with respect for human rights 
and civil liberties. Our material provides a range of evidence to support this view. Clear 
examples can be seen in Lundin Petroleum’s arguments that oil production in the Sudan 
contributed to producing peace in the country (Radio I Lundin 2012-03-21), and in Teli-
aSonera’s statement that the establishment of profitable telecommunications is enormously 
important to the democratisation of Uzbekistan (DI 2013-06-05). This neo-philanthropic 
form of argumentation claims that profitable entrepreneurial activities constitute the means 
of achieving the goals of democracy and prosperity. It is important to appear to be “benefi-
cent capitalists”, with profit-maximisation being legitimised, and thereby also in part over-
shadowed, by the righteous objective of contributing to the development of democracy. 
The material also shows that this view of “beneficent capitalists” refers to western capital-
ism in general and to Swedish capitalism in particular, as can be seen by the distinction 
made in relation to the “ruthless Chinese” (VA 2011-10-27). This self-presentation of the 
Swedish beneficent capitalist is of major importance to the maintenance of a positive view 
of the brand. At the same time, the use of this ambiguous argumentation conceals that the 
primary objective is in fact that which the companies’ statements present as the means: the 
establishment of profitable operations. Democracy and respect for human rights and civil 
liberties are not goals that are given a high priority per se, but are rather a possible side ef-
fect for the companies’ goodwill. The idea of these companies engaging in operations that 
contribute to improving levels of respect for human rights without at the same time pro-
ducing economic returns for the companies’ shareholders does not fit with the logic of 
“business as usual”. 
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A New Thing under the Sun? Crime in the Digitized Society. 
 
Inger Marie Sunde, Professor (Ph.D).  
The Norwegian Police University College/Politihøgskolen 
 
1. Introduction to Crime in the Digitized Society 
 
Computer systems can be used to commit – and be targets of – crime. The article investi-
gates whether so-called “digital crime” can be regarded as a new thing under the sun. The 
question itself is not new. It was originally raised in the 1950ies when computer technology 
had become sufficiently advanced to be put into use by large financial corporations and 
insurance companies (McQuade 2006: 11). Concomitantly, the opportunity to commit com-
puter fraud emerged, an opportunity not lost on insiders. As the era of network technology 
and mobile devices had not yet arrived, outsiders did not have easy access to corporately 
owned computers, thus they were practically excluded from committing computer crime. 
Since insider crime in such corporations was regarded as being “white collar”, computer 
crime was perceived as a form of white collar crime.  
After the emergence of the Internet, “cybercrime” came to the fore. The prefix “cyber” sug-
gests that the criminal phenomenon occurs in a space different from where humans act and 
relate. The crime is perceived as remote and the link to a specific perpetrator seems vague 
and diffuse. Crime may therefore be deemed to have developed into a new and unprece-
dented form. Obviously the criteria according to which we deem a phenomenon to be new, 
determines the assessment. Two criteria seem to predicate the present conclusion, firstly 
that what matters is the facts of the crime (digital technology), secondly, that the facts 
(technology) can be regarded as new. Thus the reasoning is as follows: As the crime could 
not have materialized in this form in the pre-computer era, the criminal phenomenon is 
new.  
Such reasoning is not only clouded, but also hazardous. Continued application of the logic 
entails a risk of gradually removing criminal liability away from the perpetrator. The more 
“intelligent” the computer (never mind that the intelligence is artificial), less is the blame 
on the individual. Ultimately, the robot is the criminal. The human is reduced to a servant 
who merely executes the robot’s commands. In the event that we not accept to regard a ro-
bot as perpetrator, no crime has been committed at all, because there is no perpetrator. 
Fortunately, the fundamentals of criminal law do not change solely by the emergence of 
new technology. As long as basic legal principles are maintained, crime is committed by 
individuals, period. A robot cannot incur criminal liability, because the commissioning of a 
crime requires the perpetrator to fulfill conditions regarding mental state at the time when 
the crime is committed (the condition mens rea). The main rule is that criminal liability re-
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quires intent (dolus). Should a robot have been trained to choose between alternatives, the 
choice is still made by a program created by humans. And humans are responsible for their 
doings. For example, a small monkey trained to climb through windows and take away 
silver ware, is a tool utilized by its owner. Its owner is the criminal. This is clearly so even if 
the monkey makes choices, for instance, on a lazy day it might refuse to work. An “intelli-
gent” lawn mower which cuts down a fragile newly planted apple tree cannot be held lia-
ble for vandalism, even if it “chose” to ignore the program which told it to move around 
hindrances. In the age of artificial intelligence one should be careful not to confuse liability 
with controllability. Machines that are set to work for criminal purposes are legally to be 
considered as tools. From a criminal law perspective controllability may raise problems 
mens rea. The critical fact would be whether the perpetrator realized that the outcome of its 
actions could be unlawful, yet chose to carry on. This modality of intent is known as dolus even-
tualis, and fulfills the condition mens rea. Undoubtedly, also a robot must be regarded as a 
tool, no matter how “headstrong” and hard to control it is. The human is still responsible, 
and may be held criminally liable (provided that the act performed by the robot is a crimi-
nal offence laid down in law).   
Some may claim that a cyborg can incur criminal liability. A cyborg differs from a robot in 
that it is made of organic material (and grafted into a machine), whereas a robot is made of 
“dead” material. A cyborg is therefore perceived to be more “human like” than a robot. 
Actually, in combination with strong computing power and artificial intelligence, cyborgs 
are perceived to be “super-humans”, even superior to humans. In relation to criminal liabil-
ity, however, the material of which the machine is made (live versus dead material) is irrel-
evant. Robots and cyborgs alike are associated with intelligence, but by virtue of being ma-
chines any possibility of assuming criminal liability is excluded. At least this is the case de 
lege lata. One may also ask what kind of punishment would be fit for a robot/cyborg. Prob-
ably, here is a case for reintroducing medieval forms of punishment, such as mutilation and 
decapitation. Even “brain” paralysis could be an option, in the form of deleting the pro-
gram that runs the “perpetrator”.   
Today the phenomenon which somewhat vaguely has become known as “digitization” is 
present in every dimension, sector and level of society. It is reflected in all forms of social 
discourse, it be colloquial, professional, academic or political, where expressions such as 
“big data”, “automation”, “robotics”, “Internet of Things”, “cloud computing” and “artifi-
cial intelligence” have become common. One can also tell by our media habits. Constant 
presence on social media is the norm, not to possess a smartphone an oddity and turning it 
off not an option. TV-programs about artificial intelligence seem to cause the kind of mar-
vel formerly reserved for Sir Attenborough’s wildlife explorations.  
My feel is that the habit of adding “cyber“ as prefix to “crime” soon will end. It will end 
just as we no longer emphasize that cars are vehicles that are able to move without the as-
sistance of horses, or that light bulbs are powered by electricity. “Cyber-expressions“ might 
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become hallmarks of a transitory stage, defined by the struggle of coming to grips with digit-
ization’s impact on society. In a perspective de lege ferenda however, issues relating to (crim-
inal) liability for lack of control may become increasingly relevant and important. Such ques-
tions can be addressed both with regards to producers and users of automated digital de-
vices.  
In the end the relevant question is whether crime in the digitized society is a new thing under 
the sun or not. A question so general lends itself to a nuanced explorative approach. Defi-
nite answers are not to be expected from the brief analysis of this article. What follows is a 
description of themes and priorities in current cybercrime research, and some observations as 
to where existing theories may fall short of explaining digital crime. If the article inspires 
more cyber research, its goal has been reached. 
The structure of the ensuing parts is as follows: First we need to describe the subject matter 
of our investigation (section 2). Then we take a look on the human factor of cybercrime, 
which allegedly has been a blind spot in cybercrime research (section 3). Thereafter follows 
an analysis divided into three parts (sections 4 to 6). Section 4 adresses the problem of at-
tribution, which is the top research priority of Interpol’s Cyber Research Agenda. Section 5 
adresses the function of digital technology as a cross cutting crime enabler, and section 6 -  
the final part of the analysis – discusses phenomena that can be regarded as new. It is as-
serted that criminal law de lege lata may be considered as partly inadequate, at least with 
respect to random digital crime. As regards the facts, digital technology produces some ef-
fects that create considerable problems for crime prevention, criminal investigation and 
prosecution. There is also much to indicate that online privacy violations have more hard-
hitting effects on its victims than their physical equivalents. Finally, the main findings and 
conclusions are summarized (section 7). 
2. Defining the Phenomenon: Digital Crime 
 
In the introduction the notion was rejected, that technology itself suffices as sole criterion 
for defining digital crime. But how then do we define the criminal phenomenon which is 
the subject matter of our investigation? “All crime is cybercrime” Europol claims, and points 
to the necessity of “thinking ‘digital’ first” (Europol 2014: 84). However, the claim can merely 
serve as a general starting point, because we still need to make clear if we are concerned 
with digital crime as it is performed or digital crime as defined in law. The alternatives repre-
sent research topics relevant to criminology (crime as fact) and to law (crime as normative 
concept). In the former case we need to describe which facts that must be present in order for 
the crime to be a “cybercrime”, whereas in the latter, we need to describe the legal conditions 
that define the crime as “digital” (a “cybercrime”). It turns out however, that the alterna-
tives are both necessary, and must be combined. This can be explained as follows:  
Crime as fact may take the form of speech. Common examples are threats of violence, fraudu-
lent misrepresentation of facts, hate speech and distribution of sexual abuse material of 
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children. Crime in the form of speech can be committed physically, i.e., face to face (“F2F”), 
in a letter and so forth. Obviously such crime can also be committed electronically, for in-
stance, a threat by email, skype or sms; a fraudulent website selling fake tickets to Premier 
League soccer games; a misleading website in a “phishing “scheme; hate speech on extrem-
ist fora, and; exchange of illegal images on the Darknet. Judged by the facts the “F2F-
crimes” do not count as cybercrime, whereas their digital equivalents do.  
The law however may not make relevant the distinction between speech F2F and its digital 
equivalent. Perfectly technology neutral criminal provisions may be equally applicable to F2F 
crime and cybercrime. Section 371 (a) of the Norwegian Criminal Code is an example in point. 
The provision concerns fraud by deception for the purpose of obtaining unlawful economic 
gain. The criminal offence is defined as the fraudulent exploitation of a mistake made by the vic-
tim, who is brought in error by materially misleading information provided by the perpetrator. 
Whether the act is performed F2F (for instance in a supermarket) or online (for instance in a 
webshop), is not relevant to the question of criminal liability, as the provision does not 
mention “cyber”, “computer data”, “digital” or the like. Yet the provision is very practical 
in relation to Internet fraud.  
Conversely, it is conceivable that a reprehensible act performed online is not criminal, even 
if its physical equivalent is. The “blog case” from 2012 illustrates this (HR-2012-1554-U). 
Exhortations to kill two police officers were posted on a publicly available blog. Utterances 
with such content are punishable provided that they are made “in public”. The Norwegian 
Supreme Court found that a blog could not be a forum for utterances made “in public” 
within the meaning of the criminal code. Had the exhortations been published in a physical 
newspaper instead, they would have constituted a crime.  
The blog-case uncovered a legal anomaly, which led to an amendment of the legal provi-
sion also to cover utterances on the Internet. The legal definition is technology neutral, and 
the condition is that the utterance must “be suitable to be reached by a large number of 
people”. 20-30 individuals suffice as “a large number”. Because of the low threshold, most 
content on the Internet is made “in public” pursuant to Norwegian criminal law (Sunde 
2016 chapter 3.2).  
Finally, one cannot always be sure if digital and physical phenomena are legal equivalents 
or not. This can be illustrated by the uncertainty with regards to the legal status of computer 
data. According to Norwegian criminal law doctrine, computer data is not regarded as an 
“object”. This is the case despite that computer data can be specified, individualized and 
quantified (factual aspects), and despite that one would think that the word “object” is 
technology neutral (legal interpretation). Unlawful deletion and suppression of computer 
data cannot, for this reason, be punished as traditional vandalism (i.e., vandalism against 
an object). The legislator has therefore been compelled to supplement the criminal provi-
sion with a new paragraph which specifically makes vandalism against computer data a 
criminal offence as well (Sunde 2006 chapter 4; 2011 chapters 6-10; 2016 chapter 2.5 and 6).   
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The examples show that an adequate definition of digital crime hardly can be attained by 
the sole application of factual or legal criteria. In order to ensure that the phenomenon we 
investigate is criminal and involves digital technology, conditions must be set relating both 
to law and to fact, as follows:  
(i) The act must be covered by a criminal provision in force at the time when the 
crime was committed (the criminal provision may be technology neutral).  
(ii) The act must involve - have a nexus with – digital technology.  
By default, criminal acts which are covered by technology specific criminal provisions are 
included. Criminal provisions of this category typically concern computer intrusion, van-
dalism against computer data, computer forgery and computer fraud. Note that computer 
fraud is a crime different from fraud by deception, also when the latter is committed on the 
Internet. Computer fraud is defined as unlawful manipulation which causes a computer au-
tomatically to perform a process which entails an economic loss to somebody, (and is per-
formed with the intent of obtaining an unlawful economic gain). The distinction between 
computer fraud and fraud by deception is that, a computer is manipulated, whereas an indi-
vidual is deceived (can also happen on the Internet) (Sunde 2016, chapter 7).   
A digression in furtherance of the note on robots and cyborgs: Fraudulent manipulation of 
a robot/cyborg is an instance of computer fraud. Despite their “intelligence”, they cannot be 
“deceived” within the meaning of criminal law. Legally, deception indicates a mental state 
exclusively reserved for humans. Speech is a similar example. Legally, speech is a phenomenon 
between humans. An utterance which orders “sit!” is not speech if directed to a dog, yet it is 
if directed to a person. Voice transmission of login credentials to a computer is not speech, 
yet it is if uttered to an individual. The examples show that legal concepts developed to 
regulate inter-human behavior, may not be applicable to relations of a different kind (hu-
man-machine; human-animal). Neglect of the distinction between the legal meaning of 
words, and their practical (colloquial) meaning, may not only cause an analysis de lege lata 
to be flawed, but undermine concepts important to criminal policy as well.   
On this backdrop the criteria for digital crime can be developed like this:  
(i) The act must be covered by a criminal provision in force at the time when the 
crime was committed (the criminal provision may be technology neutral), and 
the act must involve digital technology.  
(ii) If the criminal provision contains technology specific conditions (concerning dig-
ital technology), the acts falling under its scope are by default “digital” crime.  
On a first glance, physical crime is excluded from the list, which means that crimes in the 
form of “F2F speech”, arson, burglary, physical violence and homicide fall beyond the 
scope of our investigation. Or, is it really so? How about the Internet of Things (“IoT”)? “In-
ternet of Things” means that physical objects, living creatures and individuals, get connect-
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ed to the Internet. Embeddables and wearables are integrated into or fixed onto the object / 
creature /individual, and put it online. The device can be contacted remotely (online), and 
be caused to do something (actuate). Actuation may have an impact on the object / creature 
/ individual. The lesson learned from Internet connectivity is that, in order to communicate, 
one must also expose oneself (the computer) to input received from over the network. Input is 
not 100% controllable. Hence communication makes one vulnerable to abuse and attacks. 
This makes a case for questioning if indeed we succeeded in our efforts to single out a ra-
tional definition for digital crime. 
Here are some examples of “IoT-crime”:  
(i) The online door lock 
Electronic door locks controlled and managed online, have become popular. The resident of 
the house enters into an agreement with a door lock service provider (DSP). The DSP opens 
a user account for the resident, who becomes a door lock service subscriber. By managing 
the account, individual entrance codes can be set for each member of the household. More-
over, temporary entrance codes can be registered both for infrequent occacions (for instance 
letting in a babysitter) and for routine visits (for instance a biweekly house cleaning ser-
vice). Each one has a unique code, so, should somebody else use it, the trusted holder of the 
code is responsible. Each usage of the entrance code is recorded in the logs of the user ac-
count with the DSP. However, assuming that the entrance codes are kept secret, the resi-
dent’s security depends on the security of the DSP. The system of the DSP can be hacked 
and the entrance codes disabled or copied. A criminal organization, perhaps assisted by an 
insider, could disable the entrance codes of an entire neighborhood, or add their own 
codes, thus being able to empty the area before noon. The example describes a series of 
criminal offences, ranging from clear cut digital crime in the form of computer intrusion 
(hacking a DSP system) and vandalism against computer data (change/deletion of entrance 
codes), to physical crime (burglary). The burglary is facilitated by the preceding digital 
crimes. Should it too be considered as digital crime, or is it simply crime in the digitized 
society?  
(ii) The online pacemaker 
A corresponding scenario can be envisaged for online pacemakers, i.e., pacemakers moni-
tored and updated over the Internet. The computer system of the pacemaker service pro-
vider can be hacked, and the electronic communication which supports the device can be 
interfered with. Worst case is a hack or interference which amounts to homicide. Perhaps 
we do not think of this as digital crime, but certainly it is crime in the digitized society. 
Marie Moe, a 37 year old computer engineer, became acutely aware of the security issues 
relating to remote interference, when suddenly she needed a pacemaker. In an interview 
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with a Norwegian newspaper, she said she was prepared to be a more demanding custom-
er in the future when her pacemaker needs replacement.1 
In the end, we have to conclude that technological development expands our phenomenon, 
as also crimes such as burglary and homicide can involve digital technology as a fact, and the 
applicable criminal provisions are technology neutral. Europol’s claim may therefore prove to 
be true. A practical effect is that digital evidence feature regularly, and must be secured as a 
matter of routine, in the course of a criminal investigation. Hence, knowledge and skills to 
secure and analyze such evidence are needed among criminal investigators no matter the 
type of crime they are tasked to deal with.  
3. The Human Factor of Cybercrime – a Blind Spot 
 
Crime is performed by individuals, notwithstanding any presence of digital features. The 
human factor of current digital crime has however to some extent been overlooked. At least 
this is the case if we are to believe Europol, which goes so far as to claim that the role of the 
individual has been “a blind spot” in cybercrime research (Europol 2014: 82). The explana-
tion is that cybercrime primarily has been associated with threats against cyber- and infor-
mation security, something which has entailed a strong focus on technical measures. From 
the perspective of the law enforcement, this approach is too narrow. Europol’s message 
thus is that “research focusing on people is vital if we have any real hope of coming to grips with the 
phenomena of computer crime” (ibid). The police organization of the European Union is an 
important voice in this respect. It hosts the European Cybercrime Center - the “EC3” –, has 
sophisticated multidisciplinary competence, and has proved its ability to work quite effi-
ciently against cybercrime. 
The need for more research regarding the human factor of digital crime is not in dispute 
here. But this is not to say that one has been wholly oblivious of the human factor of cyber-
crime up until now. For instance, the significance of social engineering to cybercrime has al-
ways been emphasized. The problem of “phishing” is illuminating. The criminal set up is 
the making of a request – on a fake web site or in an email - to update your personal and 
financial data and access codes. The request appears to come from your bank or telecom 
provider, but is actually part of a scam. The information provided by the victim in response 
to the request, is used to empty the bank account, hack the email account, hire a car, take 
up a loan, receive social benefits and go shopping, just to mention some of the risks. All 
acts are performed in the name of the victim and/or against the victim’s assets. The acts can 
take place offline and online, anywhere in the world, no matter where the victim lives.  
Similarly, fraudulent deception can be based on social engineering. Currently, so-called 
“CEO-fraud” is a problem. The scam is performed by submitting an email to a subordinate 
                                                 
1  «De medisinske hackerne», Dagens Næringsliv 8.1.16.  
http://www.dn.no/magasinet/2016/01/08/2128/Teknologi/de-medisinske-hackerne  
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in a corporation. The email appears as sent from the CEO, who orders prompt effectuation 
of a big payment on behalf of the corporation. The subordinate dares not object or ask any 
questions, and carries out the instruction, whereupon the money ends in a bank account 
controlled by the criminals. According to an alert by the FBI, such scams have resulted in 
losses totalling more than USD 2 billion over a three year period.2 
In terms of substantive criminal law “phishing” involves a series of criminal offences, com-
prising identity infringement, theft, computer intrusion, fraud, forgery and acquisition of 
access codes for the purpose of committing a crime against computer systems or computer 
data. The scheme as such is often referred to as “Identity theft” (ID-theft), and conceptually 
divided into the stages of (i) identity information harvesting; (ii) possession and disposal of 
identity information; and (iii) the use of identity information to commit fraud or other 
crimes (Cybercrime Convention Committee 2013: # 4; Wall 2014). The purpose is primarily 
to unlawfully gain profits or information based on usage of the victim’s credentials. Victims 
are picked at random. Those who are vulnerable may be victimized.  
Granted, Europol still has a point. But for issuing warnings and alerts against phishing and 
other forms of criminal social engineering, the practical response against cybercrime has 
primarily been technical, in the form of patches & updates, firewalls and so forth. Seeming-
ly the need for research concerns, first of all, how to realize what it is exactly – with respect 
to behaviour – that we need to understand better, in order to explain why people become 
involved in digital crime. More precisely, we want to find out whether people get involved 
in online crime more easily than in “physical” crime, and if so, identify the causes and the 
effects. One important question is whether digitization brings about more crime than be-
fore, or merely moves crime from a physical arena to a digital.  
Having succeeded in putting the human factor on the agenda, Europol follows up with sec-
tions that deal with Profiling cybercriminals and Behaviour in cyberspace (Europol 2014). The 
most relevant “cyber-psychological concepts” are claimed to be:  
- Anonymity and self-disclosure 
- Cyber immersion / presence 
- Self-presentation online 
- Pseudoparadoxical privacy 
- Escalation online 
- Impulsivity and problematic Internet use  
- Dark tetrad of personality.  
                                                 
2  “FBI warns of dramatic increase in business e-mail scams” (4.4.16). https://www.fbi.gov/phoenix/press-
releases/2016. See also the blog Krebs on Security (16.4.16) http://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/ceo-fraud/. The loss 
estimate concerns scams reported in 79 countries in the period 2013-16. 
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This is not the place for further exploration of cyber-psychological concepts. However, as-
suming that “dark tetrad” is not an altogether familiar expression, the reader might be in-
terested to learn that it is an expansion of the allegedly more well-known psychological 
phenomenon “dark triad” of personalities. A dark triad personality is regarded as malevo-
lent, because it is “Machiavellian”, “narcissistic” and “psychopathic”. In Greek “tetrad” 
means “four”, so the “dark tetrad of personalities” signifies an individual who possesses 
yet another dark personality (in addition to the three already mentioned). This is sadism 
(Buckels, Trapnell and Paulhus, 2014). Thus one may assume a “dark tetrad” to be super-
malevolent, and only the imagination sets the limits for what such a person conceivably can 
be up to.  
The research concerned “dark tetrads” is based on interviews with respondents from the 
United States. It turns out that those who fulfil the psychological criteria are so called “In-
ternet trolls”. In Norway, we tend to think of Internet trolls as bad-tempered people who 
provoke argument for the fun of it. “Trolling” can also be associated with “the deep voice” 
of the people, mercilessly asserting its right to “to tell the truth exactly as it is”. Thus, in a 
Norwegian context, to associate Internet trolls with sadism could therefore be deemed as 
going a bit too far.Be that as it may, the reader may want to check it out for herself.  To con-
clude: “Trolls just want to have fun”, at least, that’s what the researchers say (ibid).  
4. Interpol’s Top Research Priority and Its Implications  
 
The question still remains; is crime which involves digital technology a new thing under 
the sun or not? For the remaining part of the analysis the top research priority identified in 
Interpol’s Cyber Research Agenda, is suitable as starting point. The priority has been 
agreed between important stakeholders who recognize the need for a knowledge based ap-
proach to digital crime (Interpol 2015). An intolerable level of digital crime endangers the 
benefits of digital technology, prosperity and safety of the society as a whole. Knowledge of 
the problem which is perceived to be the greatest, and most deserving of research in order 
to counter digital crime, may be helpful to our analysis. 
The Interpol Cyber Research Agenda is the outcome of a workshop which convened “an 
equal number of participants” from the law enforcement, academia, private sector and public 
policy making bodies. Eight research themes were discussed: (1) Digital forensics; (2) 
Measuring and forecasting cybercrime; (3) Improving attribution; (4) Improving cyber hy-
giene; (5) Capacity building & training; (7) Improving information exchange and sharing; 
and (8) Cyber criminology. At the end, their relative importance was ranked by each of the 
four participating groups (ibid.).  
“Improving Attribution” is the clear winner among the eight research themes. It is the top 
priority of the law enforcement, and second and third of the private sector and the policy 
makers. (Academia put cyber criminology on top). 
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“Improving Attribution” is short for improving the law enforcement’s ability and possibility to 
link a criminal act on the Internet to a specific individual who can be identified and held criminally 
liable (given that the legal conditions for criminal liability are fulfilled).  
It demonstrates a general agreement that anonymity is the major problem to prevention and 
prosecution of digital crime. Despite that the police may be aware of illegal activity online it 
can be unable, by regular methods, to identify the perpetrators. In order to convict some-
body for a crime, evidence that links the perpetrator to the criminal act is required. The 
public prosecutor has the burden of proof, and must prove the link beyond any reasonable 
doubt. Under the protective shield of anonymity criminals can carry out illegal activities 
online with little risk of being caught. The risk is low, not non-existent. But, in order to 
identify criminals on anonymous services, the police may have to make use of so-called 
“extraordinary” or “untraditional” methods. Such methods are less controllable than the 
traditional ones. Undercover operations which infiltrate illegal market places may for in-
stance entail a need to engage in illegal transactions. Observation of illegal activities with-
out taking any intervening steps (in wait for “bigger fish”), raises ethical questions. Provo-
cation may jeopardize prosecution, and should evidence be deemed as unlawfully obtained 
the risk is that it is excluded from trial.  
The TOR network (“The Onion Router” network) is the most well-known anonymous net-
work. Computers running the TOR-software are nodes that function as layers (“onion lay-
ers”). Their purpose is to anonymize communication by “shaving off” information that 
identifies its source. “Darknet” is frequently used as synonym to TOR (which is not totally 
fair to TOR, but that is a different story). “Darknet” is the illegal part of the “Deep web”.  
The Deep web is the part of the Internet which is not indexed by ordinary search engines. 
The source of the communication on the Darknet is usually hidden (anonymous). In addi-
tion, the content of the communication can be encrypted. Problems of anonymity and en-
cryption are among the driving forces behind increasingly more intrusive investigation 
methods. Computer surveillance is an example in point. The method became legally au-
thorized and sanctioned by the Norwegian legislator in June 2016 after seven years of de-
liberation.3  
The TOR network itself can of course be technologically infiltrated by nodes controlled by 
the law enforcement. Should the practice become popular, a risk of running into “blue on 
blue” operations – where police organisations go after each other, instead of after the crim-
inals – cannot be ignored.  
                                                 
3 Computer surveillance is “dataavlesing” in Norwegian.  An expert committee proposed the method in 2009 
in the report “Hidden information – Open control” (my translation from Norwegian) (Metodekontrollutvalget 
2009). The result is a new chapter 16d (computer surveillance) in the Norwegian Criminal Procedural Code, 
adopted by law no 54/2016 of 17 June 2016.   
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Moreover, not only communication, but also payments can be performed anonymously. The 
usage of block chain currency, of which Bitcoin is the most well-known, sees to this. Ac-
cording to Europol’s stats, Bitcoin accounts for 40% of all identified criminal-to-criminal 
payments in the EU. It features as “a common payment mechanism across all [criminal] payment 
scenarios”. Europol concludes that Bitcoin is establishing itself as “a single common currency 
for cybercriminals within the EU” (Europol 2015: 11, 46-47). 
Computer engineers and other technical experts often take measure of the probability that 
algorithms which provide anonymity can be mathematically cracked. Hence, they prefer 
the word “pseudonymity”. From a practitioner’s point of view, mathematical probability 
calculation is one thing and practical investigation quite another. Both TOR and Bitcoin are 
services that provide anonymity for practical purposes. Some claim that Bitcoin is not 
anonymous because the transactions are recorded and made transparent in the publicly 
available block chain log (e.g. Meiklejohn, Pomarole, Jordan et. al., 2013). But even if the log 
may contain sufficient information to deduce the identity of certain big “Bitcoin players”, it 
does not plainly disclose specific identity information. The anonymity of its users might perhaps 
not survive a dedicated mathematical attack, but so far the digital currency has preserved 
sufficient unallocated blocks to shield the user’s identity from the investigative eye of the 
law enforcement.  
Given the significance of the problem, research concerning “Improving Attribution” must 
be important. Whether the outcome supports a strategy which aims at cracking the ano-
nymity of criminals (and of everybody else), or just pave the way for other strategies, re-
main an open question. It is important whether policy makers are dedicated to strategies of 
general deterrent effects, or prefer other strategies. In any case, anonymity as problem 
number one does not give any reason for questioning old theories that can explain crime, or 
throw them overboard. Rather, the situation is the opposite. Traditional key factors of crime 
such as economic gain, opportunity and low risk are clearly present in digital crime. Ano-
nymity facilitates and enhances them all. 
5. Digital Technology as a Cross Cutting Crime Enabler  
 
So far, the most striking observation of the analysis is that new technology is relevant to a wide 
range of crimes. Europol has captured this nicely by pointing out that digital services func-
tion as “cross cutting crime enablers” (Europol 2015: 15). Digital technology is generally rele-
vant to and facilitates crime, no matter the type of crime. Digital technology offers functions 
and services which make life easier, enable public administration to operate more efficient-
ly and commerce to be more competitive. The flip side of the coin is that criminals may ex-
ploit its benefits equally well. Besides from “money mules and money laundering services” Eu-
ropol’s list of cross cutting crime enablers thus feature “bullet proof hosting”, “illegal trading 
sites on the Darknet”, “criminal schemes around Bitcoin and other virtual currencies” and “crimi-
nal expert forums online” (ibid.).  
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The upshot is that crime has become an online service. One can seek the service of a crimi-
nal host, get illegal advice, hacker tools, illegal content, drugs, devices such as explosives 
and firearms, and even hire a hitman, on demand. The host can hold Bitcoin in escrow, 
providing a safe mechanism for the exchange of a criminal service against payment. Ac-
cording to Europol, “Crime-as-a-Sevice” (“CaaS”) “acts as a multiplier for many facets of cyber-
crime. Services such as bulletproof hosting, spam, illegal currency exchanges, money mules and 
counter anti-virus […] may have been crucial to those offences being committed” (Europol 2015: 
63, see also p.7). 
CaaS mirrors ordinary online commerce. However, while law-abiding services adhere to 
rules for bookkeeping and accounting, knowing your customer, the conditions for a license 
(for instance to sell fire arms or sell pharmaceuticals), CaaS operates outside the legal regu-
latory framework, and outside the law. CaaS operates in a normative environment where it 
is understood that the activity is illegal, hence the participants take care to operate anony-
mously.  
Finally, one may point to the leveraging effect of network technology. It has caused crimi-
nologists to question the methods for defining and quantifying online crime, the adequacy 
of current theories of digital victimization, and the methods according to which economic 
losses and damages are calculated (e.g. Wall 2007). The examples in point concern dissemi-
nation of computer virus which may infect thousands, even millions, of computers in a 
short time; the perennial availability of illegal content on the Internet, and the estimates of 
economic loss (should it be recoverable, because it is caused by a crime, or just as an in-
stance of bad luck no different from the risk we take in other aspects of life?). The questions 
are open for research. 
6. Things that can be regarded as New under the Sun 
 
In this section we turn to criminal phenomena which can be regarded as new, either be-
cause of law or of fact. As regards the law, it can be asserted that it does not adequately 
grasp the significance of network technology to crime. Important effects of connectivity have 
yet to be suitably taken account of by criminal law. As regards the facts, it can be asserted 
that the effects of automation and online privacy violations raise serious questions, which 
cause problems that can be regarded as new.  
6.1  Internet Connectivity vs. the Notion of a Direct Attack 
 
Internet Banking Fraud, cyber-extortion and DDOS-attacks may be performed according to 
largely similar modus operandi. Below, Internet banking fraud is presented as the “case”. 
Chronologically the events succeed as follows:  
Step one, the developing phase, is concerned with the development of a program (malware) 
which can be remotely controlled. Step two, the distribution phase, is concerned with the in-
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fection of computers. Infection is caused either from popular websites where the malware 
has been stealthily placed, or in the form of spam-mail with a malware attachment. Victim-
ization is random. Those who own a computer vulnerable to the malware may get infected 
(nothing “personal” here). Step three, the notification phase: This is when the malware 
transmits an alert over the network to the perpetrator, informing about the identity of the 
infected computer, whereupon it becomes a target for the perpetrator. Step four, the exploi-
tation phase: The perpetrator exploits the vulnerability. In the case of Internet banking fraud, 
he takes control over the victim’s connection with the bank, and places a payment order to 
an account controlled by a so-called “money mule”. At this point final success depends on 
two factors: Firstly, that the victim is tricked to confirm payment; secondly, that the money 
mule delivers the money (net of a provision), to the main perpetrator (the “main brain”). 
Accordingly, the final step is the phase when the scheme is completed: The victim is tricked to 
confirm payment from her account, because she is asked to log in twice due to a fake error alert 
caused by the malware. When she enters the secret key as part of the logon procedure, she 
unwittingly confirms the order. Promptly upon notice that its account has been credited, 
the loyal money mule withdraws the money in cash from an ATM. The proceeds are ulti-
mately delivered to the “main brain”.  
One may note a certain discrepancy between the legal conceptualization and the practical 
implementation of the crime. The facts describe a criminal continuum in stark contrast to the 
specificity of criminal provisions. The specification is due partly to the principle of legality, part-
ly to tradition and partly to perception of the interests that is violated and must be protected. The 
principle of legality protects individuals from arbitrary prosecution and punishment, by re-
quiring that the law first must describe which acts that are criminal (cfr., e.g., ECHR article 
7 and the Norwegian Constitution section 96). But the principle of legality does not give 
precise instruction as to how the description must be framed. This depends a lot on tradi-
tion and perception of the protected interest.  
Currently, criminal law has split digital crime into a multitude of criminal offences. Exam-
ples in point are the making and/or distribution of malware, computer intrusion, illegal 
surveillance, interference with computer data, interference with computer systems, com-
puter fraud and fraud by deception. This mode of thought stems from tradition and is re-
flected in the Cybercrime Convention (CETS 185). The convention has had considerable 
international influence. Criminal provisions of corresponding character are therefore gen-
erally included in the criminal codes in national legal systems. Finally, the protected inter-
ests are privacy and the property interests of the owner of the computer and the bank ac-
count. The owner is the offended party (“fornærmede”).  
The outcome of the legislative approach is that the owner of the computer is the victim of a 
multitude of crimes (computer intrusion, computer surveillance, vandalism against com-
puter data and/or the computer system, computer fraud or fraud by deception). This is a bit 
odd, given that his computer only is a vehicle to commit a crime, and has been picked at random. 
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Typical for such crime is that the malware infects many computers, thus effectively creating 
botnets controlled by the criminal. That is why modus operandi largely is the same also for 
cyber-extortion and DDOS-attacks.  
Cyber-extortion can be performed by infecting computers with malware which encrypts 
the content (“ransomware”/”cryptolocker”). Unless the owner pays an amount as ransom, 
in Bitcoin, within a certain deadline, the decryption key is deleted, hence the data is lost. 
Also DDOS-attacks (vandalism against computer systems) can be used for the purpose of 
extorting payment from a victim. The victim pays under the threat of else suffering a 
DDOS-attack. A DDOS-attack is usually carried out by triggering a botnet to attack the tar-
get computer. A simultaneous attack by thousands of computers brings down the target.  
The creation and utilization of botnets through malware infection is a main feature of such 
crime. The botnet is a resource on the Internet, which in essence is about making computer 
resources available to others (e.g. supplying computing power for a decryption experi-
ment). However, the exploitation of a botnet as described above is undoubtedly criminal. 
The point concerns the distinction between targeted and random digital crime. The criminal mo-
dus operandi described above, shows that randomly chosen Internet computers are used as 
resources for a continuing widespread criminal activity. The crime is not targeted at special vic-
tims. The law does not fully seem to capture this. Rather, it seems to be based on the oppo-
site assumption.  
The Cybercrime Convention Committee has observed that computers “may be linked for 
criminal or good purposes […] The relevant factors are that the computers in botnets are used with-
out consent and are used for criminal purposes and to cause major impact.” (Cybercrime Conven-
tion Committee # 2 (botnets). Cf. also # 3 (DDOS-attacks) and # 6 (malware). 
Essentially, the problem concerns victimization and the interests that are put at stake by such 
crime. Legal policymakers have so far mainly concentrated on modus operandi, and paid less 
attention to the other questions. But they are at least as important to the framing of provi-
sions of criminal law, as the modus operandi. One could envisage that the law, instead of 
featuring the computer owner as the victim of a crime, treated the crime as a violation of the 
public interest in information security. The crime could be described in terms of a criminal 
continuum. The number of infringements on confidentiality, integrity and availability, could 
be regarded as aggravating circumstances, in addition of course to the size of the illegal prof-
its. Criminal provisions of this kind are applied in relation to terrorism and sabotage, and 
seem relevant to ordinary random digital crime as well. The computer/account owners may be 
indemnified by insurance coverage, refund from the bank and damages paid by the crimi-
nal or covered by proceeds that have been confiscated.  
Bitcoin can be confiscated. In the case against the founder of “the online drug bazaar Silk 
Road” Ross Ulbricht, 144 000 Bitcoin was confiscated as proceeds from crime. In June 2016 
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when Australian law enforcement held a Bitcoin auction, the amount equalled more than 
USD 13 million (NOK 108 million).4   
Existing criminal provisions should be maintained in so far as they are necessary to punish 
crime which is targeted at certain victims. This would be computer intrusion for the purpose 
of state or industrial espionage, computer interference for the purpose of bringing down a 
competitor, surveillance for the purpose of controlling the private life of an ex-girlfriend 
and so forth.  
References to some cases concerning random digital crime prosecuted in Norwegian courts: 
Internet banking fraud: HR-20122-2397-A; DDOS-attack by botnet: TNERO-2013-89352; 
Random hacking: HR-2004-1807-A. Targeted hacking and vandalism against a competitor is 
the case in HR-2004-127-A. Information crime at the expense of a competitor is illustrated in 
TOSLO-2004-84792, and targeted search for intimate images in HR-2012-2056-A.  
The approach may also be adequate to deal with IoT-crime (discussed in section 2). Burgla-
ry has been regarded as a crime against property and private life. But numerous house 
owners are put at risk, if the crime is pulled off first by hacking the computer system of the 
DSP (or of the cloud service that hosts the service of the DSP). The house owners are ran-
domly picked according to the same criteria as the owner of the internet computer, and the 
crime is carried out by exploitation of network vulnerability.  
A corresponding scenario is perhaps not as likely with respect to the pacemaker, because 
homicide usually is targeted. However, large-scale random killings are conceivable, as a 
terrorist attack. Killing is terrorist communication, it does not matter who the victims are. 
In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo killings, TV5 Monde France was taken down by hackers.5 
The hack was originally thought to have been performed by the “CyberCaliphate”, i.e. 
hackers partial to IS., The assumption has later been questioned as new leads point to Rus-
sian hackers called “Pawn Storm”.6  
6.2 The impact of automation 
 
Automation may be exploited to commit crime in a “self-executing” manner. This has sev-
eral advantages to the perpetrator. The perpetrator’s efforts are only needed in the initial 
phase of planning and of software development. The criminal concept could for instance be 
a fake website which sells tickets to Premier League soccer games. The website is connected 
to publicly available databases with information about time and location of the games. 
                                                 
4 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/31/australian-police-to-auction-13m-in-confiscated-
bitcoins 
5 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/09/french-tv-network-tv5monde-hijacked-by-pro-isis-hackers 
6 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/tv5monde-hack-jihadist-cyber-attack-on-french-tv-
station-could-have-russian-link-10311213.html. 
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Thus the service is automatically updated with new events. Payment is made by card. The 
tickets obtained from the service are not valid of course.  
When the program (website) is put to work, the perpetrator is free to move around, per-
haps go on holiday and enjoy the proceeds which keep coming in as a steady flow to his 
bank account. Thus, automation provides new flexibility to the perpetrator, because there is 
no need to be present at a physical crime scene. The flexibility may be utilized to cross in-
ternational borders, and increases the problems that the law enforcement already has to 
identify and locate the perpetrator. The scheme may be further enhanced by anonymity, 
both with regards to the Internet source of the fraudulent website, and the ownership of the 
bank account (client privilege in safe havens for banking services). Also the anonymity of 
Bitcoin can be exploited, for instance by cooperating with the host of a “bullet proof” ser-
vice who holds the proceeds in escrow for a certain time.   
There are early warnings that this type of fraud may become a problem. In Sweden, five 
men were convicted for fraud. They had developed the automated poker playing program 
“Maggie”, which was put to play on Svenska Spel (“Swedish Games”), a site which was 
open for participation by real persons only.  Maggie’s poker playing skills were superior to 
the other players’, and she beat more than 5000 players before the scam was uncovered. 
The court estimated their economic loss to SEK 760 000 (approximately EUR 80 000).7  
6.3 The Sad Story of Criminal Privacy Infringements 
 
Commercial live streaming of children is on the increase, facilitated by broadband and ano-
nymity. The users pay in Bitcoin, and instruct the criminal in the other end, of the kind of 
abuse they want to watch. Here, the crime is carried out on demand, which makes it a gen-
uine instance of CaaS. This worrying development of crime against children comes in addi-
tion to the burden of the lifelong violation against their privacy, caused by the perennial cir-
culation of images of the abuse on the Internet. For more detail about this, see (Sunde 2011, 
and 2016 chapter 10.1). 
There is also stalking, harassment and sextortion. “Sextortion” means that the victim is forced 
or threatened to give away personal sexual images or video clips. Teenagers and even 
younger children are particularly vulnerable to this kind of crime. Legally it is not regarded 
as extortion, because the victim does not suffer a loss in economic terms. Such crime is pun-
ished according to provisions regarding unlawfully to compel somebody to do something 
against its will, and unlawful threats. The unlawful invasion of the private sphere and con-
sequent loss of intimate information is not fully recognized by such more or less “value 
neutral” provisions. Whether the current legal response is adequate in relation to the prob-
lem is an open question.   
                                                 
7 Södertörn tingsrätts dom 2014-12-19, case number B 5929-13. 
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There is also much evidence to the effect that harassment on the Internet is more hard-
hitting than harassment in physical space. The fate of the American teenager Amanda Todd 
has become a symbol of this. She committed suicide at the age of 15, after having been bul-
lied on social media for years. The triggering event for the harassment is explained to be 
that she, at the age of 12, was deceived to give away intimate images to some “friends”, 
who later shamed her by making them available on social media. Despite efforts to amelio-
rate the situation, change school etc., she was harassed. She finally made a video in which 
she explains how she had suffered and her decision to commit suicide. She posted the vid-
eo clip on YouTube, then, ended her life.  
The Norwegian “tech” journalist and author Per Kristian Bjørkeng explains why online 
harassment has greater detrimental effect to the victim, than harassment in physical space. 
Bjørkeng  points out (i) the (perceived) need for constant online availability, which exposes 
vulnerability in terms of being prevented from protecting oneself from receiving unwanted 
messages; (ii) the effect of online anonymity and misuse of the identity of others. It may 
cause a situation where the victim cannot be sure who is behind the bullying. The possibil-
ity that someone in the victim’s close social environment is the one, cannot be ruled out. A 
great sense of insecurity is thus created. If the fears prove to be true, the victim may totally 
lose confidence in others more generally. It is like the world comes to a crash; and finally 
(iii) the “one degree of separation” which means that regrettable actions easily can be made 
on impulse. A sharp message is now promptly submitted, by entering “send”, when for-
merly one could normally sleep on it, and perhaps wake up in a friendlier mood. Separa-
tion also prevents the sender from watching the recipient’s immediate reaction. It could be 
that the written message came out more aggressively than intended, or was misunderstood. 
In any case the sender is prevented from moderating the message, or offer an excuse, unless 
the victim actively seeks it (Bjørkeng 2011). 
For these reasons, and in order to live up to the positive obligation to protect the right to 
private life, which flows from the EHRC article 8, the Norwegian criminal code has been 
supplemented with a new provision concerning serious stalking and harassment, i.e. sec-
tion 266a. The crime can be punished with imprisonment for up to four years.  
7. Concluding Remarks  
 
The analysis has shown that it is difficult to make a clear distinction between digital and 
physical crime when both law and fact are taken into account. The better approach is to 
address crime in the digitized society, and be generally prepared for the relevance of digital evi-
dence to all kinds of crime.  
As regards the human factor, more research is needed in order to “come to grips with” dig-
ital crime. It is essential to find out whether there is a decrease of physical crime, while digi-
tal crime is on the increase. A more ominous possibility is that crime overall is on the in-
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crease. More knowledge about the causes for engaging in online crime, both as offender 
and victim is also called for.  
Crime-as-a-Service is a natural reflection of ordinary legal use of online services. However, 
when CaaS is used in conjunction with anonymity, policy makers are confronted with di-
lemmas concerning which crime prevention policies to pursue.  
Finally, the phenomena that are new under the sun, are partially legal, partially factual. It 
can be questioned if criminal law de lege lata adequally covers random digital crime. There 
are several indications of a need for legal improvement in this respect, both as regards 
criminal and civil law. In fact, random digital crime seems to challenge present notions of 
how specific criminal provisions must be. Thus, more research on the specificity demands 
of the principle of legality is needed. Finally, effective filtering of sexual abuse material on 
the Internet should be an everlasting objective, in order to fulfil the positive obligation to 
make the right to private life become effective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
Sources: 
 
Bjørkeng, P.K. (2011) Nettkidsa – barnas digitale hverdag. Oslo: Cappelen.  
Buckels, E.E., Trapnell, P.D., and Paulhus, D.L. (2014), Trolls just want to have Fun. Personali-
ty and Individual Differences. 2014. Winnipeg: Elsevier. 
Cybercrime Convention Committee (2013), T-CY Guidance Notes. T-CY(2013)29rev. Availa-
ble online at www.coe.int/cybercrime. 
# 2 - Guidance Note on Provisions of the Budapest Convention covering Botnets.  
# 3 - Guidance Note on DDOS-Attacks.  
# 4 - Guidance Note on Identity Theft and Phishing in Relation to Fraud.  
# 6 - Guidance Note on New Forms of Malware.  
Dagens Næringsliv (2016, January 8), De medisinske hackerne. Available online at 
http://www.dn.no/magasinet/2016/01/08/2128/Teknologi/de-medisinske-hackerne 
Europol (2014), The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (iOCTA) 2014. The Hague: 
European Police Office. Report available online (as per 2016). 
Europol (2015), The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (iOCTA) 2015. The Hague: 
European Police Office. Report available online (as per 2016). 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2016, 4 April), FBI Warns of Business E-Mail Scams. Availa-
ble online at https://www.fbi.gov/phoenix/press-releases/2016.  
Guardian (2016, May 31), Australian Police to auction 13 million in confiscated Bitcoins Availa-
ble online at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/31/australian-
police-to-auction-13m-in-confiscated-bitcoins 
 
(2015, April 9) French TV Network TV5Monde Hijaced by Pro ISIS Hackers. Available 
online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/09/french-tv-network-
tv5monde-hijacked-by-pro-isis-hackers 
 
Independent (2015, June 10 ) TV5Monde Hack –‘Jihadist’ Cyberattack on French TV station could 
have Russian Link. Available online at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/tv5monde-hack-jihadist-cyber-
attack-on-french-tv-station-could-have-russian-link-10311213.html 
Interpol (2015, March 10), Interpol Cyber Research Agenda. Workshop Report.   
79 
 
Krebs on Security (2016, 16 April), CEO Fraud. Available online at 
http://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/ceo-fraud/. 
McQuade, S. C. (2006), Understanding and Managing Cybercrime. Boston: Pearson.  
Meiklejohn, S., Pomarole, M., Jordan, G. et al. (2013), A Fistful of Bitcoin: Characterizing Pay-
ments Among Men with No Names. Barcelona: IMC’13. 
Metodekontrollutvalget (2009), NOU 2009: 15 Skjult informasjon – Åpen kontroll.  
Sunde, I. M. (2006), Lov og rett i Cyberspace. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
Sunde, I. M. (2011), Automatisert inndragning. Complex, 3/11. Oslo: Unipub. 
Sunde, I. M. (2016), Datakriminalitet. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. 
Wall, D.S. (2007), Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age. UK: Wiley. 
Wall, D. S. (2014), Policing Identity Crimes. In Wall, D. S. and Williams, M. L. (Eds.) (2014) 
Policing Cybercrime, pp. 29-52. Abingdon: Routledge.   
 
80 
 
PRESENTATIONS IN PARALLEL SESSIONS 
 
WORKSHOP A 
PRISON AND PROBATION STUDIES 
 
Fra trommedans til samfundstjeneste 
Sanktionssystemets udvikling i grønlandsk kriminalret  
 
Hans Jørgen Engbo 
Kort om Grønland 
Grønland er verdens største ø med et areal på 2.166.000 km² svarende til en 
femdobling af Sveriges areal. Landet har 56.000 indbyggere svarende til 
indbyggerantallet i Gotland kommune i Sverige eller Skien kommune i Norge. Der 
er 2.670 km fra nord til syd, svarende til afstanden fra Trondheim til Barcelona. 
Frem til 1953 havde Grønland en kolonilignende status i forhold til Danmark, men 
ved en ændring af Danmarks Riges Grundlov i 1953 fik Grønland status som en 
ligeberettiget del af Danmark. I 1979 fik Grønland hjemmestyre, som indebar større 
ansvar og øget kompetence for lokalbefolkningen. I 2009 blev ordningen udvidet 
med overgangen til selvstyre, som indebar, at det grønlandske folk nu officielt af 
Danmark blev anerkendt som et eget folk i henhold til folkeretten. Den folkeretslige 
status som eget folk er en betingelse for en eventuel løsrivelse og ny statsdannelse, 
som kredse i Grønland har som den ultimative vision. Grønland har under hjemme- 
og selvstyreordningerne ’hjemtaget’ en række forvaltningsområder, som landet nu 
selv administrerer uafhængigt af dansk statsforvaltning. Det gælder eksempelvis 
uddannelsesvæsenet, socialvæsenet og sundhedsvæsenet. På andre områder er det 
fortsat rigsmyndighederne, som opererer i Grønland. Således er retsvæsenet – politi, 
anklagemyndighed, domstole og kriminalforsorg – fortsat områder, som forvaltes af 
den danske stat. Loven om Grønlands selvstyre hjemler mulighed for, at de 
grønlandske myndigheder kan hjemtage også disse områder. Ambitionerne herom 
er til stede, men en hjemtagelse af retsvæsenet vil være en tung økonomisk byrde for 
det grønlandske samfund og er derfor næppe realistisk på kort sigt.   
Kriminalitet i Grønland 
Kriminaliteten i Grønland udviser et noget andet mønster end i det øvrige Norden. 
Alvorlige personkrænkende forbrydelser som drab, vold og seksualkriminalitet 
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fylder meget i statistikken. Det fremgår således af nedenstående oversigt over 
anmeldte forbrydelser pr. 1000 indbyggere i 2015 i Grønland og Danmark samt på 
Færøerne, at der i 2015 i Grønland blev anmeldt fire gange så mange 
voldsforbrydelser og 10 gange så mange seksualforbrydelser som i Danmark, og i 
sammenligning med Færøerne blev der i Grønland anmeldt 25 gange flere 
seksualforbrydelser. 
Tabel 1: Anmeldelser om vold pr. 1.000 indbyggere sammenlignet med Danmark og Færøerne. 1 
 
Grønland Danmark Færøerne 
Alle forbrydelser 74 66 12 
Voldsforbrydelser 12 3 2 
Seksualforbrydelser 5 0,5 0,2 
Grønland er imidlertid ikke noget specielt farligt samfund at færdes i, jfr. følgende 
kommentar fra politimesteren til statistikken:  
’[N]år vi taler om vold og drabsforsøg generelt, så kender 
gerningsmand og offer som oftest hinanden. Det bliver 
forbrydelsen ikke mindre voldsom af, men det er sjældent, at det 
er tilfældige personer, der bliver overfaldet på gaden i Grønland. 
Mange lovovertrædelser foregår ”bag hjemmets fire vægge” …’2 
Samfundets reaktioner på kriminalitet i Grønland 
Det strafferetlige reaktionssystem i Grønland er præget af en nedarvet retskultur, 
som på mange måder adskiller sig markant fra den retskultur, der kendes i de øvrige 
nordiske (og mange andre) lande. I det følgende trækkes historien bag Grønlands 
nuværende retssystem op i korte træk. 
Konfliktløsning før kristendommens indførelse (1721) 
Grønland har været – og er i nogen grad fortsat – præget af en række små isolerede 
samfund. I dag taler vi om bygder; tidligere talte man (danskerne) også om 
bopladser og udsteder. Der var oprindelig ingen myndigheder til at løse konflikter. 
Dem måtte man selv løse, og det gjorde man uden noget fast mønster. Man valgte 
individuelle løsninger, som man i det enkelte tilfælde fandt bedst egnet. Blandt de 
oftest benyttede redskaber for konfliktløsning var 
- sangkamp og trommedans (vil blive nærmere beskrevet nedenfor), 
- blodhævn, 
                                                 
1 Grønlands Politis årsstatistik 2015, tabel 1.2, 1.11 og 1.14. 
2 Grønlands Politis årsstatistik 2015, side 3. 
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- bagtalelse, 
- hemmelig brug af magi, 
- undvigelse (man undgik hinanden i en tid fremover). 
Trommedansen – eller sangkampen – bestod i, at den forurettede part udfordrede 
krænkeren til en sangdyst med dans og tromme. Denne måde at løse konflikter på 
omtales ikke sjældent i romantiske toner, men at det ikke altid gik romantisk til, 
vidner følgende beskrivelse fra Østgrønland om:   
’Før en alvorlig sangkamp må man gå i gang med at hærde 
kinder og pande. Man surrer et sælkranium fast til husstolpen og 
giver det kindbensstød, og når man er nået så vidt, at man 
smadrer sælskallen (fjordsæl), udfordrer man sin modstander.  
Denne møder op med venner og bekendte som vidner, thi det er 
publikums reaktioner på sangenes indhold, der tæller i 
domsafsigelsen. 
 
Danserne stiller sig midt på gulvet med tilhørerskaren i kreds om 
sig, og udfordreren har først ordet. Det hænder, at den, der bliver 
sunget på, bindes til stolpen, men dette er sjældent og er da kun 
at betragte som et led i forhånelsen. Den, der lader sig synge på, 
må tage imod hån og smerte med et smil, og så alvorlige 
kindbensstød kan han få, at ansigtet bliver helt smadret, så 
pande og kinder går ud i én plamage. Hans tid kommer i reglen 
først, når sårene er lægt, men han har lov til at svare med det 
samme. 
Efter en sådan sangkamp lader man i reglen alt nag være banket 
ud af hovedet, man bytter koner og giver hinanden 
forsoningsgaver. I tiden derefter er man ”ivingarît”, 
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sangkampsvenner, der ofte mødes til en venskabelig dyst.’ 
(Rosing 1960: 18) 
Den juridiske ekspedition 1948-49 
 
Efter at den norsk-danske præst, Hans Egede, i 1721 havde bragt kristendommen til 
Vestgrønland, blev flere af de tidligere brugte konfliktløsningsmetoder afskaffet. Det 
gjaldt blandt andet trommedansen, som dog levede videre i Nord- og Østgrønland, 
hvor kristendommen først for omkring 100 år siden for alvor fik fodfæste. Men 
konflikter forbundet med kriminalitet blev blandt grønlændere fortsat løst meget 
konkret på sædvaneretligt grundlag, medens den danske straffelov blev anvendt 
over for danskere, som opholdt sig i landet.  
I første halvdel af 1900-tallet blev det flere gange foreslået, at dansk strafferet blev 
indført som gældende ret for alle i Grønland, men de danske myndigheder tøvede 
hermed og valgte at sende en juridisk ekspedition til Grønland med den opgave at 
undersøge, om dansk strafferet ville kunne bringes i anvendelse i Grønland. 
Den juridiske ekspedition, som bestod af tre unge jurister, rejste i et år rundt i 
Grønland og talte med relevante personer og studerede retspraksis for derved at 
danne sig et billede af retskulturen og retssædvanerne. 
Ekspeditionen konkluderede i sin betænkning blandt andet: 
’Den nuværende grønlandske befolknings holdning [til 
kriminelle] adskiller sig på iøjnefaldende måde fra den 
indstilling, man i Danmark indtager over for de kriminelle …  
[F]olk i de små grønlandske samfund kender hinanden godt og 
holder sammen i vanskelige tider’.3 
’[D]et grønlandske reaktionssystem [præges] i første række af ... 
den grønlandske befolknings individualiserende holdning over 
for dem, der har begået lovovertrædelser.’ 4  
’Det går som en linie igennem de grønlandske retsafgørelser, at 
den foranstaltning søges valgt overfor den kriminelle, som er 
bedst egnet til i fremtiden at holde ham fra kriminalitet, og som i 
mindst muligt omfang isolerer ham fra samfundet.  
Grønlandsk retspraksis synes i det hele mere præget at et 
”individualiserende personlighedssystem” end af det 
                                                 
3 Den juridiske ekspeditions betænkning, side 1. 
4 Den juridiske ekspeditions betænkning, side 63. 
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”takstsystem baseret på den begåede lovovertrædelse”, som 
dansk ret bygger på.’ 5 
Ekspeditionen fremlagde følgende oplysninger om de anvendte foranstaltninger i 
årene 1938-48: 
Tabel 2: Foranstaltninger anvendt i 1938-48.6 
Foranstaltning Antal Procent 
Indespærring  14  1 
Forvisning  53  3 
Tvangsarbejde  153  8 
Bøde  817  45 
Formaning  246  13 
Spiritusforbud (frakendelse af maltret)  78  4 
Erstatning  78  4 
Andre foranstaltninger  62  3 
Frifindelse  40  2 
Undladelse af foranstaltning  239  13 
Uoplyst  73  4 
Tilsammen  1840  100 
Ekspeditionens forslag 
Den juridiske ekspedition kunne ikke anbefale indførelse af dansk straffelov i 
Grønland, idet de i grønlandsk ret anvendte foranstaltninger var meget forskellige 
fra dem, der blev anvendt i dansk retspleje, og idet baggrunden for anvendelse af de 
enkelte sanktioner i det væsentlige var en anden end i Danmark. Ekspeditionens 
anbefalinger kan kort refereres således. 
’Det henstilles, at der udarbejdes en lov for Grønland, som ... 
med hensyn til sanktioner bygger på grønlandsk praksis ... som i 
princippet er i harmoni med moderne kriminalvidenskabs krav’ 
(Den juridiske ekspeditions betænkning, side 81). 
’[Loven skal] i størst muligt omfang hjemle adgang for 
myndighederne til at give kriminelle en behandling af 
                                                 
5 Den juridiske ekspeditions betænkning, side 81. 
6 Refereret i Udvalget for samfundsforskning 1962:86. 
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individualpræventiv karakter’ (Den juridiske ekspeditions 
betænkning, side 82). 
Man har beskrevet forskellen mellem det grønlandske og det danske 
sanktionssystem ved at tale om ’gerningsmandsprincippet’, som modsætning til 
’gerningsprincippet’. Man lagde i Grønland mere vægt på at finde en foranstaltning, 
som var afstemt efter gerningsmandens behov, end at udmåle en straf i forhold til 
den begåede gerning.  
Kriminalloven 1954 
 
Ekspeditionens forslag blev fulgt, og i 1954 fik Grønland sin egen kriminallov.7 Det 
var helt bevidst, at man undlod at bruge betegnelsen ’straffelov’ og i stedet kaldte 
det en kriminallov. Man brugte ikke – og bruger fremdeles ikke – begrebet ’straf’ i 
grønlandsk ret. I stedet taler man om foranstaltninger.  
De foranstaltninger, der efter kriminalloven (§ 85) kunne bringes i anvendelse, var 
1) advarsel,  
2) bøde, 
3) beskikkelse af tilsyn, 
4) anvisning af eller forbud imod ophold på bestemt sted, 
5) tvangsarbejde,  
6) tvangsuddannelse, 
7) lægelig begrundet kur eller anstaltsbehandling, 
8) forvaring, 
9) andre indskrænkninger i handlefriheden, 
10) konfiskation. 
 
Man skal særlig lægge mærke til, at ’fængsel’ ikke indgik i kataloget over 
foranstaltninger, hvilket førte til, at loven blev betegnet som ’verdens mest moderne 
straffelov’. Men indespærring var ikke et middel, som var almindeligt brugt i den 
grønlandske sædvaneret.  
Det nærmeste, man kunne komme frihedsberøvelse, var foranstaltningen ’forvaring’, 
som var beregnet til lovovertrædere, som måtte betegnes som erhvervs- eller 
vanemæssige eller særlig farlige forbrydere, når hensynet til samfundets sikkerhed 
gjorde det påkrævet. Men selv under fuldbyrdelse af forvaring, havde de dømte en 
ret vid adgang til at færdes ude i samfundet, så en egentlig indespærring var der i 
praksis sjældent tale om for de få, som blev idømt denne foranstaltning. 
Foranstaltningerne tvangsarbejde, tvangsuddannelse og anvisning af eller forbud 
imod ophold på bestemt sted indebar typisk tvungen anbringelse på et andet sted 
                                                 
7 Lov nr. 55 af 5. marts 1954 – kriminallov for Grønland. 
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end den dømtes bopæl og havde således et element af frihedsberøvelse – eller i det 
mindste frihedsbegrænsning – over sig. Mere om disse foranstaltninger senere. 
Allerede et år efter lovens ikrafttræden blev den kritiseret offentligt i avisen 
Grønlandsposten (på grønlandsk Atuagagdliutit – eller blot AG):   
Atuagagdliutit 24.03.1955:  
 
Kritikken gik ud på, at kun de milde foranstaltninger – advarsel, bøde og tilsyn – 
blev fuldbyrdet effektivt efter deres indhold, medens de mere indgribende 
foranstaltninger – forvaring, tvangsarbejde og tvangsuddannelse – ofte ikke kunne 
fuldbyrdes på grund af manglende praktiske muligheder herfor. Det var svært at 
finde egnede steder at anbringe de dømte, og det blev kritiseret, at de statslige 
virksomheder sjældent stillede op med tilbud om at medvirke. 
Privat fuldbyrdelse 
 
Det var et kernepunkt i den grønlandske retsorden, at fuldbyrdelse af 
kriminalretlige foranstaltninger ikke kun var et myndighedsanliggende. Også 
private forudsattes – som før kriminalloven – at bidrage til fuldbyrdelsen. I 
bemærkningerne til kriminalloven hed det således om tvangsarbejde og 
tvangsuddannelse: 
’Hvor domfældte ikke har hjem på det sted, hvor tvangsarbejdet 
skal udføres, må han i overensstemmelse med hidtidig praksis 
indlogeres hos en egnet og villig person, som modtager en vis 
godtgørelse for at have ham i pension, og som kan føre tilsyn 
med ham.’ 
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’Tvangsuddannelse har efter hidtidig grønlandsk ret fortrinsvis 
været anvendt over for yngre personer, som man har sendt til 
opdragelse og oplæring hos en dygtig og pålidelig person.’8 
Det var således ’egnede og villige’ samt ’dygtige og pålidelige’ samfundsborgere, 
som forudsattes at medvirke i kriminalretsplejen som såkaldte opholdsværter. 
Kriminalforsorg var i vid udstrækning en virksomhed, som fandt sted i privat regi – 
ofte hos fåreholdere eller fiskere/fangere. 
Evaluering 1962 
 
I 1962 udkom en evalueringsrapport af kriminalloven og dens praktiske 
gennemførelse. Rapporten, som var udarbejdet af Udvalget for samfundsforskning i 
Grønland, konkluderede blandt andet, at ’retsmyndighederne har savnet praktiske 
muligheder for at fuldbyrde navnlig tvangsarbejde, tvangsuddannelse samt 
anvisning af ophold på et bestemt sted’ og at man ’i mange tilfælde [har] været ude 
af stand til at finde personer, der var egnede og villige til at modtage domfældte i 
deres hjem eller føre tilsyn med dem’.9 
Evalueringsrapporten første til, at man ved en lovrevision i 1963 indførte anbringelse 
i anstalt som en ny foranstaltning i kriminalloven, jfr. nærmere nedenfor i afsnit 4.4. 
I 1962 blev forsorgsleder Niels Therbild, Dansk Forsorgsselskab, sendt til Grønland 
for at bl.a. at undersøge, hvordan foranstaltningssystemet rent faktisk fungerede. 
Therbild (1965) kunne afsløre, at det undertiden var højst kritisable forhold, som de 
private opholdsværter bød de unge kriminelle.  
Therbild fandt eksempler på at  
- den dømte var blevet sultet og mishandlet i en sådan grad, at hun måtte 
indlægges,  
- den dømte måtte sove på gulvet med bøjede ben,  
- opholdsværten nødte [den dømte] til spiritus til trods for, at han havde 
afholdspålæg,  
- opholdsværten [drak] sig fuld en gang om ugen, hvorefter han i sin omtågede 
tilstand ’morede’ sig med at slå og mishandle den fuldstændig sagesløse 
domfældte,  
- den dømte [måtte] hjælpe den fåreholder, han var anbragt hos, med at stjæle 
får fra naboen. 
Therbild (1965:130) sammenfattede sine observationer ved at erklære, at ’mere eller 
mindre tilfældige private faktisk [har] ”hals- og håndsret” over domfældte’. Og han 
                                                 
8 FT 1953-54 Tillæg A (26) Sp. 401. 
9 Udvalget for samfundsforskning i Grønland 1962:11. 
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tilføjede, at ’et moderne fængselsvæsen … under disse omstændigheder [ville] være 
at foretrække. 
Therbilds undersøgelse medførte oprettelse af ungdomspensioner i Grønland, så 
unge, der blev dømt til tvangsarbejde eller tvangsuddannelse, kunne bo på en 
pension under ordnede forhold. Den første ungdomspension blev oprettet i Sisimiut 
(Holsteinsborg) i 1966. Siden blev der oprettet tilsvarende pensioner i 1973 i Nuuk 
(Godthaab) og i 1979 i Ilulissat (Jakobshavn). De sidstnævnte pensioner blev nedlagt 
i henholdsvis 1976 og 2002, og siden 2010 har der ikke været efterspørgsel efter 
pensionspladser i Sisimiut, og pensionen har i praksis fungeret som afdeling under 
anstalten i samme by. 
Åbne anstalter 
 
Ved en ændring af kriminalloven i 1963 blev kataloget over foranstaltninger ændret, 
så det nu kom til at se således ud: 
 
1) advarsel, 
2) bøde, 
3) beskikkelse af tilsyn, 
4) anvisning af eller forbud mod ophold på bestemt sted, 
5) arbejde, 
6) uddannelse, 
7) lægeligt begrundet behandling, 
8) anbringelse i anstalt, 
9) andre indskrænkninger i handlefriheden, 
10) konfiskation. 
Det mest bemærkelsesværdige er indførelse af foranstaltningen anbringelse i anstalt. 
Om baggrunden herfor oplyses det i bemærkningerne til lovforslaget, at 
forandringer i samfundet havde medført, ’at der over for visse tilfælde af 
kriminalitet ikke i første række er trang til nogen egentlig behandling, men 
simpelthen at have den pågældende lovovertræder under en mere effektiv kontrol, 
end det hidtil har været muligt.’ Samtidig lagde man ’den allerstørste vægt på, at 
ønskeligheden af større kontrol kun fører til frihedsindskrænkning, hvor ganske 
særlige grunde taler herfor.’10 
Senere i lovforslaget hedder det, at man ønskede at skabe hjemmel til at anbringe 
lovovertrædere i anstalt, ’når hensynet til retssikkerheden og den almindelige 
lovlydighed gør det påkrævet, og ingen af de andre foranstaltninger skønnes 
                                                 
10 Folketingstidende 1962-63, tillæg A, sp. 698. 
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anvendelige. Der er herved givet udtryk for, at anbringelse i anstalt kan finde sted 
ud fra generalpræventive hensyn.’ 11 
Anbringelse i anstalt erstattede blandt andet forvaring, som det havde voldt 
vanskeligheder at fuldbyrde effektivt. Det blev i den forbindelse understreget, at 
evalueringen fra 1962 tydede på, at der snarere var behov for anstalter, ’hvor 
lovovertrædere kan anbringes under forholdsvis frie forhold, men under en vis 
kontrol …’ 12 
Anbringelse i anstalt skulle således i første række tjene ’retssikkerheden og den 
almindelige lovlydighed’, hvormed bl.a. mentes generalpræventive hensyn.  Det var 
dog tanken, at en eller flere sådanne anstalter ikke skulle have karakter af lukket 
fængsel, ’men blot skal være steder, hvor de domfældte kan bo og være under et vist 
effektivt tilsyn ... ’.13 
Sammenfattende kan man således om anstalternes indretning og drift konkludere, at 
det var hensigten 
- at anstalterne ikke skulle være behandlingsanstalter,   
- at anstalterne skulle være steder, hvor de domfældte kunne bo under 
forholdsvis frie forhold og være under et vist effektivt tilsyn, 
- at anbringelse i anstalt kun skulle føre til ’frihedsindskrænkning, hvor ganske 
særlige grunde taler herfor’.  
Det er kendetegnende for synet på anstaltsanbringelse, at man således talte om 
indskrænkning af friheden og ikke om berøvelse af friheden. De grønlandske anstalter 
betegnes alle som åbne anstalter. 
Den første anstalt blev taget i brug i Nuuk i 1967. Senere er der oprettet anstalter i 
Qaqortoq (1977), Aasiaat (1977), Ilulissat (2002), Sisimiut (2006) og Tasiilaq (2011). 
Beskæftigelse under anbringelse i anstalt 
 
Et fremtrædende element i driften af de åbne grønlandske anstalter var adgangen til 
(fortsat) at være beskæftiget med arbejde eller uddannelse i det frie samfund.  Det 
samme gjaldt deltagelse i fritidsaktiviteter uden for anstalten. Anstalten havde mere 
karakter af et herberg/kollegium end et fængsel. Man var ikke spærret inde i 
anstalten. Dette karakteristikum ved de grønlandske anstalter er principielt fortsat 
gældende, men der er i tidens løb indført visse modifikationer, som indebærer, at 
flere indsatte nu befinder sig i anstalterne uden tilladelse til at forlade anstalten og 
gå på arbejde eller i skole ude i byen. For det første skal de domfældte indsatte nu 
                                                 
11 Folketingstidende 1962-63, tillæg A, sp. 703. 
12 Folketingstidende 1962-63, tillæg A, sp. 693. 
13 Folketingstidende 1962-63, tillæg A, sp. 703. 
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have opholdt sig i fire uger i anstalten og tillige have gennemført en tiendedel af den 
idømte anstaltstid, før de kan få udgangstilladelse. For det andet er omkring en 
fjerdedel af de indsatte i anstalterne nu tilbageholdte (varetægtsfængslede), som er 
undergivet særlige restriktioner, ikke mindst når det gælder udgangstilladelse. De 
tilbageholdte blev tidligere normalt placeret i politiets detentioner. 
Den beskrevne udvikling har gjort det nødvendigt for anstalterne at etablere 
beskæftigelses- og fritidsmuligheder inden for anstaltens egne fysiske rammer. Dette 
har ikke været nogen let opgave, eftersom bygningerne fra begyndelsen ikke var 
indrettet med beskæftigelses- og fritidslokaler. Anstalterne var jo på det nærmeste 
kun overnatningssteder. 
Der er nu etableret (beskedne) faciliteter til beskæftigelse af mere simpel art, end det 
ses i fængslerne i det øvrige Norden. Der fremstilles kunsthåndværk af rensdyrgevir, 
fedtsten mm., og der produceres langliner til fiskeri, børneslæder, udemøbler mm. 
Visse beskæftigelsesaktiviteter foregår i anstaltsregi uden for anstaltsområdet. Det 
gælder eksempelvis rensdyrjagt, som indtager en fremtrædende position i den 
grønlandske kultur. I august og september drager mange grønlændere til fjelds for 
(gratis) at skaffe kød til dybfryserne. Det er derfor helt normalt, at også indsatte i 
anstalterne kan drage på rensdyrjagt under ledelse af anstaltspersonale.  Det sker 
normalt ved en flere dages tur i fjeldet for en mindre gruppe indsatte under ledelse 
af et par anstaltsbetjente. I efteråret 2014 var fire indsatte og to anstaltsbetjente fra 
anstalten i Sisimiut på fjeldtur i fem dage med 14 nedlagte rensdyr som resultat. 
Denne beskæftigelsesaktivitet for blandt andet drabs- og voldsdømte indsatte 
betragtes ofte med måben af udenlandske studiebesøgende og journalister, men i 
Grønland ser man det som noget helt naturligt, at indsatte får mulighed for at 
udvikle eller vedligeholde deres jagtfærdigheder under anstaltstiden, så de efter 
løsladelsen kan ernære sig ved fangst eller i fritiden bidrage til familiens økonomi. 
Der kendes ikke eksempler på, at indsatte har misbrugt denne adgang til at få 
skydevåben i hænderne.  
En lukket anstalt i Grønland? 
 
Det hænder, at psykisk afvigende (men ikke sindssyge) personer gør sig skyldige i så 
alvorlige – ofte gentagne – forbrydelser af personkrænkende art (drab, grov vold, 
grov seksualkriminalitet mm.), at de anses for farlige og derfor idømmes 
tidsubestemt forvaring. Det betragtes normalt som sikkerhedsmæssigt uforsvarligt 
at anbringe sådanne forvaringsdømte i åben anstalt, og de kan derfor blive dømt til 
anbringelse i en anstalt i Danmark med psykiatrisk ekspertise, dvs. i Herstedvester 
Fængsel. Denne mulighed har været benyttet i adskillige tilfælde siden 1958. I maj 
2015 er 27 grønlandske forvaringsdømte anbragt i Herstedvester. 
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Denne ordning har igennem årtier været kritiseret. Det er anset for umenneskeligt at 
tvangsanbringe de dømte flere tusinde kilometer hjemmefra under en fremmed 
kultur, et fremmed klima, et fremmed sprog osv.  
Presseklip fra AG 17.03.1976 og Information 10.02.1978 
 
Den grønlandske retsvæsenskommission har vurderet, at det ikke kan udelukkes, at 
afsoning i Danmark i konkrete tilfælde – afhængig af afsonerens nærmere 
familiemæssige og ægteskabelige forhold – vil kunne udgøre en krænkelse af Den 
Europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 8 om retten til respekt for 
familie- og privatliv.14 
Et embedsmandsudvalg, nedsat af justitsministeren med tilslutning fra Grønlands 
landsstyre, understregede i sin betænkning fra 1990, at man fortsat anså det for 
særdeles vigtigt, at der etableres en lukket anstalt i Grønland med henblik på at 
begrænse overførslerne af de grønlandske foranstaltningsdømte til Danmark mest 
muligt.15 Blandt andet på baggrund heraf blev Den Grønlandske 
Retsvæsenskommission i 1994 bedt om at overveje og beskrive, ’hvorledes der kan 
etableres særlige afsoningsanstalter i Grønland, således at den hidtidige ordning, 
hvor grønlandske forvaringsdømte afsoner i Anstalten ved Herstedvester, kan 
bringes til ophør’.16 I sin betænkning fra 2004 indstillede kommissionen, at der 
etableres en lukket forvaringsafdeling i Grønland med den fornødne psykiatriske og 
psykologiske bistand tilknyttet. Denne afdeling vil kunne rumme de tidsubestemt 
anstaltsanbragte, der i dag nedsendes til Anstalten ved Herstedvester.17 
                                                 
14 Betænkning nr. 1442/2004, side 857. 
15 Betænkning vedrørende kriminalpolitiske spørgsmål i Grønland 1990:12. 
16 Betænkning nr. 1442/2004, side 14. 
17 Betænkning nr. 1442/2004, side 864. 
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Kriminalloven 2010 
Politisk beslutning om ny anstalt med lukket forvaringsafsnit 
 
Kommissionens forslag blev udmøntet i vedtagelsen af en ny kriminallov for 
Grønland, som trådte i kraft i 2010, samt bevilling af midler til opførelse af en ny 
anstalt i Nuuk med et lukket afsnit, som skal rumme de forvaringsdømte. Anstalten 
forventes taget i brug i 2018. Herefter vil hjemlen til at dømme til anbringelse i 
fængsel i Danmark blive ophævet. 
Ny anstalt i Nuuk. Arkitektskitser.18 
  
Den nye anstalt vil få to åbne afsnit med i alt 36 pladser og et lukket afsnit med 40 
pladser. Af disse 40 pladser er der kalkuleret med 20 pladser til forvaringsdømte og 
20 pladser til tilbageholdte og anstaltsdømte, hvis adfærd ikke er forenelig med 
forholdene i de åbne anstalter.  
Samfundstjeneste 
 
Den nye kriminallov medførte tillige, at Grønland nu også har indført 
samfundstjeneste som en foranstaltning, der får sig eget trin på den såkaldte 
foranstaltningsstige eller sanktionsstige, som man har kaldt kataloget over de 
foranstaltninger, som domstolene kan vælge mellem.19 Samfundstjeneste er således i 
Grønland en selvstændig sanktion og ikke – som i Danmark – et vilkår for en 
betinget dom. 
                                                 
18 Illustration: Schmidt, Hammer & Lassen Architects.  
Se yderligere: http://shl.dk/dan/#/home/about-architecture/new-correctional-facility-in-nuuk.  
19 Betænkning nr. 1442/2004, side 818 ff. 
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En samlet oversigt over de nugældende foranstaltninger i grønlandsk ret illustreres 
her med en grafisk opstilling af ’foranstaltningsstigen’: 
’Foranstaltningsstigen’ 
 
De grønne trin på stigen markerer de foranstaltninger, som Kriminalforsorgen har 
ansvaret for at fuldbyrde.  
Sanktionsstigemodellen åbner mulighed for, at hele kataloget af foranstaltninger 
fortsat er til rådighed som reaktion på alle lovovertrædelser. Forskellen fra det 
danske strafudmålingssystem består først og fremmest i den højere vægtning af 
resocialiseringshensyn og i, at loven ikke opererer med strafferammer. Dette giver et 
bredere spillerum for dommerskønnet i den enkelte sag.20 
Den grønlandske retsbevidsthed 
 
På initiativ fra Rådet for Grønlands Retsvæsen21 har Flemming Balvig i 2014 
gennemført en undersøgelse af retsbevidstheden hos den grønlandske befolkning. 
Undersøgelsen er bygget op på samme måde som tilsvarende undersøgelser i andre 
nordiske lande.22 Der er dog foretaget visse justeringer, herunder en undersøgelse af 
holdningen til visse elementer i fuldbyrdelsen af idømte foranstaltninger (Balvig 
2015). 
Balvig har således undersøgt befolkningens holdning til formålet med at reagere på 
kriminalitet ved at stille følgende spørgsmål: 
Når en person har begået noget kriminelt som f.eks. vold eller 
tyveri, skal samfundet handle, synes du at måden at handle på 
først og fremmest skal være for ... 
1) at skræmme andre fra at begå kriminalitet, 
                                                 
20 Betænkning nr. 1442/2004, side 819. 
21 Se her om rådet: http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/ministeriet/råd/rådet-grønlands-retsvæsen.  
22 Læs i Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab 2010/3, side 232-250, om den nordiske 
retsbevidsthedsundersøgelse. 
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2) at straffe gerningsmanden, så han kan mærke, at samfundet taget afstand 
fra hans kriminalitet, eller 
3) at hjælpe og støtte gerningsmanden så han ikke gør det igen. 
Svarene fremgår af tabel 3. Ansporet af de grønlandske resultater gennemførte 
Balvig en tilsvarende undersøgelse i Danmark nogle få måneder senere i 2014. 
Tabellen viser resultaterne fra begge lande. 
Tabel 3: Svar på spørgsmål om formålet med samfundets reaktion mod kriminalitet. Svarfordeling i 
procent.23 
Formål 
Svar 
Grønland 
Svar 
Danmark 
Skræmme (almenprævention)  5  12 
Straffe (repression)  15  57 
Hjælpe og støtte (individualprævention)  77  29 
Ved ikke o.lign.  3  2 
I ALT  100  100 
 
Det er en meget klar udmelding, der kommer fra den grønlandske befolkning. 
Formålet med at gribe ind med kriminalretlige foranstaltninger er resocialisering og 
ikke straf, mener 77 procent af den grønlandske befolkning, medens kun 29 af 
danskerne har denne opfattelse. Danskerne vil hellere straffe end hjælpe 
gerningsmanden. 
Svarene fra den grønlandske befolkning dokumenterer, at der fortsat er god folkelig 
opbakning bag grundtanken i den grønlandske kriminallov om resocialisering frem 
for straf. Det er gerningsmandens behov for hjælp og støtte, der skal være i fokus. 
Balvig spurgte også mere specifikt, hvad formålet var med at anbringe en person i 
anstalt. Spørgsmålet lød således: 
Hvis en person efter at have begået kriminalitet dømmes til at 
opholde sig et stykke tid i en anstalt for domfældte, synes du så, 
at formålet først og fremmest skal være: 
1) at straffe ham så han kan mærke at samfundet tager afstand fra hans 
kriminalitet 
ELLER 
                                                 
23 Balvig 2015:35. 
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2) at han kan modtage hjælp i form af fx behandling (misbrugs-behandling, 
psykiatrisk behandling el.lign.) for at få bedre muligheder for at leve uden 
kriminalitet efter løsladelsen. 
Svarene fremgår af tabel 4. Svarene ligger på linje med svarene på det mere brede 
spørgsmål om reaktioner generelt over for lovovertrædere.  
Tabel 4: Svar på spørgsmål om formålet med anbringelse i anstalt. Svarfordeling i procent.  24 
Formål Svar 
Straf  13 
Hjælp  86 
Ved ikke / vil ikke svare  1 
I ALT  100 
 
Det er hjælp og ikke straf, som befolkningen i Grønland forventer af 
Kriminalforsorgens anstalter. Denne holdning står lidt i modsætning til de 
argumenter, som i 1963 lå bag indførelse af anbringelse i anstalt som en kriminalretlig 
foranstaltning, jfr. ovenfor, hvor det er refereret, at anbringelse i anstalt i første række 
skulle tjene retssikkerheden og den almindelige lovlydighed, hvormed bl.a. mentes 
generalpræventive hensyn.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Balvig 2015:38. 
96 
 
Litteratur 
Balvig F. (2015): Kriminalitet og retsbevidsthed – i Grønland. I: Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Kriminalvidenskab, s. 7 ff. 
Betænkning nr. 500/1968 om det kriminalretlige sanktionssystem m.v. i Grønland. 
Betænkning (1990) vedrørende kriminalpolitiske spørgsmål i Grønland 1990. 
Betænkning nr. 1442/2004 om det grønlandske retsvæsen. Afgivet af Den 
Grønlandske Retsvæsenskommission. 
Den juridiske ekspedition til Grønland (1948-49): Betænkning, hæfte 6. 
Rosing, J. (1960): Îsímardik – Den store drabsmand. Det grønlandske selskabs skrifter.  
Therbild, N. (1965): Rapport om kriminallovens foranstaltningssystem. 
Udvalget for samfundsforskning i Grønland (1962): Kriminalloven og de 
vestgrønlandske samfund I – Samfundsvidenskabelige undersøgelser. Udgivet af 
udvalget. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
Den grønlandske fangebefolkning 
Annemette Nyborg Lauritsen 
 
En lang række internationale undersøgelser har gennem årene tegnet et billede af 
indsatte i fængsler rundt om i verden som fattige og marginaliserede (eksempelvis 
Christie 2001, Nilsson 2002, Wacquant 2008). Størsteparten er mænd, De er unge – 
yngre end gennemsnitsbefolkningen, de er ugifte eller fraskilte, de er dårligt 
uddannet og uden fast arbejde, de er hjemløse og oftere syge, og så rekrutteres de 
primært fra de lavere sociale klasser. 
I forhold til den grønlandske fangebefolkning findes der begrænset viden. For at 
undersøge, om det samme billede tegner sig af den grønlandske fangebefolkning 
lavede jeg derfor i forbindelse med min ph.d-afhandling Anstalten – frihedsberøvelse i 
Grønland (Lauritsen 2011) tilbage i 2010 et journalstudie, hvor jeg gennemgik 
samtlige indsattes journaler på daværende tidspunkt. Jeg vidste ikke, hvad og hvor 
meget jeg ville finde, da jeg åbnede den første journal. Derfor opstod de forskellige 
variable undervejs, som arbejdet skred frem. Mit fokus var for det første: De 
indsattes socioøkonomiske forhold forud for indsættelsen, og for det andet: De 
resocialiserende tiltag, som de blev stillet overfor under anstaltsopholdet. Da 
omdrejningspunktet for afhandlingen var de grønlandske anstalter, var det også kun 
de indsatte, som var anbragt dér, som indgik i journalstudiet. Men for at få det fulde 
billede af den grønlandske fangebefolkning er det nødvendigt at vende blikket mod 
Danmark.  
I det danske fængsel, som i dag hedder Herstedvester Fængsel afsoner en gruppe 
grønlandske mænd. De er dømt ved en grønlandsk ret og sendt 4.000 km. væk for at 
afsone en forvaringsdom. Og de må naturligvis også tælles med, hvis vi skal have et 
retvisende billede af den grønlandske fangebefolkning. Men denne gruppe indgik 
ikke i journalstudiet fra 2010. 
Da jeg fortsat er interesseret i at få et tydeligere billede af den grønlandske 
fangebefolkning, at lave en sammenligning til den øvrige nordiske fangebefolkning 
og for at søge efter svar på nye spørgsmål, besluttede jeg mig for at gentage 
journalstudiet.  
I oktober 2015 gennemgik jeg igen journaler over alle indsatte, som sad i Grønlands 
anstalter. Og i marts-april 2016 rejste jeg til Danmark, hvor jeg gennemgik de 
Herstedvester-dømtes journaler. Så det er langt fra et færdig bearbejdet studie af den 
grønlandske fangebefolkning der her præsenteres.  
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Fangetal 
Et af de mest anvendte mål til at drage sammenligning af, hvor strengt de forskellige 
lande straffer, er at sammenligne fangetal. Antal indsatte pr. 100.000 indbyggere. I 
forhold til de nordiske lande, fordeler fangetallet sig således: 
 
World Prison Brief: www.prisonstudies.org  
Med et fangetal på 208 skiller Grønland sig markant ud fra de øvrige nordiske lande. 
Det grønlandske fangetal er næsten 10 gange så højt som det færøske fangetal. Når 
det grønlandske fangetal fra ”World Prison Brief” anvendes, skal det understreges, 
at der udelukkende er tale om de indsatte, der afsoner i Grønlands anstalter. 
Gruppen af de forvaringsdømte grønlændere, der afsoner i Danmark, i 
Herstedvester Fængsel indgår ikke i dette tal. Den grønlandske fangebefolkning er 
altså større end det fremgår af WPB’s tal. 
Anstaltskapacitet, belægningsprocent  
I Grønland findes ingen fængsler – men bare et svimlende højt fangetal. Først i 2018 
får Grønland sit første fængsel – eller lukkede anstalt, som den kaldes. Hvor det 
blandt andet er hensigten, at de, som i øjeblikket sendes til det danske fængsel, skal 
afsone. 
Hidtil har afsoning foregået i de såkaldte åbne anstalter, hvor den bagvedliggende 
ideologi byggede på gerningsmandsprincippet og princip om resocialisering. 
Tanken var at den enkelte domfældte skulle hjælpes til en kriminalitetsfri tilværelse 
– i stedet for at blive straffet. Dette skulle blandt andet ske ved, at de gik på arbejde 
eller uddannelse i byen, samtidig med at de afsonede i anstalten. Med årene har 
disse anstalter dog udviklet sig til særdeles lukkede institutioner, hvor det kun er et 
fåtal af de indsatte, der mærker noget til den åbne anstalts principper.  
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Den samlede anstaltskapacitet har svinget lidt i de senere år. Da det første 
journalstudie blev gennemført i 2010 var den samlede anstaltskapacitet på 182 
pladser. På daværende tidspunkt var der 180 indsatte, hvilket vil sige en 
belægningsprocent på 98,9 pct. 
Fem år efter i efteråret 2015 var anstaltskapaciteten faldet til 154 pladser med blot 
122 indsatte. Hvilket vil sige en belægningsprocent på 79,2 pct. 
En positiv udvikling, som registreres på World Prison Brief’s liste med et meget stort 
fald – nemlig fra knap 300 indsatte pr. 100.000 indbyggere i 2010 til de nuværende 
208 – som dog stadig er meget, meget højt.  
Kriminallov - sanktionsstige 
Det særlige ved Grønlands kriminallov (Kriminallov for Grønland af 5. marts 1954) 
er, at man ikke straffer, men foranstalter. Den oprindelige kriminallov fra 1954 
hvilede på gerningsmandsprincippet, hvor båndet mellem skyld og straf var brudt. 
Foranstaltninger skulle vælges ud fra, hvad der tjente gerningsmandens 
genindtræden i samfundet bedst. 
I 2010 fik Grønland en ny kriminallov (Kriminallov for Grønland, Lov nr. 306 af 
2008), hvor gernings- og gerningsmandsprincippet kombineres, en såkaldt 
sanktionsstigemodel. Som navnet antyder, opereres der med et antal sanktioner, der 
spænder fra advarsel, bøde, betinget dom, tilsyn, samfundstjeneste, anstalt og med 
forvaring som den hårdeste sanktion. Sanktionsstigemodellen giver mere detaljerede 
retningslinjer for fastsættelse af foranstaltninger, og når gernings- og 
gerningsmandsprincippet kombineres giver modellen en højere grad af 
forudsigelighed i foranstaltningssystemet (Retsvæsenskommission 2004, bind 3: 815-
824). Frihedsberøvelse finder vi på de øverste trin af sanktionsstigen, som enten 
”dom til anstalt” eller en forvaringsdom. 
Af kriminallovens § 147 fremgår det, at anbringelse i anstalt ikke må overstige 10 år. 
De tidsbestemte anstaltsdomme er da også forholdsvis korte set i forhold til 
eksempelvis danske forhold. En dom for drab vil typisk udløse en anstaltsdom på 
mellem 5 og 7 år, hvor det i Danmark vil være mere end dobbelt så lang tid.  
I 2010 var 28,3 pct. af landets indsatte tilbageholdt (varetægtsfængslede) – dvs. de 
ventede på at modtage dom. I journalstudiet fra efteråret 2015 udgjorde antallet af 
tilbageholdte et mindre fald, da det her var 23,8 pct. af de indsatte i Grønlands 
anstalter. For de øvrige fordeler afsoningstiden sig således: 
 2010 (N=180) 2015 (N=122) 
0-2 måneder 10,5 % 3,3 % 
3-5 måneder 7,2 % 7,4 % 
100 
 
6-8 måneder 6,6 % 10,6 % 
9-11 måneder 4,4 % 7,4 % 
1-2 år 20 % 18,8 % 
3-4 år 10,5 % 11,5 % 
5 år 4,4 % 2,5 % 
6 år 1,6 % 4,9 % 
Over 6 år 2,8 % 3,3 % 
Forvaring 2,8 % 6,5 % 
 
Som det fremgår afsonede den største gruppe indsatte – både i 2010 og i 2015 – 
domme på mellem 1 og 2 år. 
Forvaring 
I 2010 afsonede 2,8 pct. af de indsatte, en forvaringsdom i en grønlandsk anstalt, 
mens det i 2015 var steget til 6,5 pct. af de indsatte i Grønlands anstalter. 
Forvaring på ubestemt tid idømmes ud fra kriminallovens § 161 og kan enten foregå 
i en grønlandsk anstalt eller som det fremgår af stk. 2 i samme § ”en psykiatrisk ledet 
anstalt under kriminalforsorgen i Danmark”, hvilket i praksis vil sige det danske 
Herstedvester Fængsel. 
Hvis man udelukkende studerer det grønlandske fangetal, ud fra indsatte i de 
grønlandske anstalter, er der som nævnt tegn på en positiv udvikling med et 
dalende fangetal. Men hvis vi inddrager den gruppe, som er sendt til afsoning i 
Danmark er udviklingen måske alligevel ikke så strålende. I de sidste 20 år er sket en 
voldsom stigning. 
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www.kriminalforsorgen.dk 
Da jeg i foråret 2016 gennemførte journalstudiet i Herstedvester Fængsel, bestod 
gruppen af grønlandske forvaringsdømte af 28 indsatte. Det vil altså sige, at den 
grønlandske fangebefolkning ikke er på 122 indsatte – men på 150, hvoraf 19 pct. er 
sendt til afsoning i Danmark.  
Hvis vi medregner de 8 forvaringsdømte, som afsoner i Grønlandske anstalter er der 
tale om 24 pct. af den grønlandske fangebefolkning, som afsoner en forvaringsdom. 
36 forvaringsdømte – hvoraf – de 28 er sendt til Danmark, lyder måske ikke af 
meget. Men det skal her tages i betragtning, at den grønlandske befolkning er en lille 
befolkning på knap 56.000 indbyggere. Hvis vi ganger op i forhold til det danske 
befolkningstal, ville det svare til, at Danmark skulle have mere end 3.500 
forvaringsdømte. 
Ifølge kriminallovens § 161, kan forvaring på ubestemt tid anvendes hvis: 
§ 161. Forvaring på ubestemt tid kan anvendes, hvis 
1) gerningsmanden findes skyldig i drab, røveri, frihedsberøvelse, alvorlig voldsforbrydelse, 
trusler af den i § 98 nævnte art, voldtægt eller anden alvorlig seksualforbrydelse eller 
brandstiftelse eller i forsøg på en af de nævnte forbrydelser, 
2) det efter karakteren af det begåede forhold og oplysningerne om den pågældende, herunder 
navnlig om tidligere kriminalitet, må antages, at den pågældende frembyder nærliggende fare 
for andres liv, legeme, helbred eller frihed, og 
3) anvendelse af forvaring er nødvendig for at forebygge denne fare. 
 
Det vil sige, at den dømte for det første er fundet skyldig i en alvorlig personfarlig 
forbrydelse. For det andet at det vurderes, at vedkommende fortsat frembyder en 
nærliggende fare for andres liv og legeme. Og i forhold til de, som sendes til 
Herstedvester, vurderes gerningsmanden pga. psykisk afvigelse uegnet til 
anbringelse i en Grønlandsk anstalt. At den dømte vurderes farlig og evt. psykisk 
afvigende, er der naturligvis eksperter, som har vurderet. Det er sket gennem en 
mentalundersøgelse, som ofte er blevet foretaget på et dansk hospital af danske 
psykologer og psykiatere. På baggrund af undersøgelsen udarbejdes en 
mentalerklæring, som er dommernes vigtigste redskab til at vurdere, om en tiltalt 
skal idømmes forvaring og om forvaringsdommen skal afsones i Danmark. En 
fjerdel af den grønlandske fangebefolkning – 24 pct. – udgør altså en sådan 
farlighed, at de grønlandske dommere har fundet en forvaringsdom passende, mens 
19 pct. er psykisk afvigende af en sådan grad, at de ikke kan afsone i Grønland og 
må sendes til et dansk fængsel. 
En tidsubestemt forvaringsdom er den absolut strengeste foranstaltning i den 
grønlandske kriminallov. Og når der står den er tidsubestemt – så menes der 
virkelig, at det er på ubestemt tid. Efter at have afsonet i 3 år kan en forvaringsdømt 
for første gang få prøvet sin sag i retten med henblik på en foranstaltningsændring. 
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Herefter kommer sagen for retten hvert andet år. Til forskel fra den tidsbestemte 
anstaltsanbringelse, hvor længstetiden som nævnt er 10 år – så er der ingen 
længstetid for forvaringsdømte, hvilket betyder, at nogle af de dømte har afsonet i 
virkelig mange år. For de 28 indsatte i Herstedvester har afsoningen været følgende: 
1-5 år 10 indsatte 
5-10 år 5 indsatte 
10-15 år 7 indsatte 
Over 15 år 6 indsatte 
 
13 af de 28 indsatte har afsonet i det danske fængsel i mere end 10 år, og 3 har været 
i Herstedvester mere end 20 år. 
Spørgsmålet er, hvorfor der er så mange grønlandske forvaringsdømte? Er så stor en 
andel af den grønlandske fangebefolkning virkelig så farlige og psykisk afvigende? 
Der skal ikke herske tvivl om, at alle forvaringsdømte er dømt for særdeles alvorlig 
personfarlig kriminalitet. Men det er de ikke de eneste der er. Den registrerede 
kriminalitet i Grønland vidner om et brutalt kriminalitetsbillede. Antallet af 
voldsanmeldelser i Grønland er ca. 4 gange så højt som i Danmark, mens 
anmeldelser om drab og sædelighedsforbrydelser er mere end 10 gange højere end 
det danske antal (Grønlands Politi 2016). Kriminalitetsbilledet i Grønland er brutalt – 
men Grønland er ikke et brutalt samfund. Der er nærmere tale om et udpint 
samfund. 
Levevilkår i Grønland – Opvækst, omsorgssvigtets konsekvenser 
I februar i år offentliggjorde Statens Institut for Folkesundhed en rapport med titlen 
”Befolkningsundersøgelsen i Grønland – levevilkår, livsstil og helbred” (SIFs 
Grønlandsskrifter 2016). En trist rapport, der netop vidner om en udpint befolkning. 
Der er tale om en meget omfattende undersøgelse, hvor resultaterne bygger på 
interview, spørgeskema og kliniske undersøgelser med i alt 2.100 personer over 18 
år, der indgik i undersøgelsen. En del af undersøgelsen havde fokus på 
opvækstvilkår. Her fremgik det, for gruppen født efter midten af 1960erne, at 70 pct. 
– eller flere havde været udsat for enten alkoholproblemer i barndomshjemmet, vold 
eller seksuelle overgreb. For de 18-29-årige viste undersøgelsen, at 33 pct. havde 
været udsat for seksuelle overgreb inden de fyldte 18 år (SIF 2016: 27). Flere 
undersøgelser viser det samme. I 2009 viste en rapport fra det danske 
Socialforsknings Institut, at 27 pct. af børn under 15 år var udsat for omsorgssvigt 
(Christensen 2009). Mens endnu en levevilkårsundersøgelse nåede frem til, at 28 pct. 
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af pigerne og 9 pct. af drengene mellem 15 og 18 år i 2004, som indgik i 
undersøgelsen havde været udsat for seksuelle overgreb (Curtis 2006). 
Det er altså rimeligt veldokumenteret, at det for en del mennesker, har været svært 
at vokse op i Grønland. Og det har jo naturligvis også været tilfældet for en stor del 
af den grønlandske fangebefolkning. 
Som nævnt har de forvaringsdømte grønlændere gennemgået en 
mentalundersøgelse forud for dommen. De fleste er vurderet farlige og som psykisk 
afvigende. Men når man dykker ned i deres mentalerklæringer, bliver det tydeligt, at 
for en del af dem er dette et resultat af netop en vanskelig opvækst. Her dukkede 
blandt andet følgende sætninger op: 
”Emotionelt tidligt skadet”  
”Dissocieret personlighed på baggrund af omsorgssvigt og mange års psykisk vold”  
”Lang tids krænkelse har ført til en personlighedsforstyrrelse”. 
Mange af de oplysninger, som findes i de indsattes journaler og mentalerklæringer 
burde være offentligt kendt – ikke bare i retssalene – men i særdeleshed også hos de 
grønlandske beslutningstagere, politikere og myndigheder. En holdning, som jeg 
gætter på en læge, der havde foretaget en personundersøgelse, deler. Vedkommende 
havde skrevet følgende lille notits i en journal: 
”gennem opvækst flere voldsomme episoder, der må have været alment kendt. 
Myndighederne har flere notater herom. Det kan undre, at myndigheder og lokalsamfund ikke 
har reageret, og aktuelle sag bør give anledning til revurdering af indsatsen for børn og 
unge”. 
Problemet er bare, at der i Grønland er mangel på uddannet behandlingspersonale. 
En realitet, som de grønlandske dommere, måske skeler til, når de afsiger en 
forvaringsdom til Herstedvester, eller når de ikke imødekommer en 
foranstaltningsændringssag. I en kredsretsdom med afslag på 
foranstaltningsændring begrunder kredsdommeren sin beslutning på denne måde: 
”Herstedvester er bedre til at hjælpe ham, end man er i Grønland. Her er der mulighed for at 
blive behandlet af uddannet fagfolk”. 
Selvmord 
For en stor del af den grønlandske fangebefolkning gælder, at det ikke blot er andre 
mennesker, de har forvoldt skade. Mange har skadet sig selv, og en del af de dømte 
har flere selvmordsforsøg bag sig. Desværre er det ikke unormalt i Grønland. 
Forekomsten af selvmord i Grønland hører til blandt den højeste i verden. 
Ungdommen er en sårbar periode, og det afspejler sig i raten for selvmord og 
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selvmordstanker hos unge grønlændere. Et fænomen, som ses i alle arktiske egne 
(SIF 2016:65-68). 
I forhold til selvmord kan man måske tale om at det unormale bliver normalt. De 
fleste i Grønland har været berørt af selvmord og har mistet familie og venner til 
selvmord.  
Med det netop gennemførte journalstudie var det hensigten at indsamle og 
kategorisere så mange baggrundsoplysninger om de indsatte som muligt. I forhold 
til deres opvækst, har jeg ledt efter oplysninger om, hvor de var opvokset, om det 
var i egen familie, plejefamilie eller døgninstitution. Jeg har set på forholdene i 
barndomshjemmet, om der var vold og misbrug. Og så har jeg ledt efter oplysninger 
om hvorvidt de har været udsat for omsorgssvigt eller er blevet seksuelt misbrugt i 
deres barndom.  
Desuden er der søgt efter relationer. Hvilke relationer er der mellem indsatte og 
forurettede? Er der tale om familiemedlemmer eller er det personer, de ikke har 
relationer til? Har de selv familie og børn – og hvis de har børn, er der søgt efter 
oplysninger om, hvor børnene er placeret, mens de afsoner. Og endelig var det 
ønsket at finde frem til, om de indsatte har forældre eller andre familiemedlemmer, 
som har afsonet i anstalt. 
Som nævnt er det grønlandske kriminalitetsbillede vældig brutalt. Der er tale om 
særdeles alvorlig personfarlig kriminalitet i et meget stort omfang. Men måske bør 
den voldsomme kriminalitet vi ser i Grønland ikke kaldes kriminalitet. Måske er der 
nærmere er tale om et fænomen, der hænger tæt sammen med selvmord. Det er sig 
selv og sine nærmeste, man forvolder skade – og derved er der måske tale om en 
form for udvidet selvmord? 
Mønsterbrydere 
Grønland er indehaver af en lang række triste verdensrekorder. Verdensrekorder der 
indebærer selvmord, misbrug, omsorgssvigtede børn og kriminalitet. Men jeg vil 
våge den påstand, at Grønland også har verdensrekord i mønsterbrydere. Stærke 
mennesker, der mod alle odds bryder med deres sociale arv. 
Blandt Grønlands mange mønsterbrydere findes en unge kvinde, der i år er indstillet 
til Nordisk Råds litteraturpris. Sørine Steenholdt hedder hun. I 2015 udgav hun den 
samfundskritiske bog, novellesamlingen ”Zombie Nunaat – Zombie Land”. Sørine 
Steenholdts projekt med denne bog har været, at give stemme til Grønlands 
omsorgssvigtede børn. På en af bogens sidste sider, dukker dette afsnit frem: 
”Min mor drak i rigtig mange år. I løbet af mange år ødelagde hun langsomt sin krop. 
Hendes lunger, lever, hjerne og andre organer blev beskadiget på grund af ulykker hun kom 
ud for, når hun drak. Hun forårsagede sine egne skader. I fuldskab forsøgte hun at begå 
selvmord og rev alle sin fingerled over, så hun ikke længere kunne bruge dem. I fuldskab 
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væltede hun og slog sit hoved voldsomt, så hun fik en lille hjerneblødning, og halvdelen af 
hendes krop blev svagere. Og i fuldskab faldt hun og beskadigede sit knæ og var nødt til at 
blive opereret. Efter operationen tog hun på druk så ofte, at hendes knæ ikke helede korrekt, og 
hun kunne ikke længere bruge sit ben ordentligt. Hun lod sig tæske af tilfældige mænd og fik 
en masse ar på hovedet, i ansigtet og på kroppen. For mig at se begik hun selvmord… 
langsomt” (Steenholdt 2015: 120). 
Spørgsmålet er, om det kriminalitetsbillede der tegner sig i Grønland, er et billede af 
omsorgssvigtede børn, der er blevet voksne. Og deres forbrydelse er, som Sørine 
Steenholdt skriver – et langsom og udvidet selvmord? 
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Abstract 
This article examines humour in prison-based cognitive-behavioural programs. The 
empirical data from fieldwork in three different program settings illuminates how 
the social interactions in the lessons are, surprisingly, saturated with humour. Hu-
morous interactions and jocular stories serve as a lubricant in the lessons, but they 
also function as disruptions and boundary-making between the participants and the 
instructors. To that end humour becomes a medium and a tool for prisoners to pre-
serve autonomy and dignity in the infantilising nature of the program curriculum. 
My findings advance understandings of the meanings of humour in prisons in gen-
eral and in cognitive-behavioural programs in particular while showing the limits of 
soft power in therapeutic settings.    
  
Keywords: humour, cognitive-behavioural programs, prisons, boundary-making, 
dignity 
 
Introduction 
One of the two groups works very seriously with the task and produces 
a commercial for football boots. The second group goes about the task in 
a humorous fashion and there is constant giggling and laughter from 
their end of the room. The second group finally presents the commer-
cial: ‘Your Organic Smoking Shop’ targeted readers of ‘Gateway to 
Hope’1 and other Danish prisoner magazines. The group has developed 
a new environmentally conscious way of smuggling marihuana into the 
prison by way of a delivery cycle. The slogan for the commercial is ‘You 
call, we throw’ [hinting at the fact that sometimes marihuana is thrown 
over the prison fence]. To add credibility to their commercial, the group 
has added the testimony of a satisfied customer. 
 
                                                 
1 ’Gateway of Hope’ [Håbets port] is a Danish magazine written by and for prisoners and distributed 
in all Danish prisons. 
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The participants in the cognitive-behavioural program Cognitive Skills were taught 
how commercials are designed to convince us to buy more. I was struggling not to 
giggle when the participants came up with the creative commercial on organic mari-
huana transportation, but it did not feel appropriate for me to laugh while the in-
structor tried to communicate a serious message while it seemed completely natural 
for the participants to laugh at each other’s jokes and horseplay. Humour seemed to 
be closely related to boundary-making as ‘elements of the joking culture serve to 
smooth group interaction, share affiliation, separate the group from outsiders and 
secure the compliance of group members through social control’ (Fine & De Soucey 
2005:1). Humour thus creates coherence between the participants which often serves 
to create boundaries between them and the instructor. This friction sparked my in-
terest in humour in cognitive-behavioural programs (hereafter CBPs). This article is 
structured by the following research question: how does humour function in CPBs 
as boundary-making? I seek to answer this question by analysing three distinct pat-
terns of humour; a) when both the instructors and prisoners laugh, b) when instruc-
tors, but not prisoners laugh and c) when prisoners, but not instructors laugh. Fol-
lowing this, I discuss ethnicity as a contested medium for humour where after I raise 
questions about different interpretations of humour and the limits of power in the 
concluding discussion. 
 
The context 
Since humour itself is a form of metacommunication (Bateson 1952), its meaning and 
social function can only be understood in relation to the context within which it ap-
pears (Rossell 1981:196; Douglas 1991:106). Here, the context is Danish prisons that 
are renowned for an emphasis on normalization, humane prison regimes and low 
incarceration rates (Pratt 2008). However, new rehabilitative attempts corresponding 
to the ‘What Works’ era of neoliberal rehabilitation were implemented in Danish 
Prisons in 1994 (Smith 2006) following the Canadian forerunners (Ross & Fabiano 
1988). Currently seven different programmes are available across the Danish Prison 
and Probation service2. The programs were implemented because of their promised 
ability to reduce recidivism and improve the participants’ social and interpersonal 
skills. The Canadian program developers (Ross & Fabiano 1988) claim that ‘offend-
ers’ are more likely to be impulsive, egocentric, rigid in their views, and poor at 
problem solving, perspective taking, and critical reasoning. The CBPs focus on indi-
vidual responsibility and expect participants to set their own standards for appro-
priate conduct through self-reflective analysis and assessment of the value of their 
own thoughts and behaviour (Sjöberg and Windfeldt 2008:39). Activities in a session 
                                                 
2 In 2013 504 offenders participated in the seven different cognitive-behavioural programs offered by 
the Danish penal services. As approximately 4000 people were imprisoned and 8000 on proba-
tion/under surveillance this year (Annual Report 2013), this may not come across as a high number, 
but since most prisoners are imprisoned for too short sentences to engage in training programs, the 
coverage is actually quite high (Prieur et. al. forthcoming). 
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include role plays, thinking games, dilemma puzzles and exercises in critical think-
ing (Ross & Fabiano 1988). These activities are meant to challenge the offender’s ego-
centric thinking and increase critical thinking, perspective taking and reasoning 
skills.  
Participation in CBPs in Danish Prisons is in principal voluntary. However, this 
could be termed as a ‘coerced voluntarism’ (Peyrot 1985) since prisoners are reward-
ed an early release, i.e. half time, if they demonstrate a special effort (such as engag-
ing in CBPs or drug treatment) to start afresh without crime (Nielsen 2012:139). This 
coerced voluntarism adds an extra dimension to the subordination that prisoners 
undergo. Goffman (1961) gives a sensitive account of the mortification of self the in-
mate in ‘total institutions’ has to endure as his privacy is invaded, he is programmed 
as a number and his old self is insulted. If we relate these characteristics of the total 
institution to newer rehabilitative efforts, Fox (1999:97) shows how prisoners’ ‘sensi-
bilities, decisions, feelings, and values are targets for evaluation, confession, and cor-
rection in cognitive self-change’. Crewe (2011) coins this cognitive self-change ‘nor-
mative imperialism’ in which prisoners feel that the CBPs are instructing them to be 
different kinds of persons – robotic prototypes of responsible citizenship that could 
not survive the realities of life in the environments from which they are drawn. 
Crewe’s research does not focus on humour, but a statement from one of his inform-
ants points to the difficulties in walking a tightrope between acceptable jokes and 
avoiding repercussions in the CBPs: ‘I made a joke about sedating my girlfriend to 
take her on holiday [as part of a course scenario] – in the report they gave no context, 
said that my idea of getting someone on a plane was sedating them! I got knocked 
back, based on the psychologists’ reports’ (Prisoner cited in Crewe 2011:516). This 
example adds credibility to Foucault’s (1977) argument about power being diffuse 
and decentralized, operating in a manner that is ‘light’ but anonymous. Power is 
thus demanding without seeming coercive, everywhere but nowhere (Crewe 2011: 
515). For Foucault, the prisoner is not regulated by ‘an exterior relation of pow-
er…but the individual is formed or, rather, formulated through his discursively con-
stituted ‘identity’ as prisoner’ (Butler 1997:84). This soft power in CBPs rests upon a 
particular construction of abnormality, distorted thinking, and ‘antisocial’ behaviour 
and thus constitutes a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1982). It is tempting to follow earli-
er research on resistance in prison (e.g. Bosworth & Carrabine 2001; Ugelvik 2011) 
and coin the prisoners’ humour as resistance against this type of power. However, 
Rubin (2015:27) argues that prison researchers in general overuse the concept of re-
sistance and proposes instead the term friction. Rubin suggests that we understand 
‘friction as individual’s actions that render power incomplete’ thus highlighting that 
many acts of fighting back towards power is about ameliorating one’s own condition 
rather than undermining the prison regime. The concept of friction allows me to ana-
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lyse humour as one of the ways prisoners struggle to maintain dignity3 and autono-
my rather than as hostile attempts to undermine the instructor or the CBPs. Humour 
in CBPs should then rather be understood as temporary suspensions of the social 
structure than a threatening of reason and order (Douglas 1991:107). Furthermore, 
Scandinavian prison practices seem to allow for larger amounts of explicit resistance 
as long as it remains well-meant, rational and eventually leads to compliance 
(Shammas 2014; Ugelvik 2011), which has important implications for the appear-
ance, nature, reception, and the permitted humour in CBPs.  
Functions of humour 
This article departs in analyses of humour as meta-communicational processes (Ros-
sel 1981:196), thus it revolves around the motivation that lies behind the use of hu-
mour and its social impact or function. The following review of theory and research 
on humour is divided into two subcategories relevant for the analysis: characteristics 
of humour and humour in institutional settings.   
 
Characteristics of humour 
In general, theories on humour fall into three broad categories: superiority, relief, 
and incongruity theory4 (Watson 2015:409). Importantly, humour can neutralize un-
comfortable, but repeated experiences such as asymmetrical power relations and 
infantilising situations. Both disciplinary and rebellious humour should be under-
stood in relation to social order. According to Billig, ‘whereas disciplinary humour 
mocks the powerless, rebellious humour can delight in taking the powerful as its 
target’ (Billig 2005:208). Douglas (1991:104) argues that humour connects and disor-
ganises, it attacks sense and hierarchies. This is in line with Bourdieu’s arguments 
about the quality of humour:  
 
‘The joke […] is the art of making fun without raising anger, by means 
of ritual mockery or insults which are neutralized by their very excess 
and which, presupposing a great familiarity, both in the knowledge they 
use and the freedom with which they use it, are in fact tokens of atten-
tion or affection, ways of building up while seeming to run down, of ac-
cepting while seeming to condemn… (Bourdieu 1984:183). 
 
Following Bourdieu’s line of reasoning, humour can function as a safety valve, a sort 
of sanctuary where one is allowed to say almost anything as long as the statement is 
                                                 
3 I follow Michael Rosen’s (2012) definition of dignity as the acknowledgement of a kernel of value 
that each of us carries within ourselves - the right to be treated with proper respect. 
4 1) The superiority theory (we find humour in the misfortunes of others to the ridicule of something 
or someone), 2) the relief theory as pioneered by Freud (1950) (we laugh to release emotional or psy-
chic tension) and 3) the incongruity theory where Kant (2008[1790]: 161) defines laughter as ‘an affec-
tion arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation being reduced to nothing’. 
111 
 
followed by a disclaimer; ‘it was just a joke’ (Fine & De Soucey 2005:3). Friedman 
(2014:367) discusses the relationship between humour and class and shows how the 
culturally privileged in the UK mobilize comedy as an instrument of distinction. 
Appreciation of humour thus functions as boundary-making between groups with 
lower and higher cultural capital. However, appreciation of humour and execution 
of jokes is not solely a tool for the powerful as ‘the comic, the power of laughter, lies 
in the man who laughs, not in the object of laughter’ (Baudelaire 1884:370). Thus, a 
joke can be seen as an attack upon something formal and organised, by something 
vital, and energetic; in essence a joke is an attack upon controls (Douglas 1991:95). 
This is in line with Bakhtin’s (1981:15) analysis of the carnival which involved a tem-
porary suspension of all social rules and etiquette. The ‘carnivalesque’ laughter is 
thus a comic state of being that functioned as a respite from official order and the 
everyday repression of the lower classes. Thus the carnival became a site of festivity 
and liberation wherein boundaries and hierarchies were inverted or overcome, ra-
tionalism and fear were revoked and seriousness was repealed, if only briefly. Hu-
mour thus has the ability to turn hierarchies upside down and play with boundaries 
in a non-dangerous manner.  
 
Humour in institutional settings 
A widespread use of humour has been observed in prisons (Crawley 2004; Goffman 
1961; Kristoffersen 1986; Mathiesen 1965; Tracy et al. 2006), but there are only a few 
studies with explicitly focus on humour. These studies primarily show that humour 
is used to cope under difficult conditions in prison, both by staff members (Crawley 
2004; Nylander et al 2011), and prisoners (Geer 2002). Sykes argued that the pains of 
imprisonment ‘carry a more profound hurt as a set of threats or attacks which are 
directed against the very foundations of the prisoner’s being’ (Sykes 1958:79). 
Mathiesen (1965:148) argues that humour is embedded in the ‘defences of the weak’ 
and may help to alleviate the pains of imprisonment. Thus, humour in prison may 
serve to release tensions, avoid aggression and to create an easier everyday life. Fol-
lowing Radcliffe-Brown (1952), Nielsen (2011) coins the humorous interactions be-
tween prisoners and staff as ‘joking relationships’ and shows how officers and pris-
oners ‘play’ with power relations by way of switching roles and pretending that the 
prisoner rather than the officer is in charge. Terry (1997:32) argues that humour in 
prison allows for the rare expression of vulnerability. Prisoners use humour as an 
attempt to undermine the strength of the many voices of the correctional system that 
continually attempt to manage and control them. This subtle resistance, or friction, 
highlights the struggle prisoners undergo to retain a sense of choice and autonomy 
in a situation where they are relatively powerless (Bosworth & Carrabine 2001:505).  
 
Previous research on humour among men and boys suggests that jocular mockery as 
well as the ability to take a joke and give back is important components of male iden-
tity constructions (Evaldsson 2005; Haugh & Bousfield 2012; Schnurr and Holmes 
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2009). Willis (1978) shows how ‘having a laff’ is a multi-faceted implement of ex-
traordinary importance in ’the lads’ counter school culture. Willis argues that ‘hav-
ing a laff’ defeats boredom and fear, helps overcome hardship and problems and in 
many ways ‘is the privileged instrument of the informal, as the command is of the 
formal’ (Willis 1978:29). Importantly, the school setting produces and shapes the par-
ticular ambiance of ‘the lads’ distinctive humour and specific themes of authority are 
explored, played with and used in their humour. However, ‘the lads’ jocular mock-
ery is not solely directed at authorities, but flows wildly as ‘piss-taking’, rough psy-
chical interaction, and as quick and witty responses in their intra-group dynamics as 
well (Willis 1978:32). Other critical sociological studies of humour in institutional 
settings include examinations of humour in a drug treatment facility (Andersen 
2015), an unemployment office (Mik-Meyer 2007), and in young offender institutions 
(Franzén & Aronsson 2013:1). These studies show how the intrinsic ambiguity of 
humour and teasing allows staff members to engage in temporary breaches of social 
order, while simultaneously enforcing local rules of conduct. As we shall see below, 
humour seems to allow the participants in CBPs to create and maintain boundaries 
between themselves and the instructors while they struggle to maintain a sense of 
autonomy and dignity. 
 
Data and Methods 
The data analysed in this article come from fieldwork, individual and focus group 
interviews, and informal conversations with many different actors in the Danish 
Prison and Probation Service. I have conducted around 150 hours of semi-
ethnographic (Stevens 2012) fieldwork and 11 open-ended, semi-structured inter-
views in three Danish prisons settings: two maximum-security and one minimum-
security prison. As I mainly draw on observational material, I will not go into details 
about the interview material (see Author 2015; 2016). Besides the observational data, 
I draw on a research workshop which I conducted in an annual meeting for the in-
structors in the Danish Prison Service. I presented my initial findings on humour 
and asked the 12 participating instructors to discuss the meanings of humour in 
small groups where after we discussed their findings in plenum. I recorded this dis-
cussion and transcribed it verbatim. Field notes and transcriptions have been trans-
lated from Danish into English. The prisons as well as all names of the participants 
and instructors have been anonymised to protect the identities of the individuals. 
The fieldwork consisted of ‘moderate participation’ (Spradley 1980) in one Cognitive 
Skills programme and three different Anger Management programmes. The pro-
grammes consist of 38 lessons and eight lessons respectively in which the partici-
pants go through lectures, group work, role plays and exercises in critical thinking 
(Sjöberg and Windfeldt 2008). The observed programs were group-based and con-
sisted of 4-6 participants. Out of 24 participants in total, 13 had non-Danish back-
grounds. The participants were all male and between 18 and 50 years old with a 
skew towards younger participants (41 % were between 18-25 years of age). The in-
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structors are all prison officers who have gone through a three week training course 
plus one year of supervision before they are certified as CBP instructors.    
 
It is difficult to say whether the participants’ use of humour was exaggerated by my 
presence (as found in other studies; see Kehily & Nayak 1997:78), but, in alignment 
with my impression, all of the instructors said that the participants seemed unaffect-
ed by my presence. Nevertheless, my presence as a relatively young, female re-
searcher may have contributed to the jocular stories in the programs. As laid out in 
the introduction to this article, I often found myself struggling not to laugh when the 
participants cracked jokes or turned role plays into comedy shows. Liebling (2001), 
following Becker (1967), argues that prison researchers must navigate the balance of 
‘whose side to be on’, i.e. the officers or the prisoners. Ethnography entails deep en-
meshment in the social realities of those studied, and a fine-tuned body and mind 
towards the social clues of the field (Hastrup 2004). Taking social clues means know-
ing or feeling when to laugh or not. I especially struggled to balance my loyalties 
towards the instructors and the participants whenever it felt inappropriate to laugh 
out of loyalty towards either party.   
 
Analysis 
My goal is to provide insight into how humour saturates CBPs and how laughter, or 
non-laughter, influences the sociality of the groups. I use extracts from observation 
to show how the participants use humour as boundary work and as a tool for restor-
ing autonomy and dignity. The analysis is divided into three parts which in turn ex-
amines situations when a) both participants and instructors laugh, b) when instruc-
tors, but not prisoners laugh, and finally c) when prisoners, but not instructors 
laugh. Lastly, I discuss humorous boundary-making in relation to ethnicity.    
 
When both participants and instructors laugh 
We use humour as a tool and an instrument because the tensions be-
tween inmates and officers can be high. I believe there is a lot of humour 
in the Danish Prison Service because humour is a way for us and the 
inmates to survive (CPB instructor).  
 
Indeed, humour has been found to be beneficial in deescalating trouble, and, a way 
for prison officers to avert the disciplinary gaze (see Emerson & Messinger 1977). 
Jocular interactions and well-functioning humour seems to enforce cohesion and 
build, if not trusting, then pleasant bonds between the instructors and participants. I 
witnessed the playful interactions between prison officers and participants on nu-
merous occasions; as for instance on the first day of fieldwork in a maximum securi-
ty prison. The instructor and I were walking down the wing with four participants 
when an officer called out: ‘are you guys going to an art workshop?’ in a slightly 
114 
 
amused and condescending tone. The participants almost squealed with laughter 
and replied ‘no man, Anger Management’! When we arrived at the classroom, the 
instructor, Mohammad, experienced technical difficulties during the very first les-
son. He was supposed to show the participants a video-recording of their own role 
play, but the equipment failed. The participant, Kasper, then said mockingly ’it’s 
fucked up that we can’t see the video’ and Mohammad replied ‘yeah, I also think it’s 
fucked up’. All of the participants teased Mohammad and said: ‘we have come well 
prepared, so you should be as well’. This insult in disguise did not lead to any reper-
cussions, but on the contrary seemed to have a positive effect on the group as a 
whole. Mohammad was not afraid to admit his own shortcomings and the relaxed 
atmosphere seemed to set the tone in the group. The ability of humour to break 
down hierarchies and boundaries were also on display when the instructor, Sussie, 
was demonstrating ‘aggressive body language’ in Anger Management. She threw 
things, shouted and was threatening in her body language, which made all the par-
ticipants laugh hard. The instructor, Michael, did a similar jocular demonstration of 
aggressive body language in Anger Management where he severely overstepped 
personal boundaries by placing himself way too close to the participants, waving his 
arms, and changing his tone and voice in an aggressive manner, which made every-
one laugh.  
 
Another successful jocular interaction between instructors and participants is seen 
when the participants negotiate whether they will get ‘half time’ if they fulfil the ob-
ligations set by the instructor and thus pass the program. Despite the obvious power 
asymmetry at play here, the instructors and participants are oftentimes able to joke 
about the conditions. This was displayed when the instructor suggested that the par-
ticipants should set up an acting class after Cognitive Skills finished due to their tal-
ents as actors in the role plays. The participants replied ’yeah, for sure – if we get 
half time for doing it’! The joke brings into relation disparate elements thus resulting 
in that ‘one accepted pattern is challenged by the appearance of another which in 
some way was hidden by the first’ (Douglas 1991:96). This jocular episode resonates 
with Nielsen’s (2011) findings in her study of ‘joking relationships’ among prisoners 
and officers. She describes a situation where an officer pretends to give a prisoner his 
keys thus playing with the obvious power asymmetries between them. However, 
this example also highlights the limits of humour; no real or efficient change in the 
power balance is made and normal order is restored immediately after the interac-
tions. Another example of humour between instructors and participants is seen 
when the instructor, Mohammad, asked the participant, Viktor, to place himself up-
on signs on the floor with respectively ‘passive’ ‘aggressive’ and ‘assertive’ written 
on them according to his behaviour in relations to the police, his mother-in-law, and 
family and prison officers. He mostly chose passive or assertive, but also aggressive 
in relations to his mother-in-law. Then it was Ahmad’s turn and he placed himself 
firmly on the ‘passive’ sign in relations to his parents and mother-in-law which 
made everyone laugh, while they exclaimed that this behaviour was due to his eth-
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nic minority background. This is an example of ‘ethnic humour’ gone well, but I will 
return to more problematic types in the discussion.  
 
Previous studies have shown how many jokes deal with tendentious topics such as 
sex, aggression, and ethnic insult (Fry 1963; Davies 1990). Adding to this, another 
vernacular for shared humour between the instructors and participants in the CPBs 
is jocular stories embedded in the prison folklore (as seen in hospitals, see Coser 
1959:176), such as stories or enactments of ‘funny violence’. They can be a principal 
source of laughter, excitement and pleasure in which violence is legitimized as ‘just 
for fun’. The participants were often asked to ‘consider all alternatives’ when con-
fronted with a possible tense or violent situation. This request to self-reflect and crit-
ically assess the value of one’s own thoughts would sometimes result in jokes. These 
jocular stories are perhaps also an attempt to restore a (masculine) sense of autono-
my and dignity, as seen when Michael said: ‘well, I wouldn’t want to kill him, just 
stomp on him a little bit’. This remark made everyone laugh, including the instruc-
tor. Instead of correcting Michael, the instructor said: ‘that’s alright; if you’ve been 
completely wild and then learn to just slap someone - that’s great!’ The participants 
continued to joke and said that ‘a sweaty hand and a slap go well together – then it 
says splash!’ which also resulted in laughter from everyone present. In another ex-
ample of an exercise in ‘considering all alternatives’ when faced with a potential con-
flict, the instructor Mohammad, asked the participants to list suggestions on how to 
calm down if they become angry. After a few suggestions such as ‘smoking ciga-
rettes, being alone and working out’ the participant Ahmad exclaimed: ‘I put on a 
facial mask and listen to Tupac’. Everyone laughed at this point and the discussion 
was heated – according to the participants no man would put on a facial mask in 
order to calm down! In an attempt to redirect the discussion, the instructor then said 
that he ‘reads a novel and listens to Frank Sinatra’ when he is upset. This made the 
whole group laugh hard and protest once again; no one is able to read when they are 
upset! Reading and listening to Frank Sinatra did not seem a viable solution. Draw-
ing on Friedman (2014), this disagreement can also highlight differences in the cul-
tural capital and habitus of the instructors and participants as it seemed completely 
unrealistic to listen to Frank Sinatra (the participants would often suggest listening 
to Tupac instead) while reading. Another instructor, Jeppe, also suggested that the 
participants should read when they get upset, but this suggestion was rejected. 
Nadim exclaimed: ’I don’t really know how to read’ which made the group giggle, 
but eventually they chimed in with their own experiences of illiteracy. One of the 
other participants then suggested that ‘you should drink a beer when you are upset’ 
when another participant answered ‘yeah, but then you end up getting arrested be-
cause you smashed someone in town’ in a jocular tone which made everyone laugh. 
The following humorous interruption led to a discussion between the participants 
and the instructor about the value of negotiation skills and thus was not disruptive 
to the instructor’s point with the lesson. The participants in Cognitive Skills acted 
out a role play wherein Irfaan played an angry customer in an auto shop. Irfaan ne-
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gotiated with the mechanic and said that he would pay him extra money if he could 
have Irfaan’s car repaired by the morning which made Jonas exclaim: ‘that’s bribery’ 
while he laughed out loud. Irfaan said: ‘no, that’s not bribery, it is a social skill’. 
There seems to be a high level of common ground between the instructors and par-
ticipants when the jocular stories are characterized by tragi-comical elements. Hu-
mour can thus function as a safety valve, a sanctuary and boundary-making which 
drew the group closer together in the above examples. However, the instructors’ at-
tempts to joke and create humorous bonds between them and the participants are 
sometimes rejected and fall flat as seen below.  
 
When instructors, but not prisoners laugh 
 
The instructors in the aforementioned research workshop on humour in the pro-
grams saw the participants’ use of humour as a result of their cognitive distortions: ‘I 
think that you can observe the participants’ lack of social skills and their missing 
ability to judge a situation imbedded in their use of humour’. Thomas further ex-
plained: ‘You’ve been asked to consider something that is painful or difficult and 
then you try to avoid it by using humour, being angry or trying to pinpoint a mis-
take in the program curriculum’. The instructors seem to view most of the partici-
pants’ behaviour through a ‘cognitive deficit’ lens – much in accordance with their 
training. Nevertheless, the success of the instructors is very much dependent on the 
collaboration with the participants and tension arises whenever the instructor fails to 
accurately engage in humorous exchanges. The participants seem to reinforce 
boundaries between them and the instructors when the instructors’ humorous re-
marks are rejected. Such a rejection was on display when the instructor, Sussie, was 
joking around and used different names such as ‘sweetie’ for the participant, Omar. 
This was seemingly an attempt to humorously build report and trust between the 
two, but Omar did not seem to appreciate this and replied angrily: ‘what’s my 
name’? Omar and the instructor had a troubled relationship from the outset of the 
program and Sussie’s humorous attempt to restore their relationship could not over-
come the boundaries between them.  
 
The instructors are preoccupied with the complexities in balancing between using 
too much and too little humour. They all agree that humour is an important tool for 
building trust and coherence in the groups as well as making the lessons pleasura-
ble. The instructors seem to view humour as a lubricant that creates flow in the so-
cial order in the groups and helps tackle difficult or unpleasant situations. However, 
it is not an easy task as exemplified by Kirsten: ‘I think that sometimes you use your-
self as an instrument and take a bullet if the participants make fun of you as an in-
structor or the other participants. It depends on the relationships between the partic-
ipants and the dynamics of the group. It is very complex’. I discussed the difficult 
task of establishing bonds between instructors and participants via humour with a 
program consultant who is in charge of supervising the instructors: 
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Elsebeth: I have supervised a couple of instructors where I had to correct 
them for using too much humour. I asked them to think about where the 
limit is – when do you use too much humour? Does everyone share the 
same kind of humour?  
Author: How did the instructors use humour? 
Elsebeth: Like a putdown joke of a single person - ’you’re like this and 
you always do that’. They accidently put an individual on the spot in 
front of the others, but they don’t mean it in a bad way. But, for that in-
dividual – who knows what he is thinking? I have also experienced an 
instructor using humorous examples on the differences between men 
and women where humour is an attempt to find a common ground – 
now we agree that women are like these stereotypes. But the instructors 
have to be pro-social, a role model and they really have to be careful not 
to label people’  
 
It can be difficult for the instructors to navigate between well-put jocular remarks 
and ‘labelling’ as described by the program consultant. Attempts to overcome 
boundaries and establish trust can be difficult when prisoners oftentimes have deep 
seeded mistrust of authority figures and prisons in general are low-trust environ-
ments (Liebling 2004). Boundaries between staff and prisoners cannot easily be over-
come and it is most often prisoners’ rather than instructors’ laughter which domi-
nates the classroom as seen in the following.    
 
When prisoners, but not instructors laugh 
 
Humour seems to allow the participants in CBPs to create friction (Rubin 2015) 
against the psychological power imbedded in this type of ‘treatment’, while avoid-
ing serious repercussions. Humour thus allows them to challenge the instructors’ 
authority by making fun of the exercises and role plays, but they do not fundamen-
tally change the premises for the programs. Oftentimes humour is on display as sub-
tle disruptions or twisting of the instructors’ original point with an exercise, but goes 
relatively unabated in the lesson; the instructor does not have to stop or correct the 
participants in a harsh or strict manner. These disruptions could be understood as 
rebellious humour (Billig 2005) where jokes target the powerful; in this case the CBP 
instructors. The quixotic and oftentimes infantilising role plays in the programs are 
ripe for producing jokes, silliness and stilted examples. However, as also found in 
Fox’s study (1999:445) the participants’ disruptions actually most often revolve 
around the arbitrary format requirements of the program such as the role plays or 
thinking exercises – not the content as such. It became clear in an exercise in critical 
thinking and how to handle defeats that the participant, Jonas, was interpreting the 
lesson in his own humorous fashion. Jonas was supposed to think through all possi-
bilities if he were to find it difficult to secure a livelihood upon his release. Jonas 
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used a metaphor of his previous effort to open a safety box to get hold of the money 
inside: ‘I’ll just keep trying and use different tools. If it doesn’t work with a cutting 
blowpipe, then I’ll use a grinding machine - it will open at some point’! Bishar 
chimed in and said ’I sometimes feel defeated when I think about the crimes I am 
imprisoned for, but then again – there is a difference between the amount of crimes 
I’ve committed and the ones I am convicted for’. Both examples resulted in a roar of 
laughter from the other participants. The point of the exercise was obviously not to 
become a ‘better criminal’, but to find alternatives such as employment or applying 
for social security when the participants find themselves lacking money. However, 
Jonas seemed to find the exercise infantilising and self-explanatory so he made fun 
of it albeit in a very subtle manner. Another exercise in ‘critical thinking’ can further 
prove the point of understanding jokes as rebellious humour against seemingly ‘sil-
ly’ exercises. The participants were asked to discuss an example of two parents argu-
ing about their discovery of their daughter’s habit of smoking cigarettes from respec-
tively the daughter’s and the parents’ point of view. According to the instructor, the 
point of this exercise is to develop and practice ‘critical thinking’ and ‘efficient deci-
sion-making’. Jonas said: ’don’t worry, she just needs a little tobacco to mix with the 
marihuana’ which made all the participants laugh. However, the instructor did not 
laugh and struggled to re-rail the discussion, but the participants succeeded in their 
sabotage of the lesson when the discussion soon died out.  Following Douglas 
(1991:107), the joker Jonas, ‘lightens for everyone the oppressiveness of social reality, 
demonstrates its arbitrariness by making light of formality in general, and expresses 
the creative possibilities of the situation’. These examples highlight the boundaries of 
the group and the seemingly small, but yet significant symbolic victories that the 
participants obtain by disrupting the lessons.  
 
The failure of a shared sense of humour highlights a blur in the meta-
communicational framing process that delineates the boundary between seriousness 
and play (Bateson 1952; Rossel 1981). This is seen in CPBs when otherwise jocular 
stories are understood as underlying signs of ‘criminal thinking’ as in the following 
examples where two thinking exercises are subtly ridiculed by the participants. The 
participants were asked to write a short story based on a photograph of a man stand-
ing alone in a dark alley. The point of this exercise was to clarify how every partici-
pant has his own point of view and thus create different stories. The participant, Jo-
nas, wrote a story about the man in an ally, who had just committed robbery in a 
convenience store and was now counting the profit; money and cigarettes. Michael 
also wrote a story in the ’true crime’ genre which encompassed an outlaw biker who 
was planning his next robbery. These stories amused the other participants, while 
the instructors suggested that Jonas and Michael had misunderstood the task at 
hand, but she did not prompt them to rewrite their stories. Jokes have what Goffman 
(1981: 46) describes as a ’referential afterlife’, which in this case means that the jocu-
lar short-stories became an ongoing theme in the rest of the program which served to 
reinforce the groups internal boundaries while continuously excluding the instruc-
119 
 
tor, who did not find the stories funny. The lesson continued with a discussion about 
how fast one is allowed to drive and who should decide that. Jonas argued that it is 
alright to drive as fast as your own norms and duties dictate. The instructor chal-
lenged this and asked: 
 
Instructor: What if there is a policeman on duty assigning speed tickets? 
Wouldn’t you be obliged to slow down at that point?  
Jonas: Well, then you have to slow down right before the police officer 
and then speed up again once you’ve passed him.  
Instructor: You have obligations towards society don’t you?  
Jonas: Well, yeah some people think so…  
Ibrahim: This is why he is in prison! [All participants laugh while the in-
structor does not]  
 
All three examples resulted in laughter from the surrounding participants, but left 
the instructor baffled. Fox (1999:438) shows how ‘reports of rule-breaking behav-
iours by inmates were decontextualized from situations and rearticulated as the 
product of thinking errors characteristic of criminals’ in CPBs. This re-narrating of a 
joke was also visible in the previously mentioned example of the prisoner joking 
about sedating his girlfriend in order to get her on a plane (Crewe 2011). These sto-
ries or reports of rule-breaking behaviour do not necessarily reflect that the partici-
pants always make ‘criminal choices’ (as argued by the program manuals, see 
Sjöberg & Windfeldt 2008; Scheel & Sjöberg 2005), but perhaps rather that the partic-
ipants are familiar with the point of the exercise and have no difficulties in under-
standing that everyone has their own opinions. Hence, they creatively object to the 
exercises in a humorous fashion, which affirms the boundaries between them and 
the instructor and allows them to preserve autonomy and dignity. 
  
Another outlet for humour among the participants is sexualized joking. Humour 
within school settings has been analysed as a technique utilised for the regulation of 
masculinity and negotiation of gender-sexual hierarchies (Kehily & Nayak 1997:70). 
During an exercise in critical thinking skills and self-containment in Anger Man-
agement, the participants are supposed to relate to an example of a football player 
who is about to do a penalty shot which will determine the outcome of the game. 
The football player is thinking ‘negative thoughts’ and he is sure that he will fail. The 
participants’ fidgeting, yawns, sideway glances and stretches serve as signs of their 
difficulty in engaging in this particular exercise. Nevertheless, they begin to answer 
the instructor’s questions about what topics the football player should replace his 
negative train of thoughts with:  
 
Amin: Women.  
Khazar: It depends on what kind of match it is.     
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Omar: I cannot really see how I am supposed to stand and think about 
this in a heated situation. I have to try it before I believe it.  
Amin: Just say PEACE! [Everyone, besides the instructor, laughs. The 
discussion is derailed and the instructor changes the topic].  
Instructor: Can anyone summarize today’s lesson?  
Imad: It is normal to be angry and we are not crazy.  
Omar: Don’t we have to do any homework?  
Amin: You have to listen to that CD, you have to be completely naked 
while you do it and touch yourself all over your body [All participants 
laugh while the instructor seems frustrated] 
 
This exercise was effectively disrupted by the participants’ humorous horseplay and 
the instructor was forced to move on to another subject after she had unsuccessfully 
prompted them to take the exercise seriously. The young participants pride them-
selves with having an assertive heterosexuality and a ‘feel for the game’ with young 
women. The participants joke about their capacity for ’gangster-love’ and how they 
aim to win female prisoners over with their charm and wit. Jokes, innuendos and 
comments about women or girls were frequently on display, but seemed to function 
as a group consolidating mechanism rather than actual sexist or misogynist behav-
iour (for a different account, see Kehily & Nayak 1997). Tales of female conquests 
also highlights the numerous ways that the participants might seek redemption for 
their experiences of being emasculated and infantilised qua their imprisonment 
(Ugelvik 2011). Adding to this, I argue that expressing an active heterosexual identi-
ty and success in winning women over are important elements of such jocular identi-
ty work as seen below. Stereotypical or dominant images can be redeployed differ-
ently or disruptively (Munoz 1999) for instance through bodily resistance; tattoos, 
sexual experiences and physical prowess (Raby 2005:154). In this vein, humour can 
potentially transform a problematic being into an asset. The remark by Imad (‘it is 
normal to be angry and we are not crazy’) also serves to illustrate a re-narration of a 
potentially negative self-image (being crazy) while pushing forward more positive 
self-images of being capable and skilled. The participants and the instructor in An-
ger Management went on to discuss how the participants experienced the assign-
ment of listening to a relaxation CD every night before they went to sleep. As evi-
dent in the below example, the participants were more preoccupied with girls than 
with relaxation:   
 
Khazar: It was a bit difficult to listen to the CD because my cell-mate 
was there as well. It was more relaxing when I chose the female voice-
over...  
Imad: He can’t relax because he doesn’t have a mermaid! [Girlfriend]  
Omar: Yes! He has tons of mermaids; he is an Iraqi player, an Iraqi Johan 
Travolta! [Everyone, besides the instructor, laugh] 
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Besides showing a preoccupation with women, this example also shows how disrup-
tive humour can be; the participants managed to derail the conversation completely 
and thus forced the instructor to change the subject. There is a certain esoteric nature 
in the participants’ shared humour which creates boundaries between the partici-
pants and the instructor as seen in relations to women and sexuality, but also in rela-
tions to the sociality and inner workings of the prison. The shared knowledge of the 
subcultural values and norms of the prison sociality is visible in the following. The 
participants are often asked to act in role plays where they are assigned different 
roles and have to pretend to be either ‘passive’, ‘aggressive’ or ‘assertive’. Sometimes 
these role-plays fail because it is difficult for the participants to play the roles in a 
manner that satisfies the instructor. The participant, Imad, role played with the in-
structor, but the participants kept misinterpreting her behaviour: they deemed her 
behaviour aggressive instead of passive. The role play dissolved when the partici-
pants began to make fun of assertive communication and mockingly said: ’I am very 
upset right now’. In general, the participants do not seem to find assertive communi-
cation a viable solution to a conflict in prison. This was also the case in the next ex-
ample, where the participant, Patrick, tells the story of a conflict between him and 
another prisoner. The other prisoner stole something from Patrick’s cell and he 
teased Patrick throughout the day. Patrick was furious in the end and wanted to hit 
the other prisoner. The instructor asks: ‘what could you do to solve this in an asser-
tive manner’? Patrick said ‘I guess I could have told the guards’, which made all the 
participants laugh out loud. ‘Snitching’ in the shape of telling the guard is a well-
known sin in prison regardless of the fact that snitching is actually widespread 
(Copes, Brookman & Brown 2013). The participants draw upon this subcultural 
knowledge in order to ridicule the exercise and display the absurdity of assertive 
communication in prison. The following discussion continues to focus on esoteric 
examples of humour in relations to ethnicity and shows how ethnicity is a contested 
medium for humour.  
 
Discussion - ethnicity as a contested medium for humour 
 
The following discussion will show how jokes revolving around ethnicity can work 
well and fall flat in the CBPs. The success or failures of this type of jocular interaction 
depend on the groups’ boundaries which are either reinforced or broken down de-
pending on the sender and recipient of the joke. My field notes bear testament to the 
instructors’ attempts to build bridges between themselves and the participants with 
another ethnic background than Danish by joking with their ethnicity. However, the 
following example shows how instructors’ attempts to bond with the participants 
can fall flat. The instructor in Anger Management, Mohammad, asked whether the 
participants had ever experienced peer pressure. Ahmad replied that he had indeed 
experienced the peer pressure of robbing a plumbing shop with toilets, sinks, etc. 
This story made Mohammad laugh out loud and exclaim: 
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This has to end! I am so tired of hearing foreigners talking about small 
scale tricks, like robbing old people’s homes or scamming a grocery 
store for petty things and then listening to ethnic Danes talking about 
their financial crime, large scale tax fraud and other white collar crimes!   
 
The instructor was obviously joking, but the participants did not seem amused by 
this story. They seemed to understand the joke alright, but they did not participate in 
the instructor’s laughter and sat rather baffled and speechless. The participants reject 
the invitation to create a ’we-ness’ in this example by refusing to laugh at the instruc-
tor’s joke. As joking is temporally immediate, and calls for audience involvement the 
absence of a response becomes a judgment on the teller and/or the remark (Fine & 
De Soucey 2005:3). Even though the instructor and some of the participants shared a 
non-Danish ethnic background in this particular group, the asymmetrical power re-
lation between the instructor and the participants trumped the shared ethnicity and 
the bonding that could presumably spring from that. Joking is thus not a cure-all 
ailment for a group. After the joke was rejected and fell flat, the instructor tried to re-
rail the discussion by asking whether the participants would provide more examples 
of peer pressure and blackmailing. They responded that blackmailing had basically 
been their livelihood and one dramatic story of blackmailing others for money, 
goods or power followed the other. As argued by Ortner (1995:180) subaltern re-
sponses to domination should be seen as ad hoc and incoherent springing from ideas 
called into being by the situation of domination itself. These stories of fairly horrific 
blackmailing could be seen as the participants’ attempts to reclaim dignity after the 
discrediting joke on their behalf.  
 
The final example shows how jokes about ethnicity can work well if they spring 
from the participants’ own sense of humour rather than the instructor’s in the previ-
ous example. The below example touches upon another important aspect of humour 
in CBPs, namely that despite the potential stereotypical categorizations of ethnicity, 
this subject is, in general, played out in a humoristic and seemingly unproblematic 
manner amongst the participants: 
 
The participants are asked to perform a role play based on a moral di-
lemma involving a gas station in a situation of gasoline scarcity as part 
of a ‘critical thinking exercise’. The participants are assigned different 
roles and Imad is the filling station attendant. This role assignment 
makes Michael exclaim: ‘they have a foreign worker [fremmedarbejder] 
running around and attending to the customers’ needs’! This remark 
makes everyone laugh including Imad who plays the part of a non-
Danish speaking ’foreign worker’ to perfection by displaying a heavy 
accent, thus pretending not to understand what the customers need. The 
atmosphere is very loose, full of laughter and jokes and the participants 
are truly acting out there parts. In the process of acting, the participants 
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have psychically taken over the classroom hence the instructor and I are 
standing up against a wall in the back of the room. The instructor seems 
worried about the unruly situation and she doesn’t seem to find it fun-
ny.  
 
The instructor seems to be caught in a dilemma here - is she supposed to laugh when 
the joke is actually quite offensive and the role play has run loose way beyond her 
intentions? If she laughs, she could be seen as agreeing with racial stereotypes, but 
when she does not laugh, she is excluded from the sameness created by the partici-
pants. The instructor is outmanoeuvred both physically (backed up against the wall) 
and metaphorically by her inability to respond in a proper manner. Following Doug-
las (1991:95) jokes may have a subversive effect on the dominant structure as seen 
here when the participants actually take control of the situation thus leaving the in-
structor with very limited options for appropriate action. According to Bakhtin 
(1981), humour can help to make stereotypes seem grotesque and ridiculous which 
can result in a disruption of the implicit derogatory portrait. The participants thus 
challenge negative stereotypes about ethnicity by turning them into gross over-
statements. Furthermore, joking is referential which ‘presumes that the parties in-
volved share references—their idioculture—by which they make sense of the implic-
it meanings of this jocular interaction’ (Fine and De Soucey 2005:4). The participants 
know each other, share a history and common identity and are thus able to under-
stand and appropriately respond to esoteric joking references. The participants thus 
managed to reinforce the boundaries between them and the instructor by creatively 
and humorously disrupting the exercise.  
 
Concluding discussion 
My analysis has shown how different analytical lenses or understandings provide 
very different interpretations of humour. The instructors interpret humour through 
a ‘deficit’ lens much in accordance with their training. This means that the partici-
pants’ use of humour is understood in psychological terms and as confirmations of 
their cognitive distortions. As a supplement to this understanding, this article push-
es forward a sociological analytical lens and thus a different understanding of hu-
mour. This perspective allows for an interpretation that pays attention to the social 
nature of humour, the context in which it plays out and its use in breaking and mak-
ing boundaries. Furthermore, this sociological perspective allows for an analysis of 
the way soft power in shape of prison-based CBPs operates. This enables an analysis 
of the ways power works and does not work or at least is disrupted. These senti-
ments stand in contrast to a Foucauldian understanding of power which implies that 
power always works – including in productive and positive ways. According to 
Foucault, power is not suppressing in itself, but is exercised through the individual 
and through the way the individual is subjectified (Foucault 1977). Furthermore, 
power produces resistance - in fact discipline itself inspires insubordination (Fox 
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1999:94). However, Skeggs (2004, 2011) is sceptic about the reach of governmental 
power. She has studied the attribution of value to different performances of the self 
and argues that people resist the negative categorizations, and attribute value to 
their life forms in spite of the negative discourses. Similarly, my findings call for a 
more nuanced interpretation of power because the participants actively disrupt and 
twist the power hierarchies in the CBPs. Furthermore, they do not readily accept the 
characteristics pushed forward by the program manuals such as the alleged tenden-
cies to be impulsive, egocentric, rigid in their views, and poor at problem-solving, 
perspective-taking, and critical reasoning (Ross & Fabiano 1988). On the contrary, 
they pride themselves with their ‘street smarts’, sexual capacities, psychical prowess 
and understandings of how to manoeuvre in a tense prison setting. This does not 
necessarily imply that they do not internalize the programmatic characteristics at 
some point and thus strive to conduct themselves differently, but we should not 
readily accept the notion that power always works. Perhaps the participants pay lip 
service to the programmatic goals and go on to live their lives as they see fit once 
they pass the programs. Humour is an excellent tool against power, as seen in satiri-
cal cartoons meant to challenge oppressive regimes, jocular remarks directed at the 
powerful or in working class ‘lads’ humour, which works as a defence and counter-
attack against the school culture. These jocular disruptions of power may result in 
subversion eventually (as seen when the ‘lads’ end up reproducing working class 
selves, Willis 1978), but humour should be taken seriously as attempts to delegiti-
mize stereotypes, categorizations and subordinating experiences.       
 
I have shown how the participants’ use of humour serves as disruptions of role plays 
and exercises that take place during prison-based CPBs. Use of humour thus enables 
the participants to object in subtle ways that do not call for reprimands. I have also 
analysed the participants’ use of humour to transform a supposedly problematic be-
ing into an asset. Thus, they manage to object towards the embedded ‘cognitive defi-
cit’ lens that their behaviour is understood through by humorously negotiating with 
the premises for identity construction. Jocular gripes and jocular stories of masculini-
ty, violence and crime also serve as rebellious humour which can remedy the other-
wise ‘forced production of selves’ (Fox 1999:111) in CPBs. The jokes and comments 
made by the participants in CBPs, however silly, puerile, or chaotic they may ap-
pear, could be understood as attempts to restore autonomy and dignity in an other-
wise infantilising and emasculating institution and programmatic setting. My analy-
sis of humour and soft power in prison-based CPBs has shed light on new ways of 
understanding the subordination that takes place in these programs while, im-
portantly, giving way to the numerous ways that the participants humorously create 
friction (Rubin 2015) by resisting and transforming the programmatic goals. This 
allows for an understanding of humour as boundary work and as a tool in a struggle 
for autonomy and dignity.  
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Indledning 
Med afsæt i John Hunters motto ”Don’t (just) think, try”, der udgør grundprincippet 
i den eksperimenterende kriminologi (Sherman 2006), har jeg som en del af mit 
ph.d.-projekt gennemført et socialt forsøg i et åbent fængsel. Forsøget tager 
udgangspunkt i Kriminalforsorgens normaliseringsprincip, der siden 1970’erne har 
været et grundprincip i den danske kriminalforsorg1. Normaliseringsprincippet 
knytter an til en forståelse af, at de negative sider ved fængselsopholdet skal 
begrænses mest muligt og at afsoningsvilkårene så vidt muligt skal afspejle 
forholdene uden for fængslet (Engbo 2005). Fængslet skal altså ikke være mere 
fængsel end nødvendigt (Dahl 2006, 77). 
Forsøget tager afsæt i, at disse kriminalpolitiske hensigtserklæringer har mulighed 
for at realisere sig mere, end det i dag er tilfældet. Fængsler er ikke uskyldige steder, 
de er steder, der sætter deres aftryk og de har betydning for de mennesker, der tager 
ophold heri i kortere eller længere perioder (Clemmer 1958, Sykes 1958, Goffman 
1967, Mathiesen 1965, Crewe 2009).  
I Danmark benyttes det åbne fængsel som primære afsoningsform. Der har i nyere 
tid været opmærksomhed på, at lade indsatte tage del i livet uden for fængslet, 
hvilket sikrer, at fængselsmiljøet ikke er det eneste miljø, den indsatte er en del af 
(Betænkning nr. 1181/1989, 143). Hvor der har været et fokus på passagen udadtil, 
har det omvendte i begrænset omfang været tilfældet.  Altså at omverdenen får 
mulighed for at tage del i livet i fængslet. Det er på trods af, at de få danske 
erfaringer peger i retning af, at det kan have et individualpræventivt udbytte.  
Idéen om at lukke omverdenen ind i fængslerne er ikke ny, og kan spores tilbage til 
tidligere direktør for fængselsvæsenet, Lars Nordskov Nielsen, der i slutningen af 
1960’erne fremførte muligheden for at nedbryde fængslets mure og åbne for 
passagen indad til.  
”Endnu mere interessant er måske spørgsmålet – som også gælder de lukkede institutioner – 
om at åbne for passagen indad; vil det ikke være muligt i endnu højere grad, end det hidtil er 
                                                 
1 Normaliseringsprincippet er også et grundprincip i kriminalforsorgen i de andre nordiske lande 
(Engbo 2015).   
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sket, at få eksempelvis grupper af unge, eventuelt fra undervisningsinstitutioner eller fra 
forretningslivet, til at besøge anstalterne, og vel at mærke besøge dem som ikke beskuere, men 
som engagerede deltagere i diskussioner, studiekredsmøder eller andre aktiviteter med de 
indsatte? Står vi mon ikke her over for det perspektiv, der rummer de bedste muligheder for, 
at de indsatte kan blive integreret i mere normale former for socialt liv?” (Nordskov 
Nielsen 1969, 491). 
Forsøget har fundet sted i Statsfængslet på Søbysøgaard2 i perioden august 2015 til 
og med januar 2016, og bestod af tre faste fritidsaktiviteter: Debatter, rytmisk kor og 
yoga3, som deltagere udefra og de indsatte kunne deltage i. Valget af aktiviteter er 
blevet bestemt i samarbejde med de indsattes talsmandsgruppe, og er foregået i de 
indsattes fritid.  
I artiklen beskrives de indsattes perspektiv på forsøget.  Fritidsaktiviteterne har 
været et tilbud til alle fængslets indsatte, men det er kun en mindre del af de 
indsatte, der har deltaget. I artiklen ses nærmere på, hvad der kan forklare dette. 
Desuden undersøges de indsattes oplevelser af mødet med omverdenen.   
Forskningsdesign, metode og valg af fængsel 
Undersøgelsen er designet som et casestudie, og baserer sig på et kvalitativt 
datagrundlag. Da det er en ny indsats, anlægges en åben og eksplorativ tilgang. 
Designvalget bunder ikke i et ønske om at bekræfte en hypotese eller en teori, men i 
stedet er formålet at skabe viden om, hvordan mødet med omverdenen har 
indflydelse på de indsatte og deres oplevelse af afsoningen (Eysenck 1976, 9). 
Designvalget er inspireret af Bent Flyvbjergs forståelse af casestudiet. Ifølge 
Flyvbjerg (1991) eksisterer der ikke kontekstuafhængig viden om mennesker og 
samfund, hvorfor vores viden herom altid må inddrage konteksten. Flyvbjergs 
epistemologiske ståsted betyder, at det gode eksempels magt, som casestudiet kan 
frembringe, er et nødvendigt redskab i den videnskabelige udvikling.   
Det metodiske grundlag baserer sig på etnografisk feltarbejde og kvalitative 
interviews. Hvor der i feltarbejdet er fokus på samhandling (Wadel 1991), har det 
kvalitative interview fokus på subjekters oplevelser af verden (Kvale & Brinkmann 
2015). Kombinationen af metoderne bidrager til en mere komplet og valid viden. De 
kvalitative interviews er foretaget i slutningen af feltarbejdet, hvorved 
feltobservationerne kunne bringes i spil i interviewsituationen (Pedersen 2012, 124). 
Denne fremgangsmåde skaber mulighed for, at informanterne kan protestere, da ”it 
allows the object to object” (Latour 2000).   
Feltarbejdet har været delt op i flere stadier. Inden projektperioden opholdte jeg mig 
i fængslet i kortere perioder for at blive bekendt med hverdagsrutinerne, og for at få 
                                                 
2 Når jeg i det følgende skriver Søbysøgaard henviser jeg udelukkende til den åbne afdeling. 
3 Ulla V. Bondeson fonden og Café Exit har finansieret korundervisere og yogainstruktøren. 
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skabt relationer i fængslet. I projektperioden befandt jeg mig i fængslet i 
fritidstimerne, og var der i udgangspunktet 3-4 dage om ugen. Jeg har samlet 
opholdt mig i fængslet i 470 timer. Jeg deltog altid i fritidsaktiviteterne, og brugte 
den resterende fritid sammen med de indsatte.  
I projektperiodens afsluttende fase interviewede jeg 15 indsatte (Brinkmann 2014, 
84). Mit primære fokus er på deltagernes oplevelser, men jeg har også ønsket, at få 
belyst årsager til, at de indsatte ikke deltager. Af de 15 indsatte har de 11 deltaget 
mere end 3 gange i én eller flere af aktiviteterne, mens de resterende 4 indsatte ikke 
har deltaget. Der er indsatte, som har deltaget i aktiviteterne, der undervejs i 
projektperioden er blevet løsladt eller overflyttet til en anden institution, hvorfor der 
ikke er lavet interviews med alle de indsatte, der har deltaget i forsøget.  
Forsøget blev gennemført i den åbne afdeling af Statsfængslet på Søbysøgaard, der 
huser mandlige indsatte fra Syd- og Østdanmark4. Søbysøgaard havde i 
projektperioden 134 pladser, der fordeler sig over 5 forskellige afdelinger. Der var 
ved projektstart en modtagelsesafdeling, to fællesskabsafdelinger, en 
uddannelsesafdeling5, og Figaro, der fungerede som en selvstændig 
udslusningsafdeling. Undervejs i projektperioden blev én af fællesskabsafdelingerne 
omdannet til en udviklingsafdeling, og Figaro blev nedlagt på grund af et lavt 
belægningstal.  
Søbysøgaard er valgt som case for at skabe de mest fordelagtige betingelser for 
gennemførelsen af forsøget. Der var efter en indledende rundspørge til seks af de 
åbne fængsler6, tre fængsler der havde lyst til at danne ramme om forsøget. Af disse 
tre blev Søbysøgaard udvalgt, da fængslet ligger godt placeret med flere mindre 
byer i nær afstand, og med relativ kort afstand til en større by. Desuden har 
Søbysøgaard, der tidligere var en gammel herregård, gode faciliteter i form af en 
riddersal og en nyere idrætshal, der fremstår indbydende for omverdenen.  
Erfaringer med at lukke omverdenen ind  
Idéen med at åbne fængslet op for det omkringliggende samfund er ikke ny, men på 
trods af dette, er der i en dansk kontekst relativt få erfaringer og viden herom.   
Siden 1970’erne har Pension Skejby sikret deres afsonere en tæt kontakt til 
omverdenen, ved at lade et antal af pensionens pladser være forbeholdt ikke 
kriminelt belastede. De indsatte har herved mulighed for under deres afsoning at 
interagere med folk, der ikke er en del af det kriminelle miljø. Linda Kjær Minke 
                                                 
4 Placeringen af indsatte på Søbysøgaard sker ud fra Nærhedsprincippet.   
5 Uddannelsesafdelingen på Søbysøgaard blev etableret som et pilotprojekt i forbindelse med 
flerårsaftalen for Kriminalforsorgens økonomi 2013-2016. På afdelingen er der særligt uddannet 
personale, der skal motivere de indsatte til at tage en uddannelse. (Aftale om Kriminalforsorgens 
økonomi i 2013-2016) 
6 Der alle havde en form for nærmiljø 
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(2006) har lavet en større evaluering af ordningen, hvor det empiriske grundlag 
består af 6 observationsdøgn, 47 kvalitative interviews og forskellige statistiske 
analyser, der baserer sig på 3371 forløb fordelt ud over en forsøgs- og en 
kontrolgruppe. Evalueringen viser helt entydigt, at konstellationen skaber et bedre 
afsoningsmiljø med mindre fokus på kriminalitet og et mindre recidiv.  
Af mindre omfattende karakter blev forholdet mellem fængslet og dets nærområde 
tænkt ind i forbindelse med oprettelsen af Jyderup Fængsel i slutningen af 1980’erne. 
Dette skete ikke med henblik på en normalisering af afsoningsmiljøet, men handlede 
i stedet om at sikre et godt forhold til nærområdet. I sin specialeafhandling 
undersøgte Kirsten Lærkeholm nærområdets oplevelser af fængslets 
åbenhedspolitik, men der er ikke lavet undersøgelser af de indsattes oplevelser 
(Engbo 2008).  
Af nyere dato er der i forbindelse med Kriminalforsorgens kokkeskoleprojekt7, 
erfaringer med at lukke omverdenen ind i fængslet. Kontakten med omverdenen har 
ikke stået centralt i projektet, men de indsatte har som afslutning på deres 
uddannelsesforløb afholdt restaurantaftener, hvor folk udefra har haft mulighed for 
at spise et gourmetmåltid i fængslet. Der er foretaget en evaluering af de foreløbige 
erfaringer med kokkeskoleprojektet, der baserer sig på observationsstudier, 
kvalitative interviews og en spørgeskemaundersøgelse. Om restaurantaftenerne, der 
udgør en meget lille del af evalueringen, nævnes det, at de indsatte her har haft 
mulighed for at tale med personer, der ikke er en del af fængselssystemet. Det har de 
indsatte sat stor pris på, da de godt kan lide at interagere med det de kalder 
’almindelige’ folk (Minke & Balvig 2015, 24-26).  
Hvor kontakten til omverdenen i kokkeskoleprojektet afgrænser sig til enkelte 
restaurantaftener, har de i England og Italien oprettet egentlige restauranter i 
fængselsregi. I efteråret 2015 åbnede InGalera8 i Bollate fængslet, der er det eneste 
åbne fængsel i Italien (Mastrobuoni & Terlizzese 2014). Restauranten er stadig så ny, 
at den ikke har været genstand for videnskabelige undersøgelser. I England åbnede 
den første restaurant i fængselsregi i 2009. The Clink Restaurants9 består i dag af fire 
restauranter, og er en del af et større resocialiseringsprogram, hvor indsatte under 
afsoningen får en køkkenuddannelse. The Clink’s egne opgørelser viser, at indsatte, 
der har været gennem et uddannelsesforløb på The Clink Restaurants, recidiverer i 
mindre grad end gennemsnittet (Moore 2015). Hertil skal det tilføjes, at det er svært 
at blive optaget på uddannelsen, og at de indsatte efter løsladelsen bliver tilknyttet 
en mentor, der hjælper dem med at få job (ibid.). 
                                                 
7 Kokkeskoleprojektet er et 2-årigt forsøgsprojekt med kokkeskole og restaurationsvirksomhed i tre 
danske fængsler, hvor fokus er på kost og uddannelse. 
8 Som betyder ”in jail” 
9 Der er en del af The Clink Charity 
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Der er i en europæisk kontekst begrænsede erfaringer med (og tradition for) at lukke 
omverdenen ind i fængslerne, hvilket adskiller sig fra situationen i USA. Det 
amerikanske fængselsvæsen er afhængig af frivillige, og i en tid med store 
nedskæringer, er denne tendens kun blevet forstærket(Kort-Butler & Malone 2015). I 
2009 meddelte The Federal Bureau of Prisons (2009), at de ikke havde ressourcerne 
til at imødekomme de indsattes behov, og at de var afhængige af frivillige, for at 
kunne levere den nødvendige service.  
Ét af de amerikanske programmer, som er værd at fremhæve, er The Inside-Out 
Prison Exchange Program, der blev afviklet første gang i Philadelphia i 1997, og som 
nu har spredt sig til hele verden (Pompa 2013)10. Inside-Out er et 
uddannelsesprogram, der foregår i fængslet, hvor deltagerne er en blanding af 
college- eller universitetsstuderende og indsatte. I modsætning til andre 
fængselsprogrammer i USA, betragter deltagerne udefra ikke sig selv som frivillige, 
som er i fængslet for at hjælpe de indsatte, eftersom der er lagt op til, at deltagere fra 
begge sider af muren, skal lære noget (ibid.). Der foreligger ingen studier, der 
dokumenterer Inside-Outs recidivforebyggende effekt (Latessa et. al. 2014). Dette 
kan hænge sammen med, at mange af de indsatte, der deltager i Inside-Out, afsoner 
længerevarende fængselsdomme.  
Der er forskellige erfaringer med at lukke omverdenen ind i fængslet, men som det 
fremgår af ovenstående, er der blevet viet begrænset opmærksomhed til, hvordan de 
indsatte oplever denne åbenhed. Hensigten med mit arbejde er at føje til den 
eksisterende viden og forsøge at dække en del af det empiriske videnshul, der synes 
at præge feltet.  
Deltagelse  
I projektperioden har der været forskel i tilslutningen til de tre aktiviteter, hvilket 
fremgår af tabel 1. Debatterne og koret, der kan karakteriseres som 
fællesskabsorienterede aktiviteter, har haft den største og mest stabile opbakning, 
mens yoga, hvor der i begrænset omfang er fokus på fællesskabet, har haft større 
udsving i fremmødet. I opstartsperioden var der i fængslet en stor nyhedsværdi 
omkring de nye fritidsaktiviteter, og første gang de blev afviklet, var der et 
fremmøde på 18-20 indsatte.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 I foråret 2016 blev det første hold Inside-Out afviklet i Danmark i Statsfængslet på Søbysøgaard 
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Tabel 1: Oversigt over indsattes deltagelse i aktiviteterne 
 Yoga Kor Debataftener 
Antal gange i 
projektperioden 
18 20 9 
Gennemsnitlig 
deltagelse pr gang (n) 
6 8 17 
 
I projektperioden var der et gennemsnitlig belæg på Søbysøgaard på 117 indsatte 
(LIS: Kapacitet og belæg i perioden 1.8.2015-31.1.2016). Set i forhold til det 
gennemsnitlige deltagertal er det mellem 5 og 15 procent af fængslets indsatte, der 
har deltaget i aktiviteterne.  
Der er flere af deltagerne, som er blevet løsladt eller overflyttet til andre institutioner 
undervejs i projektperioden. I projektets afsluttende fase var der en fast kerne på 11 
indsatte, der havde været faste deltagere i én eller flere aktiviteter. Den faste kerne er 
karakteriseret ved at: 
 8 er over 30 år 
 5 er førstegangsafsonere 
 4 afsoner domme på over 6 år 
 4 tager en uddannelse uden for fængslet  
 3 har én eller flere psykiatriske diagnoser 
 9 kommer fra fængslets særlige uddannelsesafdeling 
Der er en overrepræsentation af de indsatte fra uddannelsesafdelingen blandt 
gruppen af deltagere, hvilket gør det relevant at se nærmere på, hvordan afdelingen 
fungerer sammenlignet med de andre afdelinger i fængslet.  
”Afdeling A, B og C det er lort i forhold til det her. Det her det er paradis” 
Uddannelsesafdelingen er placeret afsides hovedhuset i en nyere bygning. For at få 
plads på afdelingen, skal den indsatte gennem en visitationssamtale, hvilket ikke er 
gældende for de andre afdelinger i fængslet. Som navnet på afdelingen antyder, har 
uddannelse en central rolle, men det er ikke det eneste forhold afdelingens 
socialrådgiver tager i betragtning i visitationssamtalerne. Der tages højde for 
afsoningstiden, der må hverken være for kort eller lang tid igen, og eventuelle planer 
om overflytning til anden institution. Desuden forholder socialrådgiveren sig også 
til alderssammensætningen. De vil ikke have for mange unge af gangen, og de tager 
højde for belastningen på de resterende afdelinger. Afdelingen bliver desuden brugt 
til at holde svage fanger væk fra de andre afdelinger. Under mit feltarbejde blev det 
eksemplificeret ved, at en indsat under 18 år fik plads på uddannelsesafdelingen for 
at skærme ham fra de andre afdelinger i fængslet.  
136 
 
I mit feltarbejde opholdte jeg mig på forskellige afdelinger i fængslet, og overværede 
flere gange indsatte blive flyttet fra en almindelig fællesskabsafdeling over på 
uddannelsesafdelingen. Det slog mig hver gang, at dette skift fra en afdeling til en 
anden i det samme fængsel, betød en ændring af adfærd både fysisk og psykisk. 
Indsatte som på andre afdelinger havde virket mutte, irritable og indadvendte, blev 
nu pludselig imødekommende og sociale. De brede skuldre blev sænket og armene 
kom ind til kroppen.  
De indsatte på uddannelsesafdelingen beskriver en afdeling, der står i klar kontrast 
til alt andet, de har prøvet under deres afsoning. Her er vold og konflikter ikke en 
del af hverdagen, og det er accepteret at tale med betjentene. Der er et mindre synligt 
misbrug, og det kriminelle liv fylder lidt.  
Størstedelen af de indsatte har afsonet kortere eller længere perioder på andre 
afdelinger i fængslet, og de beskriver afdelingerne som to forskellige verdener. Mike, 
der er tidligere bandemedlem, blev sendt over på uddannelsesafdelingen af en 
betjent, der var bekymret for ham, fordi han var blevet irritabel og introvert. Om 
forskellen mellem afdelingerne siger Mike: ”Det er ligesom, derovre der skal du - jeg ved 
sgu ikke, hvordan fanden man skal forklare det - men du skal jo have en eller anden facade op, 
fordi hvis du bare render rundt og ligner en eller anden lille svans, så bliver du sgu jokket på 
af alle de andre. Og sådan er det bare. Hvorimod her, der kan du sgu være tyk eller tynd eller 
være den mindste nørd, alle er velkomne.”  
Patrick fortæller videre om forskellen mellem fællesskabsafdelingerne og 
uddannelsesafdelingen: ”og flere gange kunne du komme op og diskutere med nogle, fordi 
de ikke kunne finde ud af, at gøre rent eller finde ud af at holde tingene pænt, ellers så kom de 
og bankede dørene ind, som om de var hjemme. Altså det var pisse irriterende. Total 
respektløst. I forhold til nu, dejligt, fredligt, roligt, du sover om aftenen, sådan rigtig godt. 
Du sidder ikke og tænker over, at ham der skal jeg have en konflikt med i morgen eller noget, 
fordi der er ikke sådan nogle typer herovre.”  
Både Mike og Patrick beskriver, hvordan der på de andre afdelinger foregår en 
daglig kamp, hvor der kæmpes om indflydelse og om de øverste pladser i hierarkiet. 
Det er som Mike beskriver, ikke muligt at melde sig ud af kampen og forholde sig 
neutralt, da den manglende stillingstagen placerer dig nederst i hierarkiet.   
For Patrick førte skiftet fra fællesskabsafdelingen til uddannelsesafdelingen til en 
ændring af adfærd: ”Da jeg var ovre på C, der synes jeg, at jeg var en helt anden person, 
end jeg er nu. Der var jeg sådan mere irriteret, sur, stresset og havde lyst til at tæve folk, 
fordi de var så latterlige.”  
Nicolai, der skiftede afdeling i projektperioden understøtter dette, og beskriver 
hvordan han ikke var sig selv på sin tidligere afdeling: ”Jeg var meget mere lukket 
derovre… men her åbner jeg mig mere op end jeg gjorde derovre. Der var ikke nogen, der 
vidste noget om mig derovre, jeg fortalte ingenting om mit privatliv. Det ragede ikke dem.” 
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I forlængelse af Leonard Baers (2005) beskrivelse af, at en celle ikke bare er en celle, 
og et rum aldrig bare er et rum, kan det tilføjes, at et fængsel aldrig bare er et 
fængsel. Roy King & Kenneth Elliot (1977) og Linda Kjær Minke (2012) har tidligere 
peget på, at der er forskel på de strukturelle forhold og det sociale klima på tværs af 
fængsler og på tværs af afdelinger. De indsattes beskrivelser af 
uddannelsesafdelingen bidrager til denne forståelse af, at fængslet ikke blot kan 
forstås som et særligt sted, men i stedet må forstås som steder, der kan rumme 
forskelle på tværs af regimer og afdelinger. Hermed peges på en mere kompleks og 
kontekstuel forståelse af fængslet. Et aspekt i analysen peger også på, at de indsattes 
oplevelser af fængslet som sted ændrer sig, når fængslet åbner sig mod omverdenen. 
Konglomerat – et hav af grunde til ikke at deltage 
Der er flere forskellige grunde til, at langt størstedelen af de indsatte ikke har 
deltaget i aktiviteterne.  
I forhold til den manglende deltagelse, er der den helt åbenlyse grund, at de indsatte 
ikke deltager, fordi de ikke finder aktiviteterne spændende. Hertil skal det tilføjes, at 
når jeg i min færden rundt i fængslet snakkede med folk, der ikke deltog og spurgte 
dem til, hvad de kunne tænke sig af aktiviteter, efterlyste de muligheden for at 
komme på tur uden for fængslet, men de havde ikke forslag til aktiviteter i 
fængselsregi. Ifølge Donald Clemmer er et af kendetegnende ved indsatte, at de 
under fængselsopholdet lider af ”a pausity of interest”. Det betyder at ”No matter how 
interesting, or how exciting a leisure pastime might be, there always exist that deadening 
sense of confinement which prohibits the complete release of the personality to the activity at 
hand” (Clemmer 1958, 248). 
Hassan sidder på en fællesskabsafdeling, og har ikke deltaget i aktiviteterne, hvilket 
han begrunder i en apati, som han giver det længerevarende fængselsophold 
skylden for. Hassan siger: 
”Yoga, det kunne jeg godt finde på, og jeg kunne faktisk også godt finde på det med 
debatmandag, og jeg har også overvejet det nogle gange, men jeg har bare ikke fået taget mig 
sammen til det, fordi jeg har afsonet så længe, og så skal der komme noget nyt ind i min 
hverdag, det er lidt underligt”.  
I fængslet er tiden lagt i et fast skema med faste rutiner, der for nogle indsatte giver 
begrænset mulighed for variation i fængselshverdagen (Zamble & Porporino 1988; 
Goffman 1967). Der er faste arbejdstider, faste tider for at blive låst inde og ude, faste 
indkøbsdage m.v., hvilket strukturerer den indsattes dagligdag. Hvor Clemmer taler 
om manglende interesse under fængselsopholdet, så peger Hassan på, at 
tilpasningen til den ensartede og strukturerede fængselshverdag indskrænker nye 
handlinger. Herved bliver det fængselsopholdets særlige rutineprægede karakter, 
der bliver afgørende for den manglende deltagelse. Hertil skal det tilføjes, at Hassan 
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ligesom mange andre i fængslet har et hashmisbrug, der har indvirkning på hans 
deltagelse i fængselslivet.   
En yderligere grund til den manglende deltagelse, knytter sig til det åbne fængsel, 
som et sted med stor gennemstrømning. Lars, der fungerede som en af mine 
gatekeepers og på grund af sine mange arbejdspladser i fængslet, havde en central 
plads i det interne hierarki, fortæller om sine forventninger til koret: 
”Jeg havde slet ikke forestillet mig, at vi kunne holde det der kor kørende, det troede jeg sgu 
ikke. Blandt andet fordi der er sådan hurtig udskiftning her, så det troede jeg ikke vi kunne.”  
For Lars er det ikke indespærringen, men den korte afsoningstid, der er 
udfordringen. Lars’ overvejelser henfører til, at det åbne fængsel er et sted, der er 
præget af en høj gennemstrømning. I projektperioden var der på Søbysøgaard 200 
indsættelser, 168 løsladelser og den gennemsnitlige afsoningstid var på tre måneder. 
I modsætning til det lukkede fængsel, hvor den gennemsnitlige afsoningstid 
beskrives i år, og ikke måneder, er det karakteristisk for det åbne fængsel, at en stor 
del af de indsatte afsoner relative korte domme, hvilket bidrager til en manglende 
kontinuitet i fængselsmiljøet.   
Selvom aktiviteterne foregik på faste tider, gik jeg ofte en runde en time inden 
aktiviteterne. Dels fordi der løbende kom nye indsatte til fængslet, og dels fordi 
mange indsatte havde svært ved at huske, hvornår hvad foregik. Et udsnit fra mine 
feltnoter i starten af projektperioden viser, hvorledes fængselshverdagen med 
mange rutiner og uforudsete hændelser har betydningen for den manglende 
deltagelse.  
Jeg går en runde på uddannelsesafdelingen og fortæller, at der er yoga. En førstegangsindsat, 
der er i midt fyrrerne, og som afsoner en dom på 3 måneder, er i gang med at lave mad. Han 
siger, at han ikke kan deltage på det tidspunkt, for det er der, han taler med sine børn. Han 
har et fast skema, hvor han arbejder, laver mad, spiser, taler med sine børn og derefter gør 
klar til at gå i seng, hvilket ikke levner meget tid til andre aktiviteter. Jeg går videre og møder 
en anden indsat, der fortæller, at han stresser lidt lige nu, fordi han har haft problemer med 
vagterne den anden dag, og nu er han bange for, at det vil få konsekvenser for hans 
afsoningsforløb. Vi snakker lidt om det, og han siger, at det er svært at have fokus på så meget 
andet, når den slags ting opstår. Efterfølgende møder jeg en indsat, jeg har spist med en del 
gange, og som tidligere har givet udtryk for, at han meget gerne vil være med til yoga. Han 
fortæller, at han næsten ikke har sovet i nat fordi ham og kæresten endegyldigt er gået fra 
hinanden. Hans fod banker op og ned, mens vi snakker, og hans hænder piller konstant ved 
noget. Han har et sørgmodigt udtryk i øjnene, og udtrykker stor frustration over, hvad han 
nu skal gøre. Han kan ikke se nogen mening med at skulle stoppe med kriminaliteten, da det 
er det han kender til, og nu hvor kæresten er væk, har han ikke nogen grund til at lægge det 
liv på hylden.  
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Eksemplet illustrerer forskellige forhold, der gør sig gældende i en fængselskontekst. 
Udover den rutineprægede hverdag, så viser det også, at de indsatte befinder sig i en 
stresset situation, hvor de er en del af forskellige konflikter i og uden for fængslet, 
som har betydning for deres handlerum.  
I forlængelse heraf er der også den dimension, at der blandt de indsatte er en 
overrepræsentation af psykiatriske diagnoser (Clausen 2013) og misbrug af 
narkotika (Møller et al. 2007). Et eksempel herpå er Jesper, der er blevet 
diagnosticeret med ADHD og PTST, som afviste at deltage i aktiviteter i fængslet for 
som han fortæller: ”Det er det der med for mange mennesker.”   
Småøer af frihed 
I Erving Goffmans beskrivelse af fængslet som total institution, peger han på, at der 
eksisterer småøer af levende aktiviteter, den indsatte kan søge tilflugt i med henblik 
på at modstå den psykiske belastning, der følger med fængselsopholdet (Goffman 
1967, 57).  I den totale institution er beboerne total afsondret fra omverdenen, hvilket 
ikke er tilfældet for de indsatte i det åbne fængsel. Alligevel oplever de indsatte, at 
de ugentlige aktiviteter, fungerer som små frirum i deres hverdag i fængslet.  
De indsatte beskriver, hvordan de under aktiviteterne kan glemme, at de er i gang 
med at afsone en dom. Claus, der har sin dagligdag uden for fængslet, fortæller om, 
hvordan han under aktiviteterne kan glemme alt om fængslets rammer: 
”Man glemmer helt man er i fængsel i den der halvanden time det (kor) foregår. Det samme 
med debataftenen, der glemmer man sgu også, at man er i fængsel, selvom det er de samme 
indsatte, man sidder sammen med og sådan noget. Fokus er noget andet.”    
For Michael, der også oplever aktiviteterne som et frirum, er det tilstedeværelsen af 
deltagerne udefra, der er med til at skabe frihedsfølelsen. 
”Man får også nogle andre input, man føler ikke man sidder i fængsel, når man er sammen 
med dem. Det er ligesom jeg føler, at når jeg er deroppe, så er det ligesom jeg er ude i 
friheden, fordi man er sammen med nogen udefolk på den anden side.”  
Hvor Michael taler om frihed og oplevelsen af at være uden for fængslet, taler Hans 
om normalisering. En normalisering, der baserer sig på tilstedeværelsen af kvinder. 
Hans:  
”Det er som om, der er lidt en normalisering i det. For gik man til yoga udenfor eller til 
debataften udenfor, så ville det ikke kun være fyre, så ville der også komme nogle damer. Og 
det er også derfor, at det føles som om, man var udenfor i den normale verden, det er fordi det 
er blandet … så glemmer man, at man er her”. 
Udsagnene peger i retning af, at åbenheden mod omverdenen gør noget ved de 
indsattes opfattelse af fængslet som sted. Aktiviteterne og de nye sociale 
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fællesskaber er uvante i en fængselskontekst, og de bidrager til, at stedet for en 
stund træder i baggrunden. Hertil kan det tilføjes, at de indsatte ikke har noget 
ønske om, at aktiviteterne skal foregå uden for fængslet, da der er en masse 
praktiske forhold, der vil besværliggøre deres deltagelse. Som Patrick udtaler: ”For 
min skyld så måtte det være nede i en lukkede grotte, bare vi kunne gøre det.”  De indsattes 
oplevelser udfordre opfattelsen af fængslet som et sted, der er udenfor det 
almindelige samfund, og bidrager til en mere kompleks forståelse af forholdet 
mellem indenfor og udenfor.  
Nye relationer  
 
Fængslet kan forstås som et ufrivilligt socialt fællesskab, hvor fællesnævneren er 
kriminalitet. Ifølge Edwin Sutherlands teori om Differential Association bliver 
kriminalitet ligesom alt anden adfærd indlært i relationen med andre. De sociale 
relationer har ifølge Sutherland en afgørende betydning for den kriminelles adfærd, 
hvorfor det er vigtigt at bryde med disse relationer (Sutherland & Cressey 1966). 
Med forsøget har de indsatte fået muligheden for under afsoningen at omgås folk, 
der ikke er en del af fængselssystemet, hvilket flere af de indsatte ser som vigtigt for 
deres liv efter afsoningen. Patrick, der til daglig går i skole uden for fængslet, 
fortæller om relationen til deltagerne udefra: 
 ”Det der med at være social med nogle andre mennesker, som du slet ikke kender, så 
begynder du også ligesom at resocialisere dig, for du finder ud af, at hvis du kan snakke med 
dem, så kan du også snakke med folk udenfor. Men altså hvis du snakker med de samme 
tosser hver dag, og det samme slang, og de samme bandeord, så er det dét, du går ud med.”   
Det er gennemgående for Patricks fortælling, at han er bevidst omkring, at de sociale 
relationer har betydning for hans egen adfærd. I de nye fællesskaber skal han gøre 
sig umage og tilpasse sin adfærd til, hvad der her forventes af ham. Mads har svært 
ved at sætte ord på, hvad interaktionen med deltagerne udefra betyder for hans 
fængselsophold og på spørgsmålet, hvordan han har oplevet, at der kommer folk 
ind udefra, svarer han: 
 
”Det skaber nogle sociale relationer, som ikke er normalt for det at være i fængsel, altså jeg 
tror ikke der er så mange lande, hvor man gør det. Jeg tænker det gør noget for det med, at 
skulle ud i samfundet igen, det er jeg ret sikker på.”  
 
Både Mads og Patrick betoner vigtigheden af de nye fællesskaber. I fællesskaberne 
kan de spejle sig i andre, der ikke er en del af det kriminelle miljø, hvilket giver 
mulighed for at vise andre sider af sig selv. Selvom de begge beskriver, hvordan de 
nye relationer betyder noget for deres liv efter fængslet, er der i deres fortællinger 
ikke en sikkerhed omkring, at de endegyldigt har gjort op med deres kriminelle 
livstil. De nye relationer alene vil ikke kunne forhindre ny kriminalitet, men ikke 
desto mindre fungerer de som et socialt fællesskab, hvor de indsatte under 
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afsoningen kan blive bekræftet i, at de kan fungere socialt i samfundet igen.  
 
Hvor Mads og Patrick bruger de nye fællesskaber til at klargøre sig til livet efter 
afsoningen, fortæller Jonas om, hvordan han brugte debataftenerne til at lære at 
være sammen med mange mennesker igen. Jonas havde inden sit ophold på 
Søbysøgaard siddet 4 måneder i varetægt, hvor han havde været låst inde det meste 
af døgnet, og haft begrænset social kontakt. Han blev hevet med til aktiviteterne af et 
par af sine medindsatte, og fortæller om debataftenerne: 
”Første gang, var det ikke skide sjovt. Der havde jeg stadig ikke været vant til for mange 
mennesker af gangen, så det var meget overvældende lige i starten. Så har jeg brugt det en del 
til at kunne være sammen med flere mennesker af gangen.” 
Udfylde den tomme tid 
Fritidsaktiviteterne blev iværksat med henblik på, at give de indsatte mulighed for at 
indgå i mere normale former for liv. Det blev tydeligt undervejs, at aktiviteterne fik 
en selvstændig karakter, hvor det ikke kun var den sociale dimension, der var i 
fokus. De faste ugentlige aktiviteter fik således betydning for de indsattes brug af 
tiden i fængslet.  
De indsatte fortæller samstemmigt om, hvordan aktiviteterne har skabt et afbræk og 
indhold i en fængselshverdag, der ellers er præget af kedsommelige 
hverdagsrutiner. Både under mit feltarbejde og i interviewrunden fik jeg fortællinger 
om deres ”røvsyge fængselsliv”, der er kendetegnet ved et fravær af meningsfyldt 
indhold.  
Ifølge Torsten Kolind, der har lavet et antropologisk feltarbejde i Statsfængslet i 
Ringe, er tiden i fængslet karakteriseret ved to ting: Tiden er nærmest uendelig og 
der er tale om tom tid. Den tomme tid fylder ikke noget i hukommelsen, når den er 
gået. Ifølge Kolind (2004) er det moderne menneskes udnyttelse af tiden afgørende, 
da det er her identitetsprojektet finder sted. Tiden skal fyldes ud, og den må ikke 
sløses væk, for måden vi bruger tiden på, er i sidste ende med til at skabe vores 
identitet.  
Mads, der har haft orlovsspærring i 5 måneder, fortæller om aktiviteternes 
betydning for hans hverdag i fængslet: 
”Jamen, jeg synes at det der med, at jeg har haft de der afbræk, som jeg snakker så meget om, 
og det her med, at det har giver mig noget at tænke over… jeg ville ikke blive stimuleret på 
den her måde, hvis jeg bare var i et fængsel uden de her aktiviteter, og det synes jeg er rigtig 
dejligt, fordi jeg er total understimuleret i forvejen herinde, og man kan have tendens til at 
falde totalt sammen og få depressionstilstande, og det kan jeg mærke, at det har det hjulpet 
på.”  
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Set i forhold til Kolinds forståelse af tiden i fængslet, så bidrager aktiviteterne til at 
fylde den tomme tid ud. Hvilket for Mads er afgørende i forhold til at opretholde sig 
selv under afsoningen. Hertil er det vigtigt at understrege, at aktiviteterne kun 
udfylder et meget lille tidsrum. Der er derfor stadig meget tom tid tilbage, der skal 
indholdsudfyldes.  
Udover at indholdsudfylde den tomme tid, bidrager aktiviteterne også til at 
strukturere hverdagen i fængslet. Hans, der har en del fængselsdomme bag sig, 
fortæller om, hvordan han bruger aktiviteterne til at strukturere sin tid.  
 ”Det er noget, man kan måle tiden på. ’Nu er der allerede yoga, og nu er der allerede debat - 
så er der gået 14 dage’. Det er ligesom en milepæl eller lyspunkt eller hvad man kan kalde 
det.” 
 
Hvor Hans taler om milepæl eller lyspunkt, så taler andre af de indsatte om delmål. 
Det er fælles for deres udsagn, at aktiviteterne bliver brugt til at skabe struktur og til 
at tælle ned til deres løsladelse. Her er det vigtigt, at sondre mellem afsonere med 
korte versus lange straffe. Gruppen af langtidsafsonere forholder sig ikke på samme 
måde til deres løsladelse, da den ligger langt ud i fremtiden. Langtidsafsonerne 
fremhæver derfor i højere grad det indhold aktiviteterne tilfører deres hverdag, og i 
mindre grad den strukturerende dimension.  
Samfundets afvisning 
Med en ubetinget dom følger mere end blot frihedsberøvelsen. Der følger også en 
samfundsmæssig afvisning, som den indsatte selv har ansvaret for at forvalte 
(McCorkle & Korn 1954). Sykes beskriver hvordan ”The wall which seals off the crimi-
nal, the contaminated man, is a constant threat to the prisoner´s self-conception and the 
threat is continually repeated in the many daily reminders that he must be kept apart from 
‘decent’ men” (Sykes 1958, 67).  
Søbysøgaard er ikke omringet af en mur eller et hegn, og sikkerhedsspørgsmålet har 
en anden karakter, end i de fængselsregimer som McCorkle & Korn og Sykes 
beskriver. Ikke desto mindre, er den samfundsmæssige afvisning, som følger med en 
fængselsstraf, et gennemgående tema i de indsattes oplevelser af mødet med 
omverdenen.  
Der er blandt flere af de indsatte en italesættelse af, at de tilhører en gruppe, der er 
udstødt af samfundet. Denne afvisning har betydning for deres selvopfattelse. Hos 
de indsatte er der eksempler på, at de er overraskede over, der er nogen udefra, der 
har lyst til at komme ind til dem i fængslet. Omkring denne dimension siger Lars:  
Lars: Altså for nogen herinde, og det har jeg, også for de andre afdelinger, hvor jeg 
har snakket. Jeg tror faktisk, der var nogen i starten, der var ham der den lille, han 
var her ikke ret mange gange, så blev han løsladt. 
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Interviewer: Ham der kunne rappe? 
Lars: Ja. Han sagde bare, hvor er det vildt, at de kommer i deres fritid. Og det tror 
jeg ubevidst og bevidst for nogen, der tror jeg, der er flere der tænker 'hold kæft, 
gider de virkelig bruge tid på os?'. Og det er så også igen, hvor er vi henne? Fordi 
der er nogen, der ikke rigtig har nogen. Der er nogen, der hverken får besøg eller 
noget og så er der så nogen, der faktisk gider bruge deres fritid på at komme ind, og 
så synge sammen med en flok idioter, der bare står der. Ja, det betyder sgu noget. 
Det kan godt være, de ikke vil sige det, men det vil jeg vædde med, at det gør. Fordi 
det jo er frivilligt, og det er i deres fritid, og det er hele lortet og de kommer herind.  
Lars beskriver, hvordan flere af de indsatte med fængselsdommen ikke ’kun’ er 
blevet afvist af samfundet, men også er blevet afvist af deres egen familie og venner. 
Den omfattende afvisning resulterer i, at flere af de indsatte har svært ved at begribe, 
at der er andre, der frivilligt og i deres fritid har lyst til deres selskab. De indsatte 
bliver italesat som en flok idioter, der er ude af stand til at handle, hvilket forstærker 
billedet af, at de tilhører en gruppe, som andre ikke har nogen interesse i at omgås.  
Hvor Lars taler på et generelt plan, er der flere af deltagerne, der tilkendegiver at 
omverdenens deltagelse i fængselslivet, betyder noget for deres egen selvforståelse. 
På spørgsmål om, hvordan han har oplevet, at der har været folk med udefra, siger 
Mike: 
Mike: Det har været fedt, at vi ligesom har fået noget tillid til, at der kan komme 
nogen ind udefra.  
Interviewer: Hvad tænker du? 
Mike: Jamen bare, at det ved jeg sgu ikke, bare at man gerne vil lukke civile 
mennesker ind på en eller anden måde i stedet for, at det bare er på en stor 
landbrugsdag eller økodag eller hvad fanden det ellers hedder i landbruget. At man 
ligesom tager dem ind i noget andet.  
Ligesom hos Lars, foretager Mike også en tydelig opdeling af de indsatte og folkene 
udefra. Deltagerne udefra bliver beskrevet som civile mennesker – en kategori han 
ikke anser sig selv som en del af. Hvor omverdenen tidligere er kommet ind til 
enkeltstående begivenheder, kan det betragtes som en tillidserklæring til de indsatte, 
at åbenheden mod omverdenen får en mere omfattende og vedvarende karakter.  
I forhold til at forstå fængselsdommen som en afvisning, hvor de indsatte skal 
holdes væk fra det omkringliggende samfund, bidrager forsøget til, at der skabes en 
relation mellem verden i og uden for fængslet. Det øgede sociale samspil med 
omverdenen resulterer i, at fængslerne mister sin symbolske status som et farligt 
sted, hvilket betyder noget for de indsattes selvforståelse.  
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Både Patrick og Nicolai sætter ord på, hvordan åbenheden mod omverdenen har 
betydet noget for deres selvopfattelse. Patrick siger: ”Man bliver glad, for så ved man, 
at der også er andre, der tænker på én”, og videre siger Nicolai: ”Man føler at man er lidt 
mere normal. Og at man ikke bare er den der dumme kriminelle, ingen gider.” 
Hvor Patrick taler om at inddragelsen af omverdenen giver en oplevelse af, at der er 
andre, der tænker på ham og hans situation, så beskriver Nicolai, hvordan det for 
ham fører til en større grad af normalitet. Den udstødelse, der følger med 
fængselsdommen, bliver i mødet med folk uden for fængslet reduceret, hvilket får 
betydning for deres selvværd.  
I forlængelse af den afvisning, som går på tværs i flere af de indsattes fortællinger, er 
det værd at bemærke, at de indsatte ikke har følt sig udstillet i forsøget. Rune 
fortæller om sin oplevelse med at møde deltagerne udefra:  
”Folk er ikke kommet ind og har dømt andre, og sagt 'det er en kriminel'. Det har heller ikke 
været interessant at spørge. Der er kun nogle få, der lige har spurgt 'hvad sidder du egentlig 
i fængsel for?', men det har ikke været interessant, det har ikke været sådan en zoologisk 
have.” 
Et opgør med ’den kriminelle’  
En central dimension i mødet med omverdenen viser sig, at være de indsattes 
mulighed for at italesætte sig selv som gruppe.  
De indsatte er som gruppe kendetegnet ved, at de har begået noget kriminelt, 
hvorfor de har fået betegnelsen kriminel. Betegnelsen siger ikke noget om, hvor 
mange gange loven er blevet overtrådt, eller hvor alvorlig en forseelse, der er blevet 
begået. Ifølge Howard Becker knytter der sig mange konnotationer til ’den 
kriminelle’, og der følger således særlige karakteristiske træk ved enhver, der bliver 
givet denne betegnelse. At være kriminel, kan således ifølge Becker forstås som en 
master status, der bliver definerende for hele identiteten (Becker 1973, 33).  
 
Både i forberedelserne til forsøget på Søbysøgaard og undervejs i forsøgsperioden, 
oplevede jeg gentagende gange den endimensionelle forståelse, der knytter sig til de 
kriminelle som gruppe. Folk bad mig om at passe på, og spurgte tit til, om ikke jeg 
var bange, når jeg gik rundt i fængslet. Det blev tydeligt, at opfattelsen af de indsatte 
kunne være fastlåst og unuanceret, og efterlade lidt rum for at andre mere positive 
menneskelige egenskaber kunne få lov at træde frem.  
Det går igen i mange af interviewene, at de indsatte i mødet med deltagerne udefra, 
fik mulighed for at nuancere forståelsen af ’den kriminelle’, og gøre op med nogle af 
de konnotationer, der knytter sig hertil. På spørgsmål om, hvad det har betydet, at 
der har været deltagere med udefra, nævner Claus som det første, muligheden for at 
nuancere billedet af den kriminelle: 
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”Jamen det oplever jeg som fedt. Men det er egentlig mest med tanke på dem udefra, for jeg 
tror det giver dem et andet blik på det at være kriminel. Mange har en eller anden 
forudindtaget holdning om, at når man er kriminel og sidder i fængsel, så er man sådan her, 
og mange af dem opdager jo, at vi er helt almindelige og søde og rare mennesker.” 
 
Det er gennemgående for de indsattes fortællinger, at de i interaktionen med 
omverdenen får mulighed for at vise mere menneskelige sider frem. Jonas siger: ”Og 
så de kan se, at vi også er mennesker. Og ikke bare er dem, der har lavet noget lort og er blevet 
smidt i fængsel.” Og videre siger Mike:”… også bare det der med, at selvom vi er 
kriminelle, så kan vi godt være normale mennesker ikke?”  
 
Citaterne illustrerer, at de indsatte er bevidste omkring, hvilke egenskaber, der 
knytter an til forståelsen af ’den kriminelle’, og at de med forsøget har fået 
muligheden for at påvirke disse og skabe en mere nuancerede og menneskelig 
forståelse af sig selv som gruppe.  Mødet med omverdenen giver de indsatte 
mulighed for at tale tilbage til det samfund, der med fængselsdommen har afvist 
dem. Set i forhold til projektets grundidé peger denne dimension i retning af, at en 
større åbenhed mod omverdenen giver de indsatte mulighed for at nuancere deres 
eget og offentlighedens billede af dem selv som gruppe.   
 
Konklusion 
Forsøget med inddragelse af omverdenen i den åbne afdeling af Statsfængslet på 
Søbysøgaard blev igangsat med henblik på at udfordre og udvikle den eksisterende 
fængselspraksis. De igangsatte fritidsaktiviteter har været et tilbud til alle fængslets 
indsatte, men det er kun en mindre gruppe, der har deltaget. Deltagerne kommer 
overvejende fra den særlige uddannelsesafdeling, og der er i denne gruppe en 
overvægt af ældre langtidsafsonere.   
Mødet med omverdenen og de igangsatte fritidsaktiviteter påvirker forståelsen af 
fængslet som sted, og har både en hverdagslig og en symbolsk betydning for de 
indsatte. På det hverdagslige plan, er aktiviteterne med til at strukturere og 
meningsudfylde de indsattes fritid og de fungerer som et frirum. Aktiviteterne 
foregår i fængslet, men selvom stedet er det samme, så betyder tilstedeværelsen af 
deltagerne udefra, at de indsattes oplevelser af stedet ændrer sig.  
På det symbolske plan, betyder åbenheden mod omverdenen noget for den 
samfundsmæssige afvisning, der følger med en fængselsdom. Når fængslet ikke 
længere kun er et sted, der skal holde de indsatte inde og omverdenen ude, så 
nedtones fængslets symbolske status som et farligt sted. Denne symbolske ændring, 
kan medføre en ændring i de indsattes opfattelse af dem selv som afviste borgere.  
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Mødet med omverdenen bringer desuden de indsattes identitet som kriminelle i spil. 
I mødet får de indsatte muligheden for at vise mere menneskelige sider frem, 
hvorved de på et lokalt plan, kan bidrage til en mere sammensat og nuancerede 
forståelse af kategorien ’den kriminelle’. 
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Erfaringer med tværfagligt samarbejde om fælles klienter. 
Anette Storgaard 
Juridisk Institut, Aarhus Universitet, Danmark 
 
Denne præsentation er baseret på et lille forskningsprojekt, som blev gennemført i 
regi af NSfK i perioden 2011-2013. Projektet er præsenteret i den publikation, der 
hedder ”Løsladelse – planlægning og samarbejde i Danmark, Norge og Sverige”, 
som findes op NSfK’s hjemmeside. 
Publikationen har bidrag af de forskere, der gennemførte projektet, nemlig Inger 
Marie Fridhov (Norge), Anders Persson og Kerstin Svensson (Sverige) samt Hanne 
Ramsbøll og Anette Storgaard (Danmark). 
Store dele af publikationens indhold berøres ikke i det følgende. Derimod uddybes 
et enkelt aspekt, som kun blev sporadisk behandlet i publikationen. Det drejer sig 
om de praktiske udfordringer i at etablere en konstruktiv dialog imellem 
professionelle i de forskellige myndigheder, som er involveret i 
løsladelsesprocessen. 
Myndighederne og Luhmanns systemteori 
Vi har alle – som borger eller som repræsentant for en (anden) myndighed erfaret, at 
det kan være vanskeligt at opnå den dialog, der er behov, for med en repræsentant 
for en offentlig myndighed. De fleste af os, overkommer dog denne udfordring, i 
hvert fald så længeder er tale om én myndighed og et problem, der skal løses. Men 
de færreste har nok tænkt analytisk over, hvorfor det er vanskeligt. Vi har blot indset 
det faktum, at offentlige myndigheder er ”store og stærke”. Det gælder i relation til 
borgerne, som ofte skal indrette sin adfærd, formulere sine behov, beskrive sig selv 
så de passer ind i de mønstre, kasser og systemer, som den relevante myndighed 
arbejder med, for at blive taget alvorligt. Men de offentlige myndigheder er også 
”store og stærke” i relation til hinanden. Hver enkelt myndighed anser egne værdier 
og tilgange for gyldige og sande. Derfor forventes ”de andre” at indrette sig. De må 
give os de informationer, vi har brug for. De må respektere vores tidsfrister osv. 
I sociale systemer1 beskriver Luhmann hvordan han ser det moderne samfund som 
kendetegnet ved at bestå af forskellige sub-systemer, som f.eks. justitsvæsnet, det 
sociale system eller sundhedsvæsnet. disse sub-systemer har hver sin tilgang til 
målgrupperne (som i øvrigt ofte er enkeltpersoner i unikke situationer). Systemerne 
har hver sin opgave, hver sin identitet, hvert sit mål og succeskriterium. De bygger 
på hver sin logik. Sub-systemerne er forskelligt organiseret. Der har forskellig intern 
                                                 
1 Niklas Luhmann, Hans Reitzels forlag, 2000 
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kompetencefordeling, f.eks. med hensyn til økonomi og beslutningskompetence. 
Men samfundets sub-systemer er også forbundet med hinanden. F.eks. definerer de 
ofte sig selv igennem afgrænsning til de andre sub-systemer (os og dem), samtidig 
med at de lægger vægt på egen autonomi. 
Men systemerne har ikke monopol på borgerne. Tværtimod er samme borger ofte 
involveret med mere end ét sub-system. Det er også sådan at desto mere udsat 
borgerens position er, desto flere sub-systemer er borgeren involveret med og desto 
flere systemer, man er involveret med, desto vanskeligere bliver det selvsagt at 
navigere. 
Her er fokus på de af kriminalforsorgens klienter, som er på vej ud af fængsel eller er 
kommet ud af fængsel for nylig. For den gruppe er der rigtig mange sub-systemer at 
forholde sig til, det kan f.eks. gælde: jobformidling, boligformidling, 
afhængighedsbehandling, psykiatri og social understøttelse. Dertil kommer 
kriminalforsorgens egne sub-systemer: fængslet, pensionen, kriminalforsorgen i 
frihed. I større eller mindre grad kan her til føjes hel- og halvprivate aktører, som 
f.eks. tilbyder mentor, gældsrådgivning eller andet. 
Forskning understøtter teorien 
Den ovenfor præsenterede forskergruppe satte sig for at undersøge, hvilke 
udfordringer de professionelle, der sidder tæt på løsladelsen, oplever i det daglige. 
Og med henblik på at opnå et indtryk heraf i tre nordiske lande blev der afhold et 
mindre seminar for de relevante aktører i henholdsvis Danmark, Norge og Sverige. 
Med til seminarerne var inviteret socialfagligt personale fra fængsler, pensioner, 
kriminalforsorg i frihed og kommunale socialforvaltninger. I løbet af den dag, 
seminaret varede, gennemførte de parallelle programmer på alle tre seminarer.  
Først blev deltagerne sat sammen i blandede grupper og bedt om at beskrive en case 
skriftligt. Casen skulle være så udførlig, at koncipisterne selv mente at casen kunne 
viderebehandles af andre professionelle. Casen skulle i alle tilfælde angå en person, 
der stod lige foran sin løsladelse. 
Dernæst skulle de samme grupper behandle en case, som var udarbejdet af én af de 
andre grupper. I denne fase blev det klart, at den case, som de oprindelige 
koncipister havde anset for fuldt belyst, blev oplevet som mangelfuldt belyst af den 
nye gruppe. Dette var en interessant erfaring for alle, både deltagere og forskere. 
Herefter blev grupperne omdannet således at alle fængselsfolk kom sammen, alle 
kommunale folk kom sammen osv. Her blev deltagerne bedt om at overveje hvilke 
forhold, der havde overrasket dem mest i arbejdet frem til nu samt at diskutere to 
centrale spørgsmål: Hvad er den gode plan (for løsladelse, AS)? Og hvad er det gode 
samarbejde? 
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Sammenfattende om de to centrale spørgsmål og øvrige iagttagelser fra den 
afsluttende plenumdebat er bl.a. 
- Deltagerne er i udpræget grad enige om, at såfremt der er en narkotika-
problematik tilknyttet, stjæler den hurtigt al opmærksomhed med det til 
følge, at andre opgaver og problemer anses for mindre betydningsfulde. 
- I Danmark og Norge er det jævnligt et problem, at den endelige 
løsladelsesdato fastsættes kort tid før. Dette er ikke i samme grad et tema i 
Sverige idet løsladelse akkurat på 2/3-dagen her er den altdominerende 
hovedregel. 
- På spørgsmålet om, had den gode plan er, er der generelt enighed om, at den 
gode plan er den plan, der hidrører fra klienten selv.  
- Alligevel mener de professionelle generelt, at de ved alt for lidt om deres 
klienters egne behov og ønsker. Forskerne konkluderer på baggrund af de 
professionelles udsagn, at planerne aldrig er skrevet af klienterne, de er af og 
til skrevet for klienterne, men oftest er de skrevet om klienterne. 
- Det gode samarbejde beror på viden om de andres muligheder og 
begrænsninger, som var meget begrænset hos deltagerne (ifølge dem selv) til 
trods for, at de i alt væsentligt havde samme uddannelsesmæssige baggrund, 
var fra samme land og havde arbejdet med fælles klienter i flere år. 
Til allersidst på seminardagen blev deltagerne spurgt, hvad de anså der var størst 
behov for, hvis de skulle komme nærmere de idealer, de selv så for deres arbejde. 
Her pegede de på, at der var stort behov for mere viden om, hvordan de andre 
arbejder, herunder hvilke muligheder og kompetencer, der findes for de andre og 
ikke mindst, hvilke forhindringer, de slås med. Dernæst ønskede man faste 
kontaktpersoner hos hinanden, så man kunne opbygge kontinuerligt og tillidsfuldt 
samarbejde. Dette er i nogen grad løst rundt omkring. Men fortsat lider man mange 
steder på dette felt under stor personalegennemstrømning, hyppig og langvarig 
sygdom, stress og overbelastning.  
Det blev også påpeget, at reel opbakning fra ledelsen er afgørende. Den offentlige 
sektor er i nyere tid blevet underlagt såkaldte resultatkonktrakter som 
styringsværktøj. Dette kan medføre, at medarbejderne har vanskeligt ved at følge 
ledelsens skiftende fokus-områder og derfor kan de være usikre på, om de udfører 
de ”rigtige” opgaver og om de udfører dem tilfredsstillende. 
Endelig sagde deltagerne på samtlige seminarer, at de ville opfordre til at der blev 
flere seminarer af denne type. 
Det var interessant, at de seminardeltagere, vi som forskere havde inviteret for at de 
skulle lære os noget, endte med at konkludere, at de selv havde haft stort udbytte af 
dagen. 
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Selvom man må konkludere efter seminarerne, at det ikke alene er de løsladte, der 
har en stor udfordring, men også de professionelle, der skal understøtte 
løsladelsesprocessen, må man også konkludere at disse uprætentiøse dag-seminarer 
blev en ægte ”win-win” oplevelse, som de offentlige sub-systemer med fordele 
kunne inddrage, når de får øje på behovet for at udvikle metoden i det sociale 
arbejde.
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WORKSHOP B 
GENDER RELATED STUDIES 
 
Kvinnor och brott som socialt problem i svensk forskning under 
1900-talet 
 
Erika Hedlund 
 
Syftet med detta paper är att ge en övergripande presentation av en pågående delstudie 
inom ramen för projektet ”Kvinnor och brott som socialt problem” genom att redogöra för 
bakgrund till studien, frågeställningar och materialinsamling. Delstudien syftar till att 
studera hur bilden av den brottsliga kvinnan och kvinnors brottslighet som samhällspro-
blem växt fram i den svenska forskningen under 1900-talet. 
Bakgrund 
Att män är överrepresenterade vad gäller brottslighet är ett av kriminologins mest stabila 
fynd. Kön kan ses som”the strongest predictor of criminal involvement” (Messerschmidt 
1993:1). Det har bidragit till att det i första hand är mäns brottslighet som studerats samti-
digt som kvinnor och flickor historiskt har utelämnats från forskningen (Heidensohn, 
1968; Klein, 1973; Smart, 1977). En lång rad feministiska forskare har kritiserat kriminolo-
gin för vad som beskrivs som en könsblindhet. Man menar att brottslighet har studerats 
utifrån en manlig norm utan att utveckla en kritisk syn på sambandet mellan brott och kön 
(se t.ex. Belknap 1996; Heidensohn & Silvestri 2012; Naffine, 2016; Tomsen, 2008). Att män 
undersöks har varit så självklart att titeln på studier om enbart män sällan reflekterar del-
tagarnas kön medan titeln oftast reflekterar deltagarnas kön om kvinnor inkluderas eller 
är studiens fokus. När forskare som enbart studerar män använder titlar som ger intryck 
av att vara generaliserbara verkar det akademiska området mindre manscentrerad. Det 
verkar som att det finns stor kunskap om brottslighet och avvikelse när det egentligen 
finns stor kunskap om manlig brottsliget och manlig avvikelse (Belknap, 1996; Hannon & 
Dufour, 1998). Vid 1970-talets mitt skrev Wilson & Rigsby (1975:131-132) att ”the woman 
offender has so consistently been ignored in the study of crime that what little we do 
know seems to consist almost solely of what we know about the male offender. The possi-
ble contribution of one-half of the population to the crime picture remains largely unex-
plored”. Messerschmidt (1993) menar att kriminologin traditionellt är skriven av män om 
män och länge har varit anmärkningsvärt ointresserade av att förklara kvinnors brottslig-
het. Det råder inte brist på kända kriminologiska forskare som kritiserats för hur de har 
behandlat, eller helt bortsett från, kvinnor i sin forskning. Dels finns det, på sin tid, stora 
teoretiker som uppmärksammar kvinnors brottslighet, eller icke-brottslighet, utifrån en 
maskulin syn på kvinnor. Lombroso förklarar kvinnors underrepresentation i brott med 
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hjälp av biologi och hävdar att kvinnor som begår brott begår andra typer av brott än män 
på grund av deras biologiska egenskaper som är underlägsna mäns. Senare på 1950-talet 
hävdar Pollak till skillnad från Lombroso att kvinnor begår lika mycket brott som män 
men att kvinnors biologi i kombination med vissa sociala omständigheter döljer deras 
brottslighet. En av Pollaks biologiska förklaringar är att kvinnor är mer svekfulla och där-
för tenderar att dölja sina brott vilket kopplas till att kvinnor kan dölja sin menstruation 
samt att deras orgasm inte är nödvändig för sexualakten till skillnad från män1 (Messer-
schmidt, 1993). Dels finns det inflytelserika teoretiker2 som helt bortser från kvinnor och 
vars teorier enligt Messerschmidt inte kan förklara skillnaderna i brottsmönster mellan 
kvinnor och män. Hannon & Dufour (1998) skriver att det inte behöver vara något fel med 
att begränsa sin undersökningspopulation så länge forskaren uppmärksammar begräns-
ningarna. Genom att enbart undersöka män men hävda generaliserbarhet förstärks margi-
naliseringen av genus i kriminologiska teorier. 
Steffensmeier & Clark (1980) presenterar kritik från en rad feministiska kriminologer som 
menar att tendenser från klassiska verk om kvinnliga brottslingar påverkar den senare 
kriminologiska forskningen. De hävdar att det finns anledning att ställa sig skeptisk till 
denna tolkning av den kriminologiska litteraturen. Tolkningen av till exempel Lombroso 
och Freud som sexistisk är, enligt Steffensmeier & Clark, överdriven eftersom de utöver 
kvinnors brottslighet även förklarar mäns brottslighet med biologi. Det säger snarare nå-
got om kriminologin som ämne än frågan om kvinnors brottslighet. Dessutom hävdar de 
att kritiken av den traditionella kriminologin bortser från att den stora majoriteten krimi-
nologer förkastar den syn på kvinnors brottslighet som kritiseras och att det är svårt att 
hitta texter där denna syn accepteras (Steffensmeier & Clark, 1980).  Zedner (1991) menar 
dock att den biologiska positivism som till exempel Lombroso företrädde, och som starkt 
influerade senare psykologiska förklaringsmodeller, har använts för att förklara kvinnors 
brottslighet långt efter att de ansågs förlegade för att förklara mäns brottslighet. Som ex-
empel menar Zedner att dessa teorier har stort inflytande över utformning av dagens 
fångvård och psykiatrisk vård för kvinnor3. Dessutom är teorierna nära knuten till dåti-
dens moral och kvinnliga ideal samt inbyggda antaganden om kvinnors biologiska under-
lägsenhet (Zedner, 1991).  
Under 1990- och 2000-talet har genus blivit ett centralt och etablerat ämne inom krimino-
logi i Sverige (Karlsson & Pettersson, 2006) och internationellt (Flavin, 2001; Heidensohn & 
Silvestri 2012; Zedner, 1991). Zedner (1991) menar att utvecklingen av en feministisk kri-
                                                 
1 Messerschmidt påpekar att dessa teoretiker måste förstås utifrån den sociala och historiska kontext de ver-
kat inom. 
2 Bland dessa kan nämnas t.ex.: Metrons anomiteori, enligt vilken kvinnor borde begå mer brott eftersom 
kvinnor har sämre ekonomiska förutsättningar att uppnå kulturellt definierade mål. Hirschis kontrollteori 
som förklarar varför människor inte begår brott men tar bort den undersökningsgrupp som i störst utsträck-
ning inte begår brott ur materialet; flickorna. Listan av teoretiker som på liknande sätt är genusblinda kan 
enligt Messerschmidt göras lång (Messerschmidt, 1993). 
3 I en brittisk kontext. 
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minologi starkt har bidragit till vår förståelse av brott och dess kontroll dels genom att fo-
kusera specifikt på kvinnors brottslighet men också särskilt på genus.  
Tidigare forskning 
 
Studier av amerikanska kriminologiska läroböcker4 visar att en mycket liten andel av in-
nehållet ägnas åt kvinnor och brott (Steffensmeier & Clark, 1980; Wilson & Rigsby, 1975; 
Wright, 1992). Det verkar inte som att andelen ökar nämnvärt mellan 1950-talet och 1980-
talet (Wright 1992). Under perioden 1956-1965 upptog ämnet 2,3 % av innehållet vilket 
ökade något till 4 % för perioden 1981-1990. Den största delen av den lilla ökningen utgörs 
av ett ökat fokus på våldtäkt (Wright, 1992). Wilson & Rigsbys (1975) studie av läroböcker 
från perioden 1956-1974 visar att enbart 18 % av böckerna5 ägnar mer än 3 % av innehållet 
åt kvinnor och brott6. En jämförelse av andelen publicerad forskning om kvinnor och brott 
under perioderna 1956-1960 och 1976-1980 visar en ökning från 7 % till 22 % i sociologiska 
tidskrifter (Wright, 1987). Under senare period har andelen ökat än mer dramatiskt i kri-
minologiska tidsskrifter7. Andelen artiklar som inkluderar både kvinnor och män har ökat 
dramatiskt från 34 % på 1970-talet till 68 % under 1990-talet. Dock noterar Hannon & Du-
four (1998) att könsskillnader uppmärksammas i mindre utsträckning under 1990-talet och 
att andelen artiklar där kön enbart används för statistisk kontroll har ökat. Samtidigt har 
andelen artiklar som enbart inkluderar män minskat från 60 % till 26 % och andelen som 
enbart inkluderar kvinnor legat stabilt på 6 %. Eftersom andelen som enbart inkluderar ett 
kön har minskat har andelen av dessa som enbart inkluderar kvinnor ökat från 8 % till 18 
%. (Hannon & Dufour, 1998). Den stora ökningen av andelen forskning på området verkar 
inte ha fått något större genomslag i läroböcker (Wright, 1987). 
 
Även om kvinnor inkluderas i studier oftare under 1990-talet så är män fortfarande nor-
men inom kriminologisk forskning8  (Hannon & Dufour, 1998). Bland de artiklar som en-
bart undersöker det ena könet fortsätter män att vara normen genom att titlarna fortfa-
rande tenderar att ge sken av generaliserbarhet. 90 % av artiklar med enbart män reflekte-
rar inte detta i sin titel medan andelen är minimal för de artiklar som undersöker enbart 
kvinnor9.  
                                                 
4 Anledningen att undersöka just läroböcker är att läroböcker antas representera kunskap som har accepte-
rats inom fältet och att de för vidare teoretiska och empiriska fynd till framtida kriminologer och praktiker 
(Steffensmeier & Clark, 1980; Wilson & Rigsby, 1975). 
5 Totalt antal undersökta böcker är 17. 
6 Dessa tre böcker ägnade 4 %, 5 % respektive 10 % av utrymmet åt ämnet. 
7 Tidsskrifterna är följande: Criminology, The British journal of criminology, The journal of research in crime 
and delinquency och The journal of criminal law and criminology (kriminologi-sektionen) 
8 Att enbart använda kön som variabel genom att jämföra kvinnor/flickor och män/pojkar är inte detsamma 
som att ha ett genusperspektiv. Dock kan självklart undersökningar med genusperspektiv även göra sådana 
jämförelser men det är inte tillräckligt utan det krävs även en genusteoretisk analys (Pettersson, 2013). 
9 1 av 11 under 1970-talet och 0 av 10 under 1990-talet. 
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Även visuellt är kvinnor osynliga i läroböcker (Baro & Eigenberg, 1993; Love & Park, 
2013). I en studie av fotografier i 22 läroböcker i kriminologi10 från 1988-1991 skriver Baro 
& Eigenberg (1993:24) att ”the invisibility and marginalization of women in these photos is 
astounding”. Tjugo år senare konstaterar Love & Park (2013:336-337) i en replikation av 
studien att “the androcentricity of criminal justice and criminology continues to dominate 
and marginalize women as invisible”. Andelen avbildade kvinnor har ökat något, från 19 
% till 22 %. När kvinnor avbildas är det oftast i rollen som offer eller som perifer person. 
Av personer som är avbildade som brottslingar är 11 % kvinnor perioden 1988-199111 vil-
ket ökade till 22 % tjugo år senare (Baro & Eigenberg, 1993; Love & Park, 2013). De enda 
delar av läroböckerna där större andel av personerna på bilderna är kvinnor, är då texten 
uttryckligen handlar om ”kvinnor och brott” (Baro & Eigenberg, 1993). Under den senare 
perioden är det när texten handlar om kvinnomisshandel, media och brott och genus och 
brott (Love & Park, 2013). 
 
När kvinnor och brott uppmärksammas i läroböckernas texter är de vanligaste ämnena 
prostitution, kvinnor i fängelse, könsskillnader i omfattning, våldtäkt12, abort och porno-
grafi. I de äldre läroböckerna ägnades mer av texten om kvinnor och brott åt prostitution 
och kvinnor i fängelse medan de nyare läroböckerna ägnar betydligt större utrymme åt 
våldtäkt. Brott som egendomsbrott och våldsbrott utförda av kvinnor är i princip helt 
frånvarande (Wright, 1992). Wilson & Rigsby (1975) finner att de vanligast nämnda brot-
ten är prostitution, snatteri, fylleri och förargelseväckande beteende. 
 
Wright menar att många författare av läroböcker framställer och förklarar kvinnors bete-
ende enligt fyra sexistiska teman; 1. Stöd till myter om våldtäkt som lägger skuld på offret 
och friar förövaren 2. Framställningen av kvinnliga brottslingar som mer svekfulla och 
sluga än manliga brottslingar 3. Stereotypen att kvinnor är intellektuellt och fysiologiskt 
underlägsna och mindre rationella än män 4. Ett underförstått fördömande av moderna 
kvinnors ökade promiskuitet. Under 1950- och 1960-talet återfinns dessa teman i 60 % av 
de undersökta böckerna. Genomgående framställs kvinnliga förövare i de tidiga läroböck-
erna som ”vamps” medan offer för våldtäkt och sexuellt frigjorda kvinnor beskrivs som 
”tramps”. Wright påpekar att författarna inte tar dessa sexistiska teman ur luften utan att 
de stöder sina påståenden med hänvisning till framstående forskare som t.ex. Sutherland, 
Lombroso, Pollak och Freud. Under 1980-talet har andelen böcker med ovanstående sex-
                                                 
10 De refererade studierna avser analyser av ”criminology and criminal justice textbooks”. Författarna påpe-
kar att de till viss del kan ses som olika ämnen men att de dock tillhör samma forskningsfält. I en svensk 
kontext finns ingen motsvarighet till ämnet ”criminal justice” vilket gör det svårt att översätta. Min bedöm-
ning är att åtminstone en del av den forskning som särskiljer ”criminal justice” från ”criminology” i den 
amerikanska kontexten faller under disciplinen kriminologi i Sverige. 
11 Vilket är en underrepresentation då kvinnor utgör mellan 5-18 % av brottslingar beroende på nivå i rätts-
systemet (fängelse, häktade, övervakade, villkorligt frigivna eller samtliga gripna) 
12 Detta behandlar inte kvinnor som förövare utan kvinnor som offer för våldtäkt.  
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istiska teman minskat till 31 %, det enda tema som helt försvunnit är dock att kvinnor är 
intellektuellt och fysiologiskt underlägsna och mindre rationella än män. De sexistiska 
framställningarna av kvinnor har under 1980-talet blivit mindre påfallande och grova. Bil-
den av kvinnor som ”vamps” och ”tramps” har bytts ut mot ”coquettes”, ”teases” och 
”flirts” (Wright, 1992).  
 
I Wilson & Rigsbys studie är de vanligaste förklaringarna till könsskillnader i brott kultu-
rella. 24 % av böckerna berör bilden av kvinnor som mer moraliska men enbart en (6 %) 
trycker på denna förklaring. 29 % av författarna diskuterar fysiska eller biologiska orsaker 
men ingen har det som huvudsaklig förklaring. Wilson & Rigsby (1975) påpekar att ingen 
författare presenterar en fullständig förklaring men att följande tre förklaringar återkom-
mer: 1. ”Power behind the throne syndrome” – kvinnor är ofta medhjälpare eller uppvig-
lare av brott, 2. ”The mother goose hypothesis” – goda kvinnor är mycket goda medan 
dåliga kvinnor är förskräckliga, 3. ”The poor pitiful pearl etiology” – den kvinnliga brotts-
lingen framställs som ett offer. 
 
Steffensmeier & Clarks (1980) menar att de finner lite bevis för en biologisk eller sexistisk 
förklaring av könskillnader vad gäller brott i amerikanska läroböcker under perioden 
1918-1965. De menar att förklaringar tenderar att betona strukturella och kulturella orsa-
ker och att de undviker eller förkastar biologiska förklaringar. Exempel på förklaringar är 
begränsade möjligheter för kvinnor jämfört med män, att kvinnor lever ett mer skyddat 
liv, skilda förväntningar på könsroller samt skillnader i socialisering och inlärning av atti-
tyder och beteenden. Ingen av de undersökta läroböckerna för fram enbart en fysisk, bio-
logisk eller psykologisk förklaring medan samtliga läroböcker som erbjuder en förklaring 
åtminstone inkluderar en sociokulturell förklaring13. I 26 % av läroböckerna14 hävdas att 
fysiska skillnader (framför allt styrka) är en bidragande faktor till könskillnaden. Stånd-
punkten att biologiska eller fysiologiska skillnader per definition leder till könsskillnader i 
brott förs enbart fram i 15 % av böckerna. De understryker dock att de enbart undersökt 
vad de definierar som kriminologiska läroböcker vilket innebär att flera stora verk om 
kvinnlig brottslighet inte undersökts eftersom de faller utanför deras definition av krimi-
nologi. Eftersom läroböcker antas spegla de teorier som anses accepterade inom fältet me-
nar de att det speglar kriminologers syn på könsskillnader i brottslighet (Steffensmeier & 
Clark, 1980).  
Studiens planerade upplägg 
 
Projektets övergripande syfte är att ur ett svenskt perspektiv a) studera bilden av den 
brottsliga kvinnan och framväxten av kvinnors brottslighet som samhällsproblem och b) 
analysera utvecklingen av kvinnors brottslighet. Projektet anlägger ett historiskt perspek-
                                                 
13 Samma lärobok kan innehålla flera förklaringsmodeller. 
14 Totala antalet undersökta böcker är 34 
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tiv och undersöker utvecklingen under 1900-talet. En utgångspunkt är den feministiska 
kritiken av kriminologins normalisering av mäns brottslighet. För att förstå kvinnors brott 
som samhällsproblem behöver vi ta reda på hur problemet har växt fram och hur det har 
definierats. Utöver genusperspektivet anknyter studien till ett intersektionellt perspektiv 
(de los Reyes & Mulinari 2005) eftersom andra dimensioner som klass, etnicitet och ålder 
antas ha betydelse för hur kvinnors brott uppmärksammas, förklaras, problematiseras och 
vilka åtgärder som föreslås. 
 
Genom att utreda vilka aktörer som har varit engagerade i frågan, hur problemet har be-
skrivits och de åtgärder som förespråkats förväntas studien ge en nödvändig bakgrund för 
förståelsen av kvinnors brott som samhällsproblem. Den forskning som finns på detta om-
råde är i huvudsak anglosaxisk.15 En analys av utvecklingen ur ett svenskt perspektiv sak-
nas vilket denna studie kan bidra till. 
 
Den aktuella delstudien är den första inom den del av projektet som fokuserar på den för-
ändrade förståelsen av kvinnors brottslighet och de åtgärder som samhällets föreslås 
vidta. Hur kvinnors brott konstrueras har betydelse för vilka åtgärder som samhället sät-
ter in och hur myndigheter behandlar och kontrollerar kvinnor med sociala problem.  
 
Studiens frågeställningar är: 
 I vilka sammanhang synliggörs kvinnors brottslighet? 
 Vilken typ av brottslighet är det som lyfts fram? 
 Hur förklaras kvinnors brottslighet? 
 Hur beskrivs kvinnors brottslighet? 
 Vilka åtgärder föreslås, alternativt kritiseras? 
 
Ett genomgående fokus är hur ovanstående frågor förändras över tid under den studerade 
perioden. 
 
Studiens empiriska material består av svensk forskning publicerad i centrala svenska och 
nordiska tidsskrifter under 1900-talet. Brottslighet har behandlats av forskare inom en rad 
discipliner, med olika stor tyngdpunkt på olika discipliner över tid, vilket innebär att en 
fullständig bild kräver att flera områden täcks in. I så stor utsträckning som möjligt är det 
att föredra tidsskrifter som täcker en större del av perioden. Den pågående 
materialinsamlingen omfattar följande tidsskrifter: 
 
 Svensk juristtidning (1916-1999) 
 Nordisk tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab (1949-1999) 
 Barnavård och ungdomsskydd (1948-1964) 
                                                 
15 Se genomgång av tidigare forskning ovan. 
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 Socialmedicinsk tidsskrift (1924-1999) 
 
Då vissa discipliner saknas eller är representerade i liten utsträckning kommer det empi-
riska materialet troligen utökas. Framför allt behöver samhällsvetenskapen täckas in i 
större utsträckning, särskilt sociologi och psykologi. Eftersom både sociologi och psyko-
logi blir ett etablerat ämne i Sverige under 1900-talets andra hälft16 kommer dessa inte att 
täcka in hela undersökningsperioden, det är dock inte ett problem då det speglar forsk-
ningens utveckling i Sverige. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Sociologi blir egen universitetsdisciplin i Sverige först 1947. Den första professuren i psykologi inrättades 
1948. 
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Twisting and turning desistance from crime: 
A Qualitative Approach to the Understanding of Women's Transitions out of 
Crime. 
 
Robin Gålnander 
Stockholm University, Sweden 
 
This paper describes my dissertation project; its main objective, background, previous re-
search, theoretical framework and methodological considerations.  
Main objective and scientific questions 
 
This research project is focused on women’s desistance from crime. The meaning of the 
term ‘desistance’ is widely debated, and will within this project be conceptualized as a 
complex process involving a major change in lifestyle, from “deviance” to “normality”. 
Previous research has shown that this process of desistance is diverse and can take many 
different forms. Some individuals simply ‘fall’ into desistance, while others consciously 
make hard efforts to desist – with different outcomes (Halsey & Deegan 2015). Focusing on 
the desistance process itself, with its twists and turns, the aim is to investigate women’s 
transitions out of crime and contribute to the theoretical understanding of women’s de-
sistance.  
Three different scientific questions to guide this research project are: What are the women 
desisting from (and into)?, Under what circumstances does certain mechanisms work as 
facilitating desistance? and How can the desistance process be understood from an inter-
sectional point of view?. These questions are elaborated on throughout this research plan.  
The previously mentioned concept of criminal lifestyle is defined as a collective pattern of 
criminal-related behavior based on choices made from life chances and options available 
(see Bourdieu 1984; see also Cockerham, Rütten & Abel 1997 for a similar definition). Thus 
within this project, desistance from crime refers to the procedural move away from a life-
style largely circulating around criminal behavior.  
In order to create an understanding of the processes of desistance, I will interview women 
in different phases of leaving the criminal life. Using a longitudinal, prospective approach, 
I will be able to follow the women's desistance processes as they unfold by interviewing 
them repeatedly for a period of time. 
164 
 
Background 
 
Two different approaches to desistance dominates the literature; desistance can be concep-
tualized as either a process leading to change in offending or as a more clear-cut event of 
termination of criminal activity (Halsey & Deegan 2015; Rodermond, Kruttschnitt, Slot-
boom & Bijleveld 2016). The interpretation of desistance as an event has been criticized for 
oversimplifying a more complex phenomena, and a major problem attached to this view 
of desistance is to determine when an individual actually has terminated her criminal ac-
tivity. Temporary breaks in offending, understood as intermittent desistance, is very 
common, and problematizes the view of desistance as a clear-cut event (Carlsson 2013a; 
Halsey & Deegan 2015). Therefore, desistance is increasingly seen as a process, where the 
complexity of the phenomena can be developed and understood. Advocates of such a dy-
namic view of desistance often emphasize the social implications of the desistance process, 
arguing that the transition out of a criminal lifestyle involves both a changed approach to 
interaction with society (with changed routine activities and enhanced social bonds) and 
an individual identity shift (see e.g. Giordano, Cernkovich & Rudolph 2002; Laub & 
Sampson 2003; Maruna 2001). I will primarily rely on this dynamic understanding of de-
sistance as processes.  
Another important question to the study of desistance is why it occurs. The lives of people 
in our western society is guided or regulated by age-graded transition norms constructing 
our conception of what is appropriate behavior. These norms can be understood as fram-
ing a life-schedule, leading our lives to follow a certain order (Carlsson 2014; Elder, Kirk-
patrick Johnson & Crosnoe 2004; Hughes 1984; Lander 2015; Uggen & Massoglia 2004). 
Following the normative life-schedule means leading a normal life. Awareness of the 
strong influence of such age-graded norms lets us understand the life course as a Durk-
heimian social fact, i.e. as a force external to us as individuals which controls our ways of 
life by restricting available choices for action (Carlsson 2014; Durkheim 1895/1982). Within 
this frame, desistance can be understood as a normative conception, i.e. as something eve-
ryone is expected to strive for and in the end accomplish (Lander 2015; see also Laub & 
Sampson 2001). As crime is conceptualized as deviance, we are supposed to want to desist 
in accordance with a striving towards normality. Awareness of the importance of normali-
ty, as well as the norms separating normality from deviance, can prove helpful to under-
stand the processes of desistance.  
The interest for women's desistance specifically is best understood against the backdrop of 
past and present research on desistance from crime. Such research traditionally focus on 
the group of individuals that commit many and serious crimes and have come far in the 
criminal career (Farrington, 2003). Due to the fact that far more men than women commit 
crime, and that the women who do commit crime tend to be less criminally active than 
men, the research on such criminal careers has typically been conducted on male respond-
ents exclusively (see e.g. Carlsson, 2013b) and without gender perspective (Andersson, 
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Levander & Torstensson Levander 2013; Jennings & Piquero 2009; Oliver & Hodgins 2013). 
This way of treating crime as a male issue reflects one of (life-course) criminology’s most 
well-known flaws (Halsey & Deegan 2015). By focusing on women and their life-courses 
we could gain a better understanding of the complexity of desistance from crime, and thus 
(as seen in the literature review below) nuance and problematize current “truths” based 
on studies on male desistance. 
Intensive drug use is very common among criminally active women in Sweden (Estrada & 
Nilsson 2012). European research has shown that individuals struggling to desist from 
drug use as well as crime tend to focus strongly on the former (Colman & Vander Laenen, 
2012). Furthermore, research has proven drug use to be important both as a risk-factor for 
recidivism and as a factor reducing the chance for desistance (Laub & Sampson 2003; Nils-
son 2002; Nilsson et al 2014). Despite these findings, drug use seldom is highlighted in de-
sistance research (Schroeder, Giordano & Cernkovich 2007). In a similar way but within 
drug research, the process of desistance is understudied in relation to onset and relapse 
(Hser, Longshore & Douglas Anglin 2007; Nilsson et al 2014).  
Previous research on women’s desistance 
 
This literature review is focused on “mechanisms” that previous research has identified as 
helpful in facilitating individuals’ desistance from criminal lifestyles. Most such research is 
quantitative, but interview-based and ethnographic qualitative research is discussed as 
well.  
Mechanisms facilitating desistance 
 
A lot of previous research has been outlined to answer the question of what works in de-
sistance, i.e. what mechanisms has proven helpful in individuals struggle to change their 
lives from deviancy to normality. Rodermond, Kruttschnitt, Slotboom and Bijleveld (2016) 
recently presented a review of the literature on female desistance. The review covers both 
quantitative and interview-based qualitative research. Most of the qualitative studies in-
cluded in the review were singlehandedly focused on women, whereas the quantitative 
studies that included women also featured men in their samples.  
Focusing on classic turning points identified in research on men, the meta-study shows 
that relationship to a romantic partner (married or not) can work as a turning point for 
women too. However, it is paramount to study the specific circumstances of the relation-
ship in order to understand when a romantic relationship works for women’s desistance. 
For example, a woman involved with a drug using partner might decrease her involve-
ment in non-drug crimes, but increase her drug-dealing activities (Rodermond et al 2016). 
In a similar way, getting a job has proved a prominent turning point for men, but here too 
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the surrounding circumstances moderate employment effects on women. Leaning on 
Cobbina (2009), Rodermond et al (2016) argues that this moderate employment effect for 
women might be due to the fact that for desisting women with a history of illicit drug use 
and other crime, employment is only available in low-level positions on the labor market. 
Male desisters are unattractive on the labor market, and due to structural gender-based 
discrimination, female desisters might be even more so (see also Lander 2003; Maher 
1997).  
The quantitative studies also indicate that education, mental health, family formation and 
economic independency has an effect on desistance (see e.g. Benda 2005; Huebner, DeJong 
& Cobbina 2010; Uggen & Kruttschnitt 1998). The qualitative interview studies largely 
support these conclusions, providing more detailed insights into the ‘how and why’ such 
mechanisms work for women’s desistance (see e.g. Cobbina 2010; McIvor, Trotter & 
Sheehan 2009). This methodological synergy-effect can be exemplified with the case of 
motherhood as a turning point. Within the research on women’s desistance, there is an 
overweight of research on the effect of children and motherhood on desistance. The quan-
titative research indicate that motherhood has some effect on desistance for women. This 
claim is nuanced and even problematized in the qualitative studies, as they point out that 
while it is true that motherhood can serve as a motivation to keep crime free and thus 
maintain desistance (or avoid intermittency in offending), the interviews also highlight 
that stress and expectations related to the motherhood sometimes caused a cancelation of 
desistance (thus leading to intermittency rather than desistance, see Carlsson 2013a). This 
stress was itself often caused by financial issues (Rodermond et al 2016).  
This insight on the importance of paying attention to surrounding circumstances when 
assessing mechanisms important for desistance will be further developed within this pro-
ject. The previous research identifies a number of mechanisms that can play a crucial role 
in women’s desistance processes. Drawing on this literature review, a question of when 
these mechanisms work and why emerges (see also Agnew & Messner 2015 for a similar 
call for future research). As suggested, a qualitative approach has the potential to be espe-
cially useful here, as a deeper understanding of the social surroundings of desistance pro-
cesses might be necessary in order to make sense of the complex phenomena that is de-
sistance.  
The life course from within: ethnographical studies 
 
Among the most influential studies on criminally active women and their lives are ethno-
graphical studies, wholly focused on women. Rosenbaum (1981), Taylor (1993), Maher 
(1997) and Lander (2003) have all greatly improved our knowledge on the living-situations 
for criminally active and drug (ab)using women struggling with constructs of normality 
and deviance. Although none of these works explicitly focus on desistance processes, they 
do contribute to our knowledge in this area as well. These ethnographic studies all focus 
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on the ubiquitous influence of illicit drug use on the women’s lives. In that respect they 
differ from the mechanism-oriented studies discussed above with their focus on non-drug 
crime. Even though the contexts that have formed the women’s lives differ in time and 
space between the different ethnographic studies, drug use presents the main theme 
shared in the women’s life-histories. Striving to live up to normative ideals of femininity 
with its focus on respectability, purity and selflessness, drug use present the biggest prob-
lem in the women’s self-perceptions. ‘Good’ or ‘normal’ women doesn’t use drugs, and in 
a world of narrowing opportunities, the available ways to present oneself in a better light 
are getting more and more restricted as the deviant lifestyle proceeds (Lander 2003; Maher 
1997; Rosenbaum 1981; Taylor 1993). 
One important theme in these studies concern narratives on a changed understanding of 
drugs. As the drug intensive life unfolds, the perception of the relation to drugs can 
change from being a craved necessity to becoming a crime with a victim, i.e. a fetus, a 
child or other friends and relatives that is adversely affected by the women’s drug use 
(Rosenbaum 1981; Taylor 1993). The changed assessment of the drugs can launch a strong 
will for the women to change their lives and quit the drugs in order to be perceived (by 
themselves as well as others) as ‘better’ women. Such findings are in line with Giordano et 
al’s (2002) theory on cognitive transformation, a widely used theory within desistance re-
search that will be discussed in the theory section below. The results are also in line with 
Swedish alcohol- and drug research focused on gender differences in desistance from 
drugs (Blomqvist 1999, 2002).  
Another theme is marriage as a normative dream. Living with men can present a seduc-
tive way for women to present themselves as feminine, ‘normal’ and ‘good’ within the 
dominating heteronormative and monogamous gender-frame (Rosenbaum 1981). Much in 
line with the mechanism-oriented studies above, the ethnographic studies problematizes 
the understanding of marriage as facilitating desistance (as suggested by research con-
ducted on men, see e.g. Laub & Sampson 2003). The ethnographic studies show quite to 
the contrary how women living with men face repeated battering and exploitation from 
their partners. Instead of presenting a pathway into a better life, such situations rather 
work opportunity limiting, locking the women further to the drug spiral as the women 
often react to such misery by escalating their drug use in order to distance or numb them-
selves from despair (Lander 2003; Maher 1997; Rosenbaum 1981; Taylor 1993). 
Motherhood can also work as a strong motivational force due to its implications for the 
women’s perception of what a ‘good’ woman is (Lander 2003; Rosenbaum 1981; Taylor 
1993). Becoming a mother can thus, quite like marriage, be understood as a normative 
dream and present one of few available ways for the drug using woman to pass as femi-
nine and ‘normal’. On the other hand, motherhood comes with a risk for drug using wom-
en. Failing in motherhood and the risk of being perceived as a ‘bad mother’ can in many 
ways be worse for a woman than to fail in other aspects of life (Byrne & Trew 2008). The 
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women in both Maher’s (1997) and Taylor’s (1993) studies additionally had to relate to the 
at-the-time much debated discourse on ‘crack babies’, i.e. the view of women drug users 
as selfish, unable to care for others and therefor unfit mothers (see also Lander 2003). Thus, 
motherhood, much like heterosexual monogamy as discussed above, can present both op-
portunities and risks for women striving for normality. The normative dreams of marriage 
and family formation can pull the women towards a will to change their lives and thus 
work as facilitating mechanisms in desistance. But on the other hand, just as shown by the 
qualitative studies concerning motherhood above, these normative dreams can also limit 
the women's abilities to pass as normal as the high demands of the new situation can be 
perceived as simply too hard for the women to live up to. The discrepancy between will 
and ability to desist is further developed in the theoretical section below.  
Altogether, this review of previous research emphasizes the impact of gender norms on 
our lives and life-choices. The ethnographic studies also underscores the importance of an 
intersectional approach in order to better understand women’s lives as they unfold. An 
intersectional approach can be defined as an analytical ambition to explore gender, age, 
sexuality, class, functionality and race as complex and intertwined categories of oppres-
sion and social structures, in order to understand crime and its links to social position (de 
los Reyes & Mulinari, 2005; Elder et al 2004; Mattsson 2014). The life-course is complex and 
our opportunities for action (e.g. desistance) are limited by these different intersecting 
power relations (Elder et al 2004; Halsey & Deegan 2015; Lander 2015; Maher 1997; Ro-
dermond et al 2016; Rosenbaum 1981; Taylor 1993). This research project will build upon 
these findings, as I do believe that an intersectional approach to the construction of nor-
mality and deviance can benefit desistance criminology in general, and this research pro-
ject particularly. 
Theoretical framework 
 
A prominent approach to understanding desistance as processes is Laub & Sampson’s 
(2003) age-graded theory of informal social control. According to this theory, variation in crime 
over the life course is due to different mechanisms (conceptualized as turning points) offer-
ing changes in social control and routine activities. Laub & Sampson (2003) argues that a 
turning point (e.g. a marriage) can enhance the amount of social control in the lives of the 
men they studied, and also change their routine activities in a conformist direction. Mech-
anisms such as marriage thus might raise the cost of criminal behavior and at the same 
time decrease contact with delinquent peers in criminogenic areas (see Cohen & Felson 
1979; Hirschi 1969). This theoretical understanding of desistance processes is developed 
further and from a psychological view in Giordano et al’s (2002) theory of cognitive trans-
formation. According to this theory, the mechanisms (here conceptualized as hooks for 
change) can present one important step in the individual’s gradual change of self-
perception that brings about desistance from crime. A total of four steps are required in 
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order to desist: openness to change, exposure to hooks for change, ability to envision a 
replacement self and a changed view of the deviant lifestyle. In accordance with the influen-
tial works of Maruna (2001), Giordano et al (2002) thus argues that a shift in identity might 
be important or even needed in order to sustain desistance and avoid intermittency. The 
notion of an identity shift implies a quite static view of desistance as a final state, a view 
which clashes somewhat with the previously presented understanding of desistance as 
continuous and ongoing processes. Within this research project, I will relate to both these 
different views of desistance. A definitely dynamic element though is the all-important 
individual will to change conceptualized as agency that constitutes a major aspect in both 
of these theories.  
Discrepancy between will and ability to desist 
 
As stated in the introduction, desistance is normative and expected. A will to change is 
tightly connected to a will to perform normality and be perceived by oneself and others as 
normal (Carlsson 2014). In many aspects, though, a criminal lifestyle is understood as the 
opposite of normal. It is marked as deviant, and theories propose that a major cognitive 
shift is required in order to leave such a deviant lifestyle (see e.g. Giordano et al 2002). As 
the literature review shows, a will to change, no matter how strong, is very seldom 
enough to accomplish such a transition. This fact was noted by Matza as early as 1969 as 
he wrote “being willing is not quite the same as being able” (Matza 1969:112). Life-course 
research has since then elaborated the discrepancy between will and ability to desist by 
highlighting the importance of turning points or hooks for change as external motivational 
forces that makes desistance possible for the willing agent (Giordano et al 2002; Laub & 
Sampson 2003).  
Thus, according to these theories, the individual may need some kind of mechanism to 
facilitate her desistance, but without a will to desist, she won’t be able to make use of the 
chance given by this mechanism. Agency is a key concept in desistance research, but the 
definition of the term is still somewhat vague (Carlsson 2014; King 2014). Agency can be 
understood as “attempts to exert influence to shape one’s life trajectory” (Hitlin & Elder 
2007:183). Within this research project, agency will be used as a term for conscious actions 
taken in order to influence the life course. In desistance, such actions are taken in order to 
change one’s life from deviance to normality.  
However, the actual ability to change is also dependent upon the economic, social and ma-
terial resources available to the individual (Nilsson, Bäckman & Estrada 2013). Individual 
resources are largely dependent on social position, which in turn is regulated by an inter-
secting web of norms.  
Gender norms and desistance 
 
In life-course criminology in general, gender is (when present) all too often treated as an 
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individual-level variable (i.e. sex) (Miller 2010). This project will apply a more dynamic 
gender perspective focused on gender norms and their implications for our choices of ac-
tion. A central concept in gender sensitive desistance research is "doing gender": People 
perform certain actions coded as masculine or feminine in order to be perceived as such by 
themselves and others. Gender performance is interactional and dynamic as the underly-
ing gender norms are dependent upon historical and cultural context (Carlsson 2013b; 
Lander 2003; Maher 1997; McCarthy & Gartner 2014; Miller 2014; West & Zimmermann 
1987). 
Carlsson (2013b) took a first step towards gender awareness in life-course criminology as 
he added a dynamic gender perspective into Laub and Sampson's (2003) influential age-
graded theory of informal social control. In doing this, Carlsson (2013b) showed how the 
will to change was dependent upon age-graded gender norms, as deviance could be 
linked to a youthful gender project while normality was linked to maturity. This concep-
tualization helps to understand the classic age/crime-curve that has eluded life-course 
criminology for so long (see e.g. Laub & Sampson 2001). However, Carlsson (2013b) chose 
to theorize on men and masculinities only. It is possible that the process of maturation has 
other connotations for women – both socially as women might be expected to mature in 
other ways or in different stages in life (in relation to the life-schedule), and neuro-
scientific research indicates that the biological process of maturation might be different for 
women than for men (De Bellis, Keshavan, Beers, Hall, Frustaci, Masalehdan, Noll & Bor-
ing 2001). Additionally, Carlsson’s (2013b) view (although it is arguably way more dy-
namic than the individual-level approach to gender as a dichotomous sex) still is limited to 
two relatively static categories: the young and the mature. I will build on this first im-
portant step, by further developing a dynamic understanding of how gender as well as 
other intersecting social structures makeup a social position that impact our opportunities 
for action.  
Social position, freedom to act and ability to change. 
 
In order to advance the understanding of the dynamics of women’s identity constructions, 
an intersectional approach to identity will be adopted. I use intersectionality as an analyti-
cal approach to explore how different power-relations (such as gender, age, sexuality, 
class, functionality and race) affect the identity construction throughout the life course. 
Thus, as the women strive to desist from crime and to be accepted by society as 'normal' 
women, they construct or reshape their identities by relating to, and position themselves 
within patriarchy as well as class-, age- and ethnicity-based systems of oppression (de los 
Reyes & Mulinari 2005; Mattsson 2014). Such power relations impact what choices are 
available to us, i.e. what kind of identities we are able to do.  
Bourdieu (1984) says that the body is the primary materialization of class, and that bodies 
therefore are continually evaluated and interpreted in relation to social class. Women 
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striving to belong and perform normative femininity (Lander 2003) invest in their bodies as 
symbolic capital. But looks are not all, it is also important to show signs of ‘inner feminini-
ty’, making the caring self an important part of women’s habitus (Lander 2003). Bour-
dieu’s (1987; 1999) understanding of symbolic capital will be crucial to understand the 
women’s social positions in this respect. With social position follows freedom to act and 
ability to change one’s life.  
The importance of the social position for the freedom to act and ability to change can be 
further extended with a resource perspective, shedding light on factors restricting the 
women’s struggle to desist (Nilsson & Estrada 2009). Different factors are bound to restrict 
the freedom of action in different situations. Understanding how and when different fac-
tors gain importance could greatly benefit the understanding of women’s desistance pro-
cesses. 
A resource perspective and cumulative disadvantage 
 
Generally, women punished for crimes in Sweden come from far more disadvantaged up-
bringings than the general population (Estrada & Nilsson 2012; Nilsson 2002). When pun-
ished for crimes, the women might get exposed to the social process of cumulative disad-
vantage (Sampson & Laub 1997), causing the marginalized situation to escalate into an al-
ienation that severely restricts freedom of action. Gender norms limit our discretion by 
defining some actions as unfitting our gender projects. Drug (ab)use certainly works limit-
ing for the freedom to act, as it often comes with a clear cut dependency towards the drug. 
Thus, the already difficult choice of desistance becomes even harder to make (Blomqvist 
2004).  
 
Method 
 
The study of processes of within-individual change over time require data with a longitu-
dinal scope (Menard 2002). Such data can be gathered both qualitatively and quantitative-
ly. Since this research project will apply a dynamic and intersectional approach to social 
position in order to understand how will and ability to change impact women's desistance, 
a qualitative approach is required. More specifically, a prospective interview design is out-
lined here.  
Prospective interview approach 
 
To conduct prospective interviews is to follow the life courses of individuals by repeatedly 
interviewing them at different times of their lives. The major strength of this method is its 
ability to collect data of an event relatively soon after it has happened (Benson 2013). The 
idea of actually taking part in the women’s desistance processes as they unfold is intri-
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guing, and such an approach could lead to much sought-for knowledge about women’s 
life-courses and pathways that are unprecedented in desistance research today.  
However, the method also contains issues that needs consideration. One of the more obvi-
ous challenges’ is it’s time consumption as interviews need to be conducted on several oc-
casions in order to actually capture the eventual period of within-individual change that is 
of interest. There is no way of knowing whether if an individual is about to desist in the 
near future, nor the duration of her desistance process as it really is quite individual (Ben-
son 2013; Halsey & Deegan 2015; Menard 2002). However, this research project will be 
concerned with the desistance processes per se – their twists and turns and how desistance 
unfolds. When desistance fails thus becomes just as interesting as when it is successful. 
Depending on what will come out of the prospective interviews, the concept of intermit-
tency (now only touched upon in the background, literature review and theoretical con-
siderations of this outline) might turn out to be a key concept within the research project. 
Many of the common issues with a prospective approach thus become less problematic 
when researching the processes of desistance, as the uncertainties of the outcome of the 
interviews is part of the bigger issue that is studied. Thus, a prospective approach is well 
suited for this research project.  
One last issue with prospective interviewing worth mentioning is attrition. Attrition is the 
accelerating loss of cases which can be caused by for example respondent movement or 
death (Menard 2012). In this study, attrition could be an issue since some of the interview-
ees probably will struggle with drug (ab)use. Drug (ab)using people are more likely to 
have unstable living conditions, making them more difficult to contact as they might be 
missing a home address or phone subscription (see also Benson 2013; Nilsson & Flyghed 
2004).  
Sample, interview themes and timeframe 
 
With a prospective, longitudinal interview design, this study will target about 10-15 wom-
en that are today struggling with desistance. These women will then be interviewed once 
every six months for a two-year-period. The project thus contains four sweeps of inter-
views, and all of the women will be followed during the entire period. 
The interviews will be of a thematically open character, meaning that they will have a 
conversational framing and circulate around a number of preset themes. These themes all 
originate from the theoretical framework and previous research discussed in this outline 
(see e.g. Carlsson 2012:6; Colman & Vander Laenen 2012:6-7; Giordano 2014:50; Holstein & 
Gubrium 1995:32-33; Kristensson 2014:17-18; Lander 2003:128-129; Lander 2015:272; Laub 
& Sampson 2003:139; Rodermond et al 2016). As interview sweeps 2-4 are supposed to 
work as follow-ups, interesting themes will for these interviews be drawn from each re-
spondent’s previous interview respectively. A timeframe of 2-3 hours per interview has in 
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previous research proven to be reasonable for the purposes of this research project (see e.g. 
Carlsson 2012; Lander 2003).  
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Validity of the gender gap theory in a substance-abusing popula-
tion with previous prison sentences 
 
Teemu Kaskela & Tuuli Pitkänen 
Abstract 
 
AIMS: In general, men commit most crimes, and this phenomenon is called the gender gap 
in criminology. Is the gender gap theory valid for substance abusers who have been im-
prisoned? In this paper, the theoretical background of the gender gap and other factors 
connected to criminality and preliminary results of a registry study are presented. 
METHODS: The data consisted of 2034 female and 4537 male substance abusers. Gender 
differences in the groups of substance abusers with and without prior convictions were 
compared. Additionally, the effect of gender and prior convictions on the amount and 
type of crimes committed between 2006 and 2010 were studied.  
RESULTS: In the group of substance abusers with prior convictions, gender differences 
were quite narrow compared to substance abusers without prior convictions. Generally, 
convicted substance abusers committed more crimes than other substance abusers, and 
men committed more crimes than women. However, there was no gender difference in the 
proportion of substance abusers with prior convictions who committed property crimes in 
the observation period. 
CONCLUSIONS: A gender gap in the criminality of substance abusers was found regard-
less of earlier prison background. However, preliminary results suggest that substance 
abusing women with prior convictions might have a risk of committing property crimes 
similar to men. Further analyses and control of confounding factors are needed before 
conclusions can be made. A more advanced analysis considering the confounding factors 
and deaths will be performed using Cox regression analyses in the near future. 
Introduction 
Imprisonment, gender and crime 
 
Gender gap. In the general population, men commit most crimes, and substance abuse is 
more common among men. This phenomenon is called the ‘gender gap’ (e.g., Steffenmeier 
& Allan, 1996; Steingrimsson, Carlsen., Sigfusson, & Magnusson, 2012). Women use sub-
stances less frequently than men do, though the un-prescribed use of sedatives is more 
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common among women (alcohol: Pitkänen, 2010; drugs: The European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction [EMCDDA], 2005). Both socio-cultural and genetic factors 
have been used to explain this phenomenon (Fattore, Melis, Fadda, & Fratta, 2014). The 
early onset of substance use predicts problematic use in the future for alcohol (Pitkänen, 
Lyyra, & Pulkkinen, 2005) and for prescription drugs (Hermos, Winter, Heeren, & Hing-
son, 2008). The use of illegal drugs usually decreases with age (Kandel & Raveis, 1989), but 
in Finland, the use of alcohol stabilizes at the same level from early adulthood to the age of 
50 (Pitkänen, 2010). In criminology, the gender gap seems to be wider for the most serious 
crimes.  
Some evidence for the narrowing of the gender gap was found in the 1970s (Simon, 1975). 
There have been several explanations for this phenomenon. The ‘liberation hypothesis’ 
(Heimer, 2000) connects this phenomenon to women’s liberation. However, this theory has 
been criticized because the narrowing of the gap seems to precede the liberation of women 
(Heimer, 2000). A less criticized theory is the ‘economic marginalization hypothesis’, 
which bases the narrowing of the gap in the relational worsening of the economic situation 
of women. Heimer (2000) suggests that changes in family structure, a gender gap in wages 
and the collapse of the safety net have had a combined effect on the relational economic 
marginalization of women. A third theory, the ‘decay of chivalry hypothesis’, argues that 
police and other authorities used to overlook women’s crimes more in the past more than 
they do today (Heimer, 2000). This theory has been criticized for its lack of explanation for 
relatively rapid changes, but it may explain some parts of the phenomenon (Heimer, 
2000). Steffenmeier (1993) explains the increase in women’s criminality concentrated on 
minor property crimes in relation to increased opportunities for women to commit this 
type of crime, increased drug abuse by women, and the increased economic marginaliza-
tion of women. 
In Finland, less than ten percent of prisoners are women. Women prisoners have lower 
social status, worse self-rated health and more problems with mental health than male 
prisoners do (Joukomaa et al., 2010). According to Estrada and Nilsson (2012), ‘it takes 
more to become a female offender’, and it also ’costs more’; by the age of 48, convicted 
women were more socially excluded compared to men. However, when social problems in 
childhood and drug abuse history were controlled, there were no significant differences 
between genders. 
Women have been found to be less likely than men to recidivate (Deschenes, Owen, & 
Crow, 2007, Tyni, 2011). Although the frequency of criminality differs between genders, 
most factors that affect criminal behavior, such as poverty and unemployment, seem to 
have parallel effects on crime rates regardless of gender (Kruttschnitt 2013). However, 
some factors connected to crime seem to be gendered. For example, drug use increases 
women’s risk of recidivism more than men’s risk (Li & MacKenzie, 2003). Some variables, 
such as education and employment have a stronger protective effect, and illegal drug use 
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stronger injurious effect against recidivism for women than for men (Uggen & Kruttschnitt 
1998 and Simons et al., 2002). There is also evidence that women have a later offending 
onset than men do (Block, Blokland, van der Werff, van Os, & Nieuwbeerta, 2010). Uggen 
and Kruttschnitt (1998) theorize their findings based on Black’s (1976) theory of law on the 
differences between genders: 1) women’s reputations are more easily damaged as an effect 
of prior crime and drug use, but their reputations are also protected by education and 
work; and 2) gender differences in official crime statistics seem to be at least partially af-
fected by the behavior of officials. 
Identity and categorization. Black (1976) suggests in his theory of law that the role of law 
increases when other forms of social control, such as family, therapeutic relations and 
friendships, decrease. In his theory, differences between genders are dependent on their 
correspondence to social location and thus to the other identities or roles they possess. 
Women often have social locations as wives, carers and mothers, and they have tradition-
ally been economically dependent. These locations together form mechanisms that protect 
women from formal legal controls (Uggen & Kruttchnitt 1998). According to Black (1976), 
the more marginal people are, the more likely they are to be blamed and their behavior to 
be defined as deviant. Being a known offender can stigmatize a person for life, making the 
person more likely to be watched and harassed. 
When Black (1976) examined ‘labeling’, he stressed the perspective of others, such as offi-
cials. Jenkins (2008) stated that identity must be considered from two perspectives: in the 
process of self-identification, we also categorize others. Therefore, as others, such as offi-
cials, categorize us, we begin to act according that identity and the labels attached to it and 
vice versa. According to Link and Phelan (2001), ‘Stigma exists when elements of labeling, 
stereotyping, separation, status loss and discrimination occur together in a power situation 
that allows them’. Therefore, stigmatization and discrimination are social psychological 
processes that affect persons who have been stigmatized.  
Criminality is often connected to masculinity (e.g., Messerscmidt 1993), but this may be a 
simplification (Hood-Williams, 2001). Steffenmeier and Allan (1996) offer a more compli-
cated theory in which the masculinity of criminality is related to the way gender is orga-
nized. Norms of society, moral values, social control, sexuality as a source of exploitation, 
and physical strength (in some crimes) lead to a difference between genders in criminal 
behavior. These gender roles tend to restrict women’s occupations and positions (illegal or 
legal) connected to criminal opportunities and the motivation to take risks. Although the 
underlying macro-level causes of criminality (poverty, age, unemployment, low educa-
tion) may be the same, the context (the motives and the details of the offence) may differ 
depending on gender, even if the crime is registered in the same way (Steffenmeier & Al-
lan, 1996). 
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Factors connected to criminality 
 
Substance use. Substance abuse and criminality are related to one another by definition 
with regard to illegal drugs. Indirectly, the connection of crime and substance abuse is 
more complicated. Although alcohol abuse increases the likelihood of both violent and 
property crimes, this phenomenon may also be caused by confounding factors (Fergusson 
& Horwood, 2000). However, most crimes are committed while an individual is intoxicat-
ed or by persons with substance abuse problems. Elonheimo et al. (2007) found that alt-
hough only 1.8 percent of the young men born in 1981 had a diagnosed substance use dis-
order, this group was responsible for 24 percent of the crimes committed by this cohort 
between 1998 and 2001. In Finland, more than four-fifths of prisoners have been diagnosed 
with lifetime substance dependence (Joukamaa et al., 2010). 
Different crimes are also committed for different reasons. For example, property and drug 
crimes may be ‘survival crimes’ that are committed for emotional and economic reasons 
(Deschenes et al., 2007). Substances may also be a cause of property crimes (e.g., stealing 
money to buy drugs), but there is often a more complex relationship between substance 
abuse, criminality and one or more other factors (Albery, McSweeney, & Hough, 2004), 
and many motives for the crimes committed by substance abusers are not connected to 
substances (Kekki, 2012). Drug use is also connected to a higher risk of committing proper-
ty crimes among released prisoners (Kirwan et al., 2015). 
Age. The connection between crime and age is another well-known criminological phe-
nomenon. The crime-age curve (e.g., McVie, 2005) peaks in adolescence or early adult-
hood, and criminal activity and the likelihood of an individual committing a crime de-
creases with age. However, the shape of the curve varies depending on the types of crimes 
and social and cultural factors, such as generation, country, social background, and gender 
(Ulmer & Steffenmeier, 2014). For those who commit crimes, the spectrum of criminal be-
havior seems to widen with age (Stattin, Magnussen, & Reichel, 1989). Property crimes 
seem to peak earlier than violent, drug- or alcohol-related crimes (Sampson & Laub, 2003). 
People with unstable situations, such as those with previous incarcerations, unsteady jobs, 
homelessness and substance abuse, seem to persist in criminality into older age (Laub & 
Sampson, 2003, for ex-prisoners see Monnery, 2015).  
Work and education. The desistance from criminality as people age is not simply due to 
aging. During their life-course, people find things that prevent criminality, such as finding 
a job, obtaining an education or getting married. Laub and Sampson (2003) call these 
events ‘turning points’. In particular, employment reduces the probability of committing a 
crime, but in some studies education has also been found to have a connection with de-
sistance. Most of the women who commit crimes have a limited education and poor em-
ployment status (Heimer, 2000).  
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Current employment reduces the risk of arrest for both genders (Uggen and Kruttschnitt 
1998), but employment seems to act as a turning point only after early adulthood (Uggen 
2000). However, Giardano, Cernkovich and Rudolph (2002) did not find adulthood job 
stability to be a significant predictor of adult desistance from crime for either gender. In-
carceration also influences the likelihood of not having a steady job, which, in turn, is con-
nected to the continuation of criminality in the future (Sampson and Laub 1993). Impris-
oned women more often have problems with employment (Peters, Strozier, Murrin, & 
Kearns, 1997). In his study of convicted ex-prisoners, Monnery (2015) found a slightly 
higher risk of recidivism for persons with employment but no difference based on educa-
tion.  
Lochner and Moretti (2004) found a causal link between higher education and reduced 
criminality. They also presented theories for the crime-reducing effect of education: the 
relational economic cost and stigma related to being caught was higher for educated peo-
ple; education had an effect on patience, risk aversion, and the psychic costs of criminal 
activity; and schools had the effect of keeping children off the street. Huebner et al. (2009) 
found that convicted women with high school diplomas were less likely to fail in parole. 
Education level also protects middle-aged women from the impact of labeling (Culbertson 
and Fortune 1986). Witte and Tauchen (1994) found no connection between previous high 
school education and future crime. 
Mental health and substance abuse. Compared to the link between substance abuse and 
crime, other mental disorders and criminality, especially combined with substance abuse, 
are less frequently studied. Most studies concerning mental disorders and criminality con-
centrate on violent behavior rather than other types of criminality (e.g., Räsänen et al., 
1998, Brennan et al., 2000). However, conduct disorders as well as anxiety and depression 
linked with substance use disorders in early adolescence have been found to increase the 
risk of criminal behavior in late adolescence (Copeland, Miller-Johnson, Keeler, Angold, & 
Costello, 2007).  
Hernandez-Avila et al. (2000) did not find that schizophrenic or personality disorders pre-
dicted criminality in a one-year follow-up after substance abuse treatment, with the excep-
tion of borderline personality disorder and violent crimes. Persons with schizophrenic 
disorders and co-occurring substance disorders, particularly drug abuse, have a higher 
risk of committing a crime than do other persons with schizophrenic disorders and normal 
populations for most types of crime, including property crimes (Tiihonen et al., 1997, 
McCabe et al. 2012). Substance-abusing men with schizophrenic or mood disorders com-
mit more crimes than other men with these mental disorders do (Modestin & Wuermle, 
2005), and women prisoners seem to have mental problems more often than men do 
(Joukamaa et al. 2010, Peters et al. 1997). 
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Research question 
 
Two different issues were analysed in this paper. First, the existence of gender differences 
between convicted substance abusers and other substance abusers was studied. Secondly, 
the likelihood of substance abusing men and women to commit different types of crimes 
categorized in two populations, substance abusers with and without prior convictions, 
was examined. 
Data and Method 
Data 
The data were part of our large register study, the Registry-based follow-up study on 
criminality, health and taxation of inpatients and outpatients (RIPE; N = 12 047) who en-
tered substance abuse treatment between 1990 and 2009. The data consisted of treatment 
records from two out-patient clinics in Helsinki and one in-patient treatment center, Jä-
rvenpää Addiction Hospital. For inclusion in this study, substance abusers had to be alive 
at the beginning of 2006 and had to have an entry in treatment records due to their own 
alcohol, illegal drug, medicine or multiple substance problem. Of the 6571 substance abus-
ers, 327 women and 1707 men had been convicted, and 1936 women and 2601 men had 
not. Sixty percent of the substance abusers were living in the Greater Capital Area around 
Helsinki. 
Selected variables from the following national registers were combined for the treatment 
data: 1) the causes of death from Statistics Finland; 2) the prisoner data system of the 
Criminal Sanctions Agency (VATI); 3) the Finnish Care Register for Health Care (HILMO); 
4) the information system of taxation; 5) Statistics Finland’s Register of Completed Educa-
tion and Degrees; and 6) three different registers provided by the legal register center (the 
record of judicial decisions, the record of fines and criminal records). The ethical commit-
tee of the A-Clinic Foundation approved the study’s protocol. Permission was granted for 
the use of data from the keepers of each register, and the National Institute for Health and 
Welfare approved the dataset. The data were anonymized.  
Variables 
 
In the analysis, we separated substance abusers convicted to imprisonment or to commu-
nity service (n=2034) and other substance abusers (n=4537). A binary variable concerning 
prior criminal sanctions between 1.1.1992 and 12.31.2005 was created for this purpose. On-
ly criminal sanctions served in prison or community service were taken into account. For 
demographic comparison, we used variables related to age, education, work situation, 
substance abused, mental health and earlier criminal sanctions. 
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Demographic variables. Age and gender were obtained based on social security numbers 
before anonymization of the data. A binary variable for secondary or higher education 
before 2006 was created. Information concerning working or not working in 2004 or 2005 
was evaluated using income reported for state income taxation. This binary variable was 
created by using The Social Insurance Institution of Finland’s minimum income limits to 
measure full-time work when granting unemployment money. This variable excludes 
some incomes of entrepreneurs and does not count undeclared work. Substance abuse and 
its treatment. Information about substance use problems was combined from treatment 
records and all diagnoses received in inpatient care during 1990 - 2009. A binary variable 
was created by differentiating people for whom alcohol was the only substance causing 
problems from people who had problems with other substances (drugs, prescribed medi-
cines or multiple substances). A binary variable concerning whether the timing of the first 
known substance abuse treatment had begun before or after 2006 was also created. Our 
data are not comprehensive on the matter of substance treatment centers; therefore, this 
variable is only directional. Mental health diagnoses for inpatient periods between 1996 
and 2005 included all inpatient periods in any officially approved Finnish hospitals. The 
International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems version 10 (ICD-10) 
has been used nationally for diagnoses since 1996. Diagnoses of schizophrenia, schizotypal 
and delusional disorders (F20-F29), mood [affective] disorders (F30-F39), neurotic, stress-
related and somatoform disorders (F40-F48), and disorders of adult personality and be-
havior (F60-F69) were used as binary variables. Other blocks of the chapter Mental and 
behavioral disorders (F00-F99) as well as diagnoses of Human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) disease (B20-B24) and Chronic viral hepatitis C (B18.2) were used for descriptive 
purposes. For the group of convicted substance abusers, the following three variables were 
used as covariates: a criminal sanctions client only in community service; a default prison-
er at some point; and the number of imprisonments that began or ended between 1992 and 
2005 (excluding community service). 
Analyses 
 
We examined the frequencies of the different crimes committed during the entire follow-
up period. Fisher’s exact test and an independent variables t-test were used to analyze 
gender differences. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 21.0 was used to perform 
the analyses. 
Results 
 
There were 4308 substance-abusing men and 2263 substance-abusing women in the sam-
ple. Between 1992 and 2005, 39.6 percent of the men and 14.4 percent of the women had 
been convicted to prison or community service. The mean age was 41.1 years, and the me-
dian age was 40.4 years on 1/1/2006. The convicted abusers were generally four years 
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younger than the other substance abusers (p < 0.001). Women were slightly younger than 
men. Only 32.2 percent of the sample had graduated from secondary education, and 11.5 
percent had tertiary education. In both groups, men had secondary or higher education 
slightly more often than women. Convicted abusers had secondary education less often (p 
< 0.001) and had been employed in 2004 or 2005 (p < 0.001) less often than the other abus-
ers. Two-fifths of the other abusers but only 13.9 percent of the convicted abusers had been 
employed in 2004 or 2005. Men had been working more often than women in both groups. 
Drug or multiple substance abuse was more common among convicted abusers than other 
abusers (77.6% and 53.8%, p < 0.001), and there were no gender differences. The majority 
(82.3%) of the sample had been in substance abuse treatment before 1.1.2005. Convicted 
abusers more often had their first treatment after the follow-up period (19.7% and 13.1%, p 
< 0.001). Convicted men had their first treatment after 1.1.2005 more often than convicted 
women did (14.0% and 8.3%, p < 0.001). 
Almost half (48.6%) of the substance abusers had had a diagnosed mental health problem 
other than substance-use-related problems (F00-F09, F20-F99) during an inpatient period. 
Non-convicted women (55.5%) had been diagnosed more often than non-convicted men 
(45.1%, p < 0.001). The four most common diagnostic blocks among substance abusers 
were mood (affective) disorders (30.1%), disorders of adult personality (20.9%), neurotic, 
stress-related and somatoform disorders (15.8%) and schizophrenia, schizotypal and delu-
sional disorders (12.1%). Other blocks within mental diagnoses were uncommon (< 2.5%). 
One percent of the sample had HIV, and 12.8 percent had Hepatitis C diagnosed in inpa-
tient treatment. 
More than 7 percent of the persons had died during the follow-up period without commit-
ting a crime. Convicted men had died without committing a crime more often than con-
victed women. Convicted men had died more often (10.8%) than other men (5.2%, p < 
0.001) without committing a crime. 
Criminality by gender and previous prison sentences 
 
More than half (53.4%) of the substance abusers committed a crime between 1/1/2006 and 
9/30/2010. A larger proportion of men (60.2%) than women (40.5%, p < 0.001) committed a 
crime. Of the persons sentenced to imprisonment or community service between 1.1.1992 
and 31.12.2005, 75.5 percent committed at least one crime during the follow-up. 
Overall, 66820 different offences were found in the official registries between 1.1.2006 and 
30.9.2010. When examining the absolute number of crimes, the most common offense was 
some type of crime against property. These crimes constituted 47.0 percent of all offenses, 
of which 47.9 percent were petty thefts.  
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Offenses were divided into the following seven categories according to the nature of the 
crime: 1) offenses against property (35.8% of substance abusers), 2) traffic offenses other 
than driving under the influence (22.7%), 3) crimes against public authority and public 
peace (21.4%), 4) narcotic offenses (20.6%), 5) driving under the influence (23.2%), 6) 
crimes against life and health (12.3%), and 7) firearm offenses (4.4%). The three most 
common property crimes were petty theft (30.2%), theft (10.4%) and assault (9.6%). The 
most typical narcotic offences were narcotic abuse offence (17.7%) and narcotic offence 
(9.2%); only 0.9% of the persons had committed an aggregated narcotic offence. Convicted 
abusers had committed crimes more often than other substance abusers in all of the cate-
gories. Men had committed offenses more than women in all seven categories (p < 0.01), 
except property crimes in the group of convicted abusers (men 41.4% and women 42.5%, p 
= 0.379). Other gender differences remained significant (p < 0.01) when convicted and oth-
er abusers were analysed separately. 
Discussion 
 
Two-fifths of the studied substance abusing men had been imprisoned between 1992 and 
2005 compared to only 14 percent of the women. Convicted men were more often em-
ployed, had a better education and were less often diagnosed with neurotic, stress-related 
or somatoform disorder than convicted women, and the number of imprisonments was 
also higher for men than for women. However, the differences between men and women 
in the group of convicted substance abusers were smaller than in the group of substance 
abusers without convictions.  
Half of the studied substance abusers committed a crime during the 5-year observation 
period. Two-thirds of the convicted abusers committed at least one crime during the fol-
low-up. Property crimes, especially petty thefts, were the most common type of crime re-
gardless of the gender or history of prior convictions. Convicted abusers committed crimes 
more often than other abusers in all of the categories. Overall, men committed crimes 
more often than women, but there were no differences in the amount of property crimes in 
the group of convicted substance abusers. 
Some explanations for these preliminary findings can be found in the literature. Convicted 
substance abusing women constitute a very small sub-group. Although most crimes are 
committed by men, it is a simplification to connect it to masculinity (e.g., Hood-Williams, 
2001). The relationship between criminality and gender is more complicated (Steffen-
Meier and Allan, 1996). Gender roles tend to restrict women’s occupations and positions 
(illegal or legal) connected to criminal opportunities and the motivation to take risks. 
However, some women achieve these positions. This might explain why differences be-
tween genders were narrower amongst convicted substance abusers than other abusers. 
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Women are more protected from committing crimes than men (Steffen-Meier and Allan, 
1996). However, convicted women have difficulties resisting stigmatizing labels that have 
been imposed on them (Geiger & Fischer 2005), and as substance abusers with criminal 
backgrounds, women also fall under the surveillance of officials (Uggen & Skruttschnitt, 
1998). Self-identification as a criminal is also connected to drug use and convictions 
(Alarid & Vega, 2010). There is evidence that labelling can trigger processes that increase 
involvement in deviant behaviour (Bernburg, Marvin, & Craig, 2006). 
In the general population, the gender gap is also narrower in regards to property crimes. 
As a type of crime, property crimes have been found typical for women with previous 
convictions (Deschenes et al. 2007). Steffenmeier (1993) explains the concentration of 
women’s offenses in minor property crimes as a result of the following: increased oppor-
tunities for women to commit this type of crime, increased drug abuse by women, and 
increased economic marginalization of women. 
These results are descriptive and cannot be generalized to other convicted substance abus-
ers. As presented in the introduction, there are other confounding factors connected to 
criminality that should be taken into account before drawing conclusions. In the near fu-
ture, this study will be expanded with the use of a Cox regression to analyse the propor-
tional risk of committing a crime between 2006 and 2010. A Cox regression will be utilized 
because deaths and confounding factors can be taken into account. Cox regression models 
will be created to separately analyse both overall criminality and property crimes specifi-
cally. 
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Inledning 
Under 2000-talet har människohandel för sexuella ändamål etablerats som ett av de största 
(brotts-) problemen i Västvärlden och står högt upp på internationella och nationella 
agendor (Doezema, 2010). Människohandel framställs av myndigheter, medier, organisat-
ioner, aktivister och ofta även av många forskare som ett enormt problem som bara ökar 
(Weitzer, 2015). Weitzer (2007) har mycket kritiskt sammanfattat diskursen om människo-
handel som ett moraliskt korståg underbyggt av tveksam statistik och med skräckhistorier 
om en växande epidemi av samhällelig ondska. Denna studie fokuserar på hur människo-
handel för sexuella ändamål har formulerats som problem i framför allt den mediala och 
politiska diskursen i Sverige, och tittar på vilka åtgärder som har lyfts fram.  
Tidigare forskning 
I Sverige är antalet fall av människohandel för sexuella ändamål som myndigheter får vet-
skap om få; och antalet grova fall är några enstaka per år. De polisanmälda fallen av män-
niskohandel varierar kring ett tjugotal per år, och siffrorna är beroende av polisens resur-
ser. De få empiriska studier som har gjorts i Sverige visar att det är ovanligt att människo-
handel för sexuella ändamål bedrivs inom ramen för organiserad brottslighet eller inom 
större nätverk. Det är också ovanligt med kopplingar till annan typ av brottslighet. Istället 
verkar det vanliga förhållandet vara att det är ett par där mannen förmedlar kontakter och 
kvinnan prostituerar sig. (Brå 2008:21; Brå 2011:19).  
Metod 
Ingången till denna studie har varit att analysera människohandel för sexuella ändamål 
under den tidsperioden då det etablerades som ett socialt problem i Sverige och fördes 
upp på den mediala och politiska dagordningen. Människohandel för sexuella ändamål 
uppmärksammades inte alls på 1990-talet men fick stor uppmärksamhet under första hal-
van av 2000-talet i både dagspress och av politiker, med en topp under 2005 och 2006. Den 
här studien inkluderar ett omfattande politiskt och medial material, liksom rapporter av 
den nationella polisen mellan 2000-2010. Det politiska materialet är en statlig utredning, 
tre propositioner och sju protokoll från riksdagsdebatter om människohandel för sexuella 
ändamål. Jag har också analyserat 157 tidningsartiklar publicerade i fyra tidningar, samt 
rapporter om människohandel för sexuella ändamål skrivna av Rikskriminalpolisen. 
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Analytiskt utgår denna studie från en diskursanalys inspirerad av Faircloughs (1989; 1992) 
bredare inriktning av den kritiska diskursanalysen. För att ringa in diskurserna inom 
människohandel för sexuella ändamål har jag använt mig av vissa begrepp inspirerade av 
Laclau och Mouffes (1985) diskursteori. 
Resultat 
I dagspressen och i de politiska texterna konstruerar aktörer människohandel för sexuella 
ändamål som problem inom ramen för åtminstone fyra diskurser; vår tids slaveri av pas-
siva kvinnor och barn, den ideala sexslaven Lilja, det främmande hotet från öst, och den 
svårupptäckta men väletablerade organiserade brottsligheten.  
Diskursen om vår tids slaveri av passiva kvinnor och barn har begreppet slaveri i fokus 
och cirkulerar kring subjekten ”kvinnor och barn”. Dessa två subjekt är både tätt samman-
länkade, men också separerade då kvinnor kopplas till prostitution medan barn associeras 
med barnporr och vidare med barnsexhandel. Kvinnornas och barnens främsta karakteri-
stika är att de är passiva, alltså helt i avsaknad av agens, vilket gör att andra aktörer utta-
lar sig i deras ställen.     
 
Diskursen om den ideala sexslaven Lilja är kopplad till filmen Lilja 4-ever och till huvud-
personen Lilja, som också används som ett begrepp i diskursen för att beskriva ett ide-
alt/stereotypt sex trafficking-offer som är ung, fattig, lurad/tvingad, oskyldig och passiv. 
Liljas egenskaper medför att hon länkas tätt till sexslaveri och kategoriseras som brottsof-
fer. 
Diskursen om det främmande hotet från öst är centrerad kring ”utlänningen” som subjekt, 
fast på två skilda sätt, men båda med negativa konnotationer. Kvinnor som i de två före-
gående diskurserna har kategoriserats som brottsoffer beskrivs i denna diskurs som ”ut-
länningar”. Dessa utlänningar länkas till människosmuggling och vidare till ”illegal in-
vandring”. Parallellt med detta finns ytterligare en ekvivalenskedja i denna diskurs där 
kvinnor kategoriseras som ”öststatsflickor”. Dessa öststatsflickor kopplas till sex traffick-
ing och vidare till prostitution och de länkas till sexuellt överförbara sjukdomar, som HIV.   
Slutligen är diskursen om den svårupptäckta men väletablerade organiserade brottslighet-
en centrerad kring begreppet organiserad brottslighet och organiserade brottslingar är i 
fokus. Människohandel för sexuella ändamål kopplas tätt ihop med organiserad brottslig-
het och det sistnämnda beskrivs motsägelsefullt som både väletablerad i Sverige, men 
också svårupptäckt. Den organiserade brottslingheten kopplas vidare till Östeuropa, och 
framstår därmed som ännu mer hotfull då den rasifieras.    
När det gäller de lösningar som förs fram är de kopplade till problemformuleringarna som 
görs genom diskurserna. De tre huvudsakliga åtgärderna är att straffa människohandlare 
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och/eller kopplare, att utbilda poliser samt att skicka hem kvinnorna/offren för människo-
handeln.    
Argumentet för hårdare straff av människohandlare är att brottsoffret på det sättet får 
upprättelse. Under den studerade tidsperioden introduceras en lag mot människohandel 
med maximistraffet två år, som senare höjs till tio år. När det gäller utbildning av poliser 
ska det bland annat göras genom att de får se filmen Lilja-4ever, vilket också genomförs. 
Filmen visas även i riksdagen, i svenska skolor, i EU-parlamentet, i den ryska duman samt 
åker på ”turné” över världen med Utrikesdepartementets hjälp. Slutligen är det sista, och 
kanske mest problematiska lösningsförslaget för människohandel för sexuella ändamål att 
utvisa kvinnorna/offren. Om kvinnorna uppfyller ett ”ideal” brottsofferskap kan de an-
vändas som vittnen i svenska domstolar vid åtal för människohandel för sexuella ända-
mål. Då kan kvinnorna få tillfälligt uppehållstillstånd. Därefter ska kvinnorna alltid skick-
as ”hem”, oavsett om de vill det eller inte.  
Diskussion 
I den svenska debatten gör problemdefinitionerna och lösningsförslagen för människo-
handel för sexuella ändamål att tydliga hotbilder etableras. Hotet är främst transnationellt 
från det forna Östeuropa och från externa, rasifierade aktörer. Det skapar en tydlig upp-
delning mellan ”vi” och ”dem”. Debatten bidrar också till att etablera stereotypa beskriv-
ningar av ideala brottsoffer baserade på könsstereotypa beskrivningar av ”horan och ma-
donnan”. Lösningsförslagen med hårdare straff, hemskickandet av kvinnor/offer och ut-
bildning av poliser och politiker med hjälp av Lilja-4-ever filmen förstärker ytterligare den 
problematiska problembeskrivningen och uppdelningen mellan vi och dem, mellan 
svenskar och ”utlänningar”, mellan oäkta och äkta brottsoffer och migranter.    
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Conceptual and methodological challenges in exploring the links 
between human trafficking and sham marriages 
 
Minna Viuhko 
researcher/HEUNI 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The topic of the 2016 NSfK Research seminar is “New challenges in criminology”. Human 
trafficking, and particularly its so-called new forms, such as trafficking for forced or sham 
marriages or trafficking for forced criminality or begging, can well be defined as a new 
challenge in crime. Also, the question in the title of the seminar, “Can old theories be used 
to explain or understand new crimes?”, is relevant when studying these “new forms” of 
human trafficking.  
 
In this paper, I will concentrate especially on the terminological, conceptual and methodo-
logical challenges of studying a “new” and “not-so-much-studied” topic. The topic of the 
paper is human trafficking and sham marriages, and the paper asks what kind of prob-
lems researchers encounter when studying such phenomena. 
 
The paper is based on a research component of the project called “HESTIA1 – Preventing 
human trafficking and sham marriages”.2 The aims of the research are to explore the links 
between sham marriages and trafficking criminality and to provide new information on 
the vulnerabilities, factors and methods that facilitate sham marriages resulting in traffick-
ing in persons. In the project, we are interested in sham marriages in the context of human 
trafficking, not sham marriages as such, and thus the exploitation element is essential. The 
focus of the project is on marriages concluded between EU-nationals and third country 
nationals. In the majority of the cases studied the wife is an EU-national and the husband 
is a third country national. (Due to the focus, marriages between two EU citizens and mar-
riages between two non-EU nationals fall outside the scope of this study.)   
                                                 
1 Grant Agreement No. HOME/2013/ISEC/AG/THB/4000005845 
2 The project started in 2015 and is led by the Latvian Ministry of the Interior. HEUNI is coordinating the 
research activities in the project, has developed the research methodology and has trained the researchers 
who conducted the research in five countries. HEUNI shall also publish the joint research report, and HEU-
NI’s researchers are responsible for the introductory and summary chapter of the joint report, including the 
conclusions and recommendations at the EU level. In addition, HEUNI shall participate in the development 
of training material.  
  
196 
 
The study asks 1) what are the links between (the organisation of) sham marriages and 
trafficking criminality, 2) how do persons concluding sham marriages end up in situations 
of exploitation and/or trafficking in persons, 3) what forms of exploitation do the victims 
encounter, 4) what are the weaknesses in the system / legislation / administrative proce-
dures that enable trafficking in the context of sham marriages, 5) what can be done to en-
hance the identification of cases / victims (of trafficking and serious exploitation) and what 
can be done to improve assistance provided to victims, and 6) what can be done to prevent 
exploitation. The research has been carried out in five countries: Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Slovak Republic. The researchers in the five countries have collected 
empirical data, such as qualitative interviews, statistics and examples of cases, on the top-
ic.3 
 
Challenges related to terms and definitions 
 
When the project started, we needed to think about what, exactly, we are looking at and 
what terms should be used. In the context of the topic in question, it was not clear how we 
should talk about the phenomenon. Many different terms, such as marriage of conven-
ience, fictitious marriage, fake marriage, false marriage and bogus marriage, are used, and 
there are many synonyms for “sham marriages”. A term that is often used, particularly in 
official documents, is “marriage of convenience” and that is probably the closest parallel 
term for “sham marriage”. In this context, a “marriage of convenience is commonly under-
stood as a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of conferring a right of residence un-
der EU law on a non-EU national who would otherwise not be able to benefit from such a 
right.”4  Therefore, the purpose of the marriage is to legalise the stay of a third country 
national in the European Union. 
 
It has to be noted that although some of the terms appear to be similar, they may have 
somewhat different meanings or at least dissimilar connotations. For example, the terms 
fictitious, fake and false marriage may imply that the marriage would not be “real”. How-
ever, the marriages studied in the project are formally valid marriages. It is only the mo-
tive for concluding the marriage that is “false”. Thus, it can be said that the marriages are 
not “fictitious” or fake in the sense that there would be no “real” marriage. However, the 
marriages are not “genuine” in the sense that the purpose of the marriage is something 
other than love, or establishing a family and living together as husband and wife. There-
fore, the marriages studied are formally valid, but not “genuine”. 
 
                                                 
3 The project is on-going at the time of the writing of this paper. The paper does not present the empirical 
findings or the final results of the study, but discusses terminological and methodological issues. The project 
will be concluded in the end of 2016. 
4 Handbook on addressing the issue of alleged marriages of convenience between EU citizens and non-EU 
nationals in the context of EU law on free movement of EU citizens (European Commission 2014). 
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In addition to the above-mentioned terms, which are more or less similar to one another, 
there are marriage-related concepts, such as forced marriage and arranged marriage, that 
have clearly different meaning. 
 
A further challenge arises due to the fact that the project involves partners from six coun-
tries and therefore six languages are used in the project. Each partner (with the exception 
of Ireland) had to find appropriate terms in their national language that could be used 
alongside the English terms. In addition, the terms used at the national level may be dif-
ferent from the terms used at the EU level. For example, “fictitious marriage” is used as a 
synonym for sham marriage in Latvia, but at the EU level, fictitious marriage can be de-
fined as a marriage that has been concluded by using fake documents. Also, the term 
“sham” itself may refer to something that is either not real or not genuine, but in the con-
text of the HESTIA project “real” and “genuine” have different meanings.   
 
Furthermore, as the project is particularly interested in sham marriages related to traffick-
ing (i.e. sham marriages in the context of human trafficking / trafficking in human beings 
for the purpose of sham marriage), we needed a concept that encompasses the exploitative 
element. We developed the term “exploitative sham marriage” in the project.5 The term refers 
to sham marriages that include elements of exploitation. We are studying cases that include 
elements of exploitation but are not actual trafficking and also cases that can be defined as 
trafficking (i.e. “trafficking for (the purpose of) sham marriages”). In practice, it is not easy 
to draw a line between different forms of exploitation.  
 
An important and essential aspect in defining these different phenomena is the difference 
between sham marriage and trafficking in persons as regards the subject of the offence. A 
sham marriage is a crime or an act against the state,6 whereas trafficking is a crime against 
the person. In the project we are focusing on exploitation of persons. Furthermore, the dif-
ference between forced and exploitative sham marriage is relevant. We are not focusing on 
whether the potential victims are forced to marry a third country national in the first place 
but rather the exploitative elements and conditions during the process (both during the 
recruitment and actions in the destination country, before and after concluding the mar-
riage). Sometimes the cases studied involve force already at the beginning of the activities, 
but sometimes they do not. A person may be willing to conclude a sham marriage, but 
later on s/he will be exploited. In fact, the role of an EU-spouse (who are primarily wom-
                                                 
5 The term was used to some extent during the data collection and will be used in reporting the findings of 
the study.  
6 In many EU Member States, sham marriages as such have not been criminalised. However, conclud-
ing/organising a sham marriage can be a crime or sham marriage can be used as a reason to annul or refuse 
to confer a residence permit. 
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en) may change from a perpetrator (of a (minor) offence or fraud against the state7) to a 
victim (of exploitation, or in severe cases, of trafficking in persons).  
 
Challenges related to the methodology 
 
The challenges are partly the same as methodological challenges related to studying hu-
man trafficking (or other sensitive topics and hidden crime) in general. The cases are not 
easy to find, disclose and investigate. (Potential) victims do not come forward and they are 
not willing to tell about exploitation they have encountered. Also, statistics on these kinds 
of crime are not very reliable and/or informative. 
 
Furthermore, doing research on exploitative sham marriages entails a number of other 
issues beyond those that are relevant to trafficking research in general. The conceptual is-
sues that were presented in the previous chapter have resulted in several methodological 
difficulties. First, not only the definition but also the “status” of sham marriage (as an of-
fence, an administrative issue or something else) varies in different countries and may not 
be very clear. Secondly, the role of different parties involved is ambiguous: who is the vic-
tim, and who is the perpetrator? A person who concludes a sham marriage may be seen as 
a perpetrator of a violation of migration laws / immigration fraud, but s/he also may be a 
victim of exploitation. Also, one may ask whether the questions and answers related to the 
authenticity of a marriage are so clear and obvious. Are love and/or “an intention to create 
a durable family unit and lead an authentic marital life”8  the only “real” or “proper” rea-
sons for concluding a marriage?  
 
When it comes to the methodological issues and challenges, one of the most central ques-
tion is “what to study and how to study it”. As there is a lack of clear understanding of the 
phenomenon and concepts related to sham marriages, this question had to be thoroughly 
reflected on. In the course of the project, we have had to decide what kind of cases to in-
clude and what to exclude. What kind of data should be collected? Who, for example, is an 
expert on “exploitative sham marriages”? The methodology had to be developed for the 
project, and in the development work, we utilized pilot methodologies used in previous 
trafficking studies carried out by HEUNI.  
 
Furthermore, the lack of identified cases resulted in problems in finding concrete examples 
of the phenomenon. The topic hasn’t been studied much, and particularly among the EU 
Member States there is a huge lack of research on the linkages between sham marriages 
                                                 
7  In some countries, concluding a sham marriage is a crime. 
8 See Handbook on addressing the issue of alleged marriages of convenience between EU citizens and non-
EU nationals in the context of EU law on free movement of EU citizens (European Commission 2014). 
199 
 
and human trafficking. Therefore, it is difficult to reflect the research findings to earlier 
studies.  
 
In addition to the conceptual and methodological questions, there are also important ethi-
cal issues that need to be considered. One needs to be careful of how one talks about this 
phenomenon. Researchers may, partly unintentionally, label people or groups of people, 
and research may also have counterproductive consequences. In this kind of study, there 
is the potential for further stigmatising certain groups of people, such as, on the one hand, 
“third country nationals” (especially men) and on the other hand, women from certain 
countries or certain areas, and with certain background (issues such as poverty, addic-
tions, mental disabilities, lack of education etc.).  
Furthermore, the results of the study can be used for purposes that may be harmful e.g. for 
third country nationals. Closed borders or stricter border control have partly resulted from 
the fear of potential negative consequences for the EU Member States caused by the in-
creased number of asylum seekers or other third country nationals. A fear of the abuse of 
immigration laws may be so strong among authorities of the EU Member States that an 
abuse of the system gets far more attention than abuse of persons.  
These are ethical and methodological issues that researchers need to think about thor-
oughly when studying these kind of topics and when reporting the results. 
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WORKSHOP C 
POLICE STUDIES 
 
“Together Against Domestic Violence” 
A New Approach to an Old Problem 
 
Marta Kristín Hreiðarsdóttir and Rannveig Þórisdóttir 
Reykjavík Metropolitan Police 
 
Attitudes play a big role in the response to domestic violence. Societal attitudes can for 
example shape the formal responses of institutions and how cases are dealt with (Flood 
and Pease, 2009). In Iceland domestic violence was for a long time dealt with as a “non-
crime”, unless other acts of the criminal code were also involved. This led to a lenient reac-
tion by the police when called to homes, as they lacked the necessary support to intervene 
and properly address the situation (Sonja Einarsdóttir, 2009) even though research indicat-
ed that police officers believed that domestic violence should be taken seriously (Rannveig 
Sigurvinsdóttir, 2011). 
Due to this situation and as a response to it, the chief of police in Sudurnes district started 
a pilot project in 2012 called „Keeping the Window Open“. The project was based on a co-
operation between the police and social workers. It used the opportunity created by emer-
gency calls to the police for a full intervention by all parties in order to give the victims full 
support to leave or solve their situation and increased safety. The project was very success-
ful, raising the number of cases reported to the police and charges in domestic violence 
cases. As a result there was a huge interest in implementing the same project in the Rey-
kjavik capital area. The former chief of Sudurnes district, now the chief of the Metropolitan 
police started a similar pilot project in the capital area called “Together against Violence” 
in 2015 following the revision of domestic violence working procedures for the police.  
The project “Together against Violence” started in mid-January 2015 with a formal contract 
between the Metropolitan police and Reykjavík municipality. Other municipalities in the 
Metropolitan area later followed during 2015 and the Metropolitan police serves all of 
those municipalities. The aim of the project was mainly to prevent repeated violations and 
secure the safety of those involved by targeting the first response of the police and there-
fore improving the initial investigation. It brings capable parties to the table (social ser-
vices and child welfare) in order to provide assistance to victims and perpetrators, increase 
the use of restraining orders and expulsion from the home by presenting this option to the 
victim and also ensure the use of this resource by the police and prosecutor. As a part of 
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this approach it is emphasized that prosecutors take more cases to court than before due to 
their severity. 
Here we discuss the effects of the new approach and what we can learn from this first year. 
Domestic violence in Iceland 
One of the first research projects on domestic violence in Iceland was conducted in 1982 
(see Hildigunnur Ólafsdóttir, Sigrún Júlíusdóttir and Þorgerður Benediktsdóttir, 1982). 
The research was based on medical records and in a way confirmed the existence of do-
mestic violence in Iceland. Another research from the same year supported this, showing 
that a third of both males and females said they knew of incidents of domestic violence 
(Kristinn Karlsson, 1982). In 1996 the first victimization survey on domestic violence in 
Iceland was conducted. The results showed that 1.3% of females and 0.8% of males had 
experienced violence from their spouse or prior spouse in the last 12 months and 14% of 
females and 4% of males reported a life-time experience of domestic violence (Dóms- og 
kirkjumálaráðuneyti, 1997). More recent studies show similar results regarding the fre-
quency of domestic violence in Iceland (see Anni G. Haugen, 2009; Elísabet Karlsdóttir and 
Ásdís A Arnalds, 2010; Erla Kolbrún Svavarsdóttir (ritstj.), 2010; Guðrún Helga Sederholm, 
2010; Guðrún Helga Sederholm, 2009; Jóhanna Rósa Arnardóttir, 2009; Ingólfur V. Gísla-
son, 2008; Ingólfur V. Gíslason, 2010). 
 
Many of these researches also show that only a minority of domestic violence incidents are 
reported to the police, although there are some differences between surveys. In a survey 
conducted in 1996 (Dóms- og kirkjumálaráðuneyti, 1997) 29% of those who had experi-
enced domestic violence said they had reported the incident to the police. More recent 
surveys show on the other hand only a 13% report rate (Elísabet Karlsdóttir and Ásdís A 
Arnalds, 2010; Jóhanna Rósa Arnardóttir, 2009). 
 
Attitudes towards domestic violence 
This extensive under-reporting of domestic violence is of concern to the police since it 
might indicate perceptions that the police are unwilling or unable to act on the victims’ 
behalf (Tjaden and Thonnes, 2000). Although there are many and complex personal rea-
sons why victims of domestic violence do not report to the police (Felson, Ackerman and 
Gallagher, 2005) it is also important to view the impact of police attitudes toward domestic 
violence. Especially since public and official attitudes and responses regarding domestic 
violence reflect norms and play an important role in shaping the social climate in which 
the violence occurs (Gracia and Lila, 2015). 
 
Research has for example shown that officer´s attitudes and evaluation of circumstances 
affects their behaviour and how others perceive them (Coulter, Kuehnle, Byers and Alfon-
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so, 1999; Stephens and Sinden, 2000). Negative attitudes among officers can thus act as a 
barrier for victims and reduce the likelihood for them reporting. Victims have even report-
ed more harm from negative attitudes amongst officers than from the domestic violence as 
such (Smeenck and Malsch, 2005).  
 
A number of factors can affect officers’ attitudes towards domestic violence. The police is 
for example more likely to make an arrest in domestic violence incidents if the offender is 
under the influence (Bayley, 1986; Ferraro, 1989; Rigakos, 1997). Gender plays a role as 
well since officers are more likely to arrest male offenders than females (Jones & Belknap, 
1999) although not all research findings supports this (Feder, 1998).  
 
Attitudes within the system and amongst victims are thus very important. Here we look 
into the situation in Iceland during system and procedural changes, discuss what can be 
learned and the challenges ahead.   
 
Data 
From the beginning of the project the partners agreed upon the importance of evaluating 
the project as it was being implemented in order to be able to learn from the process and 
improve the procedures/responses. Independent researchers followed the implementation 
and made a formative evaluation. They produced a preliminary evaluation report six 
months into the project and a final report after the first year (Rannveig Sigurvinsdóttir, 
Erla Hlín Hjálmarsdóttir and Kristín I. Pálsdóttir, 2015; Rannveig Sigurvinsdóttir, Erla Hlín  
Hjálmarsdóttir and Kristín I. Pálsdóttir, 2016). 
 
In the evaluation, domestic violence is defined according to the working procedures of the 
National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police. Cases are defined as domestic violence if 
the following apply: The perpetrator and victim are closely associated persons, i.e. related 
or connected (current/former spouses, married or cohabiting), children, siblings, guardi-
ans, a third party if the intention is to reach the related person) and if a violation of the 
penal code or child welfare act has taken place (such as assaults, sex offences, threats, 
property damages, extortions, prostitution, human trafficking, or other acts). The scene is 
not limited to the home but can be anywhere where there is a violation between related or 
connected persons. 
Statistical data on the number of reports made to the police are based on the report system 
of the Icelandic police (LÖKE) which is a database where all police tasks are registered.  
The evaluation is based on data gathered from the police and the social services with dif-
ferent methods. From August 2015 to February 2016 interviews were made with 14 key 
employees within the police, Reykjavik municipality and support systems for victims and 
offenders. Six focus groups with police officers, prosecutors, social workers and child wel-
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fare personnel were conducted from August 2015 to December 2015. In-depth interviews 
with 15 victims were also conducted from July 2015 to January 2016.  
Results on general attitudes amongst police officers are based on survey data gathered in 
January and February 2016. A survey was sent to all police officers in Iceland, but here on-
ly the findings from those working in the capital area are represented.  
What changed with the implementation of the new approach? 
For many years the number of domestic violence cases in the capital area had been around 
200 each year. From 2010 there was a slight increase in numbers up to approx. 20 cases per 
month in 2014 (with the total number rising to about 240 cases). The number of cases start-
ed to increase when the new approach was introduced rising up to 50 cases each month on 
average in 2015 – and the first months of 2016. 
 
Figure 1. Domestic violence cases in the capital area 2007-2015 
As Figure 1 shows, the total number of domestic violence cases was around 1,000 in 2007 
and 2008 but then declined for the following few years and recently has increased again, to 
X number of cases in 2015, the year of the project. This total number is made up of cases 
classified as dispute or as violence, and this relationship has changed over the years. For 
example, in 20 – 27 % of total domestic affairs cases were defined as violence. The ratio 
rose to 51 percent in 2015 and cases of dispute saw a decline. The increase in cases of vio-
lence is therefore partly due to a reclassification of cases from dispute into violence cases, 
but also because of an increased number of reported cases, which could be due to a grow-
ing awareness of domestic violence and increased willingness of the public to report vio-
lence to the police. In addition to the growing number of cases, time spent on each case 
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also grew as the new procedures required more time and manpower, both at the scene and 
afterwards. The number of expulsions from home had also risen dramatically, more than 
tripling in the first six months of 2015 compared to the same period in 2014. 
Attitudes within the police 
The survey amongst police officers shows that police officers in the capital area are gener-
ally happy with this new approach, especially in the enforcement of the procedure. But 
there are indicators that some do not believe that the approach will help victims in the 
long run.  
 
Figure 2. Attitudes of the Metropolitan police officers regarding the new domestic violence procedures 
 
From the focus groups it was evident that policemen were overall positive towards the 
new approach in spite of increased workload - the change in procedures was regarded as 
positive, necessary and long overdue. Officers reported feeling a change in attitude to-
wards domestic violence within the police. They felt that the police was sending a message 
to the society that domestic violence would not be tolerated. In the focus groups some also 
mentioned that they believed that the new procedures were likely to prevent repeated vio-
lence. They were generally pleased with the role of social services/child welfare at the sce-
ne and felt that they could now focus on the investigation. They believed people were now 
getting the help they needed except maybe male victims and people with severe 
drug/alcohol addiction due to lack of resources for those groups. Finally, they thought re-
straining-orders were more often implemented than before. 
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On the other hand police officers complained of work overload and more stress due to an 
increase in the number of cases and time spent on each case without a corresponding in-
crease in manpower. Interviews also showed that the police officers felt they did not have 
enough practical training at the beginning of the project. They also criticized the way the 
cases were reviewed by the project managers. The criticism made some upset while others 
found it helpful and thought it was important to coordinate the response of the police. 
Some police officers remarked that they felt that the new work procedures were too un-
compromising and there was a lack of prioritization. Every case was handled the same, in 
spite of how serious it was. In addition some mentioned that the follow-up visits were dif-
ficult to carry out due to problems finding time when all the parties involved were availa-
ble and the victim was at home. The police officers also reported discontent with risk as-
sessment check-lists and some police officers found prosecutors/judges too conservative in 
implementing restraining-orders. 
 
Attitudes amongst prosecutors 
 
The attitudes reported by the prosecutors of the Metropolitan police were much less posi-
tive than those reported by the police officers. The prosecutors reported they were content 
with how domestic violence cases were handled before and did not see the need for chang-
ing the practice. They were very critical of the new procedures and the lack of collabora-
tion with the prosecution when they were written.   
 
Like the police officers the prosecutors were concerned about the workload for the police 
officers due to the growing number of cases. Some also pointed out that investigators 
should be able to decide if they thought the procedures should apply – not to view all cas-
es as equally severe. 
 
In the focus group some of the prosecutors said that they didn’t think there was a reason to 
increase the number of restraining-orders (some believed victims sometimes themselves 
“violate” restraining–orders). Some of the prosecutors even considered that their role was 
to protect the rights of the offender too, and felt that restraining-orders were often too 
much intervention in the perpetrators lives. 
 
The only merit the prosecutors gave the new approach was that the initial scene investiga-
tion had improved, they especially mentioned that taking photos of the scene and injuries 
was helpful for their job. 
 
The evaluation revealed a gap between the attitudes of policemen and prosecutors regard-
ing the new approach. In a way prosecutors have resisted working according to the proce-
dures and as a result the ratio of conviction in domestic violence cases has not risen as 
could be expected.  
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Victim’s point of view 
In-depth interviews with victims indicated that the implementation of the project was suc-
cessful at police level but there were some concerns regarding risen expectations that were 
not later met, only few of them had for example received a follow-up visit. Victims report-
ed satisfaction with firm intervention though it was sometimes mentioned to be a bit 
overwhelming but still showed recognition of the seriousness of the situation.  
 
They were pleased with the increased awareness and recognition of the problem and its 
severity. As one remarked: „I slept with a hammer under my pillow… it is very uncom-
fortable position when you have been deprived of safety in your own home“. 
 
They reported seeing difference due to more agents involved – especially the involvement 
of the social services. Some mentioned that they found it positive not to have to press 
charges themselves and there was a general demand for follow-up visits (the ones who 
had not gotten follow-up visits, reported that it was still not too late). Some of them also 
reported less repetition – the violence had stopped after the firm intervention. In words of 
one of the victims: 
„It was just kind of firmly addressed…I then felt like something would be done about it. 
And I also felt like everything would now be…everything would be alright“. 
 
Lessons learned so far 
Awareness of domestic violence seems to have increased in the society, i.e. because of me-
dia coverage and the education of professionals. More cases are being labelled and han-
dled by the police as domestic violence. This might indicate a growth in general trust to-
wards the police and belief that they are capable to handle such cases (Tjaden and 
Thonnes, 2000).  
 
Investigation has and is still improving and the police is gathering better evidence. Co-
operation and trust between police, social services, child welfare and other organizations 
has increased and more people are getting help (verified by statistics from Woman‘s shel-
ter, Men against violence, social services, child welfare). The number of restraining-orders 
has risen and the legal framework has changed – (new article on domestic violence that 
took effect in April 2016). There is evidence of less repetition but it still needs to be seen if 
more cases are actually going to court. 
 
Challenges ahead 
 
Although progress is evident in police work with domestic violence there are some chal-
lenges ahead. There is a need to consolidate unified understanding of the procedure with-
in the police and its value as a toolbox to tackle domestic violence. It is also vital to guaran-
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tee that prosecutors work according to procedures and to ensure judges’ awareness of the 
severity of domestic violence. Furthermore it is important to increase the belief of police 
officers and prosecutors in the positive impact of the project. 
 
Risk assessment remains to be developed further and check-lists to be able to prioritize 
cases according to manpower and resources. There is a need for guidance to help police 
officers to make emergency plans/contingency plans for victims at risk. But most im-
portantly strengthening co-operation among institutions and organizations and bringing 
more people to the table is the key to the success in tackling domestic violence in the fu-
ture. It is all about the culture and how we can change it. 
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1. INLEDNING 
1.1 Om formål, fokus og analysedesign i de nationale strategiske analyser 
Dansk politis nationale Strategiske Analyse 2015 blev som den første af sin art udgivet i 
september 2015. I sommeren 2016 udkommer Strategisk Analyse 2016, der er en 
ajourføring med de nyeste data og har funktion af et bilag til Strategisk Analyse 2015. 
Strategisk Analyse 2015 og 2016 har som formål tilsammen at angive grundlaget for de 
operative strategiske pejlemærker for politiet i 2017 og frem. Dermed skal de kvalificere de 
strategiske prioriteringer af politiets indsatser i forhold til kriminalitet, trafiksikkerhed og 
beredskab. 
1.1.1 Formål  
De nationale strategiske analyser er analyseprodukter, der har til formål at kvalificere 
beslutninger om, hvilke områder der skal prioriteres af dansk politi. De skal altså 
anvendes til strategisk prioritering – først og fremmest i organisationen Dansk Politi.  
1.1.2 Analysedesign og -fokus 
De strategiske analyser er problemorienterede, handlingsorienterede og – frem for alt – 
fremtidsorienterede.  
De læner sig op ad omverdensanalyser (selvstændige dele af de strategiske analyser) af de 
store, langsigtede og mangefacetterede forandringer, som gør sig gældende i politiets 
omverden, og som forventes at fortsætte med at gøre sig gældende frem til 2020. 
Omverdensanalyserne ser på politirelevante forandringer – trends og megatrends – inden 
for klima og miljø, demografi, international økonomi og globale magtforskydninger samt 
digitalisering.  
De strategiske analysers analysedesign består af tre hoveddele: En skadesanalyse, der 
fokuserer på, hvor omkostningsfulde og alvorlige sikkerheds- og 
kriminalitetsproblemerne inden for de enkelte områder er for individer og det danske 
samfund, en trussels- og sårbarhedsanalyse og en vurdering af den sandsynlige fremtidige 
udvikling. 
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Skadesanalyserne anlægger tre forskellige perspektiver: 
1) omfanget af problemerne, dvs. hvor mange indbrud, trafikdrab og så videre, der er i 
Danmark.  
2) kriminalitets- eller uheldstypens skadevirkninger. Vurderingen omfatter, dels hvor 
alvorlig forbrydelsen eller uheldet er for offeret, dels hvor store omkostningerne er for 
resten af samfundet. Der peges i denne del af analysen på en række forskelle på, hvor 
farlige, krænkende og langtidsskadende konsekvenser forskellige forbrydelser har for 
offeret, ligesom også de samfundsmæssige skadevirkninger beskrives, hvor det er muligt. 
Mere specifikt kan de samfundsmæssige skadevirkninger inddeles i fire hovedtyper, 
nemlig de sociale omkostninger (hvilke konsekvenser har kriminalitets- eller 
sikkerhedsproblemet for den sociale orden, borgernes tryghed og nærmiljøet?), de 
økonomiske (hvad koster problemet i kroner og ører?), de politisk-institutionelle 
omkostninger (hvordan påvirker problemet andre samfundsinstitutioner?) samt 
følgekriminalitet (hvor megen anden kriminalitet fører problemet med sig?).1  
3) Endelig er det nødvendigt at vurdere fordelingen og udviklingen inden for området. 
Eksempelvis ved at se på den geografiske fordeling af en bestemt problemtype. 
Tilsvarende giver den hidtidige udvikling en indikation af, om der er tale om et voksende, 
konstant eller aftagende problem, hvilket igen kan sige noget om, hvor stort problemet 
bliver i fremtiden.  
De nationale strategiske analyser er altså problemorienterede, men som nævnt er de også 
handlingsorienterede. Det er de, idet de søger efter indikationer på, hvad der driver eller 
bestemmer omfanget af et bestemt kriminalitets- eller sikkerhedsproblem. For hvis vi 
opnår viden om årsagerne til et problem, giver det politiet mulighed for at sætte relevant 
ind over for det. Analysen af disse årsager omfatter en trussels- og sårbarhedsanalyse: 
Sociale hændelser har imidlertid utallige årsager og kan forklares på mange forskellige 
niveauer, fra det meget overordnede sociologiske eller økonomiske til det mere specifikke 
og aktørfokuserede. Vores tilgang er pragmatisk i den forstand, at kriminalitets- og 
sikkerhedsproblemerne analyseres på det niveau, der er relevant for netop politiets 
arbejde. Det betyder, at analyserne for det første er relateret til den type opgaver, som det 
er politiets ansvar at løse, og for det andet fokuserer særligt på de forhold, der er en 
realistisk mulighed for at påvirke med de midler, politiet har til rådighed. Dvs. at vores 
hovedfokus er på det, der kan betegnes som de nære årsager til problemerne 
Når vi herefter kombinerer fundene i vores skadesanalyser og trussels- og 
sårbarhedsanalyser med viden om de brede udviklingstendenser fra 
omverdensanalyserne, får vi mulighed for at give nogle bud på den mere konkrete 
                                                 
1 Denne del af analysedesignet er inspireret af bl.a. Paoli og Greenfield’s A framework to assess the harms of 
crime (Paoli og Greenfield 2013). 
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fremtidige udvikling på de enkelte kriminalitetsområder. Og derved bliver analyserne – 
foruden at være problemorienterede og handlingsorienterere – også fremtidsorienterede. 
1.1.3 Offentligt tilgængelige analyser 
Dansk politi samarbejdede med bl.a. forskningsverdenen om udarbejdelse af Strategisk 
Analyse 2015, og da den blev offentliggjort i i september 2015, var det, som nævnt ovenfor, 
første gang, at denne form for analyse blev delt med offentligheden. Som nævnt ovenfor 
fastholdes offentlighedsprincippet også i den Strategiske Analyse 2016, der bliver 
færdiggjort i løbet af sommeren 2016. Dette indebærer, at  omverdenen, i højere grad end 
tidligere, oplever et videnskabende og videndelende dansk politi med en vilje og evne til 
åbent at fremlægge grundlaget for sine prioriteringer.  
Dansk politi vil også fremover samarbejde med bl.a. forskningsverdenen for til stadighed 
at kunne opnå et velunderbygget billede af fremtidens kriminalitets-, trafiksikkerheds og 
beredskabsmæssige udfordringer. Dermed vil politiet kunne prioritere ressourcerne ud fra 
en analytisk funderet forventning til samfundets – herunder kriminalitetens – udvikling. 
2. KRIMINALITETSUDVIKLINGEN 
2.1 Generelt billede 
Omfanget af anmeldte straffelovsovertrædelser i Danmark har været faldende siden 2009. 
Tendensen til faldende kriminalitet slår særligt klart igennem, når det gælder 
ungdomskriminalitet, og den generelle oplevede utryghed i Danmark er lav. Men der er 
alligevel en række markante undtagelser fra den positive overordnede udvikling, som vi 
skal være opmærksomme på. 
2.1.1 Udviklingen inden for anmeldelser af straffelovsovertrædelser 
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FIGUR 1 Antal anmeldelser af straffelovsovertrædelser i perioden 2009–2015. 
 
 
Kilde: POLIS (2016). 
Det samlede omfang af anmeldte straffelovsovertrædelser i Danmark falder fortsat og 
tendensen til faldende ungdomskriminalitet ser ud til at fortsætte. Justitsministeriets 
Forskningskontor udgav i april 2016 den seneste rapport om udviklingen i børne- og 
ungdomskriminalitet, der dækker årene 2006-2015. Rapportens overordnede konklusion 
er, at den registrerede børne- og ungdomskriminalitet er mindsket for niende år i træk, og 
at faldet er størst blandt de yngste aldersgrupper i undersøgelsen (Justitsministeriets 
Forskningskontor 2016b: 129). 
2.1.2 Tryghed og tillid til politiet 
 
Befolkningens tryghed er et vigtigt bidrag til forståelsen af kriminalitetsbilledet, fordi 
utryghed er en del af den sociale skade, som (bestemte former for) kriminalitet forvolder. 
Mere præcist kan utryghed defineres som ”følelsen af angst, af at være i alarmberedskab, 
forårsaget af en bevidsthed eller forventning om fare” (Rigspolitiet 2013:1). Utryghed 
omfatter dels en mere ukonkret følelsesmæssig oplevelse af ængstelse eller angst (som 
derfor kan kaldes ”den generelle utryghed”), dels en mere konkret form for frygt for 
kriminalitet (som kan kaldes ”den specifikke utryghed”) (Kongstad & Kruize 2011; Scherg 
2013). 
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På  baggrund af de nyeste tryghedsmålinger fra Rigspolitiet2 og TrygFonden3  kan det 
forsigtigt konkluderes, at der er sket et mindre fald i den generelle utryghed fra 2014 til 
2015 (TrygFonden 2015: 12-13, Rigspolitiet 2015b: 6). 
 
Som nævnt på side 33 i Strategisk Analyse 2015 har det betydning for trygheden, at 
borgerne har en oplevelse af, at politiet er tilgængeligt, når man har behov for det. Tilliden 
til dansk politi er høj, og størstedelen af danskerne vurderer, at politiet vil hjælpe dem, 
hvis de får brug for det (Rigspolitiet 2015b). Det viser også internationale 
sammenligninger, hvor Danmark er blandt de lande, hvor tilliden til politiet er højest 
(Justitsministeriets Forskningskontor 2016a: 6-7).  
2.1.3 De gode nyheder og de dårlige nyheder 
 
Der tegner sig altså helt generelt et ganske positivt billede af kriminalitetsudviklingen i 
Danmark, hvis man alene ser på de helt overordnede tendenser. Men der er nogle 
bevægelser inden for det generelle billede, som vi skal være opmærksomme på: Antallet af 
anmeldelser inden for kategorien borgervendt kriminalitet4 falder, men anmeldelser for 
øvrige straffelovsovertrædelser er svagt stigende i 2015. 
Eksempelvis er antallet af anmeldelser for økonomisk kriminalitet steget med 45 % fra 
2014 til 2015.  
Som dette indikerer, så er der nogle vigtige nuancer i det overordnet ganske positive 
generelle fald i den registrerede kriminalitet. Vores analyser viser, at der er en række 
markante undtagelser fra den positive overordnede udvikling. Det er rimeligt at formode, 
at det kan skyldes, at kriminaliteten forskyder sig til nye mere komplekse former. Heraf 
nogle, der er mindre synlige og måske i mindre grad bliver anmeldt end den traditionelle 
borgervendte kriminalitet. 
I det følgende afsnit præsenterer vi alene de konklusioner om generelle tendenser inden 
for kriminalitet, trafiksikkerhed og beredskab, som vi samlet kan drage på baggrund af 
Strategisk Analyse 2015 og 2016. Begge analyser og de tilhørende metoderapporter kan 
downloades i fulde versioner på dansk på www.politi.dk/strategiskanalyse. 
                                                 
2 Andelen [af de utrygge borgere] er baseret på, hvor mange der har svaret 5, 6 eller 7 på spørgsmålet: ”På en 
skala fra 1-7, hvor 1 er ”jeg føler mig grundlæggende tryg i mit nabolag”, og 7 er ”jeg føler mig 
grundlæggende utryg i mit nabolag”, hvor tryg eller utryg føler du dig så?”. 
3 TrygFondens tryghedsmåling er en måling, der undersøger befolkningens utryghed i forhold til en bred 
vifte af faktorer, herunder den økonomiske og den helbredsmæssige tryghed. Vi fokuserer her, svarende til 
fokus i Strategisk Analyse 2015 s. 31, på den del af TrygFondens undersøgelse, som omhandler utryghed i 
relation til kriminalitet. 
4 Inddelingen i ”borgervendt ” og ”øvrig straffelovskriminalitet” er en grov inddeling, og der vil være sager i 
kategorien ”øvrige straffelovsovertrædelser”, som har borgere som ofre, herunder sager om bedrageri. 
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2.2 Konklusioner om de generelle tendenser 
Dette afsnit omfatter de konklusioner, som vi samlet kan drage på  baggrund af Strategisk 
Analyse 2015 og 2016. 
Strategisk Analyse 2015 og 2016 viser, at kriminalitetsudviklingen i Danmark i 
analyseperioden overordnet set har været særdeles positiv. Ser vi på anmeldelsestallene, 
er den samlede kriminalitet i Danmark således i undersøgelsesperioden faldet med knapt 
20 % til det laveste niveau i mange år. Samtidig er borgernes frygt for at blive udsat for 
kriminalitet faldet, og sammenlignet med andre lande er trygheden i Danmark meget høj.   
Men selvom kriminaliteten over en bred kam er faldende, så er der områder, hvor der er 
grund til opmærksomhed, og hvor udviklingen går i den forkerte retning. Det drejer sig 
både om nyere kriminalitetsformer, fx avanceret it-kriminalitet, og om mere velkendte 
former for kriminalitet. Selvom antallet af indbrud falder, er der således stadig for mange 
indbrud i privat beboelse, omrejsende kriminelle udgør stadig et alvorligt problem, og der 
er stadig for mange, der bliver dræbt eller kommer til skade i trafikken. Hertil kommer 
udfordringerne for beredskabet. Af Strategisk Analyse 2015 fremgår, at det høje trussels- 
og konfliktniveau i Danmark og i verden udenfor skaber et øget behov for planlagte 
beredskabsindsatser og et stigende og mere uforudsigeligt behov for politiets 
beredskabsparathed og -indsats i forbindelse med kriser og større uvarslede hændelser. 
Det bekræftes i Strategisk Analyse 2016, at særligt terrorangrebene i Danmark, Frankrig og 
Belgien samt flygtninge- og migrantsituationen påvirker behovet for politiet. 
Den udvikling i samfundet, som er beskrevet i Strategisk Analyse 2015, og som også 
fremgår af Strategisk Analyse 2016, særligt den teknologiske udvikling, udfordrer i 
stigende omfang den klassiske forståelse af politiets arbejde gennem nye 
kriminalitetsformer, der afviger markant fra de traditionelle, fx ved at gerningsmanden 
ikke behøver at være fysisk til stede på gerningsstedet, ved at kriminaliteten rækker ud 
over politikreds- og landegrænser, eller ved at den begås af organiserede kriminelle 
netværk med tiltagende komplekse organisationsstrukturer.   
På baggrund af Strategiske Analyse 2015 og 2016 tegner der sig således en række 
udfordringer, som politiet vil stå overfor i de kommende år, og som vil gøre det 
nødvendigt at justere de måder, dansk politi løser sine opgaver på. I det følgende 
sammenfattes udfordringerne i nogle generelle tendenser, som vil præge politiets arbejde 
frem mod 2020. 
2.2.1 Ny kriminalitet  
Strategisk Analyse 2015 og Strategisk Analyse 2016 viser som nævnt, at der på en lang 
række kriminalitetsområder ses en positiv udvikling, herunder i forhold til den 
borgervendte kriminalitet. Men der er også områder, hvor udviklingen går i den forkerte 
retning. Det drejer sig både om nyere kriminalitetsformer og om mere velkendte former 
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for kriminalitet, såsom stalking, bedrageri, særlig økonomisk kriminalitet, hvor den 
teknologiske og øvrige samfundsmæssige udvikling har ført til såvel stærkt øget omfang 
som øget kompleksitet. I det følgende betegnes disse områder under et som ”ny 
kriminalitet”, fordi de, selv i de tilfælde, hvor kriminalitetsformen er velkendt, i kraft af 
den øgede kompleksitet udgør en ny udfordring for politiet. 
Kendetegnende for den nye kriminalitet er for det første, at politiet generelt mangler viden 
om den og kun har relativt begrænset erfaring med at efterforske og retsforfølge den. 
Således har det været et gennemgående træk i analysearbejdet, at visse områder har været 
svære at analysere, enten fordi der mangler viden og data af tilstrækkelig kvalitet, eller 
fordi data ikke entydigt kan isoleres til kriminalitetsområderne. 
De nye kriminalitetsformer er derudover ofte udfordrende i kraft af organiserings- og 
specialiseringsgraden hos de kriminelle. Derved afviger de fra den hidtil kendte 
organiserede kriminalitet, fx rocker- og bandekriminalitet. De nye kriminalitetsformer 
udføres i videre omfang end de traditionelle i det skjulte og inkluderer nye både nationale 
og internationale aktører, blandt andet faguddannede specialister med relevante tekniske, 
juridiske eller økonomiske kompetencer. Det gælder for eksempel vekselbureauer, der 
bistår i forbindelse med hvidvaskning af penge eller rådgivere, der bistår med etablering 
af selskaber i forbindelse med økonomisk kriminalitet, fx momskarruselsvig. På samme 
måde findes der eksempler på hjemmesider på internettet, hvor det er muligt at købe 
bistand til forskellige former for kriminalitet, fx såkaldte DDoS-angreb, hvor 
internetservere søges blokeret. 
Der anvendes også nye former for social organisering, fx virksomhedslignende strukturer 
eller projektorganisering, hvor grupper af individuelle aktører finder sammen i et kortere 
tidsrum for at udføre en bestemt kriminel handling. I forbindelse med efterforskning af 
sager om menneskesmugling er der fx konstateret eksempler på, at mindre grupper har 
specialiseret sig i en særlig type bistand til kriminaliteten. En gruppe tager sig fx af 
forfalskning af identitetspapirer og rejsedokumenter, en anden af transport frem til 
landegrænsen og en tredje af transporten over grænsen, fx Middelhavet. En del af denne 
bistand har karakter af ”Kriminalitet-som-en-service”. 
Dertil kommer, at ny kriminalitet ofte er grænseoverskridende og begås af fx 
internationale kriminelle organisationer eller omrejsende kriminelle.  
Ny kriminalitet adskiller sig også fra den traditionelle ved at involvere nye typer af 
gerningsmænd og ofre. Det kan fx være it-studerende eller softwareudviklere med 
vellønnede jobs, som næppe tidligere ville være blevet kriminelle, men som i dag har 
mulighed for at sælge deres specialviden til kriminelle handelsplatforme på internettet 
eller for at udnytte personlige oplysninger, som de er kommet i besiddelse af ved at 
inficere tilfældige borgeres computere med virus, til afpresning mv. 
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Kriminalitetsudviklingen indebærer en særlig udfordring for danske myndigheder og den 
danske forvaltningskultur. Det er et grundlæggende krav til offentlige myndigheder i 
Danmark, at de er serviceorienterede, blandt andet således at borgere og virksomheder 
har nem adgang til myndighederne og kan blive betjent effektivt. Men åbenhed og service 
skaber også en sårbarhed, der kan udnyttes af kriminelle, fx fordi det er forholdsvis nemt 
at oprette virksomheder og foretage andre registreringer digitalt. Hvepsebo-sagen og 
sagen om de udenlandske selskaber, som har krævet refusion af udbytteskat på baggrund 
af forfalsket dokumentation er gode eksempler på det. Tilsvarende opererer de nye 
kriminalitetsformer ofte i grænsefeltet mellem forskellige myndigheder, herunder politiet, 
forsvaret og forskellige statslige forvaltnings- og tilsynsmyndigheder.  
2.2.2 It som kriminalitetsaspekt 
Strategisk Analyse 2015 og Strategisk Analyse 2016 peger på, at en større del af 
kriminaliteten fremover vil have et mere eller mindre markant it-aspekt. Det betyder 
blandt andet, at man må forvente, at en række særtræk ved det, vi i dag betragter som it-
kriminalitet, fremover vil sprede sig til andre former for kriminalitet.  
It-kriminalitet er typisk kendetegnet ved, at gerningsmanden – i modsætning til de fleste 
klassiske kriminalitetsformer – ikke er fysisk til stede der, hvor kriminaliteten har sin 
skadevirkning, og kriminelle aktører kan derfor fra en pc på en hvilken som helst 
geografisk placering begå kriminalitet over hele verden.   
Udover de udfordringer dette i sig selv medfører for politiet, betyder det også, at 
gerningsmanden ikke behøver at blive konfronteret direkte med ofrene for sin 
kriminalitet, hvilket alt andet lige må forventes at mindske de psykologiske barrierer, som 
gerningsmanden ellers ville skulle overvinde for at gennemføre kriminaliteten.  Det 
betyder, at der er risiko for, at flere og andre personer end tidligere kan blive kriminelle, 
fordi det fx kan opfattes som mere acceptabelt at sidde bag en skærm og købe tyvekoster 
end at møde op hos hæleren selv for at få dem udleveret, ligesom det formentlig er lettere 
at bedrage eller forfølge og chikanere medborgere eller at krænke et barn seksuelt, når det 
foregår på afstand af offeret.  
Et andet relevant aspekt er, at vi som borgere er mere sårbare på internettet, fordi vi ikke i 
samme omfang som ved traditionel kriminalitet er opmærksomme på farer, når vi færdes 
online. I takt med at flere borgere tvinges på nettet, blandt andet for at kunne kontakte 
offentlige og private virksomheder, øges sårbarheden. 
Anvendelsen af it som værktøj til at udføre kriminalitet indebærer også en udfordring af 
politiets klassiske efterforskningsmetoder. Brugen af kryptering og skiftet fra traditionel 
telefoni til internetbaseret kommunikation vanskeliggør politiets efterforskning og gør det 
nødvendigt at udvikle nye efterforskningsmetoder for at holde trit med de kriminelle. 
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2.2.3 Risikohåndtering 
Traditionelt politiarbejde har ofte karakter af sagsbehandling. Sagen starter typisk med, at 
et forhold kommer til politiets kendskab, hvorefter politiet foretager de fornødne 
dispositioner, og sagen måske med tiden bliver til en egentlig straffesag, der forelægges 
for domstolene. I fremtiden må det forventes, at politiarbejdet gradvis vil ændre karakter, 
sådan at der – udover den traditionelle sagsbehandling – også vil blive stillet stigende 
krav til politiets evne til at håndtere og minimere risici. Politiet skal ikke alene reagere på 
forbrydelser, der allerede har fundet sted:  
Politiet skal fortsætte arbejdet med løbende at styrke indsatsen for at minimere risikoen 
for kriminalitet ved at eliminere trusler og mindske mulighederne for at begå kriminalitet.  
En tilsvarende udvikling finder sted inden for det beredskabsmæssige område, hvor der er 
en stadig mere udtalt forventning om, at politiet formår at forhindre kriminalitet og uro, 
ligesom det forventes, at politiet gennem en høj grad af operativ parathed meget hurtigt 
kan stoppe uvarslede hændelser og minimere deres skadesvirkninger, hvis de alligevel 
skulle finde sted.  
Dette gør sig gældende i forhold til den flygtninge- og migrantsituation, vi oplever i 
øjeblikket, og det gør sig i særlig grad gældende i forhold til terrortruslen – senest 
illustreret ved hændelserne i København i februar 2015 – men forventningerne og kravene 
til politiets evner til risikostyring sætter sig igennem over en bred front, fra fx natur- og 
menneskeskabte kriser til skoleskyderier.  
De overordnede tendenser, som på baggrund af kriminalitetsanalysen er beskrevet 
ovenfor, betyder, at dansk politi i de kommende år står over for store udfordringer. Det 
gælder på kriminalitetsområder med en bekymrende udvikling eller et uacceptabelt højt 
kriminalitetsniveau, hvor der er behov for et styrket strategisk, operativt fokus i de 
kommende år, og det gælder på tværgående fokusområder, hvor en styrket indsats 
generelt skal forbedre dansk politis evne til at forebygge og bekæmpe kriminalitet.  
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Doing the Right Masculinities Right: The Police Force as Gen-
dered Practices1 
 
Ingrid Lander 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on how gender configurations are produced and maintained by 
means of normation processes. One important and central theoretical discussion focuses 
on regulatory notions of gender performativity in relation to the context in which gender 
is performed (Butler 1990), that is to say, the issue of the gender norms and the gender ex-
pectations that an individual experiences in a certain situation, and how these are linked 
to the actor’s body. An additional dimension concerns how these expectations and norms 
are formulated in a specific gender-coded practice. This chapter discusses these gender 
theoretical issues on the basis of a study of norms and normation within the police train-
ing programme, a programme, and an occupation associated with strong connotations of 
masculinity. The discussion proceeds from an assumption that bodies do not always, by 
definition, perform gender, and nor are they by definition always expected to perform 
gender, in line with the performer’s ascribed and/or perceived gender identity (Butler 
1990, 2004, Halberstam 1998). In this chapter I argue that gender performativity can be 
linked to the arena and the context in which the actions are performed, i.e. to doing the 
right masculinity or femininity in the right way in the specific context. I further argue that 
what is considered normatively ‘right’ is linked to the specific arena in question, in this 
case the gender connotation of police practice. 
The police profession is associated with a large number of conceptions and opinions; im-
ages of the profession are disseminated via popular culture, the media and not least by the 
police themselves. There are a great many myths associated with the police profession, as 
well as a large number of powerful symbols signalling strength, action and violence, all of 
which may be regarded as markers of masculinity (Connell 2005, Lander 2013). The police 
profession is also associated with conceptions about crime and how it can and should be 
combated using policing methods (Loftus 2010). The Swedish debate about the character 
of the profession often includes statements characterizing the profession as involving non-
intellectual work, as being a practical profession. These conceptions colour the process of 
normation into the profession. The norm regarding how a police officer ought to be is 
viewed here as a manifestation of ordering practices, as a form of continuous, ongoing 
normation process that emphasizes practical, physically demanding and violent working 
                                                 
1 First published in Lander, Ravn & Jon eds. (2014) Masculinities in the Criminological Field. Control, Vul-
nerability and Risk-Taking. London: Ashgate.  I want to thank David Shannon for help with the translation 
from Swedish to English. 
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conditions focused on combating crime. This produces powerful conceptions of the type of 
body that is suitable for the profession, a normative (male) body. This moulds a culture 
that emphasizes a special kind of (strong, muscular) masculinity with working-class con-
notations (Andersson 2003, Finstad 2003, Loftus 2010, Lander 2013). 
 
At the same time, the police profession has been the subject of both debate and processes 
of change, which have included a demand for increased diversity (Lander 2008, 2013). The 
police profession must therefore be viewed in relation to the national (Swedish) political 
reforms and public debates that have challenged traditional norms of masculinity and 
thus created space for a ‘modern, middle-class man’ (Hearn et al. 2012), one who is in-
volved in parenthood, one who is not afraid to show emotions, who stresses core values in 
life, and who puts effort into his appearance (Johansson 2006). The police as both organi-
zation and practice do not exist in a vacuum, but are rather influenced by societal dis-
courses on diversity and equality in the same way as other organizations and practices. 
The Nordic diversity and equality project has influenced gender norms by amongst other 
things challenging traditional conceptions of masculinity (Nordberg 2005). This can be 
seen as a shift in a region-specific construction of hegemonic masculinity (Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005); more specifically, in the idea of the Nordic, assimilated modern man 
(Johansson and Klinth 2008). 
 
The chapter begins with a section focused on the theoretical framework for the arguments 
presented, in which I also present a discussion of relevant existing research. Then follows 
a section focused on the study on which the arguments and discussion are based. Follow-
ing these two sections, the analytical discussion begins by describing those who perform 
in the wrong way and the wrong performance. This because what is right/normal is al-
ways produced in relation to what is wrong/abnormal (Järvinen 1998, Lander 2003). 
Against the background of this presentation of the wrong performance, I discuss what it 
is, then, that constitutes the right way of performing gender within today’s (Swedish) po-
lice force. The chapter concludes by linking this discussion to the way the Swedish police 
training programme and its associated gender connotations have been influenced by the 
discourses on diversity and equality. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Previous Research 
 
The theoretical point of departure for the discussion is drawn from the post structural and 
discursive approach on doing and undoing gender outlined by Butler (1990, 2004) and 
Halberstam (1998). According to Butler (1990), the sex-gender dichotomy comprises dis-
cursive effects of discursive action; gender is a performance, an effect of actions that re-
quire continuous repetition. ‘There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; 
that identity is performatively constructed by the very “expressions” that are said to be its 
result’ (Butler 1990: 25). The theoretical discussion in this chapter proceeds from the per-
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spective that views gender as a form of discursive action that is both transformable in rela-
tion to, and can be influenced by, other discursive processes, in this case the diversity dis-
course (see the section on the chapter’s empirical framework below) and the Nordic dis-
course on equality. In the context of a Butlerian theoretical approach, the body as materi-
lality is discursively shaped, since bodies as both actions and practices are constructed as 
masculine and feminine in discursive processes. This means that the body is shaped 
through linguistic discourses. Viewed in the context of this framework, gender configura-
tions are negotiated and renegotiated in social processes. 
The theoretical framework described above is employed as an analytical tool that is used 
to open up the data and examine how categories such as gender, class and ethnicity (age 
and sexuality) function in the context of conceptions of the police profession and of be-
coming a police officer, i.e. how discourses relating to these categories assign people dif-
ferent positions and act together in conceptions of the police profession (Lander 2013). 
Viewed from this perspective, gender is one of many fluid subject positions that open the 
way for a more dynamic analysis based on the different positions assumed by subjects, the 
positions they view as being possible to assume and the positions that are assigned to the 
other by the norms relating to how a police officer is required to be (Kelan 2010). Focusing 
on masculinities as fluid positions opens up for an analysis of how norms are created and 
symbolized and the ways in which the normation processes manifests themselves. It is in 
this context that Halberstam’s (1998) discussion of female masculinity becomes interesting, 
because it disturbs the binary division as male/female, masculine/feminine. Women in 
connotatively masculine occupations, such as the police, may undo gender and thus dis-
turb the norm, but they may at the same time reproduce the gender dichotomy through 
the creation of specific female spaces within the framework of their occupational practice: 
‘In this case “doing gender” and “undoing gender” intersect, as “doing gender” can be 
used to undo gender’ (Kelan 2010: 182). 
Actions, as well as bodily and occupational representations, are gender-coded and based 
on the binary logic (Laqueur 1994). The police profession, like many other occupations and 
arenas, reinforces essentialist conceptions of bodies and reproduces them accordingly 
(Lander 2013, Nordberg 2005, Sörensdotter 2008). The dichotomies female – male, weak – 
strong, emotional – rational, caring – disciplining, is reproduced by means of ordering 
principles and practices (Andersson 2003, Lander 2013). The police training programme is 
here viewed as an arena in which normation and socialization processes occur during the 
process of becoming a police officer. These normation and socialization processes relate 
not only to knowing what you should do in certain situations but also to how you are re-
quired to be. Andersson (2003), in a study of ordering practices in two local police organiza-
tions, describes this how you are required to be as involving an ongoing inter-male homoso-
cialization. The concept of ordering practices is here used to refer to interpersonal activities 
that create the patterns for how an organization is ordered. ‘When the life of the organisa-
tion is ordered by the organisation’s members in ordering practices, gender [class, ethnici-
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ty etc.] constitute integrated parts of this ordering’ (Andersson 2003: 42 [current author’s 
addition]). The homosocialization begins during the time spent on the training pro-
gramme and is regarded as a culture which presses the new police officers into the same 
mould and impregnates them with the prevailing police-cultural perceptions of how they 
are required to be, i.e. how they are required to think, what they are permitted to say and 
how they are required to look (Finstad 2003, Granér 2004, Lander 2008). It is a normation 
process that takes place between students during the police training programme and in 
which gendered bodily expressions play an important role (Andersson 2003, Finstad 2003: 
219, Lander 2008). 
 
Police performativity occurs in relation to conceptions of the other, the criminal body as 
risk-taking (see Balkmar and Joelsson, chapter 10; Simonsen, chapter 11 and Ugelvik, 
chapter 2), potentially aggressive (see Pettersson, chapter 3), and gendered as MALE (see 
Jon, chapter 1). The body is of central significance for how the police profession is por-
trayed, for the conduct of police recruitment practice and not least for how norms about 
how one is required to be as a police officer are constructed and reproduced. Conceptions 
about which body is most suitable for a profession such as the police lead to the body be-
coming a form of symbolic capital that individuals can invest in (Bourdieu 2001; Lander 
2003, 2008). The normative body is described and constructed in relation to the other body, 
the abnormal body and it is through perceptions of the other that normality is formulated 
and expressed (Lander 2003). In the Swedish police context, the other, the abnormal body 
is the supposedly weak (female) body (Lander 2008, 2013), and the non-white, non-
Swedish (male) body (Peterson and Uhnoo 2012). The theoretical discussion in this chapter 
proceeds from the conceptions of these other bodies and from how they are related to a 
masculinity performance that is appropriate for the police. 
 
The argument that I present is that the diversity and equality discourses have produced a 
form of Butlerian ‘gender trouble’ that questions and disturbs masculinity norms within 
the police. This has manifested itself in the adoption of the standpoint that not all bodies 
within the crime control system must or should be males. This creates space and arenas for 
the other body in the police force, the female body to act within. This leads into the next 
section on the idea of diversity within the police, which provides the empirical framework 
for the chapter. 
 
Empirical Framework: A Study of Diversity 
 
The focus of my research project has been directed at the idea of diversity that the police 
have claimed to be trying to achieve, with a range of projects initiated within the Swedish 
police force (Ds 1996: 11; Gunnmo 2004; RPS 2010). Since 1998, the recruitment of students 
to the police training programme has sought to promote increased diversity in relation to 
sex and ethnicity, which is today reflected in an increased number of students who are 
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women and an increase in the number from a non-Swedish national background. The is-
sue of diversity in relation to sexual identity has also been described, but first and fore-
most in the sense that the climate at the workplace must promote the possibility of being 
open about one’s (LGBT)2 identity (RPS 2010). In the government’s directives to the Na-
tional Police Board, the demand for increased diversity within the force has been motivat-
ed by reference to a discussion of the importance of democracy and of the view that the 
police force must reflect the composition of Swedish society (Gunnmo 2004), which I see as 
an effect of a Swedish equality discourse (Hearn et al. 2012, Johansson and Klinth 2008). It 
is, however, unclear what this increased diversity is intended to accomplish. I have else-
where interpreted it as being focused on different bodies, with the (minority) bodies being 
expected to contribute something that the police as an organization is (supposedly) lacking 
(cf. Lander 2008 and 2013). Thus, the diversity discourse within the police force proceeds 
on the basis of essentialism by viewing bodies as the bearers of different properties that 
are suited to different roles within the organization. Women are expected to contribute 
soft values and thus become care-providing bodies. Non-Swedes are expected to contrib-
ute knowledge on cultural differences and language skills and thus become culture-
bearing bodies. The focus for this diversity discourse is thus directed at creating distinc-
tions rather than at creating changes in the ordering practices within the police force (An-
dersson 2003, Loftus 2010, Lander 2013). 
The discussion presented in this chapter proceeds from an interview study conducted in 
connection with the police training programme in Sweden. The study had an ethnographic 
approach, which means that the material includes interviews, field notes and logbook 
notes made during the research period and during my time as an employee on the police 
training programme in Stockholm. During the period January 2003 – December 2005, I was 
employed as assistant director of the police training programme at the Swedish National 
Police Academy. I subsequently continued working at the academy as a lecturer in crimi-
nology until the spring of 2009. The research project was born out of reflections and expe-
riences that I had during my period of employment, and it emerged in the context of a dia-
logue between myself and the others involved in the management of the police training 
programme. 
 
The interviews conducted comprise repeated, thematically structured interviews with six 
police students who met one or more of the diversity criteria. The study’s objective was to 
focus attention on the perspective of the other, with the other in the Swedish police force 
being all those who are not Swedish, white, heterosexual and/or male – i.e., all those indi-
viduals, groups, categories that in one way or another are expected to bring diversity 
within the police. Four of the six are females, two are males and three define themselves as 
homosexuals. All were born and grew up in Sweden to parents born either in Sweden or 
                                                 
2 Lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or transgender identity. 
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in one of the other Nordic countries. A total of 14 interviews were conducted between 
January 2006 and February 2007, with these 6 police students, 3 of whom were on the 
training programme in Växjö and 3 in Stockholm. The length of the interviews varied be-
tween one hour and 90 minutes. 
 
The interview method involved creating meaning-making dialogues focused on the over-
arching theme of diversity within the police force and on more subtle normative conceptions 
about what a police officer is required to be. It is an active form of interviewing that stimulates 
processes and reflections among the interview participants (Holstein and Gubrium 1995; 
Lander 2008). By asking questions focused on what has been described by one interview 
participant to the next interview participant, I worked on and developed the information. 
The interview participants were also used as informants, by giving them questions to ob-
serve and discuss with their course colleagues between interviews. All of the interviews 
were transcribed and then analysed qualitatively. During the interview study I also kept 
fieldnotes which constitute a research material in themselves focused on the research pro-
cess, involving a documentation of the contact with the participants and the knowledge 
production process during the interview study. 
 
In addition, the material also includes personal logbooks from my time as an employee on 
the police training programme, notes from meetings of the management committee and a 
number of other contexts in which I participated within the framework of my employ-
ment. On one level it may be viewed as problematic integrating observations from a peri-
od when I was director of the training programme, but it is impossible to ignore this 
knowledge and experience and from a scientific point of view it would be more problem-
atic to attempt to exclude them (Fontana 2003, Platt, 2012). 
 
The Wrong Gender Performance 
 
As in many other contexts, the norm and what is normal emerges via the identification of 
what is abnormal, the other (Järvinen 1998, Lander 2003). Conformity, and thus what is 
normal, is produced via a collective process in which deviance is identified by defining 
certain signs as deviant. What is appropriate emerges only once there is a definition of 
what is inappropriate and vice versa. Language plays a crucial role in definitional process-
es that produce the division into us – them, appropriate – inappropriate, or the right police 
identity and performance contra the wrong performance (Foucault 1972). 
Conversations and discussion of bodies’ (in)appropriateness for the police profession were 
constantly present in the day-to-day life of the police training programme; in the students’ 
conversations with one another, in discussions between teachers and students, between 
teachers, within the course management group and not least between the recruitment unit 
of the National Police Board and the management of the police training programme 
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(Lander 2008, 2013). The focus of these discussions was often directed at unsuitability, as-
sessments of and judgements about individuals’ shortcomings in relation to being able to 
do the job, at why an individual did not fit in with the team and was therefore not viewed 
as being a good colleague. In order to be able to discuss the right gender performance 
within the police, then, I therefore begin by focusing on how those who perform wrongly 
are articulated, and on what this wrong performance consists in. I have chosen in the cur-
rent context to direct my attention at the two major categorizations that are made in rela-
tion to the wrong gender performance; the physically weaker (female-)body and what Jon 
(Chapter 1) conceptualizes as a cowboy masculinity performance. 
 
The Physically Weaker (female) Body 
 
I think somehow that once you’ve got into the college, everyone has 
this unconscious or conscious conception of how a police officer 
should be. I think some of the guys, although they’re not allowed to 
actually say it, think how could SHE get in! And I can also feel it 
somehow that there should be certain physical criteria, but then 
there’s a place for everyone. But since they require that everyone is 
out in patrol cars for x number of years, I think it’s insane that a girl 
of 50–55 kilos should drive out in a uniform and go into the middle of 
domestic fights and things like that. Because I mean she’s going to get 
such a pasting … Then it’s not just about physique but you can’t get 
away from the fact that it’s a very physical job, you’re supposed to go 
in and wrestle people to the ground every now and then, and then 
you have to have a little bit of something to push back with … 
There’s x number who shouldn’t be here. So you do have a precon-
ception somewhere, there’s a silent culture about it. (Lena) 
 
Physical requirements are of decisive significance in relation to the question of who is 
(in)appropriate as a police officer. These conceptions about the physical requirements of 
the profession become highly gendered, as can be seen from the quotation from Lena. This 
gendering is not per definition essentialist, tied to the female body, but rather becomes so. 
The six interview participants’ discussions were greatly coloured by this issue of bodily 
strength. The cultural conceptions among the students about the suitable body for the po-
lice force also involve a manifest creation of the other body, where this other body takes the 
form of women whose required threshold levels of physical strength are below those of 
men both at the time of recruitment and in the tests conducted later on during the training 
programme.3 According to Lena, it is about being able to go into a situation and wrestling 
                                                 
3 Since the autumn of 2011, the required threshold values for physical strength for males have been reduced 
to the levels that previously only applied to females. These altered physical entry requirements have not, 
however, led to changes in the physical tests/demands that are made within the framework of the training in 
the subject’s self-defence and health, which are repeatedly examined over the course of the training pro-
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people to the ground. She also talks about how these conceptions about bodily precondi-
tions for the profession become a criterion by which the students judge one another, i.e. for 
how they observe, assess and question one another’s suitability: 
Although more girls are needed, because men, they’re most often a 
lot harder. I think that girls have more of a capacity to be empathetic. 
Are a bit softer. And I think that, if you go to some girl who’s been 
raped or assaulted by her husband, for example, then I think that 
she’ll have more confidence if it’s a woman who comes than if it’s a 
man. (Tina) 
 
The quote from Tina shows how women legitimize their place within the profession in 
relation to the conception of women as physically weaker than men, but instead more em-
pathetic. This leads to the legitimate place for a women in the profession being found in 
relation to interrogations, and then specifically in relation to interrogations with women as 
crime victims. Thus a space is created in this way in which the assumed weaker female 
body can work: 
I mean, I think that there’s a difference between boys and girls, girls 
don’t think it’s so important. It is important that you’re in reasonably 
good shape, but it’s not so important that you’re big and strong. In-
stead it’s more important that you can deal with people, can talk with 
them. On this all-day exercise, I was paired with this guy the whole 
day [a person whom Tina says questions women’s presence on the 
training programme] and I asked him: ‘What should we do now then 
X?’ [Tina answers as X to her question]: ‘I usually do it so that I give 
them [the individuals suspected of offences] a chance, and then I go 
in and wrestle them down.’ [Tina answers as herself]: ‘Yes, but you 
can’t do that. You have to try and talk to them first.’ [Tina answers as 
X]: ‘No, they get one chance, and then I go in and grab hold of them.’ 
I think that guys probably have that view, whereas girls think that 
you can resolve the situation by talking to them instead. (Tina [au-
thor’s addition]) 
 
It emerged in all of the interviews that the subject position as women and of being accept-
ed into the collective is a problematic and conflicted one, and this also constitutes one of 
the bearing themes within the interview material both in relation to norms and the nor-
mation processes. A premium is placed on physical ability both among the students and 
by the training programme, which has a strong focus on the subject self-defence and 
health. This subject is highly valued among the students and they also have a very close 
                                                                                                                                                                  
gramme. In these examinations, the physical requirements for women remain at a lower level than those for 
men. 
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relationship with the teacher of this subject, who follows them throughout their two years 
on the training programme. The issue of training and competition in physical strength and 
abilities thereby becomes one of the major evaluation points for suitability and thus the 
possibility of passing as a good colleague. 
The second quote from Tina illustrates the other form of wrong performance, those (for 
the most part males) who invest too much in being big and strong, and who do not want 
to compromise on their principles, those who perform a form of non-middle-class discur-
sively anachronistic masculinity, a ‘do not mess with me’ attitude. 
 
The Cowboy Masculinity Performance 
 
The assumedly weaker female body; SHE who performs connotatively feminine emotions 
and expresses these emotions, may be viewed as one dimension of the wrong perfor-
mance. Another is found in HE,4 who invests too much in performing and accentuating 
connotatively masculine actions and bodily expressions that have traditionally symbolized 
the police profession. Between these two poles a discursive (verbal) battlefield is formed, a 
struggle about which body is most appropriate for the profession (Lander 2013, Loftus 
2010). In an earlier article I discussed how professional motivations and homosociality 
within the police training programme become obstacles to both a changed police norm 
and diversity within the police force (Lander 2013). The professional motivation and the 
norm regarding how a police officer is required to be emphasize practical, physically de-
manding and violent working conditions focused on combating crime. These conceptions 
of the profession relate to a ‘combating-crime’ discourse that colours the everyday experi-
ence of the police training programme in interpersonal conversations and processes at all 
levels (see the above quote from Tina). The normative image of the profession as involving 
high-speed acts of heroism and requiring high levels of courage and physical strength as-
sumes an important role and constitutes a central part of this discursive battlefield. It is a 
battle between parallel, existing contradictory discourses, one that emphasizes equality 
and diversity and one that emphasizes combating an assumed increasingly violent and 
organized crime problem (Loftus 2010, Lander 2013). This battle exists in the day-to-day 
life of the police training programme, despite the reformulation of the recruitment docu-
ments on the police website and the years spent working to improve diversity within the 
police and work focused on the organization’s value base (Lander 2013): 
They probably think they have more reason to be here. There have 
been heated discussions that the boys in the class think that the girls 
shouldn’t become police because they don’t have the physical 
                                                 
4 I would like to point out that there are also women who perform cowboy masculinity, but in the discussion 
about the unsuitable police officer, this form of masculinity is symbolized almost exclusively by reference to 
a man. 
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strength to be able to work as police officers. So those boys keep a bit 
to themselves. And it’s those boys who have a massive interest in po-
lice equipment, you know. Those who spend their whole day in uni-
form and buy soft air guns so they can sit at home and practice shoot-
ing and so on. They keep to themselves. (Tina) 
 
What can be seen is that those who are most questioning of women’s presence on the 
training programme and within the police force are the men who, according to Tina, like 
the uniform, police equipment, flashing lights, action and who are looking for excitement 
and for a sense of belonging within the force. The gender performance of these men is lo-
cated within the framework of a binary discursive conception of gender; women are wom-
en and since the police profession requires strong MEN, they have no legitimate place 
within this profession. Within the police training programme, it is these (for the most part) 
males, who take up much of the teachers’ time in discussions of (in)appropriateness, who 
constitute the problem in relation to changing the connotations associated with the police 
profession in line with a shift towards diversity (Lander 2013, Loftus 2010). On the basis of 
the interviews and previous research, it appears that the cowboy masculinity performance 
in the police context occurs in relation to conceptions about the profession (Andersson 
2003, Finstad 2003, Granér 2004, Loftus 2010, Lander 2013), and in relation to a homosocial 
arena in which gendering processes are taking place among males (Andersson 2003, Fin-
stad 2003, Kimmel 1994): 
There are these guys who are quite masculine, of course, and who 
have this traditional, how should I put it, police [attitude], tough atti-
tude, tough approach, very masculine, masculinity that radiates 
through everything. They constitute a group … We don’t have so 
much in common. The conversations are kind of; ‘how much did you 
drink this weekend’, like that. (Enok [author’s addition]) 
 
When it comes to gendered practices, the police profession is surrounded by a range of 
contradictory discourses which the students continuously relate to (Loftus 2010, Lander 
2013, Johansson 2006). They also meet these contradictory discursive messages on a daily 
basis in the context of the different modules and subjects of the training programme, 
where the expectations placed on their actions shift between empathic listening to acting 
in a fixed, authoritarian and goal-focused manner and over to intervening with violence if 
necessary. These shifting expectations create an uncertainty about how to perform in order 
to do the right gender in the right way, as is illustrated in the following quote from Lena: 
I think, first and foremost when you’re so new to this, you’ve been 
accepted. Then you feel such a sense of confirmation in that, yes then 
I’m this norm of what a police officer should be. So you come here 
and then I think some kind of small dissonance arises in more or less 
everyone, when you like got to see your classmates. And then this, 
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how the hell has that one been able to get in, and that one, because 
that’s the way people talk a little bit. (Lena) 
 
In the context of this dissonance, the students gravitate towards individuals who think the 
same as them, and powerful homosocial groups are formed, as is illustrated very clearly 
by the earlier quotes from both Enok and Tina. For the males whose gender identity is in 
line with the performance of cowboy masculinity, professional police conduct is the same 
as being a real man. Police performativity then assumes very concrete expressions in the 
hierarchical positioning that takes place through competition, even if competition is not in 
fact on the agenda (Andersson 2003). One example of this is found in one of the modules 
in the weapons training programme: 
We had a weapons exercise a while ago. You had to lie down and 
shoot and up on your knees and then run a course in a certain time, 
and then you were supposed to shout a lot too. I thought it was good, 
but the guys thought it was great fun! Fuck, that was fun! That gave me 
goose bumps. (Erika) 
 
To summarize, the gender performances that are considered inappropriate within the pro-
fession are, on the one hand, to perform femininity in the form of physical weakness or by 
showing feelings of uncertainty. The other form of inappropriate gender performance in-
volves performing too much masculinity, showing too much of an interest in weapons and 
action. The moulding process into the police profession is thus largely focused on the con-
scious side of gender performance, on what Judith Butler (1990) defines as performativity. 
It is about the correct police identity performance in the situations, and this is constantly 
being evaluated and assessed by one’s colleagues throughout one’s entire professional 
career (see Finstad 2003, Loftus 210, Morash and Haarr 2011). The police identity is in a 
constant state of becoming, and this becoming takes place in relation to a foundation of 
discursive conceptions about what the police profession means and how modern police 
officers are required to think, what they are permitted to say and how they are required to 
look (Andersson 2003, Butler 1990). 
The Right Gender Performance 
 
The focus on the body is central to the way students judge one another and can thereby be 
viewed as a part of the ordering, homosocial practices in which the teachers, not least 
those from the self-defence subject, also participate (cf. Karp and Stenmark 2008). This is 
also found in the rest of the police organization. Andersson (2003: 156) writes that ‘The 
body is like an arena in which the men meet, challenge and distinguish themselves from 
one another and at the same time an arena where the ideal, imagined body is constructed.’ 
Thus the normation and the judging not only takes place in relation to women’s (assumed-
ly) weaker and less well-trained bodies, the police students’ entire everyday lives on the 
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training programme are permeated by constantly relating to the normative body. These 
ordering practices also give the body agenthood, by initiating a transformation through 
the training, building up and challenging of the body’s capabilities. This occurs not least 
among the women during their time on the training programme, and the interview partic-
ipants spoke of an extreme body culture among both the women and the men during the 
programme. The police identity can thus be performed by both a policeMAN and a po-
liceWOMAN. 
However, the right police performance is not only about the body as materiality, but just 
as much about mentality, which may be seen first and foremost in relation to the negative 
connotations that have become associated with the concepts of professional culture and es-
prit de corps (Granér 2004, Loftus 2010, Peterson and Uhnoo 2012). One effect that the Swe-
dish equality and diversity discourses have had on the police organization is found in the 
work focused on the organization’s value base (Westin and Nilsson 2009), which has the 
goal of changing this connotatively negative professional culture, whose mentality, ac-
cording to Peterson and Uhnoo (2012: 357) is that ‘lie-low or cover-your-ass and a strict 
adherence to the crime fighter image’. During the police training programme, this negative 
side of the professional culture and esprit de corps is raised and discussed by focusing on 
specific groupings and incidents in which the individual giving the wrong performance is 
almost exclusively portrayed as a policeMAN performing cowboy masculinity: 
 
I: Would you say that there is anything in the training programme 
that states clearly that you should not be like this?  
 
E: Yes, I think so. There are constant, repetitive gibes about the old 
police tribe. Those who, for example, perjured themselves in order to 
protect a colleague [Enok is referring to a group of police officers in 
Stockholm who were accused of systematic and brutal use of force]. 
‘That’s what people used to do, that was the old days, and we don’t 
want police officers like that now!’ Police officers who are narrow-
minded, police officers who don’t like immigrant police officers, who 
don’t like homosexuals, we don’t want people like that. (Enok [cur-
rent author’s addition]) 
 
I would argue that the undesirable police identity that Enok is referring to lies close to the 
cowboy masculinity that was described in the previous section. This undesirable mascu-
linity is also close to a connoted criminal masculinity and to the conceptions of the non-
white and non-assimilated masculinity that is posited in the debate as the antithesis to the 
desirable Nordic assimilated modern man (Hearn et al. 2012, Johansson and Klinth 2008, 
Nordberg 2005). Within today’s police organization there is a desire to distance the organ-
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ization from this form of expression of masculinity, which is reflected in the organization’s 
recruitment and normation processes (Westin and Nilsson 2009): 
I: Would you say that there are any unstated or indeed actually ex-
plicit demands on or expectations about how you should and are 
supposed to be?  
 
E: Yes, there is of course this overarching expectation that you should 
help each other and support each other, you should be open to all 
kinds of religions, sexes, sexualities, ethnicity and all that … They are 
trying to mould people in line with that. I think it fails a bit because 
the focus isn’t always on those subjects where it perhaps needs to be. 
In some way, it is emphasised more in certain subjects because it’s 
natural, such as behavioural science, mental training and in police 
science, where the teachers focus a lot on those questions …  
 
I: But how are you supposed to be then?  
 
E: Well on the one hand we’re supposed to be like the message in the 
more theoretical subjects, like open humanists, open to everything, 
broad-minded and all that bit. But in the more practical subjects, like 
self-defence for example, we’re supposed to be big and strong police 
officers who can wrestle people to the ground and things like that. 
There’s a link to certain subjects. But at the same time, I could think 
that there has to be more discussion in the class. How do they want 
this police officer? There’s no discussion in the class, there’s no dis-
cussion on the training programme. (Enok) 
 
What emerges in the quote from Enok (and that from Nadja below) is in part an ambiguity 
about how you are supposed to act, think and perform, and in part the fact that this cre-
ates an uncertainty which in turn serves to strengthen the normation processes between 
the students. They are left to interpret and evaluate the different messages themselves. At 
one level, this may be seen as positive, since ‘sensemaking is important for the preserva-
tion of self-esteem and the organization’s public presentation’ (Chan 2007). At the same 
time, however, it serves to intensify the struggle between the different discursive concep-
tions around which police identity is the right one, and thus also which gender perfor-
mances are expected of the subjects. 
It was like when we sat with the class and listed all the characteristics 
a police officer must have. I mean it becomes a kind of super-human 
that, like, doesn’t exist anywhere … you have to be very service 
minded, humorous, empathic and kind, provide help and be patient, 
physically well-trained. I mean, there were so many things that it’s 
completely impossible to fulfil all of these things. So the teacher made 
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a bit of a joke. He just: ‘Yes, it’s good that you think like that, but can 
you achieve all that?’ and so everybody just started laughing. (Nadja) 
 
Performing the right police identity involves a constant balancing act between the gender 
extremes of the see-saw, irrespective of whether you consider yourself as male or female. 
Not showing physical weakness or uncertainty, but at the same time not being too eager to 
use violence or to show arrogance and complete certainty that one is right. From the 
study, it can be seen that the diversity and equality discourses have presented a challenge 
to the gender norms that prevail in the process of becoming a police officer. They have 
contributed to the forming of a new police body that has masculinized the female body 
and demasculinized the male body away from a working-class cowboy ideal (Loftus 2010, 
Johansson and Klinth 2008, Jon in Chapter 1). A new, more androgynous, middle-class 
connoted police body is in the process of becoming, as can be illustrated by Erika’s defini-
tion of the typical police student: 
The thing that strikes you is how similar everyone is here. Saw an 
advert on the notice board [in the police college canteen] where Peak 
Performance, the brand, were looking for models. You had to be a 
man, of certain height, breadth and looks. I turned around in the can-
teen and though that everyone meets the requirements. The typical po-
lice student is a Peak Performance5 man! (Erika [current author´s addi-
tion]) 
 
To summarize, what emerges as being the right police gender performance within the 
framework of today’s Swedish diversity and equality project is to position oneself as a 
modern, emancipated, athletic, middle-classed (police-)body. In this sense, Erika’s meta-
phor relating the police identity to a Peak Performance man is both powerful and very 
clear, since Peak Performance markets itself as a brand for the sports-interested, adven-
turous person who demands quality. The company’s motto is: ‘To be Genuine, Long-term, 
Trust, Belief in the Future, Regeneration and belief in Team Peak Performance.’6 Their ad-
vertising pictures are often taken in extreme sports environments, such as off-piste ski-
ing/snowboarding and mountaineering, where those wearing the clothes are: ‘healthy 
people, well-trained, stylish and have nice things and lit of money and they have good 
                                                 
5 Peak Performance was founded by a number of Swedish downhill skiers in Åre in 1986. It started with a 
passion for sport and for experiencing those areas of nature that are as yet unexplored. The name Peak Per-
formance came to symbolize the quality and the function of the company’s clothing 
(http://www.sportamore.se/brand/peak-performance/ visited 19 November 2013). 
6http://www.sportamore.se/brand/peak-performance/http://www.sportamore.se/brand/peak-performance/ 
visited 19 November 2013, which can be compared with the personality criteria described in a recruitment 
brochure from the National Police Board: ‘You should be broad-minded, tolerant, able to cope with stress, 
honest, congenial and have a service focus’ (RPS_broschyr_08_webb[1].pdf). 
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teeth and everything,’ which is how Erika describes the appearance norm on the police 
training programme, and she continues: 
Everyone looks the same. Everyone has the same sort of clothes. If 
you’re sitting on the bus, and someone is wearing a cap with Peak on 
it, you can guarantee they’ll get off at Sörentorp [the name of the bus 
stop for the National Police Academy]. Peak Performance, that is uni-
form at the training college. (Erika [current author’s addition] 
 
Peak Performance conceptualizes a discursive representation of the idea of the Nordic as-
similated modern man, which in turn formulates the right gender performance in the po-
lice force. 
Discussion: The Discursive Right Gender Performance at the Right Time and Place 
 
The argument made in this chapter has been that the Nordic equality and diversity dis-
courses have challenged traditional norms and configurations of masculinity, in this case 
the gendered police norms (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Through demands for in-
creased diversity, and work to combat sexual and sexist harassment, the right police iden-
tity and the right police performativity are today portrayed as being more than just 
strength, body and action (Westin and Nilsson 2009). These discursive changes of the po-
lice as gendered practices on one level provide more space for different performances of 
police identities. The acceptance of the policewoman broadens the gender notions of what 
it means to be a police officer, since it is undoing gendered police configurations by creat-
ing more meanings associated with the police as gendered practices (Kelan 2009: 187–188). 
As I have shown, there is a norm-body, a normative value system and a normative pattern 
of action associated with what it means to be a police officer, which can be illustrated with 
the idea of the Nordic assimilated modern man. Doing the right police identity right might 
in principle mean that bodies as gendered are reset to zero and that the police profession is 
undoing gender through the way in which the diversity and equality discourses create 
changes in the ordering practices within the police force. At the same time, however, there 
are parallel discursive conceptions of the police profession that define and symbolize the 
practice of the profession in terms of being practical, physically testing and demanding, 
risky and with expectations about being able to act physically with strength and decisive-
ness, which means that the masculinity connotations remain in relation to the police iden-
tity. Discourses that genders the body and are crucial to the question of who does what – 
which body drives the car, which body is suited for going into situations that are expected 
to be violent, which body interviews witnesses and injured parties, and runs investiga-
tions into violence against children and women. Thus in the normation process that sur-
rounds becoming a police officer, the final judgement is directed toward the body, and the 
binary gender system is reproduced, but at the same time challenged (Kelan 2009, Lander 
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2008). When policewomen perform the right police identity right, they perform (female) 
masculinity and this performance disturbs and displaces the gender binary as it shows 
that female bodies can perform other gender positions than that assigned by the binary 
gender system (Halberstam 1998, Butler 2004). 
 
The idea of diversity within the police is based, however, on the idea of bodies as essen-
tially different from one another, as bearers of different properties that are suited to differ-
ent roles within the police organization (Lander 2008, 2013). Men are hard and women 
soft, women are more empathic and men have other physical capabilities. This means that 
policeWOMEN are legitimized via their being needed to do that which policeMEN are 
assumed unable to do, and this serves to reinforce the way in which a large part of police 
practices continue to be gendered as man’s work. In practice this means that several paral-
lel police identities are produced in which gender configurations shift in relation to time 
and place. In one context the right gender performance involves doing more traditional 
masculinity, and in another more traditional femininity, even though this, from a Swedish 
equality-discursive perspective becomes a gender performance that is out of time and 
place (Nordberg 2005, Hearn et al. 2012). 
 
In the interview participants’ narratives about normation processes, what emerges is a pic-
ture of becoming a police officer that involves multiple subject positions in different places 
and at different times. This is because the police identity of today lies in the intersection of 
contradictory discourses – on the police profession, on the assimilated (white) Swedish 
society, on diversity, on professional ethics and on how to combat an assumedly increas-
ingly violent and internationally organized crime problem (Loftus 2010, Chan 2007, 
Lander 2013). 
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Datakvaliteten af politiets indbrudsjournaler  
Pernille Søgaard Tolstrup & Cecilie Vivienne Attermann  
 
I 2013 blev Danmark udråbt til det land i Europa med det næsthøjeste antal 
indbrudsanmeldelser i forhold til indbyggertal (Lerche 2013). Jævnfør Danmarks 
Statistik er sigtelsesprocenten for indbrud i gennemsnit kun 7,6 procent for årene 2000-
2014, og ifølge Trygfonden er danskerne i stigende grad utrygge for at blive udsat for 
indbrud (Andersen et al. 2013). Det danske politi står derfor overfor en central 
problemstilling med at forebygge indbrud, samt at øge opklaringsprocenten og 
befolkningens tryghed. 
Indeværende artikel er en præsentation af de foreløbige resultater af en undersøgelse af 
politiets datakvalitet. Artiklen har til formål at afsøge muligheder for at forstå indbrud ud 
fra den statistik, der kreeres på baggrund af politiets indbrudsjournaler. Dette ved at 
undersøge og karakterisere kvaliteten af politiets datamateriale omhandlende indbrud, 
samt ved at undersøge hvad datakvaliteten har af betydning for de analyser, der kan 
udarbejdes på baggrund af datamaterialet. 
Politijournaler 
Valget af at fokusere på politijournaler skyldes et ønske om at opnå viden om blandt 
andet, hvordan gerningspersonen har skaffet sig adgang til boligen, eventuelt det 
benyttede værktøj, der er brugt for at tilegne sig adgang, og om gerningspersonen har 
efterladt eventuelle spor. Sådanne informationer er sværere at afdække i 
selvrapporteringsstudier og offerundersøgelser, da disse i højere grad er plaget af 
undersøgelsespersonernes svarvillighed, hukommelse, kendskab til de juridiske 
definitioner af kriminalitet samt hvilke spor, der eksempelvis tilkendegiver 
gerningspersonens arbejdsmetode (Balvig et al. 2013; Greve 1972). Imidlertid er brugen af 
politijournaler heller ikke optimal, da det ikke er alle indbrud som politianmeldelses 
foruden registreres i politiets systemer (Balvig et al. 2013). Politijournaler er således ikke 
dækkende opgørelser over den totale mængde af begåede indbrud, eftersom journalerne 
ikke indeholder informationer om den ikke-registrerede kriminalitet. Imidlertid vurderes 
indbrud at have en relativ høj kriminalitetstilbøjelighed (Balvig et al. 2013:4). I en 
sammenligning mellem selvrapporterings- og offerundersøgelserne og 
anmeldelsesstatistikken kan der imidlertid argumenteres for en nødvendighed af, at 
definitionerne vedrørende indbrud som kriminalitetsform, arbejdsmetoderne brugt til at 
tilegne sig adgang til boligen også videre er konsistente, således omfanget og 
forskellighederne kan opgøres og sammenlignes på tværs. Politiets indbrudsjournaler er 
derfor umiddelbart at foretrække, da disse i højere grad vurderes at være udformet 
konsistent på baggrund af en fælles organisatorisk praksis. 
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Politijournaler består af tre elementer. For det første består en politijournal af en såkaldt 
’vagthavende funktion’, hvor grunddata angives (se figur 1). Dette værende information 
om dato og tid for anmeldelsen samt for gerningen, der ønskes politijournaliseret, samt 
adressen for hvor gerningen blev begået. Ydermere tilføjes der et journalnummer, hvilken 
angiver politikreds, gerningskode (dvs. hvilken form for hændelse, der er blevet anmeldt, 
eksempelvis om der er tale om et indbrud, røveri eller tyveri), et løbenummer (hvilken 
identificerer den enkelte sag) og slutteligt et årstal. 
 
Figur 1: Vagthavende funktion 
Som illustreret i figur 1 indeholder vagthavende funktionen også et resuméfelt. I dette felt 
anføres et enkelt, overskueligt og retvisende billede af hændelsen, der journalføres. I 
Rigspolitiets vejledning til at journalføre politianmeldte hændelser fordres det, at 
resuméet består af en besvarelse af seks spørgsmål, såfremt de er relevante for den 
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pågældende sag. Dette værende en besvarelse af (1) hvad er der sket?, (2) hvor er det 
sket?, (3) hvordan er det sket?, (4) hvem er involveret?, (5) hvornår er det sket? og (6) en 
politimæssig vurdering af hvorfor er det sket. Årsagen til at de seks spørgsmål kun skal 
besvares såfremt det vurderes relevant for den pågældende sag skyldes, at det 
eksempelvis ikke altid vides, hvordan indbruddet er sket, hvormed dette spørgsmål ikke 
skal besvares i resuméfeltet. 
Foruden vagthavende funktionen består politijournalerne af en anmeldelsesrapport, 
hvilken indeholder alle grunddata fra vagthavende funktionen, der er hentet over i et 
særskilt dokument, foruden en detaljeret beskrivelse af gerningen, der er årsag til 
journalføringen, samt af gerningsstedet og en gerningsstedsundersøgelse. Endvidere 
angives informationer om hvem, der er involveret i sagen.1 Hvor resumefeltet i 
vagthavende funktionen opsummerer hændelsen, beskrives hændelsen detaljeret i 
anmeldelsesrapporten. Ved indbrudsjournaler indeholder gerningsstedsbeskrivelsen 
informationer om boligens art, beliggenhed, indretning og adgangsforhold, mens 
gerningsstedsundersøgelsen består af en detaljeret beskrivelse af, hvor og hvordan 
gerningspersonen har tilegnet sig adgang til boligen, gerningspersonens konstaterede eller 
formodede færden, hvor og hvordan gerningspersonen har forladt boligen og eventuelle 
spor efter gerningspersonen. Der må, ifølge Rigspolitiets vejledning til journalisering af 
anmeldelser, ikke angives centrale informationer vedrørende indbrudshændelsen i andre 
dele af politijournalen, hvis ikke det står skrevet i anmeldelsesrapporten. 
Det tredje element som politijournaler består af, er den såkaldte ’søgenøglefunktion’. 
Søgenøglerne er et redskab, der har til formål at ensarte og strukturer søgekriterierne i en 
sag, eftersom de består af en række fastdefinerede, søgbare, informationsbærende ord eller 
sætninger. Dette står i modsætning til resuméfeltet, der skrives i fritekst. For hver 
gerningskode findes der et antal forudbestemte søgenøgler, hvilket vil sige, at ikke alle 
søgenøgler kan anvendes i alle sager. Der er således forskel på hvilke søgenøgler, der kan 
angives til eksempelvis en indbrudssag og en voldssag. Kun de søgenøgler, der er 
relevante for den enkelte sag skal tilføjes journalen, ifølge Rigspolitiets vejledning.  
Søgenøglerne kan angives i op til tre trin, som tilsammen betegnes en søgenøglestreng. I 
udgangspunktet består trin 1 af en hovedgruppe, hvorefter valgene indsnævres, således at 
informationerne i trin 2 præciserer informationerne givet i trin 1, og trin 3 yderligere 
præciserer informationerne i trin 1 og 2 (Se tekstboks 1). Det er desværre ikke muligt at 
give et fuldt overblik over, hvilke søgenøgler, der kan angives til en indbrudssag. Dette 
skyldes, at disse oplysninger er til tjenestebrug og dermed ikke må komme til 
offentlighedens kendskab. Nedenstående tekstboks illustrerer de søgenøgleområder, vi 
                                                 
1 Dette værende personen, der anmeldte indbruddet, eventuelle vidner og gerningspersonen eller –
personerne, hvis disse kendes. 
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beskæftiger os med i indeværende undersøgelse, og er eksempler på hvordan forskellige 
søgenøglestrenge kan angives.  
Tekstboks 1: Eksempler på søgenøglestrenge 
1. Modusspor: Modusspor (trin 1), modus atypisk (trin 2)   
2. Anvendt redskab: Anvendt redskab (trin 1), koben (trin 2)   
3. Modus: Opbrydning (trin 1), dør (trin 2), hoveddør (trin 3)   
4. Identitetsspor: Identitetsspor (trin 1), falsk anmeldelse (trin 2)   
5. Koster: Kostervalg (trin 1), design (trin 2), Arne Jacobsen (trin 3)   
 
Der skal altid angives søgenøgler til en sag, såfremt der er tilgængelige informationer i 
sagen, der kan angives som en søgenøgle. Hvis dette ikke er tilfældet, angives der en 
søgenøgle, som betegnes ’ingen relevante søgenøgler’. 
Afslutningsvist er det væsentligt at nævne, at det kun er muligt at danne statistisk ud fra 
søgenøglerne og resuméfeltet. Derimod er anmeldelsesrapporten ikke søgbar i statistiske 
sammenhænge.  
Datakvalitet 
 
I artiklen defineres datakvalitet som et multidimensionalt fænomen, hvilket 
nødvendiggør, at flere dimensioner tages i betragtning i forhold til en undersøgelse af 
datakvalitet. Det betyder, at én dimension ikke i sig selv er tilstrækkelig til at vurdere 
indbrudsjournalernes datakvalitet. Dimensionerne, vi har udvalgt og fundet anvendelige 
til at afdække datakvaliteten af indbrudsjournaler, er; nøjagtighed, fuldstændighed, 
ensartethed, anvendelighed og relevans. De fem dimensioner præsenteres kort herunder. I 
artiklen fokuseres der imidlertid kun på to af dimensionerne; nøjagtighed og 
fuldstændighed, da der er tale om foreløbige resultater af undersøgelsen. Hvordan vi mere 
specifikt har undersøgt de to dimensioner i forhold til indbrudsjournalerne uddybes i 
afsnittet; Analysestrategi.   
For at give et fuldt billede af datakvalitet som et multidimensionalt fænomen er det valgt 
at præsentere alle de fem dimensioner. 
Nøjagtighed 
Nøjagtighedsdimensionen relaterer sig til, hvorvidt de registrerede informationer i 
datamaterialet stemmer overens med virkeligheden og dermed om informationen er 
fejlfrit og nøjagtigt (Batini & Scannapieco 2006). Det vil sige, hvorvidt oplysningerne givet 
i de forskellige dele af indbrudsjournalerne stemmer overens med hinanden.  
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Fuldstændighed  
Fuldstændighedsdimensionen omhandler, hvorvidt dataet forstås som værende 
fuldstændigt og dermed om nogle aspekter ikke er blevet angivet (Batini & Scannapieco 
2006). Dette indebærer, hvorvidt der mangler oplysninger i de kvantificerbare dele af en 
journal, og om alle relevante informationer er angivet.  
Ensartethed  
Ensartethedsdimensionen relaterer sig til, hvor ensartet dataet er på tværs af forskellige 
individer. Dette værende hvorvidt dataet varierer på tværs af de politibetjente, der 
udarbejder journalerne, samt om forurettede har en indvirkning på dataets ensartethed.  
Anvendelighed  
Anvendelighedsdimensionen omhandler, hvorvidt datet er af sådan en karakter, at det er 
let anvendeligt for de parter, der arbejder med dataet, og for det formål dataet har. Det vil 
sige, at dimensionen anvendes til at vurdere, om de metoder, der benyttes til at kreere 
statistisk data, er anvendelige til dette formål. Det gælder eksempelvis anvendeligheden af 
at resumefeltet angives i fritekst, mens søgenøglerne angives i allerede definerede ord eller 
sætninger. 
Relevans  
Relevansdimensionen relaterer sig til, om dataet er relevant i forhold til den 
problemstilling, det har til formål at undersøge. Det vil sige en vurdering af, om de dele af 
politijournalen, der kan trækkes statistik fra, indeholder central information set ud fra et 
rutineaktivitets- og situationel kriminalitetsforebyggelsesperspektiv (Cohen & Felson 
2011; Clarke 1980). Dette ud fra politiets ønske om at arbejde vidensstyret og 
analysebaseret (Hestehave 2013). 
Kvantitativ dokumentanalyse 
Undersøgelsen af politiets datakvalitet består af en kvantitativ dokumentanalyse af 495 
indbrudsjournaler produceret i Østjyllands Politi i perioden fra d. 1. maj 2014 til d. 30. 
april 2015.  
De 495 indbrudsjournaler er proportioneret stratificeret og tilfældigt udvalgt blandt de i 
alt 4.077 indbrudsjournaler, der er produceret i Østjyllands Politi i den nævnte periode. 
Den tilfældige udvælgelse af politijournaler er foretaget ud fra et ønske om at skabe de 
bedste forudsætninger for at kunne generalisere undersøgelsens resultater ud til 
populationen. Dette i forsøget på at sikre, at stikprøven har tilsvarende karakteristika som 
populationen (Bryman 2008; de Vaus 2001). Valget af at foretage en proportioneret 
stratificering skyldes en forskel i antallet af indbrud anmeldt over de tolv måneder, 
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hvormed det forsøges at tage højde for risikoen for unøjagtigheder på grund af en 
skævvridning af månedsfordelingen (Milhøj 1994).2 
Ud fra ønsket om at undersøge datakvaliteten af politijournaler omhandlende indbrud er 
det valgt at foretage en dokumentanalyse. Dette ved at læse de udvalgte 495 
indbrudsjournaler og undersøge, om beskrivelsen af indbruddet, der er givet i journalens 
forskellige dele, stemmer overens. Ud fra et ønske om at opnå målbare estimater foruden 
at skabe et systematisk overblik over journalernes datakvalitet er der i undersøgelsen 
foretaget en kvantitativ dokumentanalyse. Dette fordrer imidlertid en kvantificering af 
indbrudsjournalerne. Det vil sige en nødvendighed for at inddele indbrudsjournalernes 
informationer i forhåndsdefinerede kategorier, der efterfølgende gøres til genstand for 
optælling og sammenligning (Eskjær & Helles 2015:12). I forbindelse med en sådan 
kategorisering har der været et stort fokus på at inddele indbrudsjournalerne ens for at 
sikre en høj reliabilitet af dokumentanalysen. Dette er opnået ved at udarbejde en 
kodemanual, hvilken har til formål at skabe en entydig forståelse af, hvordan der 
kategoriseres. Endvidere har de, der har kategoriseret politijournalerne, kodet de første 20 
journaler sammen og sparret med hinanden løbende, såfremt der har været tvivl.  
Analysestrategi  
Forinden resultaterne af den kvantitative dokumentanalyse præsenteres, findes det 
relevant og nødvendigt at introducere, hvorledes fremgangsmåden til opnåelsen af 
resultaterne er foretaget. Dette skal ses i relation til de førnævnte datakvalitetsdimensioner 
og hvordan disse mere specifik undersøges i forhold til indbrudsjournalerne. Da 
resultaterne, der præsenteres i denne undersøgelse, er foreløbige, bliver der i 
resultatafsnittet som nævnt kun fokuseret på to ud af de fem udvalgte dimensioner – 
nøjagtighed og fuldstændighed. 
Nøjagtighedsdimensionen undersøges ved at sammenligne resuméfeltets angivelser og 
søgenøglerne med de informationer, der er givet i anmeldelsesrapporten. Hvis der er 
forskel på disse informationer, betragtes angivelsen som unøjagtig. 
Nøjagtighedsdimensionen undersøges derved ud fra to kategorier. Dette værende om 
resuméfeltets angivelser er nøjagtig eller unøjagtigt angivet. En tilsvarende vurdering 
foretages af søgenøglerne. Disse undersøges dog også i forhold til 
fuldstændighedsdimensionen. Årsagen til at det kun er søgenøglerne, der undersøges i 
forhold til fuldstændighedsdimensionen, er, at søgenøglerne er fastdefinerede ord eller 
sætninger, hvorved vi finder det muligt at vurdere, i hvilken grad de er fuldstændigt 
angivet. Resuméfeltet er i modsætning til søgenøglerne skrevet i fritekst, hvilket 
vanskeliggør muligheden for at udarbejde en valid undersøgelse af omfanget af forskellige 
                                                 
2 Den oprindelige stikprøve var på 507 indbrudsjournaler, men eftersom 12 af disse journaler ikke kunne 
åbnes i politiets it-system grundet systemfejl, måtte disse udgå af den undersøgte stikprøve. Den undersøgte 
stikprøve består således af 495 politijournaler. 
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karakteristika ved anmeldte indbrud. Dette som følge af, at de ord, der trækkes statistik på 
ud fra resuméfeltet, kan være forkortet, stavet forkert eller være udsat for en tastefejl og at 
der i nogle tilfælde kan være brugt andre ord, der synonymt betyder det, der trækkes 
statistik på. 
Fuldstændighedsdimensionen undersøges ud fra tre kategorier. Dette værende om 
søgenøglerne er fuldstændig angivet, ufuldstændig angivet eller ikke angivet. I 
præsentationen af resultaterne for søgenøglerne kombineres nøjagtigheds- og 
fuldstændighedsdimensionen. Søgenøglerenes angivelser undersøges på den måde ud fra 
fire kategorier. Den ene kategori er fuldstændig angivet, hvilket svarer til nøjagtig angivet. 
Det vil sige, at alle relevante søgenøgler, der er mulige at identificere i 
anmeldelsesrapporten, er angivet, og der er således overensstemmelse mellem de 
tilknyttede søgenøgler og informationen angivet i anmeldelsesrapporten. Den anden 
kategori er ufuldstændig angivet, hvilket refererer til, at nogle relevante søgenøgler er 
angivet, men ikke alle. Den tredje kategori er ikke angivet, hvilken angives, hvis det ud fra 
anmeldelsesrapporten findes relevant at angive søgenøglen, men hvor søgenøglen ikke er 
blevet angivet. Den fjerde og sidste kategori er unøjagtig angivet, hvilket svarer til, at 
søgenøglen, der er angivet, ikke vurderes relevant at angive, idet informationen, som 
søgenøglen tilkendegiver, ikke står beskrevet i anmeldelsesrapporten.  
Det er ikke alle journaler, hvortil der er udarbejdet en anmeldelsesrapport, hvilket er 
tilfældet for 11 procent af de 495 undersøgte journaler. Det er derved ikke muligt at 
sammenligne resuméfeltet og søgenøglerne med anmeldelsesrapporten i disse tilfælde. I 
det følgende resultatafsnit indgår der, derfor kun 442 journaler.  
Det bør påpeges, at det som ikke nødvendigvis er relevant at besvare alle elementerne i 
resuméfeltet og angive alle søgenøgler til enhver indbrudsjournal. Nøjagtigheden og 
fuldstændigheden undersøges derfor ud fra de tilfælde, hvor det er vurderet relevant at 
angive det specifikke resuméfeltselement eller den specifikke søgenøgle. Denne 
relevansvurdering er foretaget ud fra en sammenligning af anmeldelsesrapporten og 
henholdsvis resuméfeltet og søgenøglerne. Hvis et element hverken fremgår i resuméfeltet 
eller anmeldelsesrapporten og det tilsvarende for søgenøglerne, betyder det, at vi ikke kan 
vurderer om, det har været relevant at angive informationen. Vi vurderer således 
relevansen af et resuméfeltselement eller en søgenøgle ud fra oplysningerne givet i 
anmeldelsesrapporten.  
Som følge af relevansvurderingen præsenteres kun resultater for hvor- og hvordan-
elementet i resuméfeltet samt modus- og redskabs-søgenøglen. Dette skyldes, at der er tale 
om forholdsvis få angivelser ved de resterende resuméfeltselementer og søgenøgler, 
hvorved vi ikke kan vide os sikre på potentielle outliers betydning for resultaterne.  
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Resultater  
Ud fra figur 2 ses det, at både hvor- og hvordan-elementet i resuméfeltet er angivet 
nøjagtigt i omtrent to tredjelede af de tilfælde, hvor elementet er vurderet relevant at 
angive. Det betyder imidlertid også, at der i en tredjedel af tilfældene er unøjagtige 
angivelser, hvorved der kan argumenteres for, at resuméfeltsangivelserne ikke lever op til 
Rigspolitiets vejledning om journalføring. Dette skal ses i relation til, at der i vejledningen 
påpeges, at der ikke må optræde vigtige oplysninger i resuméfeltet, som ikke optræder i 
anmeldelsesrapporten. En unøjagtig angivelse er netop et udtryk for, at oplysningerne i 
resuméfeltet og anmeldelsesrapporten ikke stemmer overens, hvorfor en tredjedel 
unøjagtige angivelser for både hvor- og hvordan-elementet kan betragtes som en 
forholdsvis stor problematik for anvendelsens af angivelserne i statistiske analyser, 
såfremt det ønskes at sige noget generelt herom i forhold til anmeldte indbrud.  
Figur 2: Resuméfeltelementernes nøjagtighed 
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Ud fra figur 2 ses det, at både hvor- og hvordan-elementet i resuméfeltet er angivet 
nøjagtigt i omtrent to tredjelede af de tilfælde, hvor elementet er vurderet relevant at 
angive. Det betyder imidlertid også, at der i en tredjedel af tilfældene er unøjagtige 
angivelser, hvorved der kan argumenteres for, at resuméfeltsangivelserne ikke lever op til 
Rigspolitiets vejledning om journalføring. Dette skal ses i relation til, at der i vejledningen 
påpeges, at der ikke må optræde vigtige oplysninger i resuméfeltet, som ikke optræder i 
anmeldelsesrapporten. En unøjagtig angivelse er netop et udtryk for, at oplysningerne i 
resuméfeltet og anmeldelsesrapporten ikke stemmer overens, hvorfor en tredjedel 
unøjagtige angivelser for både hvor- og hvordan-elementet kan betragtes som en 
forholdsvis stor problematik for anvendelsens af angivelserne i statistiske analyser, 
såfremt det ønskes at sige noget generelt herom i forhold til anmeldte indbrud.  
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Af figur 3 ses det, at modus-søgenøglen er angivet fuldstændigt i omtrent halvdelen af de 
tilfælde, hvor det er vurderet relevant at angive søgenøglen. Dermed er den restende 
halvdel ikke angivet fuldstændigt. 12 procent er ufuldstændig angivet, hvilket betyder, at 
der for disse sager ikke er angivet alle de relevante søgenøgler. Det kan eksempelvis være 
tilfældet, hvis adgangen til boligen er forsøgt to steder, men at der kun er angivet som ét af 
sted ud fra de tilknyttede søgenøgler. Det kan eksempelvis være i tilfælde, hvor det er 
forsøgt at lirke hoveddøren op og ved at der er kastet en sten igennem et stuevindue. 16 
procent af modussøgenøglerne er ikke angivet, hvilket er ensbetydende med, at det har 
været muligt at lokalisere en modussøgenøgle i anmeldelsesrapporten, men at denne ikke 
er påført journalen. De restende 21 procent er unøjagtigt angivet, hvormed den 
beskrivelse, der er af gerningspersonens modus i anmeldelsesrapporten, ikke stemmer 
overens med den søgenøgle, der er angivet til journalen. Der er med andre ord angivet en 
forkert modussøgenøgle.  
Figur 3: Søgenøglefunktionens nøjagtighed og fuldstændighed 
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Af figur 3 fremgår det endvidere, at kun en fjerdedel af redskabssøgenøglerne er 
fuldstændig angivet i de relevante tilfælde. Det ses, at en mindre del af søgenøglerne er 
enten ufuldstændig eller unøjagtig angivet, hvilket drejer sig om henholdsvis én og tre 
procent. Derimod er størstedelen af redskabs-søgenøglerne ikke angivet, eftersom der i 71 
procent tilfælde ikke er blevet angivet en redskabssøgenøgle på trods af, at det i 
anmeldelsesrapporten stod, at gerningspersonen formodes at have brugt et specifikt 
redskab. Dette vanskeliggør politiets mulighed for at kreere en valid statistisk analyse 
over eksempelvis, hvilket redskab der oftest anvendes i forbindelse med indbrud. ’ 
Afrunding 
På baggrund af ovenstående resultatafsnit kan der næppe rejses tvivl om, at der er store 
problematikker forbundet med kvaliteten af det data, som Østjyllands Politi har mulighed 
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for at anvende. Det fremgår ved, at både resuméfeltselementerne og søgenøglerne lider 
under unøjagtig eller ufuldstændig angivelser, hvilket skaber validitetsproblematikker i 
forhold til anvendelsen af disse, såfremt det ønskes at skulle sige noget generelt om de 
anmeldte indbrud i Østjyllands Politi.  
På baggrund af unøjagtigheden vedrørende angivelsen af resuméfeltselementerne; hvor 
og hvordan, foruden unøjagtigheden og ufuldstændigheden tilknyttet angivelserne af 
modus- og redskabs-søgenøglen, findes det ud fra politiets kvantitative datamateriale 
vanskeligt statistisk at opgøre, hvordan gerningspersonen har opnået adgang til boligen. 
Dette besværliggør endvidere muligheden for på baggrund heraf at udforme en 
forebyggelsesstrategi, der eksempelvis kan sættes ind for den oftest anvendte modusform. 
Det betyder potentielt, at en forebyggelsesindsats risikerer at være fejlbaseret. Dette uanset 
om statistiskkerne er trukket på baggrund af resuméfelterne eller søgenøglerne, hvilke er 
de eneste dele af journalerne, der kan trækkes statistik på. 
På baggrund af de foreløbige resultater kan det konkluderes, at datakvaliteten af 
Østjyllands Politis datamateriale omkring indbrud er udsat for alvorlige problematikker 
vedrørende nøjagtighed og fuldstændighed. Dette medfører en uanvendelighed af 
datamaterialet i forhold til at udarbejde valide statiske analyser, såfremt det ønskes at sige 
noget generelt om gerningspersonernes arbejdsmetode i forhold til at opnå adgang til 
boligen, der har været udsat for indbrud. Yderligere medfører det vanskeligheder i 
forhold til muligheden for at forebygge indbrud på baggrund af disse analyser.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250 
 
Litteraturliste 
Andersen, Jacob; Anders Hede & Jørgen Goul Andersen (2013): Danskernes 
hverdagsproblemer – Tryghedsma ̊ling 2013. København: Tryghedsfonden. 
Balvig, Flemming; Britta Kyvsgaard & Anne-Julie Boesen Pedersen (2013): Udsathed for vold 
og andre former for kriminalitet – Offerundersøgelserne 1995-96 og 2005-12. Københavns 
Universi- tet, Justitsministeriet, Det Kriminalpræventive Råd & Rigspolitiet.  
Batini, Carlo & Monica Scannapieco (2006): Data Quality – Concepts, Metodologies and Tech- 
niques. Berlin: Springer. 
Bryman, Alan (2008): Social research methods. 3. udgave. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Clarke, Ronald V. (1980): ”Situationel Crime Prevention” i Francis T. Cullen & Robert Ag-
new (red.) (2011): Criminological Theory: Past to Present. 4. udgave. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Cohen, E. Lawrence & Marcus Felson (1979): ”Routine Activity Theory” i Francis T. Cullen 
& Robert Agnew (red.) (2011): Criminological Theory: Past to Present. 4. udgave. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
de Vaus, David A. (2001): Research Design in Social Research. London: SAGE publications.  
Eskjær, Mikkel Fugl & Rasmus Helles (2015): Kvantitativ Indholdsanalyse. 1. udgave. 
Frederiks- berg: Samfundslitteratur.  
Greve, Vang (1972): Kriminalitet som normalitet. København. Justitsforbundets Forlag.  
Hestehave, Nadja Kirchhoff (2013): Proaktiv kriminalitetsbekæmpelse for politifolk. 1. udgave. 
Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur. 
Lerche, Anne (2013): Danmark topper Europas indbrudsstatistik med fem indbrud i timen. 
Køben- havn: Det Kriminalpræventive Råd: 
http://www.dkr.dk/sites/default/files/analyse_indbrud_i_europa_2012.pdf (sidst 
lokaliseret d. 3. au- gust 2015).  
Milhøj, Anders (1994): Stikprøveteori for økonomi og erhverv. København: Akademisk Forlag.  
 
 
 
251 
 
Hot spot-politiarbejde i en nordisk kontekst 
Maria Bislev, Cecilie Vivienne Attermann & Rune Holst Scherg 
 
Over de seneste årtier har flere internationale undersøgelser påvist, at kriminalitet ikke 
er tilfældigt fordelt, men i stedet koncentreret på specifikke steder (Sherman, Gartin & 
Buerger 1989; Weisburd, et al. 2004; Weisburd, Groff & Yang 2012). Det har ledt nogle 
kriminologer til at tale om en ’law of crime concentration’ (Weisburd 2015). Steder eller 
områder hvor der en høj koncentration af kriminalitet betegnes ofte som hot spots, 
mens indsatser, der iværksættes i områderne, betegnes som hot spot-indsatser. 
For politiet kan viden om, at kriminalitet har en tendens til at være koncentreret på et fåtal 
af steder, være yderst nyttig, idet det giver mulighed for at fokusere politiindsatsen der, 
hvor der er flest problemer. Dette kan bidrage til udnytte begrænsede ressourcer mere 
effektivt.  
Et fokus på hot spots er ikke nyt for det danske politi (Heltberg 2012; Jørgensen 2010; 
Høgh 2015). Dog har en fælles forståelse af, hvad der karakteriserer et hot spot og en 
effektiv hot spot-indsats, været fraværende. Rigspolitiets Nationalt Forebyggelsescenter og 
Nationalt Beredskabscenter har derfor udviklet et koncept, der har til formål at omsætte 
den foreliggende viden til en effektiv arbejdspraksis i de danske politikredse.  
Før konceptet eventuelt udrulles til alle danske politikredse, ønsker Rigspolitiet en 
afprøvning og evaluering af konceptet, således at der opnås en sikker viden om konceptets 
anvendelighed og indsatsernes effekt. Rigspolitiet har derfor iværksat en pilotafprøvning 
af konceptet i tre politikredse. 
Rigspolitiets Nationale Forebyggelsescenter er ansvarlig for den praktiske gennemførelse 
af pilotafprøvningen, mens evalueringen heraf foretages af Justitsministeriets 
Forskningskontor. Evalueringen forventes offentliggjort ultimo 2016. 
Indeværende artikel præsenterer baggrunden for forsøget med hot spot-politiarbejde, hot 
spot-evalueringens design, udpegningen af hot spot-områderne samt Rigspolitiets hot 
spot-koncept. 
Tidligere forskning i hot spot-politiarbejde 
Hot spot-politiarbejde er en samlebetegnelse for politiindsatser rettet mod geografisk 
afgrænsede steder, hvor der er en høj koncentration af kriminalitet (Weisburd & Telep 
2014). Internationalt er effekten af hot spot-politiarbejde velafprøvet og testet ekstensivt, 
og den samlede viden fra de store reviews og metaanalyser peger alle på, at hot spot-
politiarbejde er en effektiv strategi til at mindske kriminalitet (Braga 2001; Braga, 
Papachristos & Hureau 2012, 2014; Telep & Weisburd 2012; Weisburd & Telep 2010, 2014). 
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Forskningen konkluderer desuden, at der ikke nødvendigvis finder 
kriminalitetsforskydning sted, som resultat af den fokuserede politiindsats, men at der 
faktisk oftere sker en spredning af nytten ved indsatsen (Bowers et al. 2011; Braga et al. 
2014).1 Andre mulige eksternaliteter såsom øget utryghed, fald i tillid til politiet og 
reduceret politilegitimitet har været nævnt som mulige bivirkninger af en fokuseret 
politiindsats. På grundlag af den forhåndenværende vidensbase ser det dog ikke ud til, at 
hot spot-politiarbejde har nogle negative effekter på disse forhold (Braga, Papachristos & 
Hureau 2014; Weisburd & Telep 2014; Weisburd et al. 2011; Kochel, Burruss & Weisburd 
2016). Dokumentationen af de skandinaviske erfaringer med hot spot-politiarbejde er få, 
men bekræfter overvejende de internationale resultater på området (Andersson & 
Malmgren 2012; Frogner et al. 2013; Jørgensen 2010; Marklund & Merenius 2014).  
Selvom den internationale (og skandinaviske) forskning samlet set peger på nytten af 
hot spot-politiarbejde som strategi, er der stadig spørgsmål, som er uafklarede i 
forhold til nytten heraf. Især spørgsmålet om, hvorledes forskellige kontekstuelle 
forhold kan påvirke effekten af hot spot-politiarbejde, er endnu ikke helt afklaret. For 
det første er det ikke helt tydeligt, om hot spot-politiarbejde er en effektiv strategi uden 
for store eller mellemstore byer (Weisburd & Telep 2014). De allerfleste af de metodisk 
stærkeste studier har testet hot spot-politiarbejde i store eller mellemstore byer (kun 2 
af 19 studier af hot spot-politiarbejde inkluderet i Braga og kollegaers (2014) 
metaanalyse var gennemført i byer med mindre end 200.000 indbyggere). Relateret 
hertil er spørgsmålet om hot spot-politiarbejde også er virksom i såkaldt ’lunkne’ hot 
spots, hvor der ikke er en meget høj koncentration af kriminalitet (Weisburd & Telep 
2014). 
Hvis dansk politi skal arbejde ud fra et nationalt hot spot-koncept, skal det tydeligere 
dokumenteres, at hot spot-politiarbejde formår at reducere forekomsten af kriminalitet 
uden for de større byer og i lunkne hot spots, da Danmark tilsvarende de andre 
nordiske lande er kendetegnet ved få storbyer og få ’glohede’ hot spots hvad angår 
kriminalitetskoncentrationen.  
Langt størstedelen af evalueringerne af hot spot-politiarbejde er indtil videre gennemført 
uden for Europa – primært i USA – men en række endnu upublicerede og metodisk meget 
stærke europæiske studier tyder på, at hot spot-politiarbejde også er fundet 
virkningsfulde i en europæisk kontekst (Ariel et al. 2013). På trods af lovende fund savnes 
der dog stadig mere sikker viden om hot spot-politiarbejde er en hensigtsmæssig 
politistrategi i en nordisk kontekst.  
                                                 
1 Med forskydningseffekter (eng: displacement) tænkes oftest på en geografisk forskydning, hvor 
kriminaliteten flytter (forskydes) et andet sted hen. ’Spredning af nytte’ (eng: diffusion of benifits) betegner det 
modsatte fænomen, hvor effekten (nytten) af en kriminalpræventiv indsats spredes og derved kommer fx 
naboområder til gavn i form af mindskning i kriminalitet (Scherg 2013).  
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Hot spot-evalueringens design og brug af metoder 
Evalueringen af hot spot-pilotafprøvningen vil dels bestå af en effektmåling, der 
undersøger, om hot spot-indsatser er en effektivt strategi til at reducere forekomsten af 
kriminalitet, og dels en procesevaluering, der vil afdække politikredsenes arbejde med hot 
spot-indsatser, anvendeligheden af Rigspolitiets koncept og bistå med uddybende 
forklaringer på effektevalueringens resultater. 
For at have den bedst tænkelige mulighed for at undersøge, om hot spot-indsatserne har 
en kriminalpræventiv effekt, er pilotafprøvningen designet som et randomiseret, 
kontrolleret forsøg. Dette er sikret ved at udpege og identificere hot spottene for derefter 
at inddele dem tilfældigt i forsøgs- og kontrolområder. Det er udelukkende i 
forsøgsområderne, at hot spot-indsatserne iværksættes, mens der i kontrolområderne ikke 
gennemføres særlige indsatser. Politiet skal derfor alene foretage det arbejde, de plejer at 
gøre, i kontrolområderne. Ved at gennemføre denne tilfældighedsprocedure er det forsøgt 
at sikre, at der ikke forekommer systematiske forskelle mellem forsøgs- og 
kontrolområder, hvilket muliggør en beregning af kausale effekter.  
For ydermere at mindske risikoen for systematiske forskelle mellem forsøgs- og 
kontrolområderne er hot spottene før den tilfældige fordeling mellem forsøgs- og 
kontrolområder blevet inddelt i par i forhold til kriminalitetens art og omfang samt 
områdernes karakteristika. Områdernes karakteristika refererer til, om de udpegede 
områder er placeret i en midtby, ved et center eller en banegård. Det er ligeledes søgt at 
danne par inden for samme politikreds, således en politikreds ikke ender med 
udelukkende at have forsøgsområder, mens en anden ender med alene kontrolområder. 
Efter opdelingen i par er den tilfældige fordeling foretaget via terningekast. 
For at skabe de bedste forudsætninger for en robust effektevaluering er det centralt, at 
evalueringen foretages på et tilstrækkeligt stort datagrundlang. Kriminalitetens omfang i 
Danmark er dog relativt begrænset, hvilket bevirker, at der er relativt få hot spots med et 
højt kriminalitetstryk, og færre af disse end i eksempelvis USA. De udpegede hot spots i 
pilotafprøvningen er derfor relativt beskedne i forhold til koncentrationen af kriminalitet 
sammenlignet med andre forsøg. På den anden side giver dette anledning til at undersøge, 
om hot spot-politiarbejde har en kriminalpræventiv effekt i de såkaldte lunkne hot spots. 
For at øge anvendeligheden af undersøgelsen suppleres effektmålingen som nævnt med 
en mere procesorienteret evaluering, der vil bestå af observationsstudier af politikredsenes 
arbejde med hot spots og interviews med de af politiets medarbejdere, der har arbejdet 
hermed. Procesevalueringen sætter fokus på den praktiske gennemførsel af hot spot-
indsatserne, anvendeligheden af Rigspolitiets koncept, hvordan konceptet passer ind i 
politiorganisationens dagligdag og ressourcer, fx muligheden for at arbejde 
problemorienteret frem for reaktivt. Ydermere vil procesevalueringen afdække, om der 
undervejs i forløbet forekommer noget, der kan påvirke resultatet for indsatsernes 
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eventuelle effekt. Dermed er procesevalueringen også af væsentlig betydning for 
tolkningen af resultaterne af effektevalueringen: Hvis der fx viser sig ikke at være en 
kriminalpræventiv effekt af hot spot-indsatsen, giver procesevalueringen et godt belæg for 
at afgøre, om den manglende effekt skyldes, at indsatsen reelt ikke virker, eller om 
indsatsen ikke er gennemført, som ønsket.  
Identificering og udpegning af hot spottene 
Udpegningen af hot spottene er sket på baggrund af registrerede anmeldelser af 
gadekriminalitet, hvilket i pilotafprøvningen er en samlet betegnelse for anmeldelser af 
vold, røveri, trusler, hærværk, visse former for tyveri samt tyveri af og fra motorkøretøj (se 
tabel 1). For at sikre den geografiske afgrænsning af hot spottene er det udelukkende 
anmeldelser, der som minimum er registreret med et vejnavn, som hot spottene er 
identificeret på baggrund af.2 
Tabel 1: Definition på gadekriminalitet  
Vold Simpel vold 
Alvorligere vold  
Vold med skade på legeme eller helbred  
Kvalificeret vold  
Røveri Røveri mod andre  
Særligt farligt røveri mod andre  
Røveri mod forretning 
Særligt farligt røveri mod forretning  
Røveri mod tankstation  
Særligt farligt røveri mod tankstation 
Trusler Trussel på livet  
Hærværk 
 
 
Hærværk  
Groft hærværk  
Groft hærværk, uagtsomt 
                                                 
2 Forinden denne udpegning er der foretaget en mere eksplorativ afgrænsning, hvor der udelukkende er 
anvendt anmeldelser, som er registreret med en komplet adresse. Dvs. med både vejnavn og husnummer. 
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Hærværk, graffiti  
Groft hærværk, graffiti  
Tyveri Tricktyveri  
Tyveri fra taske mv.  
Tyveri af taske mv.  
Tyveri fra Restauration  
Tyveri af og fra 
motorkøretøj 
Tyveri fra motorkøretøj 
Brugstyveri af motorkøretøj  
Tyveri af motorkøretøj 
 
De data, der er brugt til at identificere hot spottene, angår en treårig periode fra d. 1. maj 
2012 til og med d. 30. april 2015 for de tre forsøgskredse. 
Identificeringen af hot spottene er sket ved brug af to standard hot spot-analysetekninkker 
(Scherg et al. 2016). For det første er der anvendt en punktklynge-analyseteknik kaldet 
KDE (Kernel Density Estimation), hvorved det var muligt at afprøve forskellige 
parameterværdier for at afbalancere identificeringskriterier omkring arealstørrelse, 
antallet af hot spots og omfanget af kriminaliteten i hot spottene hensigtsmæssigt overfor 
hinanden. For det andet er der anvendt en STAC-analyse (Spatial and Temporal Analysis 
of Crime), hvis formål var at supplere KDE-analysen for at bekræfte, at ingen hot spots var 
overset. Denne identifikationsprocedure er meget lig den, der er anvendt i andre hot spot-
forsøg (Braga & Bond, 2008; Marklund 2011; Rosenfeld, Deckard, & Blackburn, 2014). 
De anvendte hot spot-kriterier er: 
- Kriminalitetshyppighed: min. 100 hændelser over 36 måneder.  
- Geografisk udbredelse: maks. 270 meter i radius. 
- Afstand til nærmeste hot spot: min. 200 meter. 
 
Hot spot-identificeringskriterierne er ikke ulig dem, der er anvendt i lignende hot spot-
forsøg (fx Ariel et al. 2013). I pilotafprøvningen indgår 31 hot spots, som er forholdsvis 
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ligeligt fordelt over de tre politikredse.3 15 af disse hot spots er tilfældigt udvalgt som 
forsøgsområder, mens de resterende 16 er udvalgt som kontrolområder.  
Rigspolitiets hot spot-koncept 
 
Hot spot-politiarbejde er ofte forbundet med indsatser som fokuseret patruljering, men 
spektret af mulige indsatser er meget større. Ifølge Weisburd & Telep (2014) omfatter 
hot spot-politiarbejde ”…a range of police responses that all share in common a focus 
of resources on the locations where crime is highly concentrated”.  En hot spot-
politiindsats kan således i princippet bestå af mange forskellige typer indsatser: Fra en 
simpel øgning af patruljeringsfrekvensen over kvalitative ændringer i politiets 
tilstedeværelse i området over gerningsmandsfokuserede indsatser til mere omfattende 
indsatser, der involverer andre aktører end politiet og har bredere fokus på at påvirke 
de underliggende kriminogene faktorer (Braga, Papachristos &Hureau 2014; Weisburd 
& Telep 2014; Groff et al., 2015). En hot spot-politiindsats defineredes dermed i 
pilotprojektet, som: en politimæssig indsats, der fokuserer på små, geografisk afgrænsede 
områder, hvor der finder markant mere kriminalitet sted end i de omkringliggende områder.  
På baggrund af en eksplorativ foranalyse af hot spottene, viste det sig at hot spottene 
havde forskellige  karakteristika: 
 De er lokaliseret i forskelligartede byområder: Hhv. i midtbysområder, omkring 
banegårde, butikscentre og i særligt udsatte boligområder.  
 De er domineret af forskellige typer kriminalitet: Hhv. personfarlig kriminalitet og 
ejendomsforbrydelser.  
 De har forskellige temporale profiler: Nogle hot spots er præget af kriminalitet 
begået primært om aftenen/natten i weekenderne, mens andre hot spots har et 
tidsligt mere jævnt fordelt kriminalitetsmønster.  
 
Forskelligheden i hot spottene indikerer, at de underliggende dynamikker, der driver 
kriminaliteten, også er forskellige, hvilket peger på, at det ikke nødvendigvis er den 
samme type hot spot-politiindsats, der bør anvendes i alle områderne. En kortlægning af 
politiets tidligere erfaringer med hot spot-arbejde indikerede ligeledes, at kredsene 
opfatter hot spots og hot spot-politiarbejde på forskellige måder og har forskellige 
ledelsesmæssige og organisatoriske rammer om deres hot spot-indsatser. Samlet set 
vurderes denne forskelligartethed bedst at kunne håndteres inden for rammerne af en 
                                                 
3 Der blev i alt identificeret 36 hot spots, hvilket er væsentligt lavere end hvad der normalt findes i 
udenlandske forsøg. Fem af disse hot spots var dog lokaliseret i såkaldte særligt udsatte boligområder, dvs. 
boligområder med særlige kriminalitetsproblemer knyttet til en meget høj koncentration af sociale og 
økonomiske problemer. Da dansk politi allerede har et særligt fokus på disse områder, ekskluderes disse 
områder fra forsøget. 
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problemorienteret tilgang. Det vil sige ud fra en dybere forståelse af de problemer, man 
ønsker at påvirke, som vil sætte en bedre i stand til at vælge den rette indsats og metode. 
På baggrund af dette og som følge af at tidligere forskning overvejende påviser, at 
problemorienteret tilgang til hot spot-politiarbejde er den mest optimale tilgang i forhold 
til at reducere kriminalitet i hot spots sammenlignet med andre mere traditionelle politi-
indsatser såsom fx patruljering (Braga, Papachristos & Hureau 2014; Weisburd & Telep 
2014), valgte Rigspolitiet at udvikle en guide til at arbejde problemorienteret med analyse 
og valg af indsats i de identificerede hot spots. At der er tale om en guide betyder, at der 
ikke er tale om en opskrift på en færdigskåret indsats, som fx fokuseret patruljering. I 
stedet er det en vejledning i en analysemetode, der tager udgangspunkt i stedligt 
koncentreret kriminalitet, og hvor der på baggrund af analysen udarbejdes en hot spot-
indsats. Guiden vil i det følgende betegnes som det operative koncept.  
Grundstenen til problemorienteret politiarbejde (POP) blev lagt med Herman Goldsteins 
artikel fra 1979: Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach. Her skitserer Goldstein, 
hvordan et fokus på de kriminalitetsudfordringer man ønsker at løse frem for på 
administrative og bureaukratiske procedurer, kan forbedre politiarbejdet. Siden er POP 
videreudviklet og gjort implementerbar med SARA-modellen, som John E. Eck  og 
William Spelman udviklede i 1987 med Goldstein som konsulent. SARA (scanning, 
analysis, respons, assesment) er et akronym, der repræsenterer de fire skridt, som politiet bør 
følge når de implementerer POP (Weisburd & Telep 2010). De fire faser i SARA indeholder 
følgende: i scanningsfasen identificerer og prioriterer politiet kriminalitets- og 
utryghedsproblemer, i analysefasen arbejder man frem mod en dybdegående forståelse af 
problemet, vha. forskellige datakilder, i responsfasen fastlægger man den type af indsats, 
som problemet kræver og endelig er ’assesment’-fasen, der hvor indsatsens effekt 
vurderes og evalueres (Braga 2008).  
Arbejdet med problem- og analysebaseret politiarbejde betyder dermed et fokus på målet 
frem for midlet, hvilket vil sige på kriminalitetsreduktion, efterforskning og forebyggelse, 
frem for på procedurer og proces. Udover et fokus på selve kriminalitetsproblematikken, 
snarere end på hvilke ressourcer man har til rådighed, og hvordan organisationen i øvrigt 
fungerer, så giver POP-tilgangen mulighed for at skræddersy en politimæssig indsats, der 
passer til kriminalitetsudfordringen. Kriminalitetens karakter og omfang varierer i hot 
spottene fra hyppige problemer med vold o. lign. i nattelivsområder, over lejlighedsvis 
hærværk i et beboelsesområde tæt på en skole, til problemer med lomme- og tricktyveri i 
tilknytning til banegårde eller butikscentre. Ofte er kriminaliteten ikke så hyppigt 
forekommende, at en tilgang med øget og fokuseret patruljering ville give mening. Den 
nedre grænse for kriminalitetens omfang var, som det fremgår ovenfor, sat til 100 
hændelser på 36 mdr., og dette tilsammen med antagelsen om, at med så forskelligartet 
kriminalitetsmønster er de underliggende drivere af kriminaliteten forskellige, gjorde at 
øget eller fokuseret patruljering ikke kunne stå alene som en hensigtsmæssig politimæssig 
indsats.  
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Endelig har det operative koncept også som teoretisk ramme, den såkaldte 
’kriminalitetstrekant’, som med et situationelt udgangspunkt, skitserer tre faktorer, der 
skal være tilstede for at kriminalitet kan opstå, nemlig fravær af kapable vogtere, et egnet 
mål og en motiveret gerningsperson (Cohen & Felson 1979). Det operative koncept leder 
dermed politiet gennem skridtene A og R fra SARA-modellen, ud fra et situationelt 
udgangspunkt med fokus på kriminalitetsproblematikken og på at vælge en indsats eller 
respons på baggrund af analysens resultater, som foreskrevet i POP.  
Problemorienteret politiarbejde og hot spot-politiindsats er to af de indsatser, der 
systematisk har vist lovende effekter i forhold til at reducere kriminalitet (Weisburd & Eck 
2004). Ved at kombinere disse to indsatstyper i konceptet bliver hot spot-tankegangen 
tilpasset en dansk virkelighed, idet danske hot spots ikke er brandvarme gadehjørner med 
narkosalg og skudepisoder, men snarere afgrænsede byområder med et vist mål af øget 
gadekriminalitet.  
Afrunding 
At kriminalitet har tendens til at være koncentreret på et fåtal af steder, giver politiet 
mulighed for at fokusere politiindsatser der, hvor der er flest problemer og dermed at 
udnytte de begrænsede politimæssige ressourcer mest effektivt. Derfor, og ud fra ønsket 
om at skabe en fælles arbejdspraksis for hot spot-politiarbejde i de danske politikredse, har 
Rigspolitiet udarbejdet et koncept til brug ved hot spot-politiarbejde. 
Hot spot-konceptet anlægger en problemorienteret arbejdsmetode, som lægger vægt på at 
skræddersy en indsats på baggrund af en analyse af kriminalitetsudfordringen i det 
enkelte hot spot. En sådan tilgang vurderes at skabe de bedste forudsætninger for at 
reducere kriminalitet i hot spottene af to grunde. Dels har tidligere forskning fundet 
arbejdsmetoden ligeså eller mere lovende end andre politimæssige metoder, og dels kan 
der dermed tages højde for forskellige former for kriminalitetsudfordringer, som fx 
lommetyveri overfor nattelivsvold eller hærværk.  
For at opnå viden om konceptets anvendelighed og hot spot-indsatsers effekt i en dansk 
kontekst har Rigspolitiet iværksat en pilotafprøvning i tre politikredse. Pilotprojektet blev 
igangsat ved et kick off-møde d. 23.oktober 2015, hvorefter politikredsene fik frist til d. 15. 
januar til at udarbejde og igangsætte en hot spot-indsats på baggrund af den 
problemorienterede arbejdsmetode. Indsatserne skal som minimum løbe ind til d. 15. 
september 2016, hvorefter Justitsministeriets Forskningskontor vil udarbejde en 
effektevaluering af, hvorvidt der forekommer den kriminalitetsreducerende effekt i hot 
spottene. Effektevalueringen forventes offentliggjort ultimo 2016 sammen med en 
procesevaluering, som blandt andet omhandler anvendeligheden af det hot spot-
konceptet. 
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Projektets resultater, uanset om en signifikant effekt findes eller ej, er et bidrag til den 
internationale forskning og udvikling indenfor hot spot og politiindsatser, og særligt i 
Norden. Der er en række særlige karakteristika ved kriminalitetsomfang og karakter, som 
gør, at en tilpasning af et angelsaksisk hot spot-koncept til den nordiske kontekst vil være 
relevant og ønskelig. Det er projektets håb at levere et væsentligt bidrag i den retning.  
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WORKSHOP D 
LEGAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
 
Begrebet voldtægt i et nordisk perspektiv 
Ragnheiður Bragadóttir 
 
I.  Indledning 
I mange år har man diskuteret seksualforbrydelser i alle de nordiske lande, både 
lovgivning og praksis. Lovgivningen er blevet kritiseret for ikke at give ofrene for 
forbrydelserne beskyttelse nok. Der er mange anmeldelser om seksualforbrydelser, men få 
straffedomme. Som eksempel kan nævnes en undersøgelse i Island, som viser at der var 88 
anmeldelser om voldtægt til politiet i 2008,1 men samme år var der kun 6 domme i 
Højesteret, hvor der var dømt skyldig for voldtægt.2 Mange mener, at straffene er for 
milde. I den forbindelse kan man henvise til projektet Holdninger til straf som NSfK stod 
for, for nogle år siden og resultaterne findes på NSfKs hjemmeside.3  
Disse faktorer har ført til revidering af landenes straffelovsbestemmelser om 
seksualforbrydelser, bl. a. med det formål at øge børns og kvinders beskyttelse mod 
seksualforbrydelser. Bestemmelser om voldtægt i landenes straffelove er blevet ændret.  
I det følgende vil jeg koncentrere mig om hvordan forbrydelsen voldtægt er konstrueret i 
landenes straffelove. Og spørgsmålene er: For det første, er der behov for at ændre 
definitionen af begrebet voldtægt endnu en gang for at få flere domme? For det andet, er 
straffene blevet høje nok? Kort sagt: Er de lovændringer som allerede er blevet vedtaget 
tilfredsstillende eller er der stadig brug for mere lovændringer?  
For at besvare det vil jeg først se tilbage på hvordan bestemmelserne om voldtægt, og 
dermed voldtægtsbegrebet, har ændret sig i tidens løb og der tager jeg den islandske 
voldtægtsbestemmelse som et eksempel. Derefter vil jeg se på bestemmelserne om 
voldtægt i de enkelte nordiske lande som de nu ser ud og give en kort redegørelse for den 
idømte straf. Til sidst prøver jeg at besvare spørgsmålet om der er brug for en ny 
definition af voldtægtsbegrebet, en konstruktion som bygger på at voldtægt er sex uden 
samtykke. 
                                                 
1 Hildur Fjóla Antonsdóttir og Þorbjörg Sigríður Gunnlaugsdóttir: Tilkynntar nauðganir til lögreglu á 
árunum 2008 og 2009: Um afbrotið nauðgun, sakborning, brotaþola og málsmeðferð (2013), s. 11. 
2 Ragnheiður Bragadóttir: Kynferðisbók – Dómabók (2009), s. 398-399. 
3 http://www.nsfk.org/Page/ctl/ArticleView/mid/383/articleId/127/Public-attitudes-to-punishment 
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II.  Udviklingen i indholdet i voldtægtsbestemmelsen 
For at give et eksempel på udviklingen i lovbestemmelserne tager jeg udgangspunkt i den 
islandske bestemmelse om voldtægt. 
Straffeloven 1869 
 
Islændinge fik sin første moderne straffelov i 1869, og forbilledet var den danske straffelov 
fra 1866. I denne lov indføres den klassificering af seksualforbrydelserne som vi stadig 
bygger på. Voldtægt og andre forbrydelser mod voksne menneskers kønsfrihed har det til 
fælles, at samleje eller anden kønslig omgængelse finder sted mod ofrets vilje og det som 
adskiller disse forskellige forbrydelser er, at der anvendes forskellige midler til at opnå 
samleje. Voldtægt er den alvorligste forbrydelse og ifølge straffeloven fra 1869, § 169, var 
det voldtægt, hvis gerningsmanden tvang en ærlig kvinde til samleje med vold eller 
trusler om at udøve livsfarlig vold med det samme. Hvis kvinden var uærlig var straffen 
mildere. Hvis der anvendtes andre midler end de førnævnte til at opnå samleje var 
forbrydelsen ikke defineret som voldtægt og straffedes mildere og man talte om egentlig 
og uegentlig voldtægt. De andre nordiske lande fik ny straffelov i den samme periode, 
f.eks. Norge (Lov angående forbrydelser = kriminalloven, 1842), Sverige i 1864 
(Strafflagen) og Finland i 1889, hvor voldtægt var defineret som at tvinge en kvinde uden 
for ægteskab til samleje med vold eller trusler.4 
 
Straffeloven 1940 
 
I 1940 fik Island en ny straffelov og som før var forbilledet den danske straffelov, nu fra 
året 1930. Der var tre bestemmelser i kapitlet om seksualforbrydelser, som handlede om 
opnåelse af samleje ved forskellige retsstridige midler. De var vold, trusler og anden 
ulovlig tvang, og udnyttelse.5 Nu var voldtægt defineret som tiltvingelse af samleje med 
vold eller frihedsberøvelse, eller med at fremkalde hos kvinden frygt for hendes eller 
hendes pårørendes liv, helbred eller velfærd, jfr. § 194. Hvis der brugtes andre retsstridige 
metoder, f.eks. andre trusler, anden ulovlig tvang eller udnyttelse, var forbrydelsen ikke 
voldtægt og straffedes meget mildere.  
Ændringer i straffeloven 1992 
 
Bestemmelserne om seksualforbrydelser i straffeloven var uændrede fra 1940, helt indtil 
1992, da de blev mærkbart ændret ved lov nr. 40/1992. Med loven var de tre bestemmelser, 
                                                 
4 Kerstin Berglund: Straffrätt och kön (2007), s. 235 og Terttu Utriainen: Brottsrekvisiten, straffen och rätts-
praxis (2012), s. 18. 
5 Der fandtes også andre bestemmelser om forbrydelser mod kønsfriheden, f. eks. udnyttelse af specielle 
fortrolighedsforhold og at tilsnige sig samleje, men de er ikke af betydning her og anvendtes meget sjældent 
af domstolene. 
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om voldtægt, anden ulovlig kønslig tvang og kønslig udnyttelse, ændret således, at 
sondringen mellem de tre forbrydelser blev klarere. Desuden blev bestemmelserne 
ændret, så at nu blev de kønsneutrale. En anden vigtigt ændring i 1992 er, at anden 
kønslig omgængelse sidestilles med samleje. Ifølge loven fra 1992 var bestemmelsen om 
voldtægt sålydende (straffelovens § 194, jf. lov nr. 40/1992, § 2 ): Voldtægt §194: „Den, som 
ved vold eller trussel om vold tiltvinger sig samleje eller anden kønslig omgængelse med 
en anden person, straffes med fængsel fra 1 og indtil 16 år. Til vold henregnes 
frihedsberøvelse ved indespærring, indgivelse af medikamenter samt andre sidestillede 
handlinger.“ 
 
Som før var det sådan, at hvis der blev brugt andre tvangsmidler eller andre metoder ved 
at opnå samleje eller anden kønslig omgængelse var overtrædelsen ikke voldtægt, men en 
anden ulovlig kønslig tvang eller udnyttelse af ofrets svækkede tilstand og straffen for de 
forbrydelser var meget mildere end for voldtægt. 
 
Ændringer i straffeloven 2007 
 
Ved lov nr. 61/2007 blev størstedelen af straffelovens kapitel om seksualforbrydelser 
revideret.6 Begrebet voldtægt er blevet udvidet meget og bruges nu i bredere forstand end 
før. Begrebet voldtægt er nu defineret i selve lovbestemmelsen, jfr. straffelovens § 194. Det 
er ikke længere en forudsætning, at der bruges vold eller trussel om vold, for at en 
forbrydelse bliver anset for at være voldtægt. Samleje ved anden ulovlig tvang og 
udnyttelse af en persons svækkede sindstilstand eller af, at en person der befinder sig i en 
tilstand, i hvilken den pågældende er ude af stand til at modsætte sig handlingen eller 
forstå den, omfattes også af voldtægtsbegrebet og defineres nu som voldtægt. Den 
nugældende bestemmelse om voldtægt er sålydende:  
§ 194, stk. 1. Den, som med vold, trusler eller anden ulovlig tvang har samleje eller anden 
kønslig omgængelse med en anden person er skyldig i voldtægt og straffes med fængsel 
fra 1 og indtil 16 år. Til vold henregnes frihedsberøvelse ved indespærring, indgivelse af 
medikamenter samt andre sidestillede handlinger. 
§ 194, stk. 2. Det er også voldtægt og straffes på samme måde som i stk. 1, at udnytte en 
persons sindssygdom eller mentale retardering til at skaffe sig samleje eller anden kønslig 
omgængelse, eller at udnytte en person, der befinder sig i en tilstand, i hvilken den 
pågældende er ude af stand til at modsætte sig handlingen eller forstå dens betydning.   
 
                                                 
6     Ændringerne behandles i: Ragnheiður Bragadóttir: Seksualforbrydelser – Forslag til ændring  
af den islandske straffelov. Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab, nr. 2 august 2006. På det  
islandske indenrigsministeriums webside kan man se straffeloven i dansk oversættelse:  
http://www.innanrikisraduneyti.is/log-og-reglugerdir/thydingar/nr/837 
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Idéen er, at den nye bestemmelse om voldtægt omfatter de tilfælde hvor samleje eller 
anden kønslig omgængelse sker uden ofrets samtykke, fordi det er en underliggende 
forudsætning, at der mangler samtykke til samlejet. Det er meningen at således opfylder 
bestemmelsen de krav, som stilles til straffebestemmelsers klarhed.  
 
III.  De nordiske voldtægtsbestemmelser 
I de nordiske straffelove er der grundige bestemmelser om seksualforbrydelser, bl.a. 
voldtægt, og de er alle sammen forholdsvis nye. I det følgende vil jeg fokusere på 
gerningsbeskrivelsen af voldtægt i lovbestemmelserne. 
Norge og Sverige var de første af de nordiske lande til at ændre sine 
voldtægtsbestemmelser.  
Norge:   
Nu er voldtægtsbestemmelsen i den nye norske straffelov fra 2005, som trådte i kraft i 
fjor (1. oktober 2015), og er blevet ændret nogle gange, se kapitel 26. Seksuallovbrudd, 
tilføjet ved lov 19 juni 2009 nr. 74, ændret 2008 og 2011.  
. 
§ 291.Voldtekt  
Med fengsel inntil 10 år straffes den som 
a) skaffer seg seksuell omgang ved vold eller truende atferd, 
b) har seksuell omgang med noen som er bevisstløs eller av andre grunner ute av 
stand til å motsette seg handlingen, eller 
c) ved vold eller truende adferd får noen til å ha seksuell omgang med en annen, eller 
til å utføre handlinger som svarer til seksuell omgang med seg selv. 
 
§ 295 handler om misbrug af overmagtsforhold og lignende og ifølge den straffes seksuel 
omgang for „å utnytte noens psykiske lidelse eller psykiske utviklingshemming dersom 
forholdet ikke rammes av § 291.“  
 
Hvis man sammenligner den islandske og den norske bestemmelse om voldtægt er det 
klart, at den islandske bestemmelse er mere vidtgående i dette henseende end den norske, 
fordi alle tilfælde hvor der er tale om udnyttelse af en persons sindssygdom eller mentale 
retardering er defineret som voldtægt, ifølge § 194 i den islandske straffelov. 
 
Sverige: 
Bestemmelsen om voldtægt er i den svenske Brottsbalk (1962:700) 6 kap. Om sexualbrott, 
lov fra 2005 med senere ændringer og er sålydende: 
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1 § Den som genom misshandel eller annars med våld eller genom hot om brottslig gär-
ning tvingar en person till samlag eller till att företa eller tåla en annan sexuell handling 
som med hänsyn till kränkningens allvar är jämförlig med samlag, döms för våldtäkt till 
fängelse i lägst två och högst sex år.  
2. stk. Detsamma gäller den som med en person genomför ett samlag eller en sexuell 
handling som enligt första stycket är jämförlig med samlag genom att otillbörligt utnyttja 
att personen på grund av medvetslöshet, sömn, allvarlig rädsla, berusning eller annan 
drogpåverkan, sjukdom, kroppsskada eller psykisk störning eller annars med hänsyn till 
omständigheterna befinner sig i en särskilt utsatt situation.  
[...] 
  
Her er det en forudsætning, at truslerne angår en strafbar handling og derfor er 
voldtægtsbegrebet i svensk ret mindre vidtgående end i islandsk og norsk ret i forhold til 
trusler.  
 
Danmark:  
 
Kapitlet om seksualforbrydelser i den danske straffelov blev revideret og ændret med lov 
nr. 633/2013. Ændringerne bygger på straffelovsrådets betænkning nr. 1534/2012.7 
Paragraffen om voldtægt, § 216, jf. lov nr. 633, 12. 6. 2013, er nu sålydende:   
§ 216. For voldtægt straffes med fængsel indtil 8 år den, der 
1) tiltvinger sig samleje ved vold eller trussel om vold eller 
2) skaffer sig samleje ved anden ulovlig tvang, jf. § 260, eller med en person, der befinder 
sig i en tilstand eller situation, i hvilken den pågældende er ude af stand til at modsætte 
sig handlingen. 
Stk. 2. For voldtægt straffes med fængsel indtil 12 år den, der har samleje med et barn 
under 12 år.  
 [...] 
 
Udnyttelse af en persons sindssygdom eller mentale retardering til at skaffe sig samleje 
defineres ikke som voldtægt og straffes mildere end voldtægt, jf. § 218, d.v.s. med fængsel 
indtil 4 år. I det henseende er det danske voldtægtsbegreb mere snævert end de islandske, 
svenske og delvis det norske begreb, som omfatter udnyttelse af sindssygdom og mental 
retardering. 
 
Finland:  
 
I Finland er bestemmelserne om seksualforbrydelser i Straflag, Om sexualbrott 
                                                 
7 Se Straffelovrådets betænkning nr. 1534/2012 om seksualforbrydelser. 
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20 KAP (24.7.1998/563). 1 § om voldtægt, (ændret 27.6.2014/509) er sålydende: 
 
1 § Den som genom våld på person eller med hot om sådant våld tvingar någon till samlag 
ska för våldtäkt dömas till fängelse i minst ett och högst sex år.  
För våldtäkt ska också den dömas som genom att utnyttja att någon till följd av medvets-
löshet, sjukdom, funktionsnedsättning, rädsla eller något annat hjälplöst tillstånd inte kan 
försvara sig eller förmår utforma eller uttrycka sin vilja, har samlag med honom eller 
henne. 
Om våldtäkten med hänsyn till att hotet har varit ringa eller andra omständigheter vid 
brottet bedömd som en helhet är mindre allvarlig än de gärningar som avses i 1 och 2 
mom., ska gärningsmannen dömas till fängelse i minst fyra månader och högst fyra år. På 
samma sätt döms den som med annat hot än sådant som avses i 1 mom. tvingar någon 
annan till samlag. Detta moment tillämpas inte, om våld brukats vid våldtäkten.8 
 
Sammenfatning om begrebet voldtægt: 
Fra det 19. århundrede har man i nordisk ret konstrueret voldtægtsbegrebet således, at det 
er voldtægt hvis gerningsmanden bruger vold og andre tvangsmilder til at opnå samleje 
eller anden kønslig omgængelse. Efter de seneste års lovændringer bruges denne 
konstruktion stadig i alle landene, men de nylige voldtægtsbegreb har det til fælles, at de 
er blevet betydeligt udvidet ved at metoderne er blevet flere, bl.a. alle slags trusler, 
misbrug og udnyttelse. Dermed omfatter begrebet voldtægt nu handlinger, som før i tiden 
ikke var defineret som voldtægt og straffedes meget mildere end voldtægtsforbrydelsen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8Finlex.fi:http://www.finlex.fi/sv/laki/ajantasa/1889/18890039001?search%5Btype%5D=pika&search%5Bpika
%5D=Strafflag#L20 
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IV.  Strafferammer for voldtægt i Norden og idømt straf 
Strafferammer i de nordiske lande vises på denne tabel: 
  
Voldtægt 
 
        Strafferamme Strafnedsættelse Strafforhøjelse 
  paragraf 
             
Danmark § 216 
Fængsel 
indtil 8 år   
Fængsel indtil 12 
år 
          
          
Finland 
§ 1 og 2, 20. 
kap. 
fängelse 1-6 
år 4 mån.-4 års fä.  
Grov våldtäkt: 
fängelse 2-10 år 
          
        
samleie: fengsel 3-
15 år  
Norge § 291 
fengsel inntil 
10 år   Grov voldtekt: 
        Fengsel inntil 21 år 
          
Sverige §1, 6. kap. 
fängelse 2-6 
år 
fängelse högst 4 
år  fängelse 4-10 år 
          
          
Island § 194 
fængsel 1-16 
år     
          
 
Her kan man se forskel på strafferammer for voldtægt, på den ene side ifølge dansk, norsk 
og islandsk ret og på den anden side i svensk og finsk ret. I Vest-Norden er der brede 
strafferammer, dvs. indtil 8, 10 eller 16 års fængsel. Den islandske straffelov skiller sig ud 
med langt den hårdeste almene maksimumstraf, 16 års fængsel. Til gengæld er 
strafforhøjelse mulig i den danske og norske lov, med 12 års og 21 års maksimum. I den 
danske lov er der intet strafminimum, men 3 års fængsel i den norske straffelov, hvis det 
drejer sig om samleje. I Øst-Norden, Sverige og Finland, er strafferammerne snævrere, der 
er minimumsstraf og strafmaksimum er lavere. Desuden er der tre slags strafferammer 
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afhængigt af forbrydelsens grovhed, som også er tilfældet i den norske straffelov. Her er 
derfor en klar forskel mellem de vestlige og østlige dele af Norden.9 
Dømt straf for voldtægt i Norden. I Danmark var straffen 6 måneders – 3 års fængel, men 
er blevet hårdere i de seneste år. I Norge er idømt straf blevet hårdere fra 2000, d.v.s. 4 års 
fængsel, men 6-7 år i alvorlige sager. I Sverige var straffen fængsel i 2 år og 9 måneder i 
1995-98, men 27-28 måneders fængsel i 2007-11. Her har straffen været stabil i de seneste 
20 år. I Finland er idømt straf i 2011 20 måneders fængsel, men for grov voldtægt er 
straffen fængsel i 2 år og 3 måneder. I Island er straffen blevet hårdere i de seneste år og er 
nu 3-4 års fængsel. Se herom den nordiske forskningsrapport: Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for 
Kriminologi: Straf for voldtægt (2012): 
http://www.nsfk.org/Portals/0/Archive/STRAF_FOR_VOLDTÆGT.pdf 10 
Sammenfatning 
I alle de nordiske lande, undtagen Sverige, er domstolenes strafudmåling for voldtægt 
blevet kritiseret for at være for mild. Straffeloven i alle landene er blevet ændret og 
voldtægtsbegrebet udvidet. Antal domme er steget og den udmålte straf i alle landene, 
undtagen Sverige, er blevet hårdere. Det viser sig klart i Norge, hvor Højesteret spiller en 
afgørende rolle i strafudmålingens udvikling, og i Danmark, hvor hensigten om hårdere 
straffe fremgår af selve lovgivningsarbejdet. I Danmark og Norge er det anerkendt, at 
domstole kan ændre sin sædvanlige strafudmåling hvis der kommer ny viden om 
forbrydelsernes fare, almenhedens retsbevisthed ændrer sig eller hensyn til almen 
prævention kræver det. I de seneste 20-30 år har udviklingen i Sverige været i den retning, 
at man lægger mere vægt på retssikkerhed og at straffene er forudsigelige, på domstolenes 
frie vurderings bekostning.11 I Island er den bredeste strafferamme og det er accepteret, at 
domstolene har godt spillerum ved strafudmålingen.  
V.  Er der brug for en ny definition af begrebet voldtægt? 
I Island er antallet af straffedomme for voldtægt steget meget i de seneste år og straffene er 
blevet hårdere. Men antallet af klager, som går videre indenfor retssystemet, er stadig 
meget begrænset. Det faktum kan have mange forklaringer, men en af konsekvenserne er, 
at der overvejes, om der er anledning til at definere voldtægt i straffeloven på en anden 
måde end den traditionelt nordiske, d.v.s. som sex uden samtykke, se her forslag i et 
                                                 
9 Ragnheiður Bragadóttir: Nauðgun (2015), bls. 146-147. 
10 I 2012 fik jeg et stipendium fra Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for Kriminologi for at stifte en arbejdsgruppe 
nordiske forskere for at undersøge hvordan der straffes for voldtægt i de nordiske lande, om nylige 
lovændringer har haft indflydelse på udmåling af straffen og hvad vejer tungest når straffen udmåles. 
Resultatet blev publiceret i rapporten Straf for voldtægt (2012) og her bygger jeg først og fremmest på denne 
rapport. 
11 Thomas Elholm og Asbjørn Strandbakken: Hvem skal nu bestemme  ̶  dommerne eller politikerne? (2010), 
s. 85-86. 
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forskningsprojekt fra 2014.12 Denne diskussion har man også haft i de andre nordiske 
lande, ikke mindst i Sverige. Forbilledet er bl.a. den engelske voldtægtsbestemmelse. I 
Sverige findes der megen litteratur herom, bl.a. bogen Sex og samtycke af Petter Asp, og 
bøgerne Samtyckesutredningen – Lagskydd för den sexuella integriteten og Svensk 
sexualbrottslag – En framåtsyftande tillbakablick af Madeleine Leijonhufvud, samt 
forskellige rapporter. I denne litteratur kan man finde mange overbevisende argumenter, 
både for og imod samtykkes-konstruktion af voldtægtsbegrebet.13 
Jeg mener, at et voldtægtsbegreb som kun konstrueres på den måde, at samleje foregår 
uden ofrets samtykke, er meget mere vidtgående og mere uklart, end den konstruktion 
som vi nu har i nordisk ret. En samtykkes-konstruktion kræver en grundig definition af 
begrebet samtykke. Der er også risiko for, at når der skal bevises hvad der skete, vil fokus 
være på ofret, hvad ofret gjorde eller ikke gjorde, for at gøre det klart, at samlejet var imod 
dennes vilje. Desuden kan man godt argumentere for, at mangel på samtykke er 
indbygget i voldtægtsbegrebet som det nu er i nordisk ret, fordi det er netop den mangel 
på samtykke som gør, at handlingen er voldtægt og dermed strafbar. Det er også 
meningen, at straffebestemmelserne skal omfatte alle mulige tilfælde hvor samleje sker 
mod ofrets vilje, dvs. uden samtykke. 
I sidste kapitel i sin bog, Svensk sexualbrottslag siger Madeleine Leijonhufvud at „ En 
samtyckeslag är inte till for att fler ska dömas till fängelse. Den är till för att det ska begås 
färre övergrepp.“ 14 Jeg mener at vi kan være helt enige i, at uanset hvilken konstruktion 
man bruger, den traditionelt nordiske eller samtykkes-konstruktionen, så er dette altid 
formålet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Hildur Fjóla Antonsdóttir: Viðhorf fagaðila til meðferðar nauðgunarmála innan réttarvörslukerfisins og 
tillögur að úrbótum (2014), s. 88. 
13 I islandsk litteratur findes der omtale om dette i: Ragnheiður Bragadóttir: Kynferðisbrot (2006), s. 76-77. 
14 Madeleine Leijonhufvud: Svensk sexualbrottslag (2015), s. 111. 
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Vil Island straffe for prostitution og narkotikabrug? 
Helgi Gunnlaugsson 
Public attitudes in Iceland towards drug use and buying of sexual services 
Many pioneers in criminology believe it necessary that the criminal law reflects the values, 
beliefs and opinions of mainstream society. Measurement of public attitudes on the crimi-
nal law is therefore important for various reasons. The question to be addressed in this 
paper concerns whether there is general agreement among Icelandic citizens to criminalize 
possession and personal use of drugs and the buying of sexual services – the current legal 
practice in Iceland today.  A survey taken in 2014 had shown that the majority of respond-
ents supported the two legislations in question. Since then the debate on the two laws in 
question has been lively in Iceland and the public stand has possibly changed.  
The findings are based on a sample of 1,200 individuals taken from a stratified random 
sample of Icelandic citizens, 18 years and older. The survey was conducted by the Social 
Sciences Research Institute, affilitated with the University of Iceland. The survey was con-
ducted online in April of 2015. The response rate was approximately 60 percent and by 
weighting the data a satisfactory congruence between the sample and the adult population 
by sex, age and residence was achieved. A question on whether the selling of sexual ser-
vices should also be criminlized was added to the questionnaire this time – an act not pun-
ishable today. Moreover, a specific focus will be on whether gender and age have an im-
pact on views on the two legislations. 
The main findings show that the majority of respondents supports criminalization of both 
personal possession of drugs and buying and selling of sexual services. Women tend to 
support these two legislations to a greater degree than men, with younger respondents, in 
particular males, more in favour of decriminalization of drug use, than older respondents. 
Indledning 
Mange progressive kriminologer anser det for vigtigt at straffelovgivning og domme 
genspejler borgernes retsfølelse (se f.eks. Sutherland, 1934). Domme der er i modstrid med 
borgernes moral og retfærdighedsfølelse kan gradvist undergrave tilliden til 
retssamfundet. Der er i løbet af de seneste år blevet begået alvorlige forbrydelser i Island, 
hvor mange har sat spørgsmålstegn ved retssystemets behandling af sagerne. Seksuelle 
overgreb mod børn tog således overordentlig meget plads i den offentlige debat i 
begyndelsen af 2013, og mange efterlyste da lovreformer for såvel seksualforbrydere som 
deres ofre (se f.eks. Forsætisráðuneyti, 2013).  
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Ligeledes er der gennem de seneste årtier blevet fremsat øgede krav i andre nordiske 
lande om offentlighedens og borgernes ret til at have indflydelse på 
retshåndhævelsessystemet, og da ikke mindst på hvordan systemet reagerer over for 
overtrædelser af straffelovgivningen og på hvad der skal eller ikke skal være strafbart og 
hvordan straffen skal udformes (Kyvsgaard, 2012). Det almindelige syn på kriminalitet 
som emneområde har længe været at det er en del af et fagområde for retsspecialister, som 
offentligheden ikke har tilstrækkelig forståelse eller viden om til at kunne træffe 
forsvarlige afgørelser i. I løbet af de seneste år er der imidlertid fremkommet mere og 
mere højlydte krav fra offentligheden og græsrodsbevægelser om ændringer af 
straffepolitikken med sigt på mere hensyntagen til borgerne og deres retsfølelse.  
 
Meningsmålinger angående lovbrud er derfor yderst vigtige for at kaste lys på, hvordan 
borgerne opfatter og oplever lovovertrædelser og de problemer, de forårsager i 
samfundet. Ikke mindst er undersøgelserne vigtige for at klarlægge, om borgernes  
holdning er i overensstemmelse med den rådende lovgivning.  
 
I det følgende vil denne artikel belyse den islandske befolknings holdning til to kategorier 
af kriminalitet og hvordan befolkningen ønsker at se myndighederne reagere over for 
disse lovbrud. De valgte kategorier omfatter lovbrud, der specielt har været i fokus i den 
offentlige debat, nemlig lovbrud i forbindelse med prostitution og narkotikabrug. 
Undersøgelsen er også vigtig for at iagttage eventuelle holdningsændringer fra tidligere 
undersøgelser. Artiklen vil bl.a. forsøge at besvare følgende spørgsmål: Bør opbevaring og 
brug af narkotika eller salg og køb af seksuelle ydelser være strafbart? Bør opbevaring af 
narkotika til eget forbrug registreres på en persons straffeattest?  
Det grundlæggende spørgsmål i undersøgelsen er, hvorvidt der hersker relativ enighed 
blandt befolkningen omkring denne type spørgsmål. Det er derudover interessant at se, 
hvilken sammenhæng der er mellem holdning og de forskellige befolkningskategorier, 
opdelt efter f.eks. køn, alder, bopæl eller uddannelse. Består der en kløft mellem 
forskellige samfundsgrupper, eller er borgernes holdninger jævnt fordelt i de forskellige 
kategorier? Er der enighed blandt den islandske befolkning hvad angår bestemte lovbrud  
og emneområder, som står i forbindelse med straffelovgivningen?  
 
Prostitution i Island 
Køb af seksuelle ydelser blev gjort strafbart i Island i 2009, og antallet af kriminelle sager 
der henhører under denne kategori er blevet mangedoblet gennem de seneste år 
(Ríkislögreglustjórinn, 2014). I kriminologien kategoriseres prostitution og brug af 
narkotika som regel som lovbrud uden offer (se f.eks. Siegel, 2016), selv om en vis skepsis 
har hersket om, hvorvidt denne definition er korrekt. Narkotikabrugere og sælgere af 
seksuelle ydelser lider skade på mange forskellige måder p.g.a. deres handling, og det er 
derfor tvivlsomt at tale om lovbrud uden ofre. Det hører imidlertid til sjældenheder at 
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politiet modtager anmeldelser om salg af seksuelle ydelser eller om narkotikabrug. Ofret 
findes ikke på samme måde som ofre for vold eller berigelsesforbrydelser, hvor der er 
meget større sandsynlighed for politianmeldelse. Antallet af sager om salg af seksuelle 
ydelser og narkotika afhænger derfor først og fremmest af politiets eget initiativ og 
efterforskningsarbejde. Politimyndighederne ændrer af og til sine fokusområder, og der 
vil derfor hvert år optræde svingninger i antallet af sager angående prostitution 
(Lögreglan á höfuðborgarsvæðinu, 2014). Antallet af registrerede overtrædelser af § 206 i 
den almindelige straffelov, som forbyder køb af seksuelle ydelser, var i perioden 2010-2013 
i alt 175. Antallet af personer som solgte disse ydelser og derfor i sagsakterne defineres 
som ofre, var i alt 30, 23 kvinder og syv mænd (Þingskjal 1295, 2013-2014). En 
opinionsundersøgelse i 2014 viste, at 58% af deltagerne er stærke eller ret stærke 
tilhængere af straf for køb af seksuelle ydelser i Island, imens godt en femtedel var 
hverken tilhængere eller modstandere af en sådan straf. Flertallet af deltagerne, især 
kvinder, støttede ifølge eget udsagn den nugældende straffelovgivning, og kun ca. en 
fjerdedel var imod den (Gunnlaugsson og Jónasson, 2014).  
 
Salg af seksuelle ydelser er ikke strafbart, selv om køb af samme ikke kan finde sted uden 
sælger. Som tidligere nævnt betragtes en sælger af seksuelle ydelser som offer, og det 
anses ikke for retfærdigt eller naturligt at straffe ofret for sin handling. En sådan ordning 
findes udelukkende her i de nordiske lande, eller i tre andre lande udover Island, nemlig 
Sverige, Norge og til dels Finland (Skilbrei og Holmström, 2013). I denne undersøgelse 
blev det alligevel besluttet også at spørge om holdning til salg af seksuelle ydelser. Bør 
både salg og køb af seksuelle ydelser straffes? Eller er borgerne enige med lovgivningen i 
at sælger bør undtages fra strafansvar?   
 
Opbevaring og håndtering af narkotika i Island 
 
Opbevaring og håndtering af narkotika har længe været strafbart i Island (jf. lov nr. 
65/1974 om vanebindende og euforiserende stoffer). Antallet af sager i denne kategori 
tælles i tusinder hvert år, og politiet har set en kraftig stigning i antallet gennem de seneste 
år (Lögreglan á höfuðborgarsvæðinu, 2015). Flertallet af politiets narkotikasager angår 
opbevaring og brug af narkotika (Ríkislögreglustjórinn, 2015). Det er her et interessant 
spørgsmål hvorvidt der hersker generel enighed omkring lovgivningen, eller om der er 
udbredt modstand mod loven, idet en ganske høj procentdel ifølge eget udsagn har prøvet  
narkotika (Gunnlaugsson, 2015).  
 
Islands sundhedsminister vakte opsigt i begyndelsen af 2014 da han udtalte, at det kunne 
blive aktuelt at afkriminalisere opbevaring af narkotika til eget brug. I fortsættelse af 
denne udtalelse blev der senere i 2014 foretaget en opinionsundersøgelse, hvor deltagerne 
blev spurgt om opbevaring og håndtering af narkotika til eget forbrug burde være 
ustrafbart (Gunnlaugsson og Jónasson, 2014). Cirka to tredjedele af deltagerne erklærede 
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sig stærkt eller ret uenige med en sådan lovændring, mens godt en tredjedel gik ind for 
den. Størstedelen af de sidstnævnte var yngre mænd. Et flertal var således imod 
ændringer af lovgivningen, men alligevel kan det ikke siges, at hele befolkningen står bag 
denne lovgivning.  
 
Deltagerne får i nærværende undersøgelse stillet samme spørgsmål og bliver derudover 
spurgt, om opbevaring af narkotika bør indføres på vedkommendes straffeattest. Den 
nugældende lov indebærer at alle overtrædelser af narkotikaloven, herunder opbevaring, 
skal registreres på vedkommendes straffeattest. Det kan af indlysende grunde have 
alvorlige følger at have en straffeattest, f.eks. i forbindelse med ansøgning om stillinger 
eller uddannelse, hvor det kan udgøre en direkte hindring. Som argument for denne 
lovgivning kan fremføres at myndighederne på denne måde vil vise, hvor alvorligt 
lovbruddet er, og samtidigt give loven en stærkt præventiv virkning. Spørgsmålet er her, 
om offentligheden er af samme opfattelse som lovgiveren. 
Metoder og dataindsamling 
Undersøgelsens resultater er baseret på en netundersøgelse, som Instituttet for 
samfundsvidenskab ved Islands Universitet udførte i april 2015. Spørgsmålene indgik som 
en del af en generel national opinionsundersøgelse, som Instituttet for samfundsvidenskab 
ved Islands Universitet regelmæssigt udfører. Deltagerne blev fundet blandt 1176 
vilkårligt udvalgte personer fra forskellige samfundsgrupper i instituttets netpanel. For at 
opnå en realistisk genspejling af den islandske befolknings sammensætning var deltagerne 
udvalgt proportionelt ifølge kategorier som køn, alder og bopæl. I alt svarede 711 af de 
1176 mulige deltagere, og svarforholdet var således ca. 60%. Da svarene derfor ikke 
genspejlede populationen fuldt ud, blev undersøgelsesresultaterne vægtet efter køn, alder, 
bopæl og uddannelse.  
Resultater 
Diagram 1 viser at flertallet af deltagerne går ind for at køb af seksuelle tjenester skal være 
strafbart. Knap 60% erklærer at de går ind for straffen, mens knap 20% er hverken for eller 
imod. Knap en fjerdedel erklærer sig derimod stærke eller temmelig stærke modstandere 
af loven, der gør det strafbart at købe seksuelle ydelser. Der ses en både signifikant og 
betydelig forskel mellem svar fra kvinder og mænd. En langt overvejende del af kvinder, 
eller ca. 77%, går ind for straffen, mens mindre end 40% af mænd mener, at denne 
handling bør være strafbar. Godt en tredjedel af mænd mener at køb af seksuelle ydelser 
slet ikke bør straffes, men kun knap 12% af kvinder er af samme opfattelse. Ud over køn 
synes også alder at spille en vigtig rolle angående holdning til spørgsmålet, selv om 
forskellen mellem aldersgrupper ikke er statistisk signifikant. Den yngre aldersgruppe har 
en stærkere tendens til at støtte den nugældende lovgivning, og tendensen synes at være 
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stærkere, jo yngre deltagerne er. Det er ligeledes interessant, at deltagere på 
hovedstadsområdet i højere grad går ind for straf for køb af seksuelle ydelser end 
deltagere i landkommunerne, og forskellen mellem grupperne er signifikant.  
 
 
Total
Total 678
Gender*
Male 336
Female 342
Age
18-29 yr 146
30-44 yr 187
45-59 yr 169
60 yr + 175
Residence*
Capital area 430
Other districts 247
Education
Primary school 233
Secondary school 235
University education 165
* significant difference between groups (p < 0,05)
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Rather oppose Very much oppose
 
Diagram 1: Percentage of those who favour to punish for buying sexual services? 
Total
Total 672
Gender*
Male 335
Female 338
Age
18-29 yr 150
30-44 yr 187
45-59 yr 165
60 yr + 170
Residence*
Capital area 426
Other districts 245
Education*
Primary school 234
Secondary school 231
University education 164
* significant difference between groups (p < 0,05)
14%
17%
11%
15%
17%
14%
9%
14%
13%
14%
15%
13%
21%
25%
17%
23%
23%
18%
19%
23%
18%
16%
22%
25%
28%
29%
27%
27%
30%
26%
26%
24%
34%
28%
30%
25%
17%
15%
19%
15%
12%
20%
22%
17%
17%
23%
11%
19%
20%
14%
26%
19%
18%
22%
24%
22%
18%
20%
22%
18%
Very much in favour Rather in favour Neither in favour nor opposed
Rather oppose Very much oppose
 
 
Diagram 2. Percentage of those who are in favor of not punishing for the sale of sexual 
services? 
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Diagram 2 viser, at af deltagergrupperne som indtager en stærk holdning til salg af 
seksuelle ydelser, går lidt flere, eller 38%, ind for straffen, mens 35% er ubetinget imod. 
Der er således lille forskel på antallet af deltagere, der er uforbeholdent for eller imod straf 
for salg af seksuelle ydelser, og man kan sige, at befolkningen her splittes i to næsten lige 
store grupper. Dog vil meget færre straffe for salg end for køb af seksuelle ydelser. Vi ser 
igen en betydelig forskel på svar beroende på køn, selv om forskellen her er mindre end 
ved spørgsmålet om køb af seksuelle ydelser. Knap 42% mænd er tilhængere af at 
myndighederne ikke straffer for salg af seksuelle ydelser, mens 35% kvinder deler denne 
holdning. I takt med dette vil flere kvinder end mænd ses salg af seksuelle ydelser straffet, 
eller 38% mod ca. 30% af mændene. De yngre aldersgrupper har som nævnt en tendens til 
at gå mere ind for den nugældende lovgivning om salg af seksuelle ydelser end ældre 
deltagergrupper, men forskellen er ikke statistisk signifikant. Cirka lige store grupper af 
deltagere på hovedstadsområdet er henholdsvis for eller imod straf for salg af seksuelle 
ydelser, eller ca. 37% og 39%. Ser vi på landkommunerne, er antallet af deltagere som er 
imod straf for salg af seksuelle ydelser en smule højere end hos deltagerne, der går ind for 
straf, eller 35% mod 31%. Forskellen er statistik signifikant.  
 
Total
Total 686
Gender*
Male 344
Female 341
Age*
18-29 yr 149
30-44 yr 189
45-59 yr 169
60 yr + 180
Residence
Capital area 436
Other districts 250
Education*
Primary school 246
Secondary school 231
University education 166
* significant difference between groups (p < 0,05)
13%
16%
10%
23%
19%
7%
6%
13%
13%
16%
13%
10%
17%
22%
12%
23%
16%
18%
13%
19%
14%
14%
16%
24%
14%
15%
13%
17%
12%
11%
15%
14%
13%
13%
11%
19%
20%
17%
23%
18%
24%
12%
26%
20%
21%
23%
19%
17%
36%
31%
41%
19%
30%
53%
41%
34%
40%
34%
42%
30%
Very much in favour Rather in favour Neither in favour nor opposed
Rather oppose Very much oppose
 
 
Diagram 3. Percentage of those who are in favor of not punishing for possession of 
drugs for personal use? 
 
Det fremgår af diagram 3 at godt halvdelen af deltagerne (56%) er modstandere af, at 
opbevaring af narkotika til eget forbrug bliver gjort ustrafbart, mens knap en tredjedel 
(30%) er tilhængere heraf. Knap 15% er hverken for eller imod. Forskellen mellem 
grupperne er således betydelig, og af deltagerne som indtager en stærk holdning går langt 
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den største del ind for at straffe opbevaring af narkotika til eget brug, således som den 
nugældende lov foreskriver. Langt flere kvinder end mænd er modstandere af at gøre 
opbevaring af narkotika ustrafbart, eller ca. 65%, mod knap 48% af mændene, og 
forskellen er signifikant. Flere ældre deltagere end yngre er ligeledes imod en ændring af 
den nugældende lovgivning om opbevaring af narkotika til eget brug. Som det fremgår af 
diagrammet vil knap halvdelen af deltagerne i aldersgruppen 18-29 år, eller 46%, se 
opbevaring gå ustraffet, mens mindre end 20% i aldersgruppen over 60 år er af samme 
mening, og igen er forskellen signifikant. Uddannelse har også indflydelse på deltagernes 
holdning. En øget uddannelse synes at mindske tendensen til at gå ind for straf for 
opbevaring af narkotika til eget forbrug. Også her er forskellen signifikant. Men hvad med 
deltagernes holdning til registrering af denne type lovbrud på straffeattesten? 
 
Diagram 4 viser, at resultaterne ligner svarene på spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt opbevaring af 
narkotika til eget forbrug burde gå ustraffet. Lidt færre mener dog her, at denne type 
lovbrud hører hjemme på straffeattesten. Cirka halvdelen af deltagerne (50%) mener, at 
opbevaring af narkotika til eget forbrug bør registreres på vedkommendes straffeattest, en 
tredjedel (33%) er modstandere, og ca. 17% er hverken for eller imod. Af den del af de 
svarende, som tog en klar holdning til spørgsmålet, er godt halvdelen således tilhængere 
af den nugældende lovbestemmelse, som fastslår at alle narkotikalovbrud registreres på 
straffeattesten. En langt større andel af kvinder end mænd, eller ca. 60% kvinder mod 40% 
mænd, går ind for denne ordning, hvilket udgør en signifikant forskel. Den yngste 
aldersgruppe viser størst modstand mod registrering på straffeattesten, eller 45%, og den 
næststørste modstand ser vi i aldersgruppen 30-49 år, eller 36%. Mange flere deltagere på 
hovedstadsområdet end i landkommunerne er modstandere af registrering, eller 38% mod 
24%. Forskellen er signifikant. Også uddannelse har en signifikant indflydelse. Således 
finder knap 40% af deltagerne, som har afsluttet en universitetsuddannelse, at opbevaring 
af narkotika til eget forbrug ikke bør indføres på straffeattesten, hvorimod kun godt en 
fjerdedel af deltagerne, der har afsluttet en ungdomsuddannelse, er af samme mening.  
 
281 
 
Total
Total 686
Gender*
Male 344
Female 341
Age*
18-29 yr 149
30-44 yr 189
45-59 yr 169
60 yr + 180
Residence
Capital area 436
Other districts 250
Education*
Primary school 246
Secondary school 231
University education 166
* significant difference between groups (p < 0,05)
24%
20%
28%
10%
31%
32%
21%
23%
25%
22%
30%
20%
26%
21%
31%
29%
16%
30%
30%
22%
33%
26%
27%
23%
17%
17%
17%
16%
17%
16%
19%
17%
18%
17%
17%
18%
18%
23%
14%
20%
18%
15%
20%
21%
13%
17%
13%
26%
15%
19%
10%
25%
17%
8%
10%
17%
11%
17%
14%
13%
Very much in favour Rather in favour Neither in favour nor opposed
Rather oppose Very much oppose
 
 
Digram 4. Percentage of those who are in favor of that personal use of drugs is 
registered on your criminal record? 
 
Sammendrag 
 
Der er i det ovenstående blevet redegjort for resultaterne i en undersøgelse af islændinges 
holdning til to kategorier af lovbrud, prostitution og opbevaring af narkotika til eget 
forbrug. Undersøgelsen blev foretaget af Instituttet for samfundsvidenskab ved Islands 
Universitet om foråret 2015. 
 
Et flertal af deltagerne gik ind for den nugældende lovgivning, ifølge hvilken køb af 
seksuelle ydelser er strafbart. Knap 60% erklærede sig enige mens knap en fjerdedel var 
modstandere af loven. Denne holdningsfordeling har ikke ændret sig siden den 
forudgående opinionsundersøgelse i 2014 og må derfor siges at holdes overordentlig 
stabil. Svarforskellen mellem kvinder og mænd er bemærkelsesværdig, idet næsten 80% 
kvinder støttede lovgivningen imod kun knap 40% mænd. Godt en tredjedel af mænd var 
modstander af lovgivningen mod kun 11% af de kvindelige deltagere. Alder havde ikke 
nogen nævneværdig indflydelse på deltagernes svar, og både unge og ældre havde 
nogenlunde den samme holdning til spørgsmålet. Deltagernes stilling på arbejdsmarkedet 
har derimod indflydelse på deres svar. Cirka 60% af deltagere under uddannelse gik ind 
for at straffe køb af seksuelle ydelser imod kun godt en tredjedel af deltagere, som var 
selvstændigt erhvervsdrivende. Forskellen er signifikant. Ifølge undersøgelsens resultater 
er flertallet af den islandske befolkning således enig med den nugældende lovgivning om 
at køb af seksuelle ydelser skal være strafbart. Kvinders holdning er her meget stærk. 
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Ifølge Islands nugældende lovgivning er det tilladt at sælge seksuelle ydelser men 
derimod forbudt at købe. På globalt plan forekommer en ordning af denne type kun i tre 
lande i Skandinavien udover Island  (Skilbrei og Holmström, 2013). Betydeligt færre gik 
ind for at straffe salg end køb af seksuelle ydelser, eller kun godt en tredjedel af 
deltagerne. Størstedelen af de deltagere, der indtager en holdning til spørgsmålet, finder 
dog at salg, såvel som køb, af seksuelle ydelser burde være strafbart. Hele 28% af 
deltagerne er dog hverken for eller imod at gøre salg af seksuelle ydelser strafbart. Igen 
var der tydelig forskel mellem kvinder og mænds svar. Knap halvdelen af kvinder var 
modstandere af at salg af seksuelle ydelser ikke er strafbart, mod mindre end 30% af 
mændene. Lovgivningen omkring prostitution som indebærer straf synes således at spille 
en større rolle for kvinder end for mænd, og da både hvad angår køb og salg. 
Undersøgelser viser, at flertallet af personer, der sælger seksuelle ydelser, er kvinder, 
mens flertallet af købere er mænd. Sandsynligvis har kønnenes forskellige tilgang til 
prostitution en vis indflydelse på deltagernes holdning. Kvinder og mænd betragter 
prostitution forskelligt, og mænd stiller sig mere tøvende over for afstrafning af denne 
type handlinger end kvinder. Generelt synes dog den nugældende lovgivning, hvor køb af 
seksuelle ydelser er strafbart, at nyde solid støtte blandt befolkningen, mens loven som gør 
salg af seksuelle ydelser ustrafbart er mere omdiskuteret. Ifølge resultaterne af denne 
undersøgelse finder en ophævelse af straffebestemmelserne omkring prostitution derfor 
ikke megen genklang hos den islandske befolkning. 
 
Holdningen til at gøre opbevaring af narkotika til eget forbrug ustrafbart har ikke ændret 
sig meget siden 2014. Af deltagergrupperne som indtager en stærk holdning, går langt den 
største gruppe, eller knap en tredjedel af alle deltagere, ind for de nugældende 
straffebestemmelser. Det vækker opmærksomhed at yngre og mandlige deltagere skiller 
sig ud fra mængden med sin modstand mod den nugældende lovgivning. Undersøgelser 
har vist, at narkotikabrug er meget mere udbredt blandt den yngre befolkning og blandt 
mænd, hvilket uden tvivl har haft indflydelse på deltagernes svar. Erfaring med stoffet 
synes at gøre deltagerne mere imødekommende i forhold til hvordan de mener, 
samfundet bør reagere. Spørgsmålet er, hvorvidt generationen, der nu indtager en blødere 
holdning, vil beholde denne anskuelse op gennem livet, hvilket efterhånden ville kunne 
svække grundlaget for den gældende lovgivning, eller om denne holdning udelukkende 
er bundet til en bestemt aldersperiode, og de nuværende unge senere muligvis vil tage 
afstand fra dette standpunkt efter som alderen stiger. 
 
Holdningen til, hvorvidt opbevaring af narkotika til eget forbrug bør registreres på 
vedkommendes straffeattest, er omtrent den samme som holdningen til en eventuel 
ophævelse af straffebestemmelserne om opbevaring af narkotika til eget forbrug. En smule 
flere var dog modstandere af at registrere lovbruddet på straffeattesten, men forskellen er 
ikke stor. Halvdelen af deltagerne var enige i at lovbruddet burde registreres på 
straffeattesten, mens ca. en tredjedel ikke delte denne holdning. Det samme mønster viser 
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sig i holdningen hos forskellige samfundsgrupper. Yngre deltagere og mænd var stærkere 
modstandere af at registrere lovbruddet på straffeattesten end ældre deltagere og kvinder.  
 
Det vækker opmærksomhed at unge ikke skiller sig ud fra mængden angående holdning 
til køb og salg af seksuelle ydelser, således som de gør angående holdning til narkotika. 
Modstanden mod henholdsvis ophævelse af strafbestemmelser for køb af seksuelle 
ydelser og indføring af straf for salg af samme ligger på nogenlunde samme niveau hos 
alle aldersgrupper, mens den er yderst forskellig mellem aldersgrupperne hvad angår 
narkotika. Yngre deltageres frisindethed i forhold til narkotika synes således ikke at have 
nogen indflydelse på deres holdning til prostitution. Mænd skiller sig dog stadig ud fra 
mængden i begge emneområder. Mænd går generelt mindre ind for strafbestemmelser for 
prostitution, lige som yngre mænd i mindre grad går ind for straf for opbevaring af 
narkotika til eget forbrug og at lovbruddet registreres på vedkommendes straffeattest.   
 
Som helhed giver undersøgelsen det billede, at den nugældende straffelovgivning 
omkring prostitution og narkotika støttes af et flertal i den islandske befolkning. Dette 
gælder for såvel køb som salg af prostitution og opbevaring af narkotika til eget forbrug 
og hvorvidt lovbruddet burde registreres på vedkommendes straffeattest. Støtten er dog 
ikke lige stærk i alle samfundsgrupper, og yngre mænd skiller sig her noget ud fra 
mængden, idet de har tendens til i mindre grad end andre at gå ind for straf for såvel 
narkotika som prostitution. 
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From a parenting measure to a crime? – Prohibiting parental cor-
poral violence in Finland1 
Riikka Kotanen 
 
Introduction 
On a global scale, corporal punishment of a child still has wide legitimacy; it is legal for 
example in most Asian countries, the United States and Great Britain. In Finland, the pro-
vision justifying parental discipline in the form of physical violence was removed from the 
Criminal Code in 1969 and all forms of parental corporal violence towards a child  was 
banned rather early in 1983. In the long term, this ban has had a significant effect on atti-
tudes and practises. The decrease in all forms of corporal punishment and other types of 
violence towards children has been radical during the last 20 years (e.g. Ellonen et al. 2008; 
Lehti et al. 2011), and violence towards children is regarded increasingly negatively 
among Finns (e.g. Peltoniemi 1983; Sariola 2014).  
However, historically corporal violence towards a child has been regarded as an accepta-
ble method of control and parenting in Finland, even as a parental obligation (e.g. Py-
lkkänen 2009). Thus the prohibition of corporal punishment of a child represents a long-
term cultural and generational change (James & James 2003). This paper focuses on the 
establishment of legal regulation and control relating to parental violence in Finland dur-
ing late 1960’s to 1983. By applying qualitative text analysis, this study looks into the justi-
fications and motives behind these legislative alterations. In addition to legislative docu-
ments and expert interviews of child welfare and legislative professionals, the data in-
cludes reports by governmental organs and text materials relating to these legislative al-
terations during the same timeframe.  
This study is a part of a wider project which belongs to the field of sociology of law, yet it 
is multidisciplinary: it is located at the intersection of sociology, criminal law, criminology 
and social work. It includes two sub-studies, hence it examines parental corporal violence 
towards a child from the perspectives of legal regulation and the control measures of the 
state generated by legal regulation. The focus is on 1) the process of banning parental cor-
poral violence toward a child in Finland, and later revisions of the law, 2) the practical 
consequences of implementing these particular laws in the state provided child protection 
services. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This paper is work in progress, please do not cite or quote. 
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Research questions and data 
This paper covers two first legislative alterations: the removal of the subsection justifying 
parental corporal discipline from the Criminal Code in 1969 and the prohibition of all 
forms of corporal punishment of a child in 1983. It aims to present some preliminary re-
sults to the following research objectives: how and why corporal punishment of a child 
did became an object of legal control? And which kind of actors, perceptions and justifica-
tions were focal in the process? 
The data is presented at the table 1. It is a collection of legal documents, i.e. the legislative 
history of two legislative alterations, other types of policy documents, and reports pro-
duced by governmental organs and institutions. In addition to this, I have also analysed 
jurisprudential texts concerning the contemporary legal professionals’ interpretation of the 
legal alterations in question at the time. Expert interviews with professionals were conduct 
in order to gather additional information concerning the processes to fill the gaps in the 
document data and get the insights of the contemporary public discussion regarding phys-
ical punishment of a child. 
Table 1: The research data 
Removal of the section justifying parental physical discipline from Criminal Code 
Legal Documents  Governmental Proposal 68/1966 
 Report of the Legal Committee 154/1965 
 Statements of the experts to the Legal Committee 
 Parliamentary Hearings  
Additional Data  Book “Finnish Criminal Justice II”, Brynolf Honkasalo*, 1970 
Act on Child Custody and Right of Access: Prohibiting physical punishment  
Legal Documents  Committee Report of the Finnish Committee of International Year of the 
Child 23:1980 
 Governmental Proposal 224/1982 
 Statements of the experts to the Legal Committee 
 Report of the Legal Committee 11/1982 
 Parliamentary Hearings 3.2.1983, 8.3.1983 
Additional Data  Report “Child Battering in Finland and Sweden”, the National Institute of 
Legal Policy, 1981 
 Guidebook ”Child abuse and neglect of care”, the Social and Health Ad-
ministration, 1982 
 Book “Child Custody and Right of Access”, Matti Savolainen**, 1984 
 Expert Interviews with professionals, n=6 
*Honkasalo was professor of Criminal Law. 
**Savolainen was one of the drafter of the Child Custody and Right of Access Act. 
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The empirical study: preliminary findings 
Removing the parental right to use disciplinary violence from the Criminal Code in 1969 
According to the governmental proposal (GP 68/1966), the removal of the subsection was 
done because it was suspected that the special provision could encourage “heavy-handed” 
parents to use “health-harming correction measures” in an unacceptable way. Although, the 
removal can be seen technically as a criminalization of corporal violence, it is quite clear 
that the aim was not to remove the parental right to use physical violence. Nor was the 
aim to acknowledge the individual autonomy of a child.  
“If a parent does not exceed his legal right to discipline a child, and his interfering in 
the physical autonomy of a child is fair, punishing the parent for this conduct as an 
assault cannot come into question.”2 (GP 68/1966) 
Although, it is not explicitly expressed in the legislative documents, the following writings 
of the legal scholars concerning the interpretation of the renewed criminal law reveals that 
the object of the removal of the subsection was only to protect children from an excessive 
use of violence. Moreover, in connection with this, the aim was also to instruct the legal 
praxis that it is not acceptable to convict serious acts of violence as a minor offence in cases 
of child victims. 
“In the discussion concerning the removal of this particular subsection, a misinter-
pretation that even moderate corporal discipline would not be allowed has been 
made.” (Brynolf Honkasalo 1970, Professor of Criminal Law)  
The prohibition of corporal punishment in 1983 
The development which led to prohibiting all forms of parental violence to children is 
connected with a very essential social change going on in Finland during 1960’s and 
1970’s. Wide criticism was directed towards state practices and policies which were re-
garded as restrictive, authoritarian, and inhumane (e.g. Erikson 1967). These humane val-
ues resonated with several governmental and non-governmental organisations, and hence 
had a considerable impact in many policy sectors. In effect, fundamental changes were 
made for example within criminal policy and different sectors of social policy (e.g. Pulma 
& Turpeinen 1987; Lappi-Seppälä 2012). 
Globally, the importance of the United Nation’s International Year of the Child in 1979 is 
highlighted by the fact that it was the starting point of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which came into force in 1990. In Finland, the Year of the Child also constituted an 
important landmark in the process of prohibiting physical punishments of children.  The 
aspiring aim of the Committee Report of the Finnish Committee of the Year of the Child 
was to employ child and family politics as an observance perspective to the entire social 
                                                 
2 All data quotes translated by the author. 
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policy. The Finnish Committee suggested in its report (KM 23:1980) adding measures of 
support to “positive home upbringing”. Banning all forms of physical violence as a form of 
discipline was one of proposed measure. 
Other international pressure for altering the legislation in this matter originated from 
Scandinavia. The Importance of the prohibition enacted in Sweden in 1979 is highlighted 
through the different parts of the research data. The Swedish legislation is utilized as an 
example during the legislative process. Also the recommendation of the Nordic Council 
for banning all forms of corporal discipline in 1982 served as a justification for the new 
enactment.  
The problematizing of physical punishment of a child generated a need for produce 
knowledge and pass on information. The differences between Finland and Sweden in the 
law enforcement and child protection services were looked in the report published by the 
National Institute of Legal Policy in 1981. At the same time, the first attitude survey con-
cerning the Finnish attitudes towards physical punishing of children was conducted. Ac-
cording to the survey 53 % of Finns (15–79 years) did not accept corporal punishment as a 
parenting measure even in exceptional circumstances (Peltoniemi 1983). For the profes-
sionals promoting, and drafting the legislation, the result of the survey was “relief”, but 
also a sign that the timing of the legislative alteration was well chosen. 
”It was a very slim majority, but still it gave a justification for enacting this law.” (In-
terviewee A) 
Intervening in parental violence to a child has a minor role in the document data. Howev-
er, the issue was not totally neglected.  The social and health administration draw up a 
guidebook  ”Child abuse and neglect of care” for the social and health care professionals in 
1982. The guidebook offered  psychological explanations to the harmfulness of physical 
violence to a child, but the main function of it was advising professionals the correct ap-
proach if one notices any signs of physical or sexual abuse of a child. The guidebook illus-
trates well how the issue was distinctively seen as a problem of the social sector. The main 
guideline through the book is to contact the social board of the municipal. Police is men-
tioned only in connection with fatal violence. 
“A fatal assault of a child, or a doubt of a fatal assault, always has to be reported to 
the police, and requires determining the cause of death by forensic examination.” 
(Child abuse and neglect of care 1982, p. 36) 
The prohibition was written in the first section of the Act on Child Custody and Right of 
Access (361/1983) which came into effect in 1984 at the same time with new Child Protec-
tion Act (683/1983). The ideological background of the prohibition was a changed concep-
tion of childhood as a special and highly venerable stage of life. Moreover, the compre-
hension of a child as an individual with autonomy and needs separate from the parents.
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”[in the effective legislation] above all, a child has been seen as an object of parental 
authority, not an autonomous personality who has his own needs and wishes [...].” 
(GP 224/1982) 
“A child must be brought up with understanding, security and affection. A child 
must not be subdued, corporally punished or treated offensively in any other way. 
The growth of a child towards independence, responsibility and adulthood must be 
supported and encouraged.” (Act on Child Custody and Right of Access 361/1983) 
 
The Act on Child Custody and Right of Access was very modern, idealistic and ideological 
legislation. The notion about the importance of parental affection rose positive attention in 
parliamentary hearings, but according to several interviewees, it caused confusion among 
some legal officials in the Ministry of Justice. In several occasions, interviewees told about 
diverse attitudes towards the new legislation, not just among professionals but media and 
citizens too. Interviewees who had educated other professionals due to the new legislation 
were all perceived that the attitudes among Finns were rather polarized; in southern parts 
of Finland, violence towards children was regarded more negatively, and the prohibition 
was considered more important, than in northern Finland. Media reactions to the prohibi-
tion were often described by the interviewees hostile and amused.  
“About this prohibition, […] the further we went from Helsinki […] to periphery, the 
sharper were the demands that the section [prohibiting all forms of physical violence] 
should be repealed and parental right to physically punish a child should be restored 
[...]” (Interviewee F) 
In the legal documents, there is no mention of the control or punishing a parent using 
physical discipline. Nor is the acts of physical discipline identified or named as violence or 
a criminal act.  The only connection between the prohibition and a criminal act is drawn in 
the governmental proposal (GP 224/1982), where the legislator states that the section re-
garding minor offences in the Criminal Act can be applied when the offender is a parent or 
guardian of the child in question, and even if the offence was done in order to discipline 
the child. The interviewees confirmed that punishing parents or any measures of control 
were not discussed during the process. The main purpose of enacting the prohibition was 
to strengthen the nascent negative attitudes and spur the attitudinal change among those 
using corporal punishment as a parenting measure. The attempt was for guide people to-
wards ’child-sensitive’ parenting.  
“[...] the law becoming in effect in 1984 [the Act on Child Custody and Right of Ac-
cess], there was no intention to associate any punishment with it in the first place. [...] 
The aim was to influence attitudinally throughout the society where, in every section 
of the society, everybody should take care, and sort of keep eye on, that no one is bat-
tering children.” (Interviewee C) 
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In conclusion   
The physical punishment of a child is defined as a problem of the social sector, but the dis-
cussion about intervention measures and who is responsible for interventions is only start-
ing at the beginning of 1980’s. Most importantly, the process of prohibiting all forms of 
parental violence can be considered establishing a new norm which hopefully will guide 
Finns, in the course of time, towards gentler upbringing measures. Although the violent 
behaviour of a parent was seen problematic, it was not considered a matter of the criminal 
justice system.    
In 1980´s, there was very little information and knowledge about the prevalence of the pa-
rental violence. Hence, The Central Union for Child Welfare, non-governmental organisa-
tion, conducted the first child victim survey concerning sexual and physical violence in 
Finland in 1988. One of the main results was that 72 % of 15-year old had experienced at 
least lenient forms of violence committed by the parents or a parent (Sariola 1990). Despite 
of the fact, that parental violence was seemingly not a minor problem in Finland at the end 
of 1980´s, most of the expert interviewees told in detail, how a problem of much smaller 
scale, sexual abuse of a child, displaced the physical violence as an agenda during 1980’s. 
Due to this, physical violence become largely ignored in terms of policy making or public 
discussion. Even to the extent, that for example the next victim survey concerning parental 
corporal violence is conducted 20 years later (Ellonen et. al. 2008).  
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Jane Addams igår, idag, imorgon i socialpreventivt arbete i Nor-
den. //Jane Addams yesterday, today and tomorrow in social pre-
vention in Nordic Countries. 
Regina Järg-Tärno 
Jane Addams (1860-1935) arbete i början på 1900-talet i Chicago samt 100 år senare på 
2000-talet i Finland och i övriga nordiska länder.  
 
Inledning 
Jane Addams arbete och betydelse inom kriminologin kom fram för ett par år sedan i 
samband med en arbetsgrupp på justitieministeriet i Finland. Inom ramen för det nation-
ella programmet för den inre säkerheten skulle man utarbeta ett system med grannsam-
verkan i Finland. Generalsekreteraren för Settlementförbundet i Finland blev ordförande 
för arbetsgruppen. Arbetsgruppen initierade dialoger med olika aktörer i samhället samt 
samlade in rekommendationer från aktörer på gräsrotsnivå dvs. från de människor som 
berördes.1  
Man ville undvika att koncentrera sig allt för mycket eller enbart på social- eller situation-
ell brottsprevention och brottsförebyggande åtgärder. Istället för att bygga murar och 
övervakade zoner dvs. uteslutning ville man koncentrera sig på metoder som syftar till att 
öka närdemokrati och medborgardialoger, förstärka medborgarsamhället och delaktighet, 
förtroende samt hjälp för de underpriviligerade i samhället. Man hade en stark tro på att 
genom att öka det goda i samhället, förstärka tillhörighet och gemenskap, medmänsklig 
hjälp och tillit kommer man att öka känslan av trygghet samt minska risker för det oöns-
kade, dvs social oro och brottslighet. Det handlade om ett långsiktigt arbete som skulle 
leda till brottspreventiva effekter.  
Av naturliga skäl var det som styrde arbetet en värdegrund för settlementrörelsen som har 
sina historiska rötter i Jane Addams arbete i Chicagos slum i slutet av 1890-talet. Med 
tanke på tid och plats ledde detta till en hypotes att Jane Addams arbete då och settle-
mentarbetet som är idag, mer känt under namnet community work, på något sätt måste 
vara direkt kopplat eller ha några länkar till Chicagoskolan som växte fram strax efter det, 
dvs i början på 1900-talet. Överraskningen var stor när det visade sig att det inte bara 
fanns en länk mellan Jane Addams idéer och arbete med socialt utsatta grupper i socialt 
                                                 
1 Grannhjälpsarbetsgruppens rekommendationer mm.: 
http://www.rikoksentorjunta.fi/fi/index/julkaisut/tutkimuksiajaselvityksia/naapuriapu-
tyoryhmanvaliraportti.html  
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utsatta områdena och Chicagoskolan utan att det till och med fanns en direkt stark kopp-
ling mellan henne och Chicagoskolans kriminologer och deras teorier. Det var något nytt! 
Men hur var det möjligt att man inte kände till det och inte hade hört om det något alls 
tidigare, speciellt i kriminologiska kretsar? Hur kan man ha missat en sådan sak om soci-
alpreventivt arbete? Och hur viktigt det helt plötsligt blev att känna till det i dagens situat-
ion med stora, oroande förändringar i världen och i det nordiska välfärdssamhället. Sam-
tidigt med den upptäckten och arbetsgruppens arbete gjordes det i Sverige av svenska 
kriminologer från Stockholms universitet en studie om oroligheterna i Husby med lärdo-
mar om problembild och orsaker. Bland de fem viktigaste förklaringarna till den sociala 
oron och händelseförloppet i Husby var upptäckten av ett demokratiskt underskott i lo-
kalsamhället. Andra viktiga frågor som togs upp var bristen på känsla av tillhörighet och 
gemenskap.2 Med tanke på framtiden och risker för social oro blev det ännu mer viktigt att 
känna till och lära sig av Jane Addams arbete och metoder. 
Jane Addams (1860-1935) 
Jane Addams (1860-1935) är en alltför okänd kvinnlig kriminolog. Hennes arbete på slutet 
av 1800-talet och början på 1900-talet i Chicago har varit mycket betydelsefullt både inom 
sociologin och kriminologin. Men hon har inte fått den uppmärksamhet inom kriminolo-
gin som hon förtjänat jämfört med de manliga kriminologer som blev kända via Chicago-
skolan. Några av dem samarbetade med henne direkt och påstås ha även fått handledning 
av henne. 
Although Jane Addams received national and international recognition for her work, most main-
stream sociologist and criminologists today have ignored and sometimes even denied her contribu-
tions.3 
Jane Addams is well known for her leadership in urban reform, social settlements, pacifism, social 
work, and women’s suffrage. The men of the Chicago School are well known for their leadership in 
founding sociology and the study of urban life. What has remained hidden however, is that Jane 
Addams played a pivotal role in the development of sociology and worked closely with the male fac-
ulty at the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago.4 
 
 
                                                 
2 Bilen brinner... men problemen är kvar – Berättelser om Husbyhändelserna i maj 2013. (2014) 
http://stockholmia.stockholm.se/forlag/bocker/alla_bocker/abc/bilen-brinner...-men-problemen-ar-kvar--
berattelser-om-husbyhandelserna-i-maj-2013/  
3 Imogenen L. Moyer MA, Phd (2008), Jane Addams. Pioneer in Criminology. 
4 Deegan (1990), Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School.  
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Hull House 
Jane Addams var mycket engagerad i flera olika aktuella frågor i samhället, men Hull 
House verksamhet i Chicago är det som Jane Addams är idag mest känd för bland aktörer 
som förknippar sig med settlementrörelsen och s.k. community work. På slutet av 1800-talet 
och i början på 1900-talet var det kris, klassmotsättningar, social oro och spänningar. Sett-
lementhusen i England, som på slutet av 1800-talet etablerades i de fattigaste kvarteren av 
Östra London, inspirerade Jane Addams och settlementrörelsen i USA och fungerade som 
en förebild för hennes arbete med Hull House i Chicago. Jane Addams startade Hull 
House 1889, ett allaktivitetshus som var öppet för alla som bodde i området oavsett socio-
ekonomisk status, kön, etnicitet, religion, kultur etc.  
Hull House var inte bara ett hus och en mötesplats utan även en vagga för demokratiar-
bete och social verksamhet. Det fanns olika typer av fritidsaktiviteter att mötas kring men 
även utbildningar och kurser för vuxna. För att stödja kvinnors möjlighet att delta i kur-
serna och utbilda sig eller arbeta organiserades det även barnpassning och aktiviteter och 
även lektioner för barn dvs. dagisverksamhet. Dessutom öppnade man 1894 även en lek-
plats eller lekpark som var öppen för alla barn och unga för att stödja deras uppväxt och 
skydda dem mot risker för kriminalitet i framtiden.5 1906 startade Jane Addams även en 
nationell organisation The Playground Association of America (PAA) som ordnade en stor 
konferens Play Congress (1911) med tal och föreläsningar bl.a. om kriminalitet (Relation of 
Play to Juvenile Delinquency) samt aktiviteter och lek för alla åldrar.  
Hon kämpade för barnens rättigheter och mot barnarbete. Att erbjuda utbildning och un-
derhållning var centrala syften men även prevention av kriminalitet och avvikande bete-
enden.  
Hennes arbete som pionjär inom kriminologin kan sammanfattas till tre centrala områ-
den:6 
(1) socialekologiska kartor (ecological maps)  
(2) social rättvisa (social justice) 
(3) fredsarbete (peacemaking) 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 children robbed of childhood were likely to become dull, sullen men and women working mindless jobs, or criminals for 
whom the adventure of crime became the only way to break out of the bleakness of their lives. Polikoff, Barbara Gar-
land. With One Bold Act : The Story of Jane Addams, p. 74, New York: Boswell Books, 1999. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hull_House  
6 Imogenen L. Moyer MA, Phd (2008), Jane Addams. Pioneer in Criminology.  
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1. Socialekologiska kartor 
Jane Addams började samla in information om alla som bodde i närheten av Hull House 
och strukturerade upp det på kartor som senare (1895) publicerades under namnet Hull 
House Maps and Papers. Där fanns det data om varje persons etnicitet och uppgifter om 
varje hushålls inkomster per vecka. Det påstås att det var hon som inledde den typen av 
kvalitativa metoder och hennes tidiga arbete utnyttjades både som bas för att utveckla so-
cialekologiska teorier (t.ex. concentric zone theories, Burgess and Parks) och även senare av 
studenter som studerade sambanden med avvikande beteende och kriminalitet i Chicago. 
Men trots det fick hon aldrig beröm för sitt arbete.  
Den ekologiska inriktningen inom kriminologin och i polisarbetet har fortfarande en stor 
betydelse. Metoden används t.ex. för att analysera all möjlig data om brottslighetens geo-
grafi och sociala bakgrundsfaktorer för att på ett mer effektivt sätt använda resurser för 
sociala och/eller situationella brottsförebyggande åtgärder t.ex. i utsatta områden i stor-
städer bl.a. i Norden. 
2. Social rättvisa 
Jane Addams var tillsammans med andra kvinnor på Hull House, ”the Chicago Woman´s 
Club” (grundad 1876), engagerad i frågor som rörde social rättvisa. De kämpade för bar-
nens rättigheter och var emot barnarbete genom att uppmärksamma dess skador för indi-
viden, familjen och hela samhället. De hade en stark tro på att barnarbete och utbildning 
på olika sätt var sammanflätade med kriminalitet. De ville förbjuda i lag att barn under 14 
år skulle arbeta. Istället skulle alla barn ha rätt till obligatorisk utbildning.   
De uppmärksammade kvinnor och ungdomar som hade fått fängelsestraff. Det var deras 
förtjänst att det startades verksamhet med ungdomsdomstolar (Juvenile Court) och skydds-
tillsyn för ungdomar (Juvenile Probation). 
3. Fredsarbete 
Jane Addams var pacifist och emot första världskriget. Hon förde en kamp för demokra-
tin, bl.a. för att kvinnor skulle få rösträtt. Hon var mycket orolig över vilka skador kriget 
kan ha när det gäller demokratin. Hon menade att krigseffekter är särskilt skadliga för 
samarbetsviljan och mänskliga relationer i invandrartäta områden. Jane Addams tillsam-
mans med en liten grupp kvinnor både i USA och utomlands organiserade sig i ”Women´s 
International League for Peace and Freedom” (Women´s Peace Party) och opponerade sig 
mot president Wilson´s utrikespolitik i samband med kriget i Europa. För sitt demokrati- 
och fredsarbete fick hon Nobels fredspris 1931 som första vita kvinna. 
Community Work och settlementarbetet i Norden 
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Jane Addams idéer, metoder och arbete med Hull House som utvecklades i socialt utsatta 
områdena i Chicago lever kvar än i dag och grundidén för settlementarbetet och ’commu-
nity work’ var och är tron på gemenskapens stärkande effekt.  
Det finns en internationell paraplyorganisation, International Federation of Settlements 
and Neighborhood Centers (IFS), för organisationer som förknippar sig med den histo-
riska bakgrunden och/eller grundtanken till settlementarbetet. IFS är också en av få 
NGO´s i världen som har en plats i FN.  
Denna typ av verksamhet finns alltså även i Norden. Settlementarbetet eller Hemgårdsrö-
relsen spred sig till nordiska länder i början på 1900-talet och finns kvar även i dag. Flera 
organisationer i de nordiska länderna har rötter i Jane Addams idéer, värdegrund och me-
toder. Flera av dem är bland de äldsta frivilliga organisationerna i respektive länder och 
firar snart sina 100 årsdagar: t.ex. Settlementförbundet i Finland, Fritidsforum i Sverige 
samt Settlementet i Danmark.  
Utöver de nationella föreningar och organisationer i de nordiska länderna grundades på 
hösten 2015 även IFS Norden som en nordisk paraplyorganisation (av fem nationella or-
ganisationer från Finland, Åland, Sverige och Island) för att stödja och förstärka settle-
mentsarbetet och kunskapsutbytet i och mellan de nordiska länderna. Det nordiska sam-
arbetet är egentligen inget nytt. Redan 1930 fanns det en nordisk samarbetsorganisation 
för settlementarbete med följande slogan: ”Världen väntar på människan”. Tyvärr avbröts 
samarbetet på grund av andra världskriget.  
Orsaken till att det just idag uppstod ett konkret behov för ett nordiskt samarbete var bl.a. 
förändringar i välfärdssamhället, social oro och förändringar i samhällsklimatet. Ideella 
föreningar och frivilligorganisationer möter idag, och kommer även i fortsättningen att 
möta, nya utmaningar och till och med tryck från den offentliga sidan samtidigt som det 
är brist på ekonomiska resurser. Samarbetet mellan det offentliga och civilsamhället be-
hövs mer än tidigare. Vid sidan om goda beprövade behövs det även utvecklas nya meto-
der för att lyckas med det. Grannhjälpsarbetsgruppen i Finland (2014) som nämndes tidi-
gare, rekommenderade i sina rapporter metoder som används och utvecklas för ätt öka 
närdemokrati eller lokaldemokrati, t.ex. medborgarråd (på finska kansalaisraati), World 
Café, trygghetsvandringar eller andra typer av medborgardialoger och metoder som för-
stärker delaktighet på flera olika sätt. Och t.ex. polisen i Sverige har efter flera utredningar 
och oroväckande resultat om situationen och risker för social oro i utsatta områden i Sve-
rige lanserat nu på våren (2016) en ny nationell modell för att arbeta kunskapsbaserat med 
medborgarlöften för att via lokala samarbetsavtal med kommuner komma närmare med-
borgarna och förstärka samarbetet med civilsamhället i ett preventivt syfte. 7  
                                                 
7 Polisen lanserar nationell modell för medborgarlöften (Brå, 2016) http://www.bra.se/bra/nytt-fran-
bra/arkiv/nyheter/2016-05-27-polisen-lanserar-nationell-modell-for-medborgarloften.html  
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Settlementarbetet, startad av Jane Addams i Chicago på slutet av 1800-talet, har varit och 
är utifrån ett kriminologiskt perspektiv socialpreventivt arbete som syftar till att förebygga 
kriminalitet och avvikande beteende, utslagning och utsatthet genom att förstärka stödfak-
torer - tillit, tillhörighet, gemenskap, jämlikhet, jämställdhet, mänskliga rättigheter och 
närdemokrati. Man strävar efter att minska samhällsklyschor, orättvisor, social oro etc. 
Det har varit och är även idag bland de viktigaste uppgifterna att stödja de underprivili-
gerade i samhället och göra deras röst hörd. I Jane Addams anda och fotspår, anpassad till 
dagens situation och förhållanden, vill man motarbeta att utsatthet och brottslighet kon-
centreras till vissa befolkningsgrupper eller till vissa platser, orter och stadsdelar. Det 
handlar om både konkret arbete på gräsrotsnivå och opinionsbildning på den nationella 
nivån om viktiga samhällsfrågor. För att göra det s.k. ’evidence based’ eller kunskapsbaserat 
kommer all relevant (i det här fallet bl.a. kriminologisk) forskning vara till nytta vilket gör 
samarbetet mellan praktiker och forskare nödvändigt och viktigare än någonsin. Dels för 
att göra sin röst hörd bland beslutsfattare men framförallt för att effektivt utvärdera, fin-
slipa och vidareutveckla sin verksamhet och metoder på gräsrotsnivån. 
Det finns redan en hel del relevant forskning, bl.a. nordisk kriminologisk forskning som 
kan utnyttjas, vilket inte tidigare har gjorts regelbundet och systematiskt. Men det behövs 
också nya studier samt konkret samarbete mellan praktiker och forskare för att hitta och 
utvärdera nya socialpreventiva metoder och dess långsiktiga effekter. Därför vill jag gärna 
uppmuntra till ett tätare samarbete mellan kriminologisk forskning och civilsamhälle i 
Nordiska länder t.ex. genom att starta ett samarbete mellan NSfK och IFS Norden.  
Dessutom finns det goda skäl att forska närmare kring Jane Addams arbete och settle-
mentarbetet, community work och närdemokratiarbete i Nordiska länder och dess betydelse 
utifrån ett kriminologiskt perspektiv. 
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WORKSHOP E 
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME  
 
Corporate and organised crime: a study of criminal liability of ex-
ecutives and leaders. 
Thorbjorg Sveinsdottir 
 
 
There have generally been a number of individuals involved in the execution of criminal 
acts in cases connected to the financial crisis in Iceland. In these cases the situation has of-
ten been that the involvement of the banks´ low-level employees has been quite clear and 
therefore quite easy to prove. They have been the ones buying and selling the banks´ stock 
in cases of market manipulation and paying out the bank´s money in cases of fraud. There 
has been a paper trail (or a trail of emails and taped phone conversations) connecting these 
individuals to the criminal acts.  
In most cases connected to the financial crisis in Iceland the low-level employees of the 
banks have claimed that they were following the orders of their superiors when commit-
ting the crimes. The high-level employees have on the other hand mostly denied giving 
their subordinates orders to commit the crimes or claim that they were not aware of all the 
facts. 
Going up the hierarchy there is generally less and less evidence connecting high-level em-
ployees of the Icelandic banks to crimes committed in connection to the financial crisis in 
Iceland. The high-level employees of the banks are not the ones selling or buying stock or 
paying out loans and they generally do not following things through with emails and 
phone calls themselves. As a result, issues have arisen in determining the exact involve-
ment of the high-level employees of the Icelandic banks´ in such cases. In some cases the 
prosecution has managed to prove their involvement but in others they have been acquit-
ted. 
Another issue that has arisen in these cases connected to the crash is the question under 
what circumstances a person can be criminally liable for a crime that is carried out by an-
other person. This question is especially relevant in cases where low-level employees of 
the banks have executed the crimes and claimed that the banks´ high-level employees had 
not given them direct orders to commit the crimes but that the crimes were however 
committed with their knowledge.  
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I will focus on two judgements where this has been the case, that is where the executives 
of Iceland´s two largest banks, Kaupthing and Landsbanki, and the Chairman of the Board 
of Kaupthing, who acted as an executive, were convicted of crimes committed by their 
subordinates although they did not given their subordinates direct instructions to commit 
the crimes. These judgements were delivered in 2015 and 2016. 
With the former judgement (H 145/2014), delivered in 2015 and commonly referred to as 
the Al-Thani case, the Supreme Court found that the CEO and the Chairman of the Board 
of Iceland´s largest bank, Kaupthing, the CEO of Kaupthing Luxembourg and one of 
Kaupthing´s largest shareholders were guilty of committing fraud and market manipula-
tion shortly before the bank´s collapse. 
The case involved the selling of Kaupthing´s shares in a very large trade shortly before the 
bank collapsed. The stock was sold to a shell company owned by Sheik Mohamed Al-
Thani. After the trade Kaupthing issued a press release containing a statement by Al-Thani 
where he expressed his great belief in the bank and its top management and that he be-
lieved the bank had performed well in the turbulent financial climate of that time. It 
turned out that this statement was not written by the Sheik but by employees of Kaup-
thing, including the defendants themselves. It also turned out that the bank never received 
any payment for the shares. The trade was fully funded by the bank itself, by loaning two 
shell companies, one owned by Al-Thani and the other by a large shareholder of the bank. 
The latter loan was without any security and was not approved by a loan committee.  
The CEO and the Chairman of the Board of Kaupthing were both convicted of fraud and 
market manipulation for granting this particular loan. The CEO instructed his subordi-
nates to pay out the loan. The Chairman of the Board who was also Chairman of the Loan 
Committee that should have approved the loan was aware of the loan and said he had ap-
proved of it. He was also convicted although he did not give his subordinates instructions 
to commit the crime. 
In the latter case (H 842/2014), the CEO of Landsbanki, Iceland´s second-largest bank, was 
convicted along with his subordinates, for manipulating the banks own stock price for a 
year before its collapse by systematically purchasing a significant part of the banks shares 
on the market. When the stock price went down the accused bought more shares and in 
this way made sure that the stock price didn´t become too low. The employees of the bank 
then disposed of the shares in various ways, partly by selling them to selected customers 
without these customers paying anything for the shares. 
In this case the CEO played a big part in the disposing of the shares. There was however 
no evidence that suggested that he had given his subordinates orders to purchase the 
shares in the market to begin with. He was however regularly informed of the banks ac-
quisition of its own shares in the market both by receiving daily reports and in weekly 
meetings and was on that basis also convicted of the buying of the shares. 
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These judgements have been hailed as landmark cases by some and have been criticized 
for the grounds on which these executives were convicted. The judgements have raised 
questions about under what circumstances executives can incur criminal liability for crim-
inal acts committed by their subordinates.  
But are these judgments in fact landmark cases when it comes to criminal liability in con-
nection to a position a person holds? In examining this I believe that another question 
must be addressed: whether the executives in these cases were convicted of omissions – 
that is – a failure to act. This is relevant when examining on what basis they were convict-
ed and if the judgements deviate from previous Icelandic case law.  
In these cases the executives were as mentioned earlier convicted of fraud and market ma-
nipulation; crimes that are generally committed by acts.  
Most criminal provisions describe an act being committed but they can as a general rule 
also be committed by an omission.1 Omissions can however only be equated with crimes 
that are described as acts in the criminal code on the basis of a so-called assumption of re-
sponsibility.2 
One example of an assumption of responsibility is a parents´ responsibility to care for their 
child. By not feeding their child for example they can become criminally liable for murder. 
Another example of an assumption of responsibility is the responsibility of the senior 
management of companies to supervise the acts of their subordinates. Executives can incur 
criminal liability for criminal acts committed by their subordinates by failing to do so.3  
This kind of assumption of responsibility is nothing new. There are in fact Icelandic 
judgements dating back to the middle of the last century where executives and board 
members of companies have been found criminally liable for crimes that have been com-
mitted within their companies (H 1947: 81 and H 1963: 6744). In these cases there was no 
proof of the executives and board members actually knowing about the criminal acts. The 
judgements however refer to the executives´ obligation to acquire an oversight of the 
companies´ operations and that they should have been aware of the companies´ non-
compliance with laws that had been going on for a long period of time. Executives and 
board members of companies have on the other hand not been found criminally liable be-
                                                 
1 This is stated in the bill following the Icelandic criminal code. Alþt. 1939, A-deild, p. 354.  
2 Omissions are divided into direct omissions and indirect omissions. A direct omission is the failure to act 
when the law imposes an explicit duty to act. Indirect omissions are however not deducted from an explicit 
legal duty to act but are omissions that can be equated with crimes that are described as acts in the criminal 
code, on the basis of assumption of responsibility. Jónatan Þórmundsson, Afbrot og refsiábyrgð I, p. 83-88. 
3 This kind of responsibility is based on the fact that the senior management and board of a company has an 
obligation to acquire an oversight of the companies operations and whether they are generally in compliance 
with laws and regulations. Jónatan Þórmundsson, Afbrot og refsiábyrgð I, p. 92-93. 
4 In both of these cases the companies had violated the foreign exchange act for a considerable period of time 
and in the latter case the company had also imported products illegaly for some time. 
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cause of individual illegal acts committed within their companies in the same way, where-
as it had not been proven that the executive had knowledge of the criminal act (H 1947: 
1065).6  
Looking at these cases the result seems to ultimately depend on whether it has been prov-
en that the executives and board members had knowledge of the criminal offense commit-
ted by their subordinates. In the cases where the acts have been committed regularly over 
a long time the courts have found that they must have, on the basis of their position and 
oversight, had knowledge of these crimes which were a regular occurrence and part of the 
companies´ operations. When the crime is not committed regularly over a long period of 
time more is needed to prove the executives knowledge of the crime.  
The Supreme Court has not deviated from this in the cases connected to the crash. 
With another judgement that was delivered by the Supreme Court in 2015 and commonly 
referred to as the Imon case (H 456/2014) the CEO of Landsbanki was acquitted for a single 
trade. This case involved the selling of Landsbankinn´s shares in a large trade shortly be-
fore it´s collapse, without the buyer paying anything for the shares. This trade was one of 
the ways the employees of Landsbanki used to dispose of the bank´s own shares after buy-
ing them on the market and the CEO was convicted of two similar trades with the same 
judgement. The Supreme Court however found that there was not sufficient evidence of 
the CEO´s approval of the trade and he was acquitted. His subordinate, who executed the 
trade, was however convicted of the crime. 
The same criteria is also met in the cases connected to the crash previously mentioned (H 
145/2014 and 842/2014). In these cases, it was proven that the executives had been aware of 
the criminal acts committed by their subordinates. 
My conclusion is that these cases connected to the crash do not go further than previous 
Icelandic judgments in terms of criminal liability of senior management of companies be-
cause of their failure to act. 
However, the question remains unanswered whether the executives in the cases connected 
to the crash were actually convicted of omissions – that is – a failure to act.  
Firstly it should be noted that the line between acts and omissions is often unclear.7 How-
ever, when comparing these cases connected to the crash to earlier cases where executives 
                                                 
5 In this case the court found that there was not proof that two executives of a company had been aware of 
goods that had been imported illegally by the company. This had only happened once and was therefore an 
isolated illegal act.  
6 Jónatan Þórmundsson, Afbrot og refsiábyrgð I, p. 94-95. 
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and board members of companies were convicted on the basis of omissions certain dispar-
ities can be distinguished.  
In the cases from the middle of last century the courts findings were solely based on the 
fact that the criminal acts had been committed regularly over a long time by the subordi-
nates of the executives and that the executives must therefore have, on the basis of their 
position and oversight, had knowledge of these crimes.  
In the cases connected to the crash on the other hand there was proof of the criminal acts 
being presented before those executives that were convicted and furthermore, that they 
had given their approval in one way or another even though they did not give their sub-
ordinates direct instructions to commit the crime. In the Al-Thani case (H 145/2014) the 
Chairman of the Board did this by saying to the CEO of Kaupthing (who gave his subor-
dinates directions to pay out the loan) that he approved of the granting of the loan. In the 
case of the manipulation of the stock price of Landsbanki for a year before its collapse (H 
842/2014), the CEO did this by not commenting when his subordinates reported to him 
that they were buying the banks own shares and thus approving the practice. It could 
therefore be said that they both gave a “go-ahead” on the execution of the crimes. 
Additionally they both facilitated the execution of the crimes. In the Al-Thani case the 
Chairman of the Board of Kaupthing who was also the Chairman of the Loan Committee 
did this by neglecting to get the Loan Committee´s approval of the loan and in the process 
concealing from the Committee that the fraudulent loan had been granted (H 145/2014). In 
the latter case the executive of Landsbanki did this by disposing of the shares that his sub-
ordinates had bought on the market in order to manipulate the bank´s stock price and 
therefore making it possible for them to continue to buy more of the bank´s shares (H 
842/2014). 
My conclusion is therefore, that the cases connected to the crash were not actual omis-
sions. In spite of this the fact remains that these cases connected to the crash are cases 
where executives have been convicted of offenses that are normally performed through 
acts on the basis of fairly passive conduct. In light of this the question might be asked 
whether these judgements have any relevance for other kinds of criminal offenses, espe-
cially crimes committed within criminal organisations. In this context it is interesting to 
look the findings of the Supreme Court in the only Icelandic case of organised crime. 
In this case (H 521/2012) a group of people attacked a woman in her home. The defendants 
were accused of assault and rape, amongst other crimes. They were also accused of com-
mitting these crimes as part of the activities of a criminal organisation. The accused were 
all members of organisations associated with Hells Angels that have been identified as 
criminal organisations. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
7 Jónatan Þórmundsson, Afbrot og refsiábyrgð I, p. 83. 
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The prosecution argued that the accused persons who committed the crimes required 
permission from the president of Hells Angels in Iceland, who was among the accused but 
did not participate in the execution of the crimes. There was some evidence to support this 
– the perpetrators went to the president´s home before the attack and while being interro-
gated by police the victim of the attack claimed that the president had contacted her and 
told her that members of Hells Angels would attack her – however she was not prepared 
to testify the same way before the court. One of the attackers had also sent a facebook mes-
sage to a third party claiming that a so-called “hunting permit” had been issued for the 
victim.   
The Supreme Court, however, found that there was not sufficient evidence to suggest that 
the president had participated in the crimes whereas it had not been proven that he knew 
that the attackers intended to commit the crimes beforehand.8 
In this case the requirement discussed earlier that a person must be aware of a criminal act 
in order to be found guilty was not met.  
However, one wonders what the situation would have been if it had been proven that the 
leader of the criminal organisation had been aware of the crimes beforehand. 
Comparing this judgement to the previous judgements discussed the question arises 
whether leaders of criminal organisations can be equated with corporate executives in 
terms of criminal liability. Are leaders of criminal organisations and corporate executives 
liable in the same way for crimes committed by their subordinates? 
First it should be noted that the law differentiates between these two groups. Company 
laws lay certain responsibilities on corporate executives where it comes to their compa-
nies´ operations. The assumption of responsibility of senior management of companies to 
supervise the acts of their subordinates is closely linked to these legal obligations. There 
are of course no similar laws in place about heads of criminal organisations and their re-
sponsibility when it comes to the operations of their organisation.  
However I do not believe that this should be a decisive factor in determining whether the 
two groups can be equated with each other.  Operating within an organisation that is ille-
gal and therefore not regulated should not benefit the person committing a crime, if the 
position is in fact comparable to that of an executive. However the fact that the organisa-
tion is not regulated will mean that there are more elements that the prosecution will have 
to prove in cases of organised crime to show that the leader´s position can be equated to 
the position of an executive within a corporation and that the same principals should 
therefore apply.  
                                                 
8 The Supreme Court also found that it had not been proven that the crimes committed had been the activi-
ties of a criminal organisation. 
305 
 
To begin with the prosecution will have to prove that a criminal organisation is in fact or-
ganised and that a certain individual is in a management position within the organisation 
in the sense that the individuals carrying out the crime are in fact his subordinates.  
The question also arises whether the criminal act will also have to be proven to have been 
part of the organisation's activities. This was an issue in the Hells Angels case discussed 
earlier. In that case the crimes were ignited by an argument of a personal nature between 
the victim and one of the perpetrators. However in that case the prosecution argued that 
the perpetrators had needed the permission of the head of the organisation to use violence 
although the argument was a personal one. It seems that countries have a different ap-
proach to the criminal liability of superior members of a criminal organisation because of 
actions by individual group members that are not (expressly) encompassed by the com-
mon crime plan. This is something that could be interesting to look further into. 
Another element to be proven is the leader´s awareness of a criminal act before it is com-
mitted. It is probably generally easier to prove that the head of a legal organisation must 
have been aware of certain acts, whereas the actions and inner workings of legal compa-
nies are more out in the open and better documented. It might be harder to prove that the 
actions of the subordinates of a criminal organisation are carried out with the knowledge 
of the head of the organisation, as was the case in the Hell´s Angel´s case. 
But what is the real relevance of the case law connected to the crash for cases of organised 
crime, assuming that the leader of a criminal organisation could be equated to an execu-
tive of a legal organisation? Comparing the Hells Angels case to cases connected to the 
crash I noticed that the charges against the head of Hells Angels and the CEO of Lands-
banki in the case discussed earlier were actually described in the same way in the indict-
ments in these cases – they were charged with crimes committed by others at their behest, 
that is with their knowledge and their will. Comparing these two cases you can see that 
they were essentially charged for quite similar behavior – for giving a go-ahead on the ex-
ecution of the crimes without giving direct instructions to commit them. In light of this I 
believe that the case law connected to the Icelandic bank crisis and the criminal liability of 
executives in these cases could be relevant for cases of organised crime. 
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In this article, I promote the possibility of making ‘activist science’, and more specifically, 
activist criminology. My argument is that criminology and activism are, indeed, compati-
ble and that, given the dynamics of current environmental conflicts, activist criminology in 
environmental issues is of critical importance to the discipline. As such, this article replies 
to the claims that activism and the production of knowledge must be clearly separated.  
 
Introduction 
 
In the discipline of criminology, Loader and Sparks (2011) consider  important debates 
around whether criminology should be (at least partly) purposely directed to the public, 
and if so, how to best interact with the public arena. They have proposed four ideal types 
of criminologists. They describe the ‘social movement theorist/activist type’, as one who 
critiques official agendas, raises problems for the government, and places her/his activity 
‘at the service of those marginalized on the basis of their class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality 
or age’ (Loader & Sparks, 2011, p. 33). In contrast, the ‘scientific expert type’ is said to be 
concerned with the production of ‘valid, reliable and useful knowledge about such matters 
as the distribution, causes and costs of crime’ but rejects the role played by some criminol-
ogists with ‘partisan political agendas and too little respect for research evidence’ (p. 30). 
More generally, they warn about the risk that an activist criminology runs of ‘suppressing 
what one knows, or what one says, for the sake of the cause’ (p. 141), and remind us that 
scientific experts ‘routinely breach their own firewalls and can be found lobbying politi-
cians in pursuit of their own preferred vision for reducing crime or doing justice’ (p. 135).   
 
Green criminology has sometimes made explicit calls for the implementation of an activist 
criminology. Here, green criminology is understood as the framework that draws on crim-
inological theories, concepts, and perspectives (Potter, 2010) in the study of transgressions 
against ecosystems, humans and non-human animals (White, 2012), produced in the inter-
action of human beings with their natural surroundings (Mol, Forthcoming). Green crimi-
nology has attempted to highlight instances of environmental degradation and destruc-
                                                 
1 This piece is based on the article ‘Green Activist Criminology and the Epistemologies of the South’ pub-
lished in Critical Criminology, issue 24, volume 4, 2016. The full version is found there.  
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tion, as well as to examine and analyse the causes thereof and contemplate the responses 
thereto. The fact that green criminology’s roots are in the critical criminology tradition 
(South, 2014) makes it prone to accusations of ‘one-sided research’ and an easy target for 
charges of bias. As Potter has stated, it is ‘inferred that green criminologists are on the 
“side” of nature. This leaves green criminology open to criticism for being overly ideologi-
cal and overtly political[ly]’ biased (2013, p. 125).  
 
All the above point to a set of important questions such as: ‘what is green criminological 
activism?’ ‘Are green criminologists always activists?’ ‘Is it possible to develop an intellec-
tual activism within green criminology without being biased?’ ‘Green criminological activ-
ism’ is defined here as the stance where, through engagement with environmental, ecolog-
ical or species justice, criminological knowledge and activity is placed at the service of 
those victimized on the basis of class, species, gender, sex, race, ethnicity or age; it involves 
a purposeful attempt to try to prevent such victimisation by making an impact in the so-
cial, political or cultural realms via research, teaching or service.  
 
The epistemologies of the South and the ‘scientific expert vs. activist ‘debate   
 
Dualities and tensions such as autonomy versus political interference; neutrality versus 
bias; objectivity versus the imposition of partisan political agendas; reliable methods and 
valid data versus little respect for evidence and one sided inquiry, mark an abstract line 
dividing two words: on one side, knowledge exists; on the other, it is invisible or worse, 
non-existent. Such dramatic consequences prompt questions about whether a scholar loses 
his/her ability to produce valid knowledge if committed to social, environmental, ecologi-
cal or species justice, and if his/her knowledge is put at the service of those marginalized.  
But are there other ways of producing high quality knowledge?  
 
Epistemologies of the South, and Southern Theory 
 
The epistemologies of the North or the South do not make reference to geographical loca-
tions, but to political orientations. Epistemologies of the North2—for example, anthropo-
centrism, capitalism, colonialism, patriarchy—make invisible and impose silence. Thinkers 
raised by and in the North do not necessarily end up adhering to the North project and 
can be allies of the South, and thus help to create an globally interconnected ‘ecology of 
knowledges’ where different kinds of knowledge, including those of the North, are valued 
                                                 
2 Hereafter, I use the terms ‘North’ and ‘South’ when using the ideas of the epistemologies of the North and 
the South, and thus when referring to cultural and political orientations. Conversely, I use ‘global North’ or 
‘global South’ when making reference to Southern Theories, and consequently talking about geographical 
locations.   
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and respected. The ‘non-occidentalist west’, described by Santos (Santos, 2014, pp. 99-135), 
is proof of this. The South, then, is a metaphor for the periphery (Carrington, Hogg, & 
Sozzo, 2015) and can be located  anywhere in the world, and resists by sharing a redistrib-
utive ethos, struggling for the recognition that different ways of knowing, not only that 
validated by the North, exist.  This metaphorical ‘South’ encompasses a diversity of beings 
(human and non-human), a diversity of origins (including some raised in the North), vari-
ous destinations, and diverging approaches. The knowledge of the Southern is necessary 
and urgent: it is eclectic and pragmatic, it is not separated from life, and it intends to se-
cure rights and lives.  
 
Autonomy vs. political interferences 
 
Bourdieu (2003) describes academic activity in terms of immersion in a structured field, 
wherein actors frame the field and, at the same time, the field determines the possibilities 
of the actors and imposes a habitus, whose importance will be explained below. Bourdieu 
acknowledges the existence of political relations within a field of power struggles for the 
acquisition of ‘scientific credit’, but he differentiates these political relations from what 
happens in the wider political realm. The recognition that the existence of power relations 
does not immediately eliminate autonomy, however, helps us to erase the line that ex-
cludes activist science from valid science. Power relations can exist without deterministi-
cally compromising autonomy. This is more so taking into account that the South is not a 
unity but a diversity—the origins of the people of the South are as varied as are their desti-
nations, beliefs and hopes. The shared oppression they all suffer from the North is the only 
reason why it is possible to refer to them as the South—as a group (Santos, 2014). Conse-
quently, even within the South there are many diverse interests and needs.  
 
Neutrality vs. bias 
 
The concept of neutrality refers to an idealised approach to a phenomenon that one re-
searches, and it tacitly suggests that one should not have any preconceptions about the 
object of inquiry. The research process, however, does not escape from the everyday life 
practice in which we interpret reality and behave within it according to the set of mean-
ings embedded in our minds by culture and the material contexts in which we live 
(Wallner, 1994). As Katja Franko Aas pointed out ‘no social group, nation state, social 
movement (and we might add discipline) “can subsist without a working knowledge of 
the definition and qualities of its territory, of its environment, of its “situated identity”’ 
(Aas, 2012, p. 6). In spite of this, the knowledge produced by the North represents itself as 
‘universal, timeless and placeless’. The ideal of a neutral scientific expert is an epistemo-
logical naivety that could furthermore have repercussions in producing de-contextualized 
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knowledge, influencing what is ‘valid’ knowledge and how can it be gained, or taking ar-
bitrary decisions over what represents a social problem.. Being allied with the marginal-
ized, impoverished and oppressed produces as much bias as being allied with metropoli-
tan knowledge biases. Consequently, the debate should recognize the impossibility of neu-
trality and avoid presuming the invalidity of knowledge based on where loyalty lies. With 
this reasoning, ‘neutrality’ should disappear as a line that divides valid and invalid 
knowledge. 
 
Reliable methods and the derived valid data vs. little respect for evidence and one sided 
inquiry 
 
Using personal experience over ‘compelling evidence’ has been termed ‘anecdotal logical 
fallacy’ (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Indeed, Gadd and colleagues (2012: 2) warn 
that ‘unless we clearly articulate what constitutes good methodological practice we could 
well witness the compromising of the critical distance researchers need to pose big ques-
tions, to establish research designs, and to contemplate competing interpretations of re-
search data’.  For the production of knowledge to be validated by Western science de-
mands proof that the researcher knows and is capable of applying recognized and validated 
methods. Nevertheless, what is considered to be a reliable method and what counts as ev-
idence entails elements of interpretation, subjectivity and politics. There are many exam-
ples of knowledge acquired through non-Western methods, however. One of these is the 
chagra—‘a space of socio-ecological production where human and non-human communi-
ties intervene, cohabiting and collaborating and thus mutually intervening in its material 
and immaterial becoming’ (Vargas Roncancio, 2011, p. 1). The chagra has now been recog-
nized as the habitat for medicinal plants, the source of food for 50 million people in Amer-
ica, and a place where biodiversity flourishes (Vargas Roncancio, 2011). This example 
shows that for knowledge to be valid—as in convincing, legitimate and usable—it does 
not require ‘validated methods’—those endorsed by a subset of researchers within a spe-
cific geopolitical (or geo-academic) part of the world. If science is about understanding 
and interpreting the world, and not about imposing views, a variety of methods3—not on-
ly those authorized by Western science—should count as means for generating evidence.    
The ‘nature’ of truth and knowledge 
 
Truth is a concept that in Western epistemology equals valid knowledge and is represent-
                                                 
3 The reference to ‘a variety of methods’ may seem too broad in formulation. Spatial restrictions render it 
impossible to offer more than an example. The idea of a variety of methods applies not only to the collection 
of material/experience, but also to the ways of analyzing it and transmitting it. In the case of knowledge 
transmission, an excellent example is the use of myths and tales to pass along knowledge through verbal 
means—something that has been seen often as mere superstitions and folklore.  
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ed in metropolitan discourses produced mainly in the north as the product of an autono-
mous and objective analysis of evidence collected through valid methods from a neutral 
point of view. Interestingly, epistemologies, including Western science, are also social con-
structions derived from social and material contexts that indicate ‘the conditions of what 
counts as valid knowledge’ (Santos, 2009a, p. 9). Within the plural social and material 
conditions of the world, infinite epistemologies with their own conditions for valid 
knowledge appear and disappear as a consequence of the apparent univocal ontological 
nature of truth. It is impossible to refer to a single truth or a unique set of conditions for 
valid knowledge, hence, the questions of the teleology of truth and knowledge appear: 
Why do we seek knowledge? For what purpose(s) do we want (the) knowledge?  
 
The importance of an ‘activist criminology’ attuned to harms and injustices 
 
The epistemologies of the South and Southern theories give further reasons as to why 
knowledge produced by activists is as valid and reliable as knowledge produced by self-
described methods of ‘scientific researchers’. Such knowledge is not only valid but also 
important in the development of a green criminology that contemplates responses to envi-
ronmental degradation and destruction. At least three lines of reasoning can be advanced.  
 
a. Deeper and contextualized knowledge of the issues  
Putting our knowledge to the service of the marginalized means recognizing that the per-
ceptions marginalized groups have and the demands they make are considered valuable 
and legitimate. Acknowledging the legitimacy of the knowledge of marginalized groups’ 
implies recognizing that non-Western-validated methods are sometimes able to produce 
deeper knowledge than Western methods. This recognition prevents us from losing valu-
able knowledge that might be discarded for being ‘un-scientific’. As Hall states ‘With 
scholarly commentary and more activist-inspired critique often overlapping in the green 
domain, we will see … how green criminology is … likely to challenge established notions 
of who collects our data as well as how those data are collected’ (Hall, Forthcoming). The 
practice of advancing academic knowledge by the interaction with the knowledges of the 
marginalized and impoverished should be permeated by a teleological activist practice in 
which the end is not science or knowledge in itself but the prevention of harm. ‘In the past 
as well as in the present there is, therefore, an innate “arrogance” in most criminology, a 
discipline which needs “informants” not peers, a type of social enquiry that needs to teach 
others in what contexts they are situated, which the others presumably ignore’ .  
 
b. Coherence with the raison d’être of criminology  
Disciplines in Western science gained legitimacy for what they could contribute to “real” 
life (Santos, 2014). The case of criminology is not different: it emerged as a discipline that 
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had the aim of producing knowledge about events that affect the lives of citizens and pre-
vention of undesirable acts (Garland, 2002). Later, it was found that relying solely on what 
is officially defined as a ‘crime’ neglects many of the most serious situations that deprive 
people of their potential and thus a perspective based on harm rather than on state-
defined “crime” was developed  (Hillyard et al., 2004; Hillyard & Tombs, 2013). Green 
criminology has not only adopted this perspective but has also expanded the category of 
victimhood to include the ecosystem and non-human animals (Hall, 2011, 2012, 2014; 
Sollund, 2013). To adopt a harm perspective is to accept that it is impossible to enumerate 
exhaustively all the situations that impair the health of humans, non-humans and the eco-
system (Lynch, Long, Barret, & Stretesky, 2013). From this line of reasoning, two im-
portant considerations can be deduced: first, an activist stance in which perceptions of vic-
timized individuals are taken as valid knowledge is the only way to coherently implement 
a harm perspective, where what is considered a problem is not imposed by researchers but 
dialectically built with the prominent participation of the victims. Second, if criminology is 
to fulfill the agenda through which it has gained social legitimacy then ideas with a clear 
end, instead of ideas that can be used as means for any end, are required.  
 
c. Reassert the validity of plural ways of knowing 
Global justice is about eliminating abysses where those on the surface have many privileg-
es and those in the abyss are neglected. Abysses are created in many ways, one of which is 
the hierarchy of knowledge, which places scientific knowledge on the top and the 
knowledge of others at the bottom. Eliminating the chasm between epistemologies is a 
step towards justice, and as such global justice depends on global cognitive justice (Santos, 
2009b, 2014). Closeness to, and recognition of, the marginalized is a pre-condition of theo-
rizing and achieving justice. Much green harm has followed the imposition of a particular 
way of knowing and the silencing of other ways. Controlling what is valid knowledge 
means controlling what is real, what problems deserve attention, what terms to use to de-
bate them, and what  ways can be used to solve them (Foucault, 1991, 2001). Brisman 
(2012, 2013) has put forward the argument that the cultures of silence created through re-
strictions on access to information reduces the likelihood of a will and possibility of con-
testing environmental harm.  
Conclusions  
 
Using examples from Latin America, this article has argued that the knowledge produced 
by green activist criminology is not only valid but also enormously valuable. This debate 
needs to be taken further; instead of just engaging in debates regarding validity, we must 
consider how to overcome the difficulties of being an activist criminologist inside universi-
ties, which tend to reflect traditional arrangements and understandings regarding what is 
and is not ‘acceptable’ knowledge (Christie, Forthcoming ; Santos, 2014). 
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Säkerhet för lönsamma kunder: ordning, styrning och bestraff-
ning av försäkringsbedrägerier 
 
Anders Stenström 
 
Inledning 
 
Risk har under de senaste trettio åren växt fram som ett central begrepp och styrnings-
princip inom brottsbekämpning och bestraffning av brott (se exempelvis Ericson & Hag-
gerty, 1997; Johnston & Shearing, 2003: Crawford, 2005). Målet är inte längre att lösa brott 
och bestraffa förövare utan i stället att – i allt större utsträckning – identifiera och för-
hindra att risker omvandlas till brott (se exempelvis Feeley & Simon, 1992; Simon, 1997). 
Parallellt med denna utveckling har ansvaret för säkerhet förskjutits från staten till privata 
aktörer (South, 1988; Jones & Newburn, 1998) och i dessa neoliberala styrningslogiker an-
vänder stater i allt större utsträckning civilrättsliga och administrativa åtgärder snarare än 
straffrätten (Zedner, 2016).  
 
Trots att forskning inom detta fält har ökat förståelsen för neoliberala former av polisar-
bete och bestraffning är relationen mellan risk, polisarbete och bestraffning inom privata 
säkerhetsorganisationer ett område som kräver mer uppmärksamhet. Mer specifikt saknas 
det studier som utforskar och analyserar hur risk och ansvar sprids inom organisationer 
samt hur de roller som görs ansvariga för att identifiera och hantera risker också själva 
hanteras som risker. I detta paper beskrivs hur mål och teknologier associerad med ”the 
new penology” (Feeley & Simon, 1992) inte endast går att applicera på hanteringen av 
gärningspersoner utan även för att förstå reglering och styrning inom säkerhetsorganisat-
ioner (försäkringsbolag). För att öka förståelsen för hur sådana tekniker genomsyrar olika 
former av riskhantering och därmed den betydelsen som begreppet säkerhet, polisarbete 
och bestraffning ges genom praktik är det därför av central betydelse att utforska hur pri-
vata polisiära roller styrs, disciplineras, kontrolleras, belönas och bestraffas.  
 
Försäkringsbranschen har vid sidan av staten en helt central roll i samhällets skapande av 
säkerhet. Många människor har ett antal såväl frivilliga (hemförsäkring, bilförsäkring, 
olycksfallsförsäkring) som obligatoriska försäkringar (socialförsäkringen) och påverkas 
därmed av försäkringsbolagens agerande. Försäkringsbolag har betydande resurser som 
bland annat används för att övervaka, styra och bestraffa försäkringstagare (Ericson et al, 
2003; Ericson & Doyle, 2003). Hur det går till i praktiken är dock ett outforskat fält. Och 
trots att forskningen om privata säkerhetsaktörer är ett växande internationellt forsk-
ningsområde saknas det studier som behandlar hur privata företag hanterar sina egna sä-
kerhetsavdelningar (Button & Brooks, 2014).  
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Baserat på 38 kvalitativa intervjuer med representanter från de sju största försäkringsbola-
gen i Sverige sammanfattar och diskuterar detta paper dessa frågor. En viktig utgångs-
punkt är att uppmärksamma hur organiseringen av makt (Hörnqvist, 2010) formar hur 
försäkringsbolag hanterar bedrägerier och därmed den sociala konstruktionen av denna 
brottstyp. Mer specifik fokuseras den roll som bestraffning spelar i den säkerhet som för-
säkringsbolag skapar för försäkringstagare. Papret påvisar förekomsten av ett system som 
genererar ett ömsesidigt ansvarstagande bland försäkringstagare, skadereglerare och för-
säkringsinspektörer att inte agera på ett sätt som hotar försäkringsbolagens vinst. Olön-
samma försäkringstagare klassificeras som ”dåliga” eller klandervärda utifrån ett antal 
outtalade riskkriterier och bestraffas i första hand genom civilrättsliga åtgärder. Försäk-
ringsbolag använder även tekniker för att identifiera ”dåliga” och ansvariga anställda. En 
konsekvens blir att normalitet kopplas samman med vinst samtidigt som avvikelser bland 
försäkringstagare och anställda synliggörs och hanteras genom mer eller mindre subtila 
former av bestraffning.  
 
Risk, polisarbete och försäkring 
 
Med utgångspunkten att vi lever i ett risksamhälle har forskare konstaterat hur brottspre-
vention, försäkringstekniska metoder (aktuariell rättvisa), övervakning och förebyggande 
arbete har växt fram som centrala strategier för att hantera brott (Ericson & Haggerty, 
1997; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Garland, 2001). Inom detta ramverk har bestraffning 
framställts som en strategi bland flera andra för att skapa säkerhet (Shearing, 2001). Fors-
kare har även framhållit vikten av att röra sig bort från att likställa bestraffning med fäng-
else för att i stället utforska andra former av straff (Zedner, 2009, 2016). Straffet fortsätter 
att vara en viktig symbol för statens makt och som sådan ett uttryck för kollektiva etiska 
principer (Garland, 1996), men det är inte endast stater som tillfogar människor pinor 
(Genders, 2002; Johnston & Kilty, 2016). Ansvar och straff har ofta diskuterats i relation till 
rättvisa som mål för rättsväsendet (Ward & Kupchik, 2009), men frågan hur privata säker-
hetsaktörer sprider ansvar för risker och infogar pinor är ett område som kräver mer 
forskning. Trots att forskare har konstaterat att det idag mer eller mindre en truism att 
hävda att staten inte är den enda auktoriteten som producerar säkerhet har kopplingen 
mellan privata säkerhetsaktörers reglering av brott och vinst fått mindre uppmärksamhet 
(se Rigakos, 2002).  
 
Försäkringsbolagens centrala position i samhället har inte speglats av ett forskningsmäss-
igt intresse (Baker & Simon, 2002). Det är en brist då försäkringsbolag styr och skapar kun-
skap om stora segment av populationen (Ericson et al, 2003), fungerar som en grindvakt 
för andra institutioner (Heimer, 2002), sprider risker (Baker, 2002) och har delegerad makt 
från staten (Baker & Simon, 2002). Försäkringar genomsyrar med andra ord den privata 
sfären på ett påtagligt sätt (O’Malley, 1991). Med utgångspunkt i en Foucauldiansk förstå-
else av begreppet disciplin kan försäkringar även ses som ett system för att ingjuta nor-
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mer, påverka beteenden och övervaka efterlevnaden av regler (Simon, 1988). Men det är 
viktigt att notera att denna disciplinära funktion inte endast gäller i förhållande till försäk-
ringstagare utan även för olika roller inom försäkringsorganisationer (Baker, 2002; Ericson 
& Doyle, 2003).   
 
Teoretiskt sett ska försäkringsbolag – precis som alla andra slags organisationer – ses som 
ett försök att skapa ordning i en kaotisk omvärld (jfr. Weber, 1978). Denna ordning upp-
rätthålls genom skapandet och övervakningen av organisatoriska gränser, och försäk-
ringsbolag använder en rad olika tekniker för att överblicka och kontrollera det flöde av 
människor, resurser och information som korsar dess gränser. En helt central cirkulations-
punkt för försäkringsbolagen är skaderegleringen, dvs. den process där bolagen tar emot 
och fattar beslut om att ersätta en skada eller inte. Som framgår nedan är det en punkt som 
kontrolleras genom såväl direkt som indirekt övervakning (Foucault, 1977; Perrow, 1986). 
Till exempel integreras kontrollen (jfr. Rose, 2000) i aktiviteter, i datorprogram och i arbet-
sytans utformning.   
 
Metod 
 
Detta paper bygger på 38 intervjuer med representanter från svenska försäkringsbolag. 
Intervjuerna genomfördes under perioden 2014–2015 och varade i fyrtiofem minuter till 
två timmar. Alla intervjuer utom fem spelades in och transkriberades. Intervjudeltagare 
(skadereglerare, försäkringsinspektörer, representanter från marknadsavdelningar, chefer) 
rekryterades genom ett snöbollsurval där en deltagare rekommenderade en annan. Inter-
vjuerna kretsade kring ett antal teman, men deltagarna uppmuntrades även att lyfta fram 
ämnen som de själva ansåg vara av betydelse för att öka förståelsen för deras arbete med 
att identifiera och hantera bedrägerier. Följande teman diskuterades: arbetsmetoder, 
kommunikation, kunskapsarbete och uppföljning. Analysen skedde i tre steg. Först lästes 
alla transkriberingar igenom och kodades rad för rad. I nästa steg sorterades koderna in 
under bredare teman, vilka sedan användes i den tredje analysfasen då artikeln som detta 
paper bygger på skrevs.  
 
Resultat och slutsatser 
 
Analysen visar hur kontroll och bestraffning ingjuter ett gemensamt ansvarstagande för 
vinst hos både försäkringstagare och anställda. Studien visar även hur straff används för 
att hantera avvikelser från denna norm. Det framstår som särskilt tydligt att försäkringsin-
spektörer (försäkringsbolagens egen polisiära utredningsresurs) kontrolleras genom att 
vara beroende av information från skadereglerare, vars arbete i sin tur övervakas och kon-
trolleras omsorgsfullt av ledningen. Studien visar även hur säkerhet skapas genom att för-
säkringstagare bedöms utifrån kriterier som inte är en del av försäkringsvillkoren (exem-
pelvis deras skadehistorik, antal skador och skadornas värde). Sådana informella kriterier 
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används i kombination med övervakning och civilrätten för att skapa kunskap om försäk-
ringspopulationen.   
 
Dessa slutsatser kastar nytt ljus över hur populationer och privatägda polisiära resurser 
styrs för att skapa säkerhet, och resultaten har även implikationer för vår förståelse av hur 
straff används. I en riskbaserad kontext används punitiva tekniker för att kontrollera bete-
enden inom båda dessa kategorier (försäkringstagare/anställda). Det inkluderar inte end-
ast panoptisk övervakning (Rigakos, 2002) utan även användningen av indirekt kontroll 
(Perrow, 1986) där kontrollen designas in i arbetsprocesser (Rose, 2000). Att kompensera 
skador innebär inte bara en kontroll av de summor som betalas ut utan även en kontroll 
av skadereglerares arbete vilket i sig skapar kunskap om och synliggör oönskade beteen-
den som kan bestraffas. Med andra ord är det viktigt att inte enbart likställa straff med 
straffrätt och fängelse utan även fokusera hur civilrätt och hanteringen av avvikande an-
ställda även medför pinor (jfr. Zedner, 2009) och bidrar till att skapa kunskap om bedräge-
rier.  
 
För försäkringstagare innebär de praktiker som uppmärksammats i denna text att bilden 
av den säkerhet som företag säljer skiljer sig från hur den produceras i praktiken. Försäk-
ringstagare köper säkerhet från ekonomisk förlust samtidigt som bolagen hanterar kunder 
som risker (och då inte främst i bemärkelsen att de byter bolag utan i stället med fokus på 
deras beteenden). Säkerhet ges med andra ord olika betydelser. Givetvis handlar det om 
att kompensera ekonomiska förluster, men säkerhet blir även en frihet från övervakning 
och kontroll bland de ”bra” segmenten av populationen (dvs. för lönsamma kunder) vilka 
”skyddas” genom att ”dåliga” kunder kontrolleras och bestraffas. Fokus på skadehistorik 
medför även att kunder i behov av ”för mycket” säkerhet exkluderas och bestraffas av för-
säkringsbolagen.   
 
Genom att säkerhet likställs med vinst visar studien att försäkringsbedrägerier inte fullt ut 
kan förklaras utan att ta hänsyn till relationer inom försäkringsbolagen. Detta handlar inte 
enbart om att bolag placerar försäkringstagare i riskpooler (King, 2013; Ericson, 2003); det 
handlar även om att fokusera på hur makt organiseras för att förklara selektionen och 
klassificeringen av ”bedrägeri” och ”bedragare” vilket är omständigheter som inte synlig-
görs i kvantifieringar av försäkringsbedrägeriers omfattning. Studien bidrar även till en 
pågående debatt om relationen mellan privata och offentliga säkerhetsaktörer (se Johnston 
& Shearing, 2003; Loader & Walker, 2007) då försäkringsbolagen främst använder civil-
rättsliga metoder och undviker att polisanmäla misstänkta brott eftersom det är ett mer 
ekonomiskt sätt att utöva makt och bestraffa försäkringstagare. Det medför dock att de 
skydd som den misstänkte omgärdas av i den straffrättsliga processen undanröjs (exem-
pelvis bevisbörda och beviskrav).  
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WORKSHOP F 
SEXUAL OFFENCES 
Cause-Effect-Responsibility? The parties of sexual crime as re-
sponsible actors discussed in the opinion column of a Finnish 
newspaper. 
 
Johanna Kronstedt-Rousi 
 
The presentation and this paper are based on the following article: 
Kronstedt-Rousi, J. & Kotanen, R. (2015). Syy-seuraus-vastuu? Seksuaalisrikosten osapuo-
let vastuullisina toimijoina Helsingin Sanomien mielipidekirjoituksissa. Psykologia 50(6), 
418-432.  
 
Introduction 
 
Understandings concerning the limits of sexual self-regulation and sexual crime are 
formed both by the cultural and historical context and tightly bound to their own time in 
history, societal atmosphere and values (Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 2000). The historical past of 
the definitions are easily detectable in the legislation of sexual crimes as well as in peoples’ 
attitudes. Although today, the object of protection is the victim and his or her sexual self-
regulation, the relation between the offender and the victim still affects the reaction to 
sexual violence. If the offender and the victim know each other from earlier, it does have 
an impact on if the sexual assault is identified as a crime and the severity of the punish-
ment of it (e.g. Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 2000). The ideal type of a victim is a young, sexually 
inexperienced, drug free girl, who lives a socially honourable life (e.g. Ehrlich, 2001), and 
her credibility is enhanced if she does not know the offender and has visible physical inju-
ries that are a result of the struggle when defending herself during the sexual assault (Joki-
la, 2008).  
 
The understandings concerning the credible victim and the so called ‘rape myths’ are still 
keeping alive the historically problematical habit of concentrating on the victim’s charac-
teristics and behaviour instead of focusing on the offender. Rape myths are widely spread 
beliefs that serve to keep women responsible for men’s sexual behaviour, leading to the 
notion that women should control men’s sexual behaviour by controlling their own behav-
iour. Rape myths are perceived to justify men’s sexual aggression towards women as well 
as reduce blame (Sleath & Woodhams, 2014). For instance, the impression that women can 
not be raped against their will is still influencing the way a victim’s credibility is measured 
by searching for physical injuries that would be a result of struggle during the rape, or 
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inversely, how much violence the offender has used during the rape (Jokila, 2008; Ward, 
1995).  
 
Questions concerning the relation between responsibility, blame and sexual crime has 
been studied by using for example attribution theory (e.g. Ward, 1995; Workman & Free-
burg, 1999). Mostly attribution theory has been used to analyse the relation between the 
victim’s behaviour and her responsibility (Anderson, Beattle & Spencer, 2001; van der 
Bruggen & Grubb, 2014). For example, the victim’s interpreted ‘provocative’ behaviour, 
earlier sexual relations, intoxication level and emotional state after the sexual assault has 
been found to influence people’s perception of the offenders guilt and the victim’s partici-
pation in the crime. In the notably fewer cases where the focus has been on the offender, 
the research questions have mostly examined the amount of force the offender used dur-
ing the assault as well as how premeditated the act was (Ward, 1995). 
 
In the study presented at the seminar, we examine the construction of responsibility in 
opinion writings published during the 21st century in the Finnish newspaper with largest 
circulation. Our aim is to pay attention to who is held responsible and what causes and 
explanations are connected to the responsibility discussed in the opinion writings. The 
research material, which consists of 73 (N) writings, have been published in the newspa-
per Helsingin Sanomat during the 21st century. Attribution theory is used both as a theo-
retical frame and partly as a methodological tool. We are expanding the analytical per-
spective to not only include micro-level actors (offender and victim) but to also include 
macro-level actors such as the society and institutions and their role in our material. 
 
Theoretical background 
 
Attribution theory concentrates on analysing people’s common sense explanations to dif-
ferent acts and behaviour (Hewstone, 1983). According to Heider (1958), people have an 
internal need to understand the reasons behind their own and others’ behaviour as well as 
everyday acts. In everyday thinking, explanations to acts and behaviour are found either 
in the actor and his/her characteristics and personality, or in the situation, which is influ-
enced by the surrounding environment (Heider, 1958). The former explanation strategy is 
called dispositional (personal) attribution, and the latter situational attribution (Hewstone, 
1983). Attributions are especially used when acts and behaviours deviate from the normal. 
When something exceptional - such as a crime - occurs, the act is first defined and thereaf-
ter, in accordance to social norms, an explanation for the act is negotiated. This negotiated 
explanation then works as the base upon which necessary consequences, such as punish-
ments and other sanctions, are built (Lloyd-Bollock, 1983).  
 
According to Shaver (1985), the understandings linked to causality include an implicit 
supposition that the cause or reason is time wise situated prior to the act being explained. 
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To hold an actor responsible for an act, a cause-effect relation between the actor and act is 
required, furthermore the effect needs to be at least partly due to the behaviour of the ac-
tor, and finally the actor must have done the deed voluntarily (Shaver, 1985). According to 
Weiner (1995), the amount of responsibility one can be held to depends on if the act was 
intended or a result of neglect (omission). For one to be able to hold an actor fully respon-
sible for an act, there cannot be any mitigating circumstances or factors. Mitigating cir-
cumstances are in a particularly important position during trials, where the assessed 
amount of responsibility is in direct connection to the severity of the punishment (Weiner, 
1995).  
 
Research concerning society’s responsibility in relation to sexual crime has been largely 
neglected, but not unheard of. For example Howard (1984) has to some extent moved be-
yond the individual level and taken society’s role into consideration by reflecting over 
how stereotypes, presumptions and beliefs - such as rape myths and understandings con-
cerning gender roles - affect how people act and how actions are being evaluated. Many 
studies  do however include prevailing assumptions of the indirect effect the society has 
on the actors in question. Beyond examining the responsibility distributed to the offender 
and the victim, this study includes the areas of responsibilities distributed to the society in 
the opinion writings. The research questions this study aims to answer are: 1) how under-
standings concerning responsibility is constructed in the writings where causes and expla-
nations to sexual crime are produced, 2) who is held responsible and 3) how the under-
standings concerning responsibility are changing in relation to who is held responsible for 
the sexual crime. 
 
Material and method 
 
The research material consists of 73 (N) opinion writings that have been published in the 
largest Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat. The data has been collected from the 
newspaper’s digital archive using keywords such as *rape, *sexual crime, and *victim. 
Writings concerning prostitution, pimping and trafficking as well as writings concerning 
rape and sexual crime in other countries than Finland were excluded. The material has 
been collected from three different time periods: 2002-2003 (27 pieces), 2007-2008 (31 piec-
es) and 2012-2013 (15 pieces). Most of the writings (46 pieces) were written by a woman. 
Experts in the field, such as therapists, psychiatrists, psychologists, legal scholars and re-
searchers, were actively participating in the discussion. The greatest limitation of the re-
search material is its selectivity. The material has been selected both when collecting the 
data and by the newspaper editors according to their criteria, and therefore the material 
can not be seen to represent any specific social group. The material can however been in-
terpreted as an example that, in spite of its limitations, offers insight on how Finnish peo-
ple explain sexual crime as a phenomenon, what causes it and what are the consequences.  
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The research material consists of qualitative texts, and the research method can be de-
scribed as a theory-driven qualitative content analysis. (e.g. Patton, 2002). While doing the 
analysis, we concentrated systematically on finding interpretations of responsibility and 
the distribution of responsibility as well as concentrating on how the interpretation and 
distribution affect the explanations presented. After selecting which writings would form 
the research material, the material was coded using ATLAS.ti. Oriented by the perspec-
tives provided by attribution theory, our attention was driven to different ways and prac-
tices that the writers produced meaning and views on who should be responsible for both 
the sexual crime itself and the consequences they bring. We focused among other things 
on examining the production of cause-effect relations and the contradictions involved 
when discussing the question of who was and could be held responsible. Furthermore, we 
examined the usage of dispositional and situational attributions as either complete or par-
tial explanations for the sexual crime and how these different forms of explanations affect-
ed the formation of responsibility. 
 
Results 
 
In the analysis, we examined the attribution of responsibility and the explanation strate-
gies related to the negotiation. The opinion writings that unequivocally spoke for the vic-
tim’s innocence and the offender’s guilt were put in a marginal position in the examina-
tion. It is also worth noting that the discussion in the material is dominated by the suppo-
sition that the offender is a stranger to the victim, although writings concerning sexual 
assault in relationships were not excluded from the material. 
 
The offender’s responsibility 
 
The discussion concerning the offender’s responsibilities in sexual crime is fairly one di-
mensional and scarce, especially in the opinion pieces where the victim is an adult woman. 
The discussion concerning what the offender is held responsible for mainly relates to the 
time when the crime occurs. The majority of the opinion writers holds the offender re-
sponsible for performing the crime. However, only two writings associates the responsibil-
ity of the offender with the preceding decision to commit the crime, and next extract is 
from one of these writings:  
 
“The rapers have chosen to rape knowing, that [the crime] has consequences. The conse-
quences does however seem to be of fleeing nature, at least in Eastern Finland. By forcing 
someone to a sexual act, the rapist deprives the victim from self-autonomy in the cruelest 
way. […] My little sister’s rapist was never caught. Her rapist can still enjoy life, a joy he 
stole from my sister. The victims whose rapists have been caught should be entitled to jus-
tice […] the verdict should be at least reasonable taken into account the amount of the vic-
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tim’s suffering. Still, the rapists will never feel the pain and life-shattering that the victim 
experiences and feels for the rest of her life. (name missing, HS 11.11.2003) 
 
A third of the opinion writings in the material deals with sexual abuse of minors and in-
cest. Understandings concerning the responsibility of the offender guilty of sexual crime 
changes considerably when the victim is a child or a young person. Because of the inno-
cence and vulnerability of the child, the consequences are interpreted as clearly more 
damaging than when the victim is an adult. Through a child’s inability to defend her- or 
himself, a clear difference between to the adult victims vulnerability is constructed. The 
results are well in line with the Norwegian criminologist’s, Nils Christie’s (1986), much 
used concept of the ‘ideal victim’. Ideal victims are victims who’s legitimisation to be 
granted the status of a victim by the society or the justice system is rarely questioned, such 
as the elderly and children. 
 
In many opinion writings, the offender of sexual crime against children is defined as a sick 
person, whose illness appears in the form of deviant sexuality. Although the illness ap-
pears to be the reason for the crime, especially in the case of sexual assault against chil-
dren, it is not perceived as a mitigating circumstance for responsibility. When the victim is 
a child, the offender’s responsibility stays intact, even though the offender’s acts are per-
ceived to be, at least to some extent, beyond the offender’s possibility to control (due to the 
illness) and therefore not completely voluntary (cf. Weiner, 1995). Especially in health care 
experts’ writings, the rehabilitation of sexual offenders and importance of treatment is 
highlighted. The responsibility for treating the illness is in the data addressed to society, 
leading to a shift of part of the responsibility from the offender to society. 
 
The victim’s responsibility 
 
The discussion concerning the responsibility of an adult, female victim of sexual crime is 
abundant. Where children fall nicely into the category of ideal victims and the lack of 
agency is attributed to the level of development as well as need for support and help 
stemming from the child’s vulnerability, the adult female victim of sexual crime is in the 
opinion column discussion expected to show very active and strong agency. The writing 
that the next extract is from had the explicit objective to offer potential victims instructions 
on how to avoid getting raped. The writing defined women to be potential victims of sex-
ual crime, especially because of the female sex and the characteristics attached to female 
gender.  
 
“The victim’s actions are of paramount importance for preventing crime (…) Nobody yelps 
when the police instructs people to take their wallets out of the back pocket of their pants in 
case of thieves, or recommend you to lock your bicycles. But heaven preserve if you tell a 
woman that it is not safe to pass out in a park or advice against going home with a group of 
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strange men you just met drunk in the street, then you are told that you are guilt-tripping 
women. We need to stop being so hysterically sensitive about blaming. It is perfectly 
healthy to feel guilty if you have not taken care of yourself and your safety. Where I come 
from, that is also called taking responsibility. Of course, you are only responsible of what 
state you put yourself in. If someone rapes or takes sexual advantage of a drunken woman, 
that person is of course responsible for the crime he has committed. When talking about 
preventing measures against sexual crime, you can not forget the victim’s intoxication lev-
el, as it is the most prominent common denominator. Sexual crime is one of the reasons why 
a woman can not drink [alcohol] as a man. (W, Detective senior sergeant, HS, 26.5.2002)  
 
A central point of the writing is the potential victim’s preparation in case of the occurrence 
of a sexual crime. The responsibility for becoming a victim is attached to a larger goal of 
the Finnish crime policy, which takes form as a kind of civil obligation. Failure to perform 
this obligation is, according to the writer, a valid reason to feel guilty. The detective senior 
sergeant’s writings and other statements in the material that use the same logic are analog 
with the routine activity theory developed in the end of the 1970’s (Cohen & Felson, 1979). 
The theory is based on the idea of crime as an everyday, normal activity that occurs in dif-
ferent, daily situations. Criminality is not so much perceived as bad or abnormal, but ra-
ther as opportunities produced by everyday actions. According to Cohen and Felson 
(1979), for a crime to occur, an offender who is motivated to perform a crime, as well as a 
potential victim that has not done the required measures to protect him/herself from the 
crime, are required. Routine activity theory provides the offender with both dispositional 
and situational attributions for committing a crime, but solutions to prevent crime only to 
the latter. Therefore in theory, the modes of prevention are reduced to actions occurring 
on a microlevel, where the potential victims of crime are in a key role.  
 
Victims of sexual crimes are indeed in the material held responsible for actions related to 
being prepared for the crime. Potential victims (women) are being offered very concrete 
advice in the form of the alteration of behaviour to prevent being raped. These advice in-
clude avoiding certain (unsafe) areas in certain (male) company at a certain time of the day 
(night), as well as conservative and unsexy dressing. Women are also advised to take self-
defence lessons and in advance practise how to act in case of ending up in a potential 
crime situation. The victim is in many comments held responsible for her level of intoxica-
tion, and therefore implicitly also for falling victim for sexual crime. As the connection be-
tween the level of intoxication and becoming a victim is often highlighted in the writings, 
it is specifically the combination of drunkenness and sex/gender that presents special risk 
for becoming a victim. The previous extract from the detective senior sergeant’s writing is 
a good example of this tendency.  
 
The areas of responsibility addressed to adult victims of sexual crime are not restricted in 
the writings to involving things done or left undone prior to the crime. Many writers pro-
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vide detailed advice on how the victim of rape should react and act during the attempt of 
rape. For example, in the writings the victims are encouraged to resist the offender and 
resort to different means of self-defence, such as running away, screaming and fighting off 
the offender. After the crime, the victim is in the writings also expected to actively get help 
for her recovery and report the crime. Urging the victims to report the crime is under-
standable as the action of the victim - informing the police, providing information and 
witnessing - construct a very central part of the justice system’s functions (Carrabine, Lee, 
South, Cox & Plummer, 2008, p. 157-158). The victim’s feelings of guilt and shame, a close 
relationship with the offender as well as fear for inappropriate treatment during the crime 
process are reasons that make it harder for the victim to report the crime (Kainulainen, 
2006).  
 
The society’s responsibility 
 
The discussion is concerning societal responsibility is in the material wide and character-
ised by a lack of precision. For example the society’s responsibility to protect is expressed 
in a passive from, failing to target any specific actor. In these cases, responsibility is ad-
dressed by writing that ‘women need to be protected’ or ‘the city needs to be kept safe’. 
The discussion concerning the preventative responsibility addressed to society includes 
the same logic as found in the earlier presented routine activity theory: a crime will not 
occur, unless an opportunity for it is presented, for example a suitable place or space. For 
adult victims, the responsibility for protection is mainly addressed to the victim herself, 
but in addition protection is also partly seen to be society’s responsibility. The protection 
of children is primarily seen to be the child’s parents’ responsibility, but also other adults 
and educators (e.g. teachers and neighbours) are accountable for the child’s wellbeing. The 
broader societal responsibility for children is attributed to the school. If a child should be-
come a victim of sexual violence, parents and other adults are obligated to get help for the 
child and report the crime. 
 
The societal responsibility to offer victims of sexual crime help is expressed in the same 
manner as preventive protection; indefinitely and using passive form. In most cases socie-
ty or its different institutions are not explicitly mentioned in the writings, but the obliga-
tion is addressed for example by statements as ‘the victim should be offered help’ or the 
victim needs to be helped’. In any case, help in the form of discussing what has happened 
with a professional is in the writings interpreted as a responsibility society can not escape. 
If society has failed to prevent the crime and protect the victim, helping the victim cope 
after the crime is the least society can do. 
 
Based on the amount of comments concerning punishments and punishing the offender, it 
can be concluded that the conviction of just punishments is one of the most significant re-
sponsibilities of the society in relation to sexual crime. In many of the writings, the relation 
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between the justice system and the commonly shared ‘senses of justice’ of lay people 
forms a problematical issue. In our analysis, a just punishment is in the material important 
for three reasons: 1) the action of the judicial system is presumed to mirror the citizens’ 
morals and sense of justice, 2) too lenient punishments are considered to send the message 
that the crime is not taken seriously, and 3) mild punishments are considered to give the 
interpretation that the victim is held partly to blame for the crime, which leads to shifting 
part of the responsibility to the victim. The problem that takes shape in the writings con-
cerns the issue that although there is considered to be - at least implicitly - a direct relation 
between the judicial system and the citizens’ general of justice, the writers experience the 
relation to be distorted or inadequate concerning the courts’ distributed punishments. The 
next extract illustrates the ambivalent relation described above: 
 
“The courts’ duty is to through their rulings show what the society - in other words we all 
or at least the majority - interpret to be wrong and act according to that. It is a meager con-
solation that the punishments are in line between themselves. Evidently the general line 
concerning sexual crimes is wrong. Especially when we know that these offenders are very 
probable to renew their crimes. Punishments that are considered too lenient are eroding our 
society’s morality and will in worst case lead to people taking justice into their own hands. 
The judicial system can not differentiate itself too much from the ordinary citizen’s sense of 
justice, or else it will lose its credibility entirely.” (W, HS, 1.2.2008) 
 
In the writings, the writers express their fear that lenient punishments will increase rapes. 
This  indirectly places the actions of the judicial system to be a partial explanation for why 
rape happens. This societal failure to carry its responsibilities is illustrated in the material 
by expressions such as ‘permissive culture’ and ‘the failure of democracy’. According to 
the writers, a just punishment would need to be proportioned to the severity of the act. 
Other disadvantages of lenient and short sentences are that they make it more difficult for 
the offender to take part of voluntary rehabilitation, that is usually offered in connection 
with serving time in prison. This is important, as  rehabilitation was one of the responsibil-
ities that in the writings was addressed to society. Therapy and rehabilitation was in addi-
tion to being interpreted as a part of the punishment also seen as a preventive measure for 
sexual crime as well as a form of protection of potential victims.  
 
The writings brought up cultural background factors that were presumed to be related to 
sexual crime. For example, the maintenance of traditional (stereotypical) gender roles and 
lack of gender equality, as well as societal permissiveness and the tendency to be overtly 
cautious to place blame for inappropriate behaviour were mentioned in a number of opin-
ion pieces as societal structures and collective understandings allowing sexual crime. Cul-
tural background factors were interpreted to affect different institutions’ and actors’ atti-
tudes, that surface through the relevant procedures for the victims and offenders of sexual 
crime. The attitudes of societal institutions and actors working under them - especially 
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courts and the police - are seen to have an impact on factors that increase sexual crimes 
(e.g. lenient punishments) and how victims are treated (e.g. blaming the victim for the 
crime). Cultural factors are in other words through institutions’ actions interpreted to mit-
igate the responsibility society addresses to the offender and at the same time, at least to 
some extent, increase the responsibility of the victim and society for the crime.  
 
Causal explanations and the chronology of responsibility 
 
Through our analysis, we found three chronological stages of sexual crime taking shape; 
prior to, during and after the crime. Each stage includes an own logic for the distribution 
of responsibility. At each chronological stage, the target or targets attributed responsibility 
differ, as well as the intensity and force with which the responsibility is demanded from 
the different actors. Explanations for the act are built based on combinations of the differ-
ent stages. Accountability and responsibility are in the writings related to 1) what the actor 
(or party interpreted as the actor) has done, 2) what the actor should leave undone or 3) 
What the actor should do. We have combined the previously mentioned elements in Fig-
ure 1. The parts written in italics in Figure 1 present the responsibilities that were most 
intensely stressed in the material.  
TIME PERIOD /  
ACTOR 
Prior to crime During the crime After the crime 
Offender  Decision to commit the 
crime 
Committing the crime - 
Victim Taking care of oneself: 
- Avoiding getting 
drunk 
- avoiding unsafe areas 
and unsafe company 
- learning self-defence 
Resisting the offender 
 
Fleeing the scene 
Calling for help 
Reporting the crime 
 
Getting help 
Society Crime prevention: 
- keeping citizens safe 
- Rehabilitating sex 
offenders 
- Punishing the offender 
Rehabilitating sex offen-
ders 
Helping the victim 
 
Figure 1: The responsibilities attributed to the offender, the victim and society in a chrono-
logical order.  
 
Explanations and reasons for the crime were mostly sought for from the time preceding 
the act. At this chronological stage reasons for the crime are mostly sought in the victim’s 
behaviour, that is  demonstrated to be in some manner wrongful. Secondarily, explana-
tions are sought from the society’s failure of its responsibility to prevent criminality. Ex-
planations for the crime is not sought in the action of the offender or the possible motives 
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for committing the crime, unless the explanations is seen to stem from illness such as pe-
dophilia. The time when the crime actually occurs is often quickly (and shortly) bypassed 
in the writings. If explanations are sought from this stage, the focus lies on the victim’s 
actions or lack of active action. Do to the opinion writings causal style to explain and pre-
sent sexual crime, the victim’s actions appears in the analysis to be the behaviour that sets 
the event in action, especially since the offender’s motivation for the act as well as action 
and decision before the rape is not discussed. It is significant to stress that almost all writ-
ings discussing the victim’s responsibility set out to defend the victim. However, only few 
writings succeeded in not placing any responsibility on the (potential) victim (woman). 
This may be due to a the restrictions of the discourse used when discussing sexual crime.  
 
The offender’s passive role is problematical from the perspective of attributing responsi-
bility. As the  examination of the offender’s action is left in a marginal role, and the expla-
nation for the act at large starts from the examination of the victim’s behaviour prior to the 
crime, this approach inevitably moves the responsibility from the offender to the victim. 
This also occurs in the cases where the writer actively tries to avoid placing blame on the 
victim and even explicitly denies doing that. The assumption concerning who is presumed 
to have the opportunity for active behaviour becomes essential in the light of the attribu-
tion of responsibility. It also seems to be attached to the generation of explanation models 
and the status of a certain ideal victim (Christie, 1986). This becomes evident for example 
in cases of child sexual crime concerning children, as the material did not contain any 
causal explanations stemming from the (child) victim. In these cases, the explanation orig-
inated from the offender’s pathology or illness, leaving the cause-effect relation between 
child and victimhood unformed.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main results of the research are that because of the reasons brought forth for sexual 
crime, the predominant part of responsibility for the crime is attributed to the victim. The 
construction of responsibility is in the material based on 1) active agency as produced in 
the writings, 2) the chronological manner in which sexual crime is divided and 3) the cau-
sality attached to the chronological manner, which has its emphasis on the victim’s behav-
iour prior to the crime. The passive role of the offender highlights the demands of the vic-
tim’s activity. By including society’s responsibilities for sexual crime to the study, the dis-
cussion is presented with a new element that also enriches the picture of the victim’s and 
the offender’s responsibilities. This occurs for example in the material when the society is 
attributed with responsibilities such as protecting the victim and preventing sexual crime. 
 
While examining sexual crime through attribution theory, the (partial) explanations that 
emerge as dispositional and situational attributions both work as mitigating and aggravat-
ing factors. In the material, the offender’s actions are, through the victim’s and the socie-
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ty’s actions or failures explained with situational attributions, while solely dispositional 
attributions are attached to the victim and the victim’s actions. This becomes apparent for 
example in writings where sexual crime is explained with reference to permanent charac-
teristics of the victim (such as the victim’s sex), which are presumed to have influenced her 
behaviour or decisions. At the same time, the reasons explaining why a person becomes 
the victim of sexual crime are used to explain why the offender committed the crime (situ-
ational attribution), leading to responsibility being addressed to the victim and society 
instead of to the offender. Children form the exception in this case as well. The disposi-
tional attributions attached to children - such as innocence and vulnerability - become ag-
gravating circumstances for the offender’s blame. The dispositional attributions that are 
used to explain the victim’s behaviour, can be held as examples for cultural background 
factors impacting the perceptions of sex, gender roles, and gender status/position (cf. 
Howards, 1984).  
 
Prior to the crime, responsibilities concerning crime prevention are considerably more 
strongly addressed to the victim, while society’s preventative measures are more saliently 
connected with punishments for the crime and the consequences these sanctions have. The 
failure of adequate punishment was seen to increase sexual crime. In the data, the society’s 
most important responsibility concerned punishing the offender justly. The society was 
perceived to have failed most drastically in this task. The perceptions of society’s respon-
sibilities and related measures do not seem to relate to the more conventional understand-
ings, such as rape myths. The perceptions rather seem to quite strongly represent ideas 
concerning how the individual’s rights are achieved and especially the weaker party’s pro-
tection, which gained foothold in Finland as late as in the 1990’s (Kotanen, 2013). In this 
discussion, the Finnish service and legal system have among others been criticised for re-
lying implicitly on expecting active agency from the victim. Especially from the perceptive 
of victims of violence, the services are organised in a manner that require the victims to 
show strong agency (Kotanen, 2013; Ronkainen, 2008).  
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WORKSHOP G 
NEW CHALLENGES RELATED TO EXTREMISM AND COUN-
TER TERRORISM 
 
Preventing radicalization in prisons 
Aarne Kinnunen 
 
Violent extremism and its prevention has been a topic of vivid discussion past couple of 
years in Finland and in other western countries. However, despite of the public outburst, 
violent extremism has not been a major problem in Finland. In fact, there hasn’t been a 
terrorist attack in Finland since the WW II. According to the estimations of the Finnish au-
thorities (Väkivaltaisen… 2015) a risk of an attack in Finland is low. Most likely the ones 
who could use terrorist violence leading to death are individual actors. Although the con-
cept of radicalization includes both religious and political (both left and right) aspects, the 
biggest threat is composed by the violent jihadists. The increase in the amount of asylum 
seekers composes a new type of threat. Furthermore, hate speech in the social media in-
creases confrontations between different groups in the population and feelings of insecuri-
ty in the society. In this presentation I will discuss the problem of radicalization in prisons 
and elaborate what kind of preventive measures has been taken to tackle this phenomenon 
in Finland. 
As said, despite of good situation in safety and security in Finland prevention of terrorism 
has been seen to be pivotal. Financing allocated for prevention of terrorism has increased 
and terrorism related issues have been in the center of political discussion and on top of 
national research agenda. All the European countries and several international organiza-
tions pay attention to the phenomena. United Nations, European Union, Council of Eu-
rope, and Nordic States, among others, have all agreed upon co-operation in this matter.  
New legislation has come into force (1.1.2015) in Finland against preparation and financ-
ing of terrorism. However, general understanding is that in the phenomena like violent 
extremism the general prevention effect of the criminal law doesn’t have a major impact. 
In fact, in extreme cases of suicide bombings even a death of the perpetrator doesn’t pre-
vent him/her to commit the act. Furthermore, a prison sentence might accelerate the radi-
calization process. Therefore, other measures must be taken in use. Lately a special em-
phasis has been on measures, which have focus more in prevention rather than in repres-
sion. The first Action Plan against Violent Extremism (Tavoitteena…2012) was approved 
by the Government in 2012.  Thereafter a Group of Ministers for Inner Safety accepted an 
Action Plan for Preventing Violent Radicalization and Extremism in 29.4.2016 (Kansal-
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linen…2016). In the latter program all together 36 actions were proposed, including pro-
posals concerning prevention of radicalization and extremism in prisons. 
Also many international organizations have paid special attention how to prevent violent 
extremism in prison settings. For example, Council of Europe issued Guidelines for prison 
and probation services regarding radicalization and violent extremism in 2015. Further-
more, European Union has set up a Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) and within 
that framework a Prison and Probation Working Group (RAN P&P). RAN P&P has pub-
lished programs and guidelines for preventing extremism in prisons. However, there 
seems to be lack of scientific research to support actions that has been proposed in the 
documents. In general, there seem to be absence of outcome studies to identify which in-
terventions – such as disengagement or deradicalisation interventions - are most effective 
at preventing extremist offending. There is also a lack of evidence regarding which types 
of intervention may be most effective and appropriate with whom, when and under what 
circumstances. 
General understanding is that prisons have an important role in the process of radicaliza-
tion. Concern has been expressed over the fact that prisons may be used as a breeding 
ground for radicalized violent extremists. Prisons can function both as catalyzators in the 
radicalization process and in other hand prisons offer a good platform for offering preven-
tion measures. In a study of Weggemans and de Graaf (2015) it was shown that some for-
mer detainees became more involved in radical networks during and after their stay in 
prison in the Netherlands. Furthermore, their arrest and detention increased feelings of 
societal distrust and resentment. After their release the status of some former detainees 
increased among comrades. In addition, they often received only limited guidance during 
their reintegration. 
A prison sentence can be a turning point in one´s life, both in good and bad. Prisoners 
have often feelings of bitterness and they can strongly perceive society as unequal and 
even hostile. The lack of trust towards political institutions and society in general is evi-
dent. Prison is perceived as a harsh environment where the individual has a pressing need 
to form part of a group which offers him affective support and physical protection. Pris-
oners are often in vulnerable position and therefore prone to propaganda and recruiting 
processes. The affinity towards persons of the same nationality and culture, and the con-
sequent formation of closed ethnic-religious groups can be used, as it has been, as an ad-
vantageous factor for recruitment. (Trujillo et al. 2009.) 
Even today, most criminal justice systems recognize that individuals charged with or con-
victed of terrorism related offences are different from “ordinary criminals”. This – gov-
ernments argue – reflects the particularly serious nature of their crimes, which are directed 
against the state and society as a whole. In the prison context, most difficulties in dealing 
with terrorists are caused precisely by the fact that these offenders do not see themselves 
as criminals. Many regard their time in prison as an opportunity to continue the “strug-
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gle”, and involve themselves in activities ranging from passive resistance to turning prison 
into a “battleground” from which to support the wider campaign. (Prisons…2010.) 
One important aspect in that must be taken into account is religious equality. If religious 
discrimination exists in prisons the radicalization process can escalate. Faith, radicalisation 
and extremism are different things. Many prisoners enter prison with a faith and others 
find one while in prison. Few of these prisoners will be “radicalized” or become involved 
in extremism or terrorist activity, although (obviously) those that do present huge chal-
lenges to the authorities. 
There is a need for coherent policy for preventing radicalization in prisons. Most im-
portant is detecting the radicalizations processes that take place. Not only prisoners who 
have been convicted of terrorist crimes should be in the focus of preventive actions, but 
also inmates with a background of e.g. violent, property or narcotic offences. 
It is important to identify both the one who is radicalizing and the one who is being radi-
calized. It is essential to be aware of the social networks that take place in prisons and of 
the role of different persons within that network. The radicalization process is most often 
“micro-social” and thus unnoticeable. In fact, being able to notice these kinds of processes 
requires training and instructions for prison guards. 
As Farhad Khosrokhavar (2013) states in his article a change in the pattern of radicaliza-
tion has taken place in French prisons over the last decade. Contrary to the extrovert model 
of radicalization in place up to the beginning years of the twenty-first century where a 
dozen people could be involved, the new one is introverted, based on very few individuals 
(mostly two or three people). In contrast to the previous network in which people with 
psychological troubles were marginalized, psychopaths or psychically disturbed people 
can now play a major role. Whereas the extrovert model was easy to detect according to a 
profiling based on features like long beards, overt proselytizing, aggressive attitudes to-
wards authorities and fundamentalist behavior models, the new attitude avoids all those 
features and people exposed to radicalization have internalized the non-visible conduct 
pattern in order not to attract the attention of the authorities.  
For learning skills how to detect radicalization processes the Finnish Criminal Sanctions 
Agency now cooperates with the Finnish Security Intelligence Service SUPO and uses their 
staff as trainers. The Finnish Criminal Sanctions Agency issued new orders to report about 
observations of radicalization in prison administration in April 2016. The orders give re-
quirements for reporting to the Security Intelligence Service, to the Central Criminal Intel-
ligence Police and to the Central Prison Administration of suspected cases of radicaliza-
tion processes. 
In Finland people sentenced to unconditional prison sentence are put through risk and 
need assessment which serves as a base for the placement of prisoners in the institutions of 
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the district. The risk and need assessment can be seen as an important tool for detecting 
signs of radicalization or vulnerabilities for being a target for radicalization. Risk and need 
assessments are intended to provide an estimate of the risk presented by an individual, its 
nature and degree of seriousness. This information assists decisions as to how to best in-
tervene with the individual to minimize risks and maximize the potential for positive 
change while responding to the individual needs of the inmate or the person on probation. 
Prison staff is needed to have a better awareness of cultural and religious issues. The staff 
must ensure prisoners are treated equitably and fairly and without prejudice. Prisoners 
should be offered tools for learning and developing skills for critical thinking. Prisons 
should develop programs for enhancing possibilities for exit from extremist subcultures.  
An important issue is disengagement from radical subcultures. Co-operation with fami-
lies, police, social- and health authorities and workers of prisons and probation is a key 
factor in this work. Disengagement processes should continue also after release from pris-
on.  
In Finland there are no special programs for rehabilitation after extremist engagement. 
However, there is a possibility for modification of programs originally designed to sexual 
or violent offenders. Furthermore, there are specific possibilities to offer therapeutic 
treatment for prisoners coming from war zones. Good prison and probation management 
should apply to all offenders including violent extremist offenders and support rehabilita-
tion efforts for everyone, also after release from prison. The more former prisoners are en-
gaged with support structures and programs after their release from prison, the easier it 
becomes to monitor them. 
Utmost important in prevention of violent extremism in prisons is good prison manage-
ment. Whenever possible, overcrowding should be avoided due the negative effects on 
offenders. Overcrowding makes preventive measures and rehabilitation of offenders more 
difficult. In ideal situations, prisons are intended to confine offenders in secure and hu-
mane conditions. The purpose of prisons includes retribution, rehabilitation and protec-
tion of society. Rehabilitation and intervention programs both in prisons and for offenders 
under probation have the objective of supporting the eventual law abiding re integration 
of offenders back into society.  
As the policy report published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation 
and Political Violence (ICSR) states the “security first” approach - which most countries 
are applying - results in missed opportunities to promote reform. Many prison services 
seem to believe that the imperatives of security and reform are incompatible. In many cas-
es, however, demands for security and reform are more likely to complement than contra-
dict each other. 
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Also prison architecture has an effect. Placement of prisoners should be carefully planned 
and planning should be based on sound information of the prisoners’ risks and needs. The 
prison work should be organized in that way that detecting possible processes of radicali-
zation could be detected as early as possible. Enough resources should be allocated for 
close and personal work with prisoners. Prison work is not just surveillance. Under-
resourcing of the prison staff should be avoided.  
In order to facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders into society, prisons 
should protect the human rights of inmates and maintain a safe and humane environment 
that supports prisoner engagement in everyday prison life in a constructive manner. 
Equality between prisoners and fair treatment of all inmates and respect towards humani-
ty are extremely important principles when preventing radicalization processes in prisons. 
Experiences of injustice or feelings of frustration can speed up the processes of radicaliza-
tion. Young offenders may be particularly vulnerable for anti-social reactions.  It must be 
kept in mind that in rational criminal policy a prison sentence is a last resort.  
Finally, conversion to Islam or any other religion should not be equated with radicaliza-
tion and or extremism. Religious conversion is not the same as radicalization. Good coun-
ter-radicalization policies – whether in or outside prison – never fail to distinguish be-
tween legitimate expression of faith and extremist ideologies. Freedom of religion should 
be respected. Giving possibilities to practice any chosen religion in prisons seems to be the 
way forward as it offers a real opportunity for disengagement from terrorism and can help 
prisoners to release their anxiety. Controversial police tactics and hard line counter-
terrorism policing raids can be counterproductive.   
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Abstract: 
This study focuses on young people’s experiences and perceptions of police and private 
security guards. A key context is a notable change in policing and crime control – the rapid 
rise of private security – taking place in many Western countries, also in Nordic countries. 
This fragmentation of state monopoly in crime control has stirred discussions about com-
mercialization of crime control. Private security guards operate in public spaces and shop-
ping malls where young people typically spend their free time. Research suggests that po-
licing of youths has intensified in Finland and encounters with private security guards and 
police are a common experience for young people. Despite these changes, young people’s 
perceptions of trust in public and private policing agents has remained an understudied 
subject. 
Procedural justice theory stresses the importance of fair treatment for building trust and 
legitimacy towards the crime control system (e.g. Tyler 2000, Bradford et al. 2008). Percep-
tions of unfair treatment can increase conflicts, decrease people’s willingness to obey the 
law, and it can lead to lack of respect in society. Prior research has not focused enough on 
the rise of private security, or young people’s experiences, and there is a lack of qualitative 
research. This study adds to prior procedural justice research in using a qualitative ap-
proach to explore how young people perceive fair treatment, trust and confidence in pub-
lic and private policing.  
The study is based on nine focus group interviews with 31 underage young people in Hel-
sinki. The primary aim is to analyze how young people formulate perceptions of trust in 
policing. What kind of interaction situations increase or decrease trust? How young peo-
ple define fair treatment? What differences are there in trust and confidence in public vs. 
private policing agents? 
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Recent changes in policing and their effects on young people 
 
In this paper, I first discuss some recent changes in policing that affect young people. This 
forms a context and background for my PhD study. After this, I present my theoretical 
approach, data and results regarding an article, which is one substudy of my PhD study. 
This study examines ‘adversarial’ encounters with underage young people, police and 
private security guards. It focuses on ‘policing agent initiated contacts’ to youth delin-
quency, alcohol use, and to their free time use of city space. I use the term ‘policing’ to re-
fer to both public and private policing agents. 
Relations between young people and policing agents are often described problematic. Fur-
thermore, scholars suggest that the social control of young people has become tighter in 
Finland (Pekkarinen 2010; Harrikari 2013; Korander 2014). It is suggested that while the 
Nordic welfare ideas form the basic structure of the system in juvenile justice and child 
welfare in Finland, there are indications of intensified social control of young people in 
other contexts (Harrikari 2013). A notable trend is that police control has intensified while 
youth delinquency or alcohol use have not increased (Salmi 2012). These changes in how 
young people are policed are one starting point for this research: Which phenomena are 
taking place in the landscape of policing and how do they appear from young people’s 
perspectives?  
Policing is typically viewed as something that the police as a state agent has the monopoly 
over. Scholars tend to emphasize that there was an era, when the state had monopoly on 
policing. What is new in a situation in Western countries, and why changes in policing are 
getting more and more attention, is that there has been a notable transformation in gov-
ernance of security as the private security field has grown rapidly (e.g. von Hirsch and 
Shearing 2000; Garland 2001; Jones and Newburn 2002; White and Gill 2013). Finland is no 
exception in this regard. Accordingly, there has been raising concerns about the privatiza-
tion of policing and ‘formalization of social control’ (e.g. Garland 2001; Jones and New-
burn 2002; White and Gill 2013). This new blurred public-private policing field is linked to 
the increasing number of spaces that are policed as private spaces but used as public spac-
es, such as shopping malls (e.g. von Hirsch and Shearing 2000). Private security guards 
now govern malls and public spaces, where young people typically spend their free time. 
Despite these changes in policing, much of the criminological and policing literature has 
focused on the police and on the criminal justice system, neglecting the recent transfor-
mations of policing and crime control that have taken place due to the rapid rise of private 
security. 
The police are typically defined as policing agents employed by the state, who participate 
in crime control, road traffic control and order maintenance (Reiner 2010, 1). I define pri-
vate security officers as policing agents employed by the private or public sectors, guard-
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ing private, quasi-public and public places, with a public mandate of order maintenance or 
private mandate of securing private property. Private security officers patrol private spac-
es, quasi-public spaces, such as shopping malls, and public spaces, such as public trans-
portation and stations. Due to a stricter social control exercised in shopping malls, re-
searchers have suggested that young people and marginalized people can have difficulties 
in using such spaces, as their access is often restricted (von Hirsch and Shearing 2000). 
These above reflected changes in policing raise a need to study how subjects of policing 
are affected. The study draws its attention on young people’s encounters with policing agents and 
their perceptions of these different policing agents. The PhD study uses quantitative self-report 
delinquency survey (substudies I and II) and qualitative focus group interview data 
(substudies III and IV). In this seminar paper, I focus on qualitative part of the study. The 
study examines how trust is formulated between young people and public and private policing 
agents. Furthermore, it analyses how young people perceive differences in trust between 
the police and security guards. There are reasons to suspect that young people’s experi-
ences and perceptions differ between police and private security guards because the police 
are public actors and they have longer professional training and more legitimacy. In this 
paper, the focus is in presenting the qualitative part of the study and some findings of the 
third substudy of my PhD study (see Saarikkomäki 2015). The primary aim is to study 
how young people define fair and unfair treatment by policing agents. 
Procedural justice and trust in policing 
 
A common view is that trust and confidence in the police is mainly related to police ability 
to control crime efficiently. The procedural justice approach has challenged this view and 
it stresses the importance of fair treatment in the citizen encounters with the crime control 
system. The procedural justice approach is often contrasted with the instrumental ap-
proach; instrumental approach stresses the sanctions and effectiveness of police in control-
ling crime as important factors in creating confidence in the justice system (Bradford et al. 
2008, 2). Main argument of the procedural justice theory is that people’s perceptions that 
the police and other crime control agents treat them fairly and in a procedurally just man-
ner is the primary influence for constituting trust in and legitimacy of the system (e.g. Ty-
ler 1990; 2000; Murphy 2015; Bradford & Jackson 2015). People care about policing agents’ 
motives of exercising power, how they are treated, and whether their rights are respected 
(ibid). People might accept police decisions that are against their own interest (e.g. getting 
a fine or other sanctions), if they perceive control agents legitimate and fair (Tyler 1990; 
2000; Bradford et al. 2008).  
Prior research has outlined the effects if people do not view the policing agents as trust-
worthy and legitimate. Research has mainly focused on the effects on cooperation and 
compliance. Research suggest that feelings of procedural unfairness, for instance disre-
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spectful treatment and unfair decision making, leads to noncooperation and conflicting 
situations (e.g. Tyler 1990; Jackson et al. 2012; Murphy 2015). Tyler (1990) argues that citi-
zens’ perceptions of procedural justice, trust and legitimacy of the crime control system 
are important for their willingness to obey the law (compliance). Finally, how citizens’ 
perceive that the police treat them can have effects on relationships between people and 
authorities, on citizens’ identity, and on perceptions of how respected members of society 
they are (Jackson et al. 2012). In particular, these aspects are important when considering 
young people. Jackson et al. (2012, 1053) state that “by treating citizens unfairly, the po-
lice’s message to them is stark: you are not valued by society”.  
Although the procedural justice literature is vast, there are gaps in research that this study 
aims to fulfil. Prior research has largely focused on police and justice system. I discussed 
earlier how the policing field has transformed and private security agents are important 
policing agents. However, there exists not many studies focusing on citizens’ perceptions 
of private security. Furthermore, this study adds to a small number of studies focusing on 
young people (e.g. Murphy 2015). These survey-based findings indicate that views of pro-
cedural justice affect youths’ compliance with law and cooperation with police. Finally, 
this study provides new perspectives to survey-dominating research field by using a qual-
itative approach (also Pettersson 2014). By using pre-defined survey questions, prior re-
search has failed to examine how people themselves define fair treatment as well as 
broader social factors, which generate trust. While prior research essentially addresses the 
importance of fair treatment, the focus is on how it could increase the legitimacy of the 
authorities or the system, or how it affects compliance and cooperation. Accordingly, 
viewpoints of subjects of policing and the many effects that particularly negative experi-
ences can arise are not fully studied.  
Focus group interviews and narrative approach 
 
The study bases on nine in-depth focus group interviews with 31 young people aged 14 to 
18. I recruited the participants from a large youth club in Helsinki in 2012–2013. I spent 
around 70 hours in the youth club to recruit participants and to observe. At the youth club, 
I played cards with young people, I discussed with them and with people working there. 
This helped to find participants for the interviews, to validate the findings and to better 
understand young people’s experiences. The data excludes those young people who do 
not spend their free time in city space and in youth clubs. All the interview participants 
had at least some experiences of police and/or security guards. Some young people had a 
few experiences, or they were in a group when they encountered policing agents, whereas 
some others said they had nearly daily encounters with security guards. All the partici-
pants studied in compulsory school, vocational school or high school. The participants 
were from a variety of different backgrounds (e.g. different class status, ethnicity, living in 
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the different parts of the capital region). Most of the participants knew each other before-
hand, which facilitated lively discussions. 
The focus group interviews had two parts. I started the interviews by asking the young 
people to continue a fictional story of intervention situation towards a fair and unfair en-
counter. Next, I present the summary of the results based on a data generated through this 
story completion method and narrative analysis (see Saarikkomäki 2015). The main point 
of interest of the last (forthcoming) substudy of this project is to analyze how young peo-
ple perceive differences between police and security guards, and how these differing per-
ceptions relate to fair treatment, trust and confidence. In the focus group interviews, I also 
used semi-structured thematic questions. The semi-structured questions covered the 
young people’s free-time activities, their encounters with police and private security 
guards, differences between these policing agents and questions about young people’s 
trust in these policing agents. Sometimes the concept of trust was difficult to understand; 
then I asked if the participants feel they can ask for help or how they feel control agents 
treat them.  
The substudy used a narrative criminological approach; it views that stories inform us 
about people’s perceptions, experiences and expectations (e.g. Sandberg et al. 2015; Presser 
and Sandberg 2015). The study brings new findings to narrative criminology by focusing 
on stories of policing and crime control. Prior research has mainly focused on stories of 
crime (ibid.). I analyzed the content of the stories by comparing how the young people 
define the actions and abilities of policing agents differently in fair and unfair narratives 
(description of the analysis see Saarikkomäki 2015).  
Results: The importance of fair treatment 
 
The study examines how young people conceptualize typical narratives of fair and unfair 
encounters with police and private security guards. I present next some of the results, the 
full narrative analysis and the findings are published before (Saarikkomäki 2015). The arti-
cle studies youths’ definitions of positive and negative encounters with the police and pri-
vate security guards by using fictional and personal stories. I used the story completion 
method to gather data. I asked the young people who participated in the focus group in-
terviews to narrate stories leading to a) fair and b) unfair situation in which security 
guards and police intervene in underage drinking in city space. The young people narrat-
ed two kinds of stories: fictional and personal. Together these stories produced infor-
mation of young people’s perceptions and understandings of fair treatment and trust.  
The study found that the key difference between fair and unfair narratives was related to 
how the police and security guards interact with and treat young people. The young peo-
ple did not define situations as fair or successful based on whether policing agents would 
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intervene or not. Young people understood that it is a part of policing agents work to in-
tervene in underage alcohol drinking. Typical narratives of fair encounters presented con-
trol agents who were able to treat young people with respect, in a friendly, nice and polite 
manner. In addition, interacting calmly and predictably was important for positive situa-
tions and for creating trust between young people and policing agents. Furthermore, fair 
policing agents listened to young people, they explained calmly what they do, and gave 
reasons why they intervened.  
“B: But just that they (the police) let the young people explain themselves, what 
they do and what happened. For instance ask who’s been drinking and who hasn’t 
and these sorts of things. Also, talking in a friendly and respectable way and not 
starting to blame or be nasty.” (I2) 
In unfair narratives policing agents did not had the abilities to treat young people fairly 
and respectfully. Typical unfair narratives presented unfriendly interactions, such as label-
ling name-calling, shouting or threatening young people, and unpredictable actions. The 
participants described this kind of situations as intimidating and sometimes scary. In un-
fair narratives, policing agents were unprofessional, aggressive, and not listening to young 
people. The young people often discussed critically that security guards were only moving 
young people on from the shopping malls. Many of the young people discussed personal 
experiences of aggressive encounters where private security guards’ were perceived to use 
unnecessary force. These situations were experienced as unfair and they challenged trust 
and legitimacy of the policing agents.  
“P: … The security guards take away all the beers and pour them out, which is a 
sort of right thing to do, but that’s not the worst thing they do, because then they 
would take them to the detention room, and keep them there for a few hours and 
call their parents and make snide comments. I was caught shoplifting when I was 
13, and I’ve never even thought of doing it again. The security guards held me in 
the detention room for two hours. Horrible bitching, constantly.... “ (I9) 
 “T: With security guards, from what I’ve experienced myself or know about, secu-
rity guards are usually really halfhearted or E: indifferent T: And if they see a 
young person they don’t seem like they’re trying to take care of it by taking the 
young person’s side. They just throw them out. H: They really are pretty aggres-
sive. E: Unempathetic. … … … T: Mostly I believe that what’s wrong with these se-
curity guards is that they don’t know how to deal with young people, they only see 
their own side. E: Against young people T: Like, just to get them out of their sight.” 
(I5) 
“F: Demeaning behaviour. K: Right. Because sometimes the police diss young peo-
ple about some things, at least this has happened in my group of friends ...” (I2) 
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The findings indicate that it is useful to include both public and private control agents 
within the research because it brought up some previously neglected issues: First, young 
people’s perceptions of fairness, and trust differed based on who is the policing agent. Pri-
vate policing agents were typically perceived more negatively than the police officers. 
Second, the analysis indicated the importance of emotions. Police officers were more often 
described as professionally doing their job, whereas security guards were typically narrat-
ed as aggressively intervening to youth activities, lacking empathy, and not capable of 
managing their emotions. Too emotional authorities were narrated as aggressive and not 
able to control their emotions. Having some emotional side was, however, important for 
good interaction situations. The young people perceived it important that the policing 
agents have some empathy towards objects of policing. An appropriate balance of emo-
tions and an ability of policing agents to control negative emotions increased views of 
trust and good relations. 
The young people understood that it is not an easy job if young people are for instance 
making trouble or not complying with the demands of policing agents. They had under-
standing for a challenging work of policing agents. They did not have one-sided opinions 
of the fairness or trustworthiness of control agents, instead, the young people negotiated 
both fair and unfair aspects of policing.  The study proposes that young people can use 
stories to express and circulate experiences, perceptions and aspirations of policing agents 
and to discuss abstract ideas of trust and legitimacy. Stories shared between friends can 
affect also perceptions of trust of those young people who do not have similar personal 
experiences. Positive stories of fairly experienced encounters can generate trust whereas 
negative stories circulating in youth cultures can undermine trust in policing agents.  
To conclude, a key factor generating trust between young people and policing agents is 
how policing agents treat young people. The study argues that there is support for the 
procedural justice theory: fair treatment is indeed a crucial element in creating trust in the 
crime control system (e.g. Tyler 1990; 2000; Murphy 2015). Similarly, prior survey-based 
procedural justice studies suggest that perceptions of unfair treatment decrease trust in 
and the legitimacy of policing and can increase conflicts between citizens’ and the police 
(ibid.). This study brought new findings on the field by highlighting the importance of 
emotions and empathy. Furthermore, it highlighted some differences between the police 
and security guards in how they were perceived to treat young people; this is further stud-
ied in the last substudy of this project. The study concludes that it is possible to create 
trust between young people and policing agents even in adversarial intervention situa-
tions by focusing on the aspects of fair treatment and procedural justice. 
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Ethnic Bias in Restorative Processes? 
A study of access and outcome for young male offenders with ethnic minority 
background  
 
Katrine Barnekow Rasmussen 
 
(This paper is an adapted version of the description of my phD-project, including some 
preliminary results). 
 
Project Background and Purpose 
 
The project is an examination of whether ethnicity influences access to and outcome of the 
participation in restorative processes for young male offenders. It is a phD-project based at 
the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, commenced in September 2015 and ending 
in August 2019.  
 
Restorative processes receive recognition for being effective in preventing and handling 
escalating conflict situations, and are increasingly utilised in Denmark and internationally, 
especially when working with youth and children. Furthermore, several countries, includ-
ing Norway and Northern Ireland, have successfully used restorative processes as an al-
ternative to the traditional juridical system, when young people have broken the law. Re-
search shows, that these methods lead to significantly lower reoffending rates and signifi-
cantly higher victim satisfaction rates than the processes of the traditional juridical system, 
and this at a lower cost. 1 
 
In Denmark male ethnic minority youth is overrepresented in crime statistics.2 There can 
be multiple explanations to this, including a higher risk of getting caught due to higher 
levels of police attention.3 Regardless of the causes, during my former employment work-
ing with vulnerable youth and crime prevention in a municipality (in the SSP-system), I 
have experienced how this group is subject to a very high level of attention from profes-
sionals, politicians and citizens when it comes to crime prevention. However, I have also 
experienced, how the methods suggested and applied, often seem to have little, no or op-
posite effect. At the same time, I have experienced scepticism towards a restorative ap-
proach to conflict and crime, if including (especially male) ethnic minority youth.  
 
                                                 
1 Strang & Sherman 2007, Sehlin 2009, Bradsteen & Roseborough 2005,  Lyness & Tate 2011, Strang et al. 
2013, Berger et.al 2015, Kyvsgaard 2016. 
2 Andersen & Tranæs 2011. DST 2015. 
3 Holmberg & Kyvsgaard 2003, Petterson 2005, Sollund 2007 in Görtz 2015. 
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In my view it poses a dilemma, if a target group, which might have an increased need for 
crime- and conflict preventive measures is limited in access to methods, which have prov-
en effective. This research field has received little to no interest in Danish as well as inter-
national research. 
 
My goal with this project is to contribute to the knowledge on if and if so how this limited 
access is manifested, as well as if there is a difference – positive or negative – in what male 
ethnic minority youth obtains from and contributes with to restorative processes, com-
pared to male ethnic majority youth.  
 
The purpose of this is to help ensure, that we employ as efficient methods as possible to 
avoid young people repeatedly ending up in conflicts and committing (repetitive) crime; a 
result which would benefit these young people, those who avoid becoming victims of a 
crime, and not least the economy of society as a whole. 
 
The target group of the project is male ethnic minority offenders between 15 and 25 years. 
By offenders I mean individuals who have been labelled responsible for a harm caused in 
a conflictual and/or criminal context. Due to the more advanced usage of restorative pro-
cesses in Norway, I will include Norwegian interviewees and data for comparative as well 
as explorative purposes.  
 
Project Focus 
 
The research question for this project is: 
 
 Does ethnicity influence access to and outcome of restorative processes for young male of-
fenders? 
  
The project will consist of three articles, with an expected focus as outlined below: 
 
1. An analysis of possible ethnic bias in access to the Danish VOM-programme (Kon-
fliktråd) for young male offenders.  
 
This article will include an analysis of data from all concluded VOM-meetings in 
Denmark for the years 2010-2015, as well as an analysis of VOM cases in 2015 from 
four selected police districts; both cases that have been considered for VOM, but 
discarded for various reasons. Data for this article also includes interviews with 
professionals involved in the Danish VOM-programme. 
 
2. An analysis of a casework project running from 2010-2012 in a Danish municipality, 
focusing primarily on young male offenders with ethnic minority backgrounds hav-
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ing committed serious, repetitive offences. A main purpose of the project was to 
achieve more coherent municipal casework for this target group. Further to this, the 
young people, who were selected for the project, were offered/submitted to various 
approaches to avoid reoffending, on of these approaches being a restorative VOM-
process with a mentor, others being anger management training and community 
service.  
 
The analysis will focus on: Reoffending rates for the project target group, compar-
ing reoffending for those, who where offered a restorative approach to those who 
were offered other approaches. Experiences of the young people participating in the 
process, primarily those, who were offered a restorative approach 
 
3. An analysis of access to and perceived outcome of restorative processes in five se-
lected Danish municipalities. The article will focus on processes targeting youth re-
lated conflicts, which are not considered police cases.  
 
For this article I will analyse interviews with young people, having had ascribed the 
main responsibility for a conflict to them, who have participated in a restorative 
process at municipality level. I will also include interviews with professionals 
working with restorative processes at the municipal level, as well as available data 
on and evaluations of restorative processes in the municipalities in my analysis. 
 
Methodology 
 
The data for the project is expected to consist of: 
 
Interviews (primarily in Denmark, secondarily in Norway): 
 Qualitative semi-structured Interviews with professionals working with restorative 
processes (so far 14 interviews) 
 Qualitative interviews (live line-method) with young male offenders (/parties hav-
ing had ascribed main responsibility for a conflict to them) belonging to an ethnic 
minority (no interviews conducted yet) 
 Qualitative interviews (live line-method) with young male offenders (/parties hav-
ing had ascribed main responsibility for a conflict to them) belonging to the ethnic 
majority (no interviews conducted yet) 
 A minor survey of perceptions of the participation in and outcome of a restorative 
process. The survey will include young people, having had ascribed the main re-
sponsibility for a conflict to them, who have participated in a restorative process at 
municipality level in five selected municipalities. The survey will include categories 
of age/gender/ethnicity.  
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Points of attention, for interviews include the following reflections: Will one admit to dis-
criminating? Does one know, one is discriminating? Can one experience discrimination 
without actually being discriminated against? How to interview on this subject without 
getting people’s guards up/force-finding something that might not be there? 
 
Statistic material 
 Police data on completed sessions in the VOM-programme (access request is being 
processed) 
 Case files on completed and considered VOM-cases in 2015 from four selected po-
lice districts 
 Evaluations of the Danish VOM-programme 
 Available statistical material and evaluations from selected municipalities’ restora-
tive processes targeting youth 
 Data from Konfliktråd, Ungdomsstraf, and Ungdomsoppfølgning in Norway 
 
The registration in the VOM-programme is somewhat inconsistent. Also, especially at the 
municipality level, there is a severe lack of statistics and evaluation on restorative practic-
es. These factors prevent the statistic angle from being dominant in the study.  
 
A recent study from the Danish Justice Department shows, that the Danish VOM-
programme in its current form does not prevent reoffending, which could be seen as an 
argument for not including the VOM-programme in this project. Despite its inefficiency 
with regards to reoffending I have chosen to include the VOM-programme because it 
probably is the most visible and well-known restorative process in Denmark, and proba-
bly also the most well documented (which unfortunately does not say much). In including 
the Danish VOM-programme, the project will also address how this programme might 
differ from other restorative processes successful in preventing reoffending, including the 
effect of the victim as point of departure, and the lack of pre- and post meeting focus.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
For my analysis of interviews and case files I will be using the works of a number of classi-
cal theorists of sociology such as Foucault, Goffman, Bourdieu and Ahrendt. 4  For the 
analysis of the life-line interviews with young participants I will also be using youth tran-
sition theory.5 
 
                                                 
4 Goffman 1959, 1963, Ahrendt 1970, Foucault 1972, 1975, 2010, and Bourdieu 1979, 1986, 1994. 
5 Wyn & Dwyer 2000, Skelton 2002, and Walther et al 2006. 
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Also I will be including theory-based discussions to define two key concepts in the project; 
‘ethnicity’ (a.o. Baumann and Bourdieu) 6 and ‘restorative processes/justice/practices etc.’ 
(a.o. Braithwaite, Zehr). 7  
 
Delimitations 
 
Vivid discussions take place within research on and practice of restorative processes; 
‘When is something truly a restorative process?’, ‘do practitioners actually do, what they 
say/think they do, when performing restorative practices?’ etc. While I recognise, that dis-
cussions like these are of fundamental importance to the research field of restorative jus-
tice, they shall not be the focus of this project. I will not be observing the performance of 
the restorative processes included in this project, in order to evaluate their contents. Other 
project have done so, and hopefully will continue to do so.8 I will be solely focusing on the 
access to an (perceived) outcome of the selected processes. 
 
Preliminary Results 
 
The first part of my study concerns access to restorative processes. The field of study is 
Danish Victim-Offender-Mediation Programmed (Konfliktråd) and restorative activities in 
Danish municipal and social housing contexts, supplemented by studies of the same field 
in Norway.  
 
Interviews with professionals indicate, that the access to restorative processes for ethnic 
minorities might be limited, since practitioners tend to fall into one of the two categories 
below: 
 
 The ones, who think ethnic minority youth are generally less suitable to participate 
in restorative practices 
 
  The ones who don’t personally think there is a difference relating to ethnicity when 
using restorative practices, but who experience the reluctance of others to include 
ethnic minorities in restorative practices (different levels) 
 
Preliminary results also show, that young male offenders with ethnic minority back-
ground do indeed not have representative access to the Danish VOM-Programme. They 
are generally not estimated to be ‘suitable’ to play the role, which is expected from offend-
ers. This should be seen from the perspective, that the Danish VOM-programme by law 
                                                 
6 Baumann 1999, Bentley 1987. 
7 Braithwaite 1989, 1999, Zehr 2002, 2004. 
8 See for instance Asmussen 2013. 
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should take point of departure in the needs of the victim. In this way offenders can be said 
to casted according to whether or not they are expected to be able to fulfil the role, the vic-
tim needs in order to be content with the VOM-session.9 It is the Danish police, who han-
dles the casting and therefor can be seen as the gatekeepers of the VOM-programme.  
 
The presentation given on the 2016 NSfK Seminar in Iceland included my preliminary 
findings on access to the VOM-programme and restorative processes in municipalities, as 
well as discussions of possible implications of the role of the police as casters and gatekeep-
ers in the Danish VOM-programme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See for instance Asmussen 2013 
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Introduction 
Cannabis sales account for a substantial proportion of the revenue generated by criminal 
groups (Reuter and Trautman 2009). In Denmark and arguably in Scandinavia as a whole, 
the sale of cannabis has historically been concentrated in Copenhagen, in an area of Chris-
tiania referred to as Pusher Street. This marketplace of thirty years’ standing was disrupt-
ed by a major police crackdown in 2004 (Moeller 2009). The crackdown appears to have 
worked as a catalyst for a series of “immigrant gangs” to challenge the dominance of out-
law biker gangs in criminal markets (National Police 2008; Moeller and Hesse 2013). In-
creased competition from these new criminal groups is a common current development in 
the Nordic countries (Korsell and Larsson 2011; Van Gemert, Peterson and Lien 2008; 
Cornils and Greve 2005), and it warrants further research (Paoli and Reuter 2008).  
There is no established tradition of researching gangs in Denmark (Pedersen 2014), and so 
far it has proven difficult to recruit these hidden populations (Jacobsen 2012). The existing 
research has primarily been conducted by the research department of the Ministry of Jus-
tice, using surveys of self-reported delinquency and register data. Pedersen and Lindstad 
(2011) examined the correlates of youth joining “criminal groups” on the basis of a self-
report survey study of 1.886 students in the 7th to10th grades of schools in socially deprived 
neighborhoods in the greater Copenhagen area. According to the minimum definition de-
rived from the Eurogang framework (Klein, Weerman and Thornberry 2006), these “crimi-
nal groups” are more informal and less organized than “gangs”. Astonishingly, Pedersen 
and Lindstad found that 13 percent of their respondents fulfilled the criteria for member-
ship of a criminal group. In a follow-up study, Pedersen (2014; see also Klement and 
Pedersen 2013) noted that for these youths, “illegal activity has become part of their group 
identity without it ever becoming an overriding goal”. She added the caveat that these 
groups may evolve into more organized criminal gangs if left to their own devices. This 
evolution affects both the individual and the group. Klement, Kyvsgaard and Pedersen 
(2010) found that there was an increase in crime of 40 percent for immigrant youths after 
they joined a gang, and of 45 percent in penal code violations (similar to the international 
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research, see Wood and Allyene 2010). These findings are surprising in that we would 
usually expect crime frequency to decline with age. The social context that surrounds the 
gang affects this trajectory.  
Densley (2012) detailed the “natural progression” of London gangs from “recreational 
neighborhood groups” to “delinquent collectives”, then to full-scale criminal enterprises 
and eventually to systems of extralegal governance. Both Densley (2012) and Venkatesh 
(1997) understand the organizational development of street gang activity as shaped 
through interaction with broader systemic societal transformations. In Britain and the US, 
these transformations relate to overall post-industrialisation and the street-level introduc-
tion of crack cocaine. The Scandinavian social context is clearly different, but the same 
mechanisms may apply to the intersection between drug related crimes and ethnic minori-
ties.  
In Denmark, immigrants from non-western countries and their descendants are consistent-
ly overrepresented in statistics on property crimes and violence (Andersen and Tranæs 
2013). A study of Norway and Finland has further disaggregated the criminal statistics 
and found that this overrepresentation is especially large for immigrants from Middle 
Eastern countries (Skardhamar, Aaltonen and Lehti 2014). The overrepresentation is com-
monly explained using the “blocked opportunity” hypothesis (Paoli and Reuter 2008; 
Sandberg 2010; Venkatesh 1997), where crime in these groups is seen as a correlate of low 
socioeconomic status, poor integration in mainstream society, and cultural marginaliza-
tion. Paoli and Reuter (2008) noted that some immigrant groups have a competitive ad-
vantage when it comes to drug related crimes because they have connections to the prima-
ry cannabis producing country, Morocco.  
Very little Scandinavian research has applied ethnographic and interview-based ap-
proaches to the study of immigrant youth gangs and drugs. The exceptions are Kalkan’s 
(2014) study of young men in Copenhagen and Sandberg’s (2008; 2010) research on street-
level cannabis dealers in Oslo. Kalkan (2014) observed street socialization among young 
immigrants and found that the stereotype of the successful criminal archetype, the “gang-
ster” was prevalent among these youths. He also found that burglary, robbery, and the 
sale of cannabis are integral parts of the street economy (2014, p. 71. Cannabis sale is 
commonly organized around locales referred to as “smoking clubs”. Sandberg (2008) 
found that the “street drug market has increasingly become dominated by ethnic minority 
dealers, and most of the dealers at the river had Islamic backgrounds”. In Germany, Bu-
cerius (2007) found that her subjects perceived their drug dealing criminal lifestyles as 
compatible with their Islamic beliefs. She noted that they considered Germany an “im-
pure” country that “doesn’t deserve otherwise”. This adds a new perspective of active 
“defiance” (Sherman 1990) to the blocked opportunity hypothesis. Lien (2008, 228) noted 
that cultural values associated with “honour, dominance and revenge” are reasons for ri-
valry with other groups. Paoli and Reuter (2008) described how immigrant groups are 
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likely to cooperate with the police. This intersection of marginalization and cultural values 
in combination with new opportunities for cannabis sales may constitute criminogenic 
factors that contribute to an explanation of new aspects of immigrant youth gang devel-
opment and proliferation in Denmark. 
I use the term “immigrant youth gang” to denote the primarily recreational groups of 
young men with a Middle Eastern background that engage in “exaggerated versions of 
typical adolescent behavior” (Densley 2012). These groups are part of a street culture char-
acterized by “violence, low scale drug dealing and protest or oppositional masculinity” 
(Sandberg 2008a). Drug dealing provides the material base for this lifestyle and also pro-
vides a form of “goal orientation” to become more formally organised (Densley 2012; see 
also Mackenzie, Hunt and Joe-Laidler 2006). It is debatable whether it is appropriate to call 
these loosely organised youth groups gangs. Ball and Curry (1995) provide a detailed dis-
cussion of the problems of defining gangs in criminology. Legal definitions tend to be ei-
ther too narrow or too broad, and they often neglect the social dimensions that make the 
phenomenon meaningful. Existing definitions tend to be based on the aspects of the phe-
nomena in question that were most visible and most salient at the time of writing, and the 
present study is no exception: my interest in the criminal activities of these youth will in-
directly downplay the more social aspects of their groups.  
Densley (2012) referred to these initial organizational stages as recreational neighborhood 
groups and delinquent collectives. The “recreational stage” involves the essentially normal 
adolescent behavior of young members of ethnic minorities with an expatriate identity 
who band together around a common cultural heritage and share experiences of cultural 
estrangement. At this stage, delinquency is opportunistic and rarely acquisitive, involving 
“adventures” or “exercises” rather than concerted criminal activities. However, when 
youths engage in criminal acts, they gain respect in the street culture and can move on to 
the next actualization stage in ‘delinquent collectives’ (Densley 2012). For delinquent col-
lectives, drug dealing is more instrumental and organized. Successful groups can acquire a 
material foundation in this way and further develop the group organizationally and eco-
nomically. A final point as regards the variability in definition is that they vary across so-
cial contexts. Densley (2012) observes that a low level of formal organization is seen as ev-
idence of gangs in the United States, while the same lack of organization is construed as 
evidence of the absence of gangs in the UK.  
In this study, I will examine how the crackdown on the cannabis market in Christiania 
may have led to a systemic transformation of the social context of immigrant youth gangs. 
Following the crackdown, these restrictions on the dominant actor may have increased the 
available opportunities for competing groups to enter the market (Kleiman 1989; Cornish 
and Clarke 2002). These new opportunities may play a role in the organizational progres-
sion of immigrant youth gangs. When a marketplace is targeted by the police, it increases 
the risk of sanctions, displaces buyers and paves the way for renewed competition be-
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tween criminal groups. This mechanism was theorized specifically for cannabis by Klei-
man (1989), empirically examined by Rasmussen and Benson (1994) and later applied to 
the Danish context by Moeller and Hesse (2013). The displacement mechanism is based on 
the logic of restrictive deterrence (Gibbs 1975), where offenders do not refrain from offend-
ing in the face of increased risk of sanction, instead displacing illegal actions temporally, 
spatially and tactically.  
On the basis of these assumptions, I will examine two broad questions that relate to the 
intersection between the police crackdown on Christiania and the proliferation of immi-
grant youth gangs in the Copenhagen area. How did the crackdown affect the structure of 
the cannabis market? Does cannabis have an instrumental role for these groups, or one 
that is only recreational? Previous studies have not examined this link between immigrant 
youth gangs and the systemic transformation of a drug market during restructuring, and 
the purpose of the present study is therefore primarily exploratory. 
Data and methods 
I conducted a total of thirteen semi-structured interviews with a variety of actors with ex-
perience of the cannabis market and the sale of cannabis in Copenhagen. Seven interview-
ees were second generation immigrant youth aged between 21 and 24. They were all male 
and born in Denmark. In all cases, at least one of their parents was originally from a Mid-
dle-Eastern country. All had sold cannabis in the context of a youth gang at the street level 
or as low level distributors. Some had also had experience with cocaine, but the interviews 
focused on cannabis. Three were active offenders, three were in a gang exit program and 
one was serving a sentence in an open prison. All had been exposed to sanctions. The sto-
ries they told about selling cannabis were very similar, despite the differences in current 
involvement (Nee 2003). These interviewees were recruited through a snowballing chain 
referral method with various gatekeepers involved in the process (Jacobsen 2014; Densley 
2012). Interviewees received no financial compensation for their participation in the study. 
Another four interviews were with police officers and prosecutors. Two were street level 
officers working in a deprived area on the outskirts of Copenhagen with known immi-
grant youth gang problems. The other two interviews were with high ranking prosecutors 
who worked in the organized crime section of Copenhagen’s police, previously known as 
the illicit drugs section. The opportunity to conduct the interviews arose from a prior re-
search project that had analyzed police data (Moeller 2012a, 2016). Finally, I interviewed 
two academics who had written about Christiania and worked with youth crime. These 
interviews provide a basic understanding of the systemic transformations in the cannabis 
market, as well as a contrasting perspective on the social context in which immigrant 
youth gangs exist.  
All interviews lasted between one and two hours and were conducted in cafés, in various 
university settings, in an open prison, and at police stations. The interviews were all taped 
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and transcribed. All interviews were conducted in Danish and relevant extracts were 
translated into English. Interviews were transcribed and coded using the qualitative data 
processing program NVivo. The interviews were held in a rather informal manner, giving 
the interviewees the opportunity to speak as freely as possible. This format reflects the 
exploratory aim of this study. On the one hand, I was interested in acquiring new perspec-
tives on the effects of the crackdown on Christiania. On the other hand, I was prepared to 
follow any new themes that might arise during the interviews. Two key themes recurred 
in interviews, irrespective of the type of interviewee: an increase in cannabis sales in and 
around Copenhagen following the displacement of buyers from Christiania’s marketplace, 
and the role of neighborhood youth centers in relation to immigrant youth gang activity. 
These themes emerged from a process of data collection and interpretation based on 
standard qualitative research methodology (Brinkman and Kvale 2014). 
I recognize the limitations of working with cross-sectional data based on retrospective ac-
counts. Statements about overall restructuring of the cannabis market can constitute post-
hoc sense-making. Statements about the interviewee’s group of friends being involved in 
cannabis sales may be exaggerated to present a certain image. This is a general limitation 
of interview data. It might also be argued that this is a conveniently selected group of in-
terviewees and that this may increase their tendency to talk about the criminal aspects of 
youth gang activity. The interview texts are interpreted as co-productions resulting from 
the interaction between interviewer and interviewee. Co-production was especially no-
ticeable in the interviews with young immigrants. Their interviews cannot be taken as di-
rect representations of any underlying reality. Interestingly when the interviewees ex-
plained their social world to me, they commonly used “us” to refer to youth with parents 
from Middle-Eastern countries. This involved active interpretation of how the majority of 
Danes perceive “them”. They resist or confirm this perceived stereotype and the elements 
of which it consists.  
Findings 
I will first focus on how restructuring of the cannabis market in Copenhagen has influ-
enced the opportunities for immigrant youth gangs to deal cannabis. Two key elements 
are highlighted. Firstly, the structure of the cannabis retail market changed: it became less 
like a concentrated industry and more like a cottage industry (Eck and Gersh 2000). This 
may have increased opportunities for new actors to enter the cannabis markets. Secondly, 
cannabis sales in immigrant youth gangs are associated with “club houses”. This relates to 
the question of how “turf” affects gang identity and evolution (Densley 2012). 
Change in structure of the cannabis market 
From a drug distribution perspective, Denmark is Scandinavia’s border to continental 
Europe, and it has a lenient policy towards cannabis sales. Denmark has historically 
applied an opportunity principle to drug laws, where low-level offenses such as can-
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nabis retailing are not aggressively followed up by the police and prosecutors. When 
this principle was implemented in the 1970s, it was perceived as a pragmatic decision 
aimed at saving police resources for other drug policy priorities. A series of changes to 
this policy in the 2000s increased sanction severity and law enforcement intensity when 
it came to cannabis related crimes, but the punitive level is still low in international 
comparison (Moeller 2012b). The comparably low levels of sanction severity for canna-
bis related crimes may help explain why Copenhagen is recognized as a stop on the 
most widely used trafficking route, extending from Morocco through Spain and Am-
sterdam to Copenhagen and further north (National Police 2008; Paoli and Reuter 
2008).  
The youth I interviewed recognized these factors and described the sale of cannabis 
prior to 2004 as a low risk endeavor:  
“Even before the ‘hashclub act’ (of 2001), the police knew about us. (…) I used to 
say that we had a license to sell cannabis (…). I wouldn’t say that it was an explic-
it agreement, but it was implied that as long as there were no hard drugs and no 
under eighteens, the police would only drop by once in a while to say ‘hello’.”  
(Youth)  
Over time this policy of toleration allowed the cannabis market in Christiania to devel-
op and stabilize. This was a recurring theme in the interviews, both with young inter-
viewees and with the police: “In Denmark, those who make money from hash specifically are 
in Christiania. It is a business with a billion crown revenue.  It is the biggest tourist attraction 
in Denmark. It is the base” (Youth). The Christiania market offered upwards of forty sell-
ing positions before 2004 (Moeller 2012). These positions were highly contested and 
have been traded as commodities: “There is a lot of self-regulation surrounding who is al-
lowed to sell and where. There is a lot of money involved and of course the positions are traded. 
Everything is for sale” (Expert). The interviewees were in agreement that Christiania’s 
marketplace was controlled by outlaw biker gangs: “The bikers make billions of money 
(sic) on Amager every year” (Youth). This has been a relatively stable situation since the 
Great Nordic biker war of the late 1990s (Høyer 1999): ”They have made not necessarily a 
truce as such, but they have agreed to divide the country into different spheres of interest” (Po-
lice). The stability that followed from this agreement and the low enforcement intensity 
allowed Christiania to evolve into a routine activity marketplace with a dominant share 
of the total cannabis market (Eck and Gersh 2005; Kleiman 1989; Moeller 2016).  
Danish cannabis policy was reformed around the turn of the century, moving away 
from the tradition of leniency and towards a focus on use reduction (Moeller 2008). In 
part, this policy change involved an increased focus on organized criminal groups, 
echoing general police trends in the other Nordic countries (Larsson and Korsell 2011). 
The crackdown on the Christiania market in 2004 involved the arrests of many dealers, 
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along with their helpers, runners and look-outs (Moeller 2012), disrupting the estab-
lished hierarchy between dealers. Instead of shutting down cannabis sales in Christia-
nia, a new set of dealers was willing to continue the trade: 
”I know there has been some repositioning in the hierarchy after they made all the 
arrests…There will always be changes among pushers, that has always happened, 
but something substantial happened this time.” (Expert)  
The interviewees showed an understanding of the drug market displacement mecha-
nism, according to which restricted access to one location leads to increase in another 
location where the restriction is less intensively enforced. They generally described the 
crackdown as a mistake made by the police:”That thing with Pusher Street - they made a 
small mistake and spread it to all the hashclubs in Copenhagen” (Youth).  
The reaction to the crackdown signaled the start of a systemic transformation of the can-
nabis market structure in which it moved away from its previous form as a concentrated 
industry (Eck and Gersh 2000; Moeller 2016). This mechanism was fuelled by buyer behav-
ior. In accordance with the theory of restrictive deterrence (Gibbs 1975), cannabis buyers 
did not give up their illegal acts when risks increased; rather, they displaced them geo-
graphically and strategically to new and more covert locations. This had consequences for 
the various cannabis sales locations around Copenhagen as new opportunities arose: 
“When they start harassing people on Christiania as they did during the Nordic 
biker war, there are other people that spot an opportunity. This time it is these for-
eign workers and second generation immigrants that are slowly starting up. They 
can see business improving and they are opening hash clubs in new locations now 
(…) The way I see it, it had been pretty well controlled until then, but then they 
destroyed everything and it is spiraling out of control. Then people will gather 
their troops and try to figure out what is happening.” (Youth)  
In the literature on street-level drug sales, the various available locations are commonly 
understood in relation to two axes of differentiation: the level of distribution and the 
relative “openness” of the specific location. The new locations described here as “hash 
clubs” are less conspicuous than Christiania’s open air market, but they are more ac-
cessible than closed social distribution among peers (see Moeller 2008 for a typology). 
The proliferation of hash clubs indirectly signals a reduction in the market share that is 
controlled by Christiania:”After all of these new hash clubs have opened on Amager and Nør-
rebro, people no longer go to Christiania. They have lost a lot of their customers and that is just 
the way it is” (Youth). Until 2004, Christiania had a competitive price advantage due to 
its wider selection of products and sellers (Moeller 2012b). 
Hash clubs are believed to be predominantly run by immigrant gangs (Moeller and 
Hesse 2013), and their growth has changed the structure of the cannabis market in the 
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direction of a “cottage industry” with many smaller groups (Eck and Gersh 2000). Vio-
lence is a resource in this restructuring (Kleiman 1989; Papachristos 2009). As one 
young interviewee put it:”Yes, it is my impression that the immigrants are trying to get into 
the cannabis market, and it is also my impression that they are quite convincing in their meth-
ods” (Youth). All of the interviewees took the conflict between outlaw biker gangs and 
immigrant gangs for granted. The conflict was referred to as a matter of fact, and a 
clear line of demarcation between of the two types of criminal groups permeated all of 
the interviews. Interestingly, some of this competition also involves cooperation:  
”Many people think that ‘perkerne’1 do not go to Christiania, that it is an ‘Aryan’ 
place and so on. What they do not know is that it is always a black man that has 
handed it to a white man. That is not visible; it is behind the scenes .” (Youth) 
Klement and Pedersen’s (2013) study of offending networks demonstrated that outlaw 
bikers and immigrant gangs occasionally co-offend, and the interviewees noted that 
this can actually be a source of conflict: ”The bikers hate the Morroccans because they have 
been robbed by them so many times in relation to drug deals. The Morrocans have the connec-
tions” (Youth), echoing Paoli and Reuter’s (2008) observation.  
The literature on drug market violence includes debates about the extent to which con-
flicts between criminal groups are utilitarian; where business ends and “respect” be-
gins remains an open question (Moeller and Sandberg 2016). My interviewees ex-
plained that these divergent motives are often intertwined in practice. Some of the con-
flict directly involves access to drug selling turf: 
”…if Christiania approaches us and says that no one from Nørrebro or (Blågårds) 
Pladsen can come in there, then it is almost like declaring war, that is how it is 
(…) All these people that are getting killed, you might as well be straightforward, 
they are dead because of five people, tops - because these five people do not get 
along, because they want to make money and because they do not allow each other 
to enter their territory.” (Youth) 
Some of the violence follows from the ”pecking order” relationship between criminal net-
works (Papachristos 2009): ”It is often about revenge for revenge (…) It is possible that it started 
as an incident concerning a criminal market, but they are mainly old scores and it always comes 
down to one event being avenged after the other, right?” (Police). When a group is the victim of 
a violent action perpetrated by a competing criminal group, it has the choice between 
avenging the incident or leaving the market. Revenge shootings are commonly carried out 
by younger members of the gang: ”(T)here are a couple of generals (…) on either side. And eve-
rything is about money. Everything is about the money. (…) Some idiot is not just going to go and 
                                                 
1 Translates to ”Persian origin” 
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start shooting for the hell of it. He has been told to do that. It goes further and further back in time” 
(Youth). Papachristos (2009; see also Moeller and Hesse 2013) noted that this violence 
tends to be perpetuated as the less violent actors leave the market: ”It is as if the culture has 
become more violent - it is not very nice anymore” (Expert). This perception was shared by 
youth in this study as well: 
It is getting wilder and wilder. The hash clubs and what is behind them are much 
worse than what was going on in Christiania. Before, it was somewhat con-
trolled…and maybe the bikers were responsible for that. Now it is young people  that 
know someone somewhere, then they get it fronted and then they are in the hash busi-
ness. (…) That is what is happening. This whole gang culture is getting out of  con-
trol in Denmark (…) More criminal, more festering.” (Youth) 
The interviewees narrated stories about Copenhagen’s cannabis market that are congruent 
with the common understanding that a number of organized criminal groups have vested 
interests in this illegal trade. The outlaw biker gangs used to control Christiania’s market-
place but have suffered the consequences of a police crackdown. This has led to a dis-
placement of buyers and spurred an increase in cannabis sales in various locations distrib-
uted around the city. Some of these cannabis sales have been absorbed by new hash clubs, 
but there has also been an increase in informal types of cannabis trading. For immigrant 
youth gangs, this has constituted a systemic transformation in their social context. A cen-
tral requisite for cannabis sales is a physical location where sellers can be found and trans-
actions can occur relatively discretely. In the next section, I will explore how cannabis sales 
intersect with the social aspects of immigrant youth gang activity. 
Instrumental or recreational cannabis: Youth clubs as turf  
A recurring subject in the interviews was the role of neighborhood youth centers in the 
cannabis selling activities of interviewees. Commonly referred to as “youth clubs”, these 
centers are not formalized cannabis sales locations like the hash clubs. Officially, they 
serve as social spaces for youth, particularly in areas with many social housing apart-
ments. Bucerius’ (2007) has described neighborhood youth centers as the main meeting 
point for dealers. Her interviewees explained that the location “was entirely in the hand 
[sic] of the group, and other people rarely entered the center”. From the point of view of 
the police working in these areas, youth centers solve some problems and cause others. 
One street-level police officer explained the dilemma regarding a youth center:  
”It’s run by the users themselves and yes there is trouble surrounding it, yes there is, 
but we are pragmatic. There will be trouble with them no matter where they are. It is 
better that they cause trouble somewhere where few ordinary citizens come by.”  (Po-
lice) 
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Both the police and the youth in my interviews recognized these youth clubs as an im-
portant component in the lives of these immigrant youth gangs and noted their high de-
gree of autonomy from public monitoring: ”These are not ordinary youth centers, but they are 
in municipal buildings and there is a contact person between the youth and the city council, but 
there are not really any teachers” (Youth). Another interviewee explained that although this 
contact person was a requirement for clubs seeking premises, he was only really expected 
to serve this role temporarily: “All youth centers have some contact person who has a close rela-
tionship with the city council. You have to get rid of him first” (Youth). This was surprising, 
and when I discussed this issue with the police, they were already aware of the lack of 
formal regulation. One police officer even drew the parallel to more organized criminal 
groups and their clubhouses: “To be a little cynical, I would say that it is their ‘biker clubhouse’” 
(Police).  
Several interviewees described the club houses in terms reminiscent of the role of “turf” in 
gang research (Densley 2012), and the police also noted this territorial ownership: “A big 
part of the identity of this group is the place. Like, they own the place. This is our place! That’s the 
attitude out there. (…) It’s a local group of troublemakers that will defend their territory if they are 
challenged by another group” (Police). I was surprised by these stories and pursued the ques-
tion of how the city council tolerated this lack of communication with the contact person: 
(I)f it is shut, we burn it down, for sure…as revenge (…) that is just the way 
it is. You have to leave us and ours’ alone. (…) As soon as the city council has 
given the grant to the club, you might say that they are out of the equation. 
You don’t listen to them anymore, you don’t have any cooperation with them 
anymore. You don’t follow up on what they say or anything. That’s the way it 
is in all clubs.“ (Youth) 
The police also refer to this: ”They used to have some kind of a club house a few years back – it 
got burnt down” (Police). 
I started to enquire into the connection between the sale of cannabis and time spent social-
izing in club houses. Some interviewees described the sale of cannabis and the club as dis-
tinct from each other, albeit with a porous delineation: ”Out in (the city) where I am from we 
do not actually sell it in the club, but we sell hash on the street right in front of the club” (Ung 4). 
Others described a similar demarcation but explained that it was not consistently main-
tained: “Young people have a tendency to take their work from the street and bring it up to the club 
and just sit and hang out there instead of in front of the store in sub-zero weather” (Youth). One 
youth was particularly vocal on this issue and insisted that he had firsthand experience 
from different locations: 
Youth: “I have seen at least twenty clubs in Denmark and they were all selling cannabis (…) 
 city run clubs that you struggle with the city council to get…then when we got it the 
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 hash selling began. Hash sales from there on and onward. It is so obvious everybody 
 knows. The city employees know about it too… 
Interviewer: The club sells cannabis? 
Youth: The club sells hash but not cocaine. (…) your ass, your coke. My hash, our hash. That 
 is how we did it. There is a community around hash; your coke business you can run 
 on your own. That is how it is done in almost all immigrant clubs.” (Youth)  
These comments on drug selling in locations provided by the city council reflect an inter-
esting and complex social problem. On the one hand, the city council provides premises to 
keep youth off the streets. On the other hand, some youth move their delinquent street 
behavior to these premises or their immediate surroundings. I asked more specific ques-
tions about the organization of this street-level dealing and the earnings involved. One 
interviewee explained the combination of “hanging and banging” (Densley 2012) as fol-
lows:   
 ”People who stand on the street get around 300-400 crowns [~Euro 40-50] and a 
 joint a day. They are there maybe six hours. (…) You smoke joints and hang out with 
 your friends. Everybody is happy.” (Youth) 
Joe-Laidler et al. (2015) have analysed this combination of recreational cannabis use and 
sale in the context of youth gang activity. According to their findings, cannabis is a normal 
and integrated part of the life of these young people and is generally not perceived as 
problematic. The potential for making money while engaging in normal socializing behav-
ior is a clear advantage of cannabis compared to other illicit drugs. 
When I inquired into the money making aspects of their cannabis trading, these young 
sellers mentioned the connection to Moroccan suppliers which has also been identified by 
Paoli and Reuter (2008). One youth explained: “I knew someone who had it imported from 
Morrocco…so I bought some good stuff for about 2,500 for 200 grams and then I sold 1.2 grams for 
a 100 kroner” (Youth). This has implications for positioning in the dealing hierarchy: “It’s 
all about the ease of access people have to the hash and what they pay. If I’m paying less than the 
other guy, I can sell to him, and vice versa” (Youth). This is more business-minded than the 
social sharing we would expect between friends in a group of youth that grew up togeth-
er. It is also a very illustrative description of how, in practice, connections to Morocco can 
actually entail competitive advantage over other sellers. 
Finally I touched on the most controversial issue for immigrant youth gangs: the relation-
ship between youth gangs and religion. The Danish press has published stories that de-
scribe how religious and criminal groups overlap, but these accounts are anecdotal. The 
focus of this study was on the role of cannabis in the crimes of these young people, but all 
of the young interviewees spoke about immigrants and immigrant gangs in a way that 
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suggested that they were referring to Middle Eastern immigrants. One of the interviewees 
had experienced a religious awakening in prison and used it as a way to stay away from 
crime after his release. He was keen to discuss immigrant youth gangs from the perspec-
tive of a common religious identification: 
Interviewer: ”Do immigrant youth gang members identify themselves as Muslim? 
Youth:  “Yes, that’s what you are. You never forget who created the world. (…) We are a lot 
closer to our religion than any other people are to their religion. (…) We have a lot 
more will, we dare do more things and we do it without thinking. If you take a look at 
Danish prisons, you’ll see that eighty percent are immigrants. It goes without saying 
because we take the chances that others won’t and it comes from your willpower. That 
what this book does to us: it makes us strong willed, it makes us calm. (…) It’s im-
portant for people like us to practice this. If we don’t, then what  will we give to our 
children? All hardcore criminals wind up religious. 
Interviewer: What is it about being a Muslim that a criminal respects? 
Youth: Everybody respects everybody else. If you put your hand forth, it doesn’t matter if it is 
 your enemy - you take the hand. 
Interviewer: What, because he is a Muslim? 
Youth: Yes, certainly.” (Youth). 
These quotes are not necessarily representative, of course, but they harmonize well with 
suggestions in prior research concerning criminal capital and group cohesion based on 
cultural marginalization and religious identification (Paoli and Reuter 2008; Lien 2008; 
Sandberg 2008a; Bucerius 2007). In the context of the evolution of gangs and criminal ca-
reers, group identity may serve to increase interaction with deviant peers in the early stag-
es but also serve as way to stop a criminal career later on. 
Discussion and conclusion 
In this study, I have explored two questions that relate to immigrant youth gangs. Firstly I 
examined how the crackdown on Christiania’s cannabis market affected opportunities for 
cannabis sales elsewhere in Copenhagen. Secondly I was interested in understanding the 
role of cannabis in the lower evolutionary stages of gangs. My point of departure was the 
understanding that cannabis accounts for a large part of the revenue generated by the ac-
tivities of criminal groups. Until recently, much of this revenue was concentrated in Chris-
tiania and controlled by outlaw bikers. The crackdown on Christiania may have constitut-
ed a systemic transformation in the social context that surrounds immigrant youth gangs. 
This type of transformation cannot be readily be understood with the help of official crime 
368 
 
statistics alone. Interviews with youths themselves provide an important data point in un-
derstanding the immigrant youth gang phenomenon in Scandinavia (Jacobsen 2014). 
The drug market literature has claimed that in the short run, drug buyers tend to continue 
offending when the police intensify their enforcement. In fact, however, whereas buyers 
do continue offending, they employ a variety of displacement strategies, moving their 
transactions to other locations and adopting covert forms of trading. This facilitates mar-
ket access for new actors who could not previously compete with the most established 
marketplaces (Kleiman 1989; Eck and Gersh 2000). Christiania was “the base” and had a 
competitive advantage as a stable location with many different sellers and products 
(Moeller 2016). The interviewees explained how the crackdown on Christiania’s cannabis 
market helped initiate an entrepreneurial process among various immigrant youth gangs. 
This process was fuelled by violence as groups sought to prevent each other from obtain-
ing market shares (Moeller and Hesse 2013; Papachristos 2009). The interviewees in the 
present study generally confirm the drug market theories. There was increased competi-
tion between criminal groups and violence played an important role. 
The conflict was described as involving outlaw biker gangs and immigrant gangs. This 
conflict has attracted the attention of researchers and the media, and has led to new legis-
lation on immigrant youth gangs (Klement, Kyvsgaard and Pedersen 2010; Pedersen and 
Lindstad 2011). According to my interviews, the violence is perpetrated in the context of a 
conflict where a few “generals” on either side determine when a transgression needs to be 
revenged. These transgressions need not necessarily be strictly related to drug market con-
flicts, and several interviewees note how personal respect plays a role in the conflicts. This 
is consistent with criminological research on illicit drug dealing:  monetary gain is but one 
factor; status and distinction can be equally important (Sandberg 2008b). An unfortunate 
byproduct of this conflict was described by my interviewees as an increase in the prolifera-
tion of “gang culture”, referencing the successful criminal archetype (Kalkan 2014; Ven-
katesh 1997) that makes money from drug dealing. 
Various motives for selling cannabis are also apparent from the accounts of my young in-
terviewees. According to their accounts, there is no clear delineation between the social 
and criminal aspects of using and selling cannabis: they blend together at street level. 
Some aspects of cannabis selling are clearly more organized and profit-driven than others. 
A particularly interesting finding here is that a good connection to Morocco can allow a 
trader to offer slightly lower prices than competitors in the market are offering. This small 
price variation can amount to the difference between being the seller to lower level dis-
tributors or being the buyer from higher level distributors. The Moroccan connection was 
also described as important at the higher distribution levels. The outlaw biker gangs may 
have controlled Christiania’s marketplace, but they occasionally had to do business with 
immigrant gangs to access large quantities of cannabis. This cooperation between groups 
that were otherwise portrayed as “natural enemies” was surprising. 
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When combined, these aspects of cannabis sales and distribution in Copenhagen form the 
contours of an explanation for the drug market related violence and increased prolifera-
tion of immigrant youth gangs in the city. A new set of actors has increasingly gained ac-
cess to cannabis market shares. The research on drug gang explains this in a variety of 
way. Opportunities for illicit drug dealing can mean that criminal groups become more 
goal-oriented and focused on monetary gain (Venkatesh 1997; Densley 2012). Recreational 
neighborhood groups become more like delinquent collectives when they earn money. 
This process may be strengthened by interactions with the police. Increased attention from 
law enforcers can make members of recreational youth groups become more involved 
with their co-offenders. This can be understood as an adaptation to restrictive deterrence 
to avoid sanctioning (Gibbs 1975) as young offenders surround themselves with other of-
fenders instead of non-delinquent peers (Wood and Allyene 2010).   
Finally, it was surprising that both the police and youths brought up the role of neighbor-
hood youth clubs in the sale of cannabis. Bucerius (2007) touched on this issue in her 
study, but the new insight here is that these locations serve as “turf” for immigrant youth 
gangs in Copenhagen. Kalkan (2014) does not mention these locations, despite his focus on 
the social realm between the family and the streets. My findings indicate that youth clubs 
play a pivotal role in this intersection. The proverbial ownership of these locations is con-
tested between the youths and the city council. The council is represented by a contact 
person whose actual role is questioned by my interviewees. Future research could attempt 
to examine these locations in greater depth. If, as suggested by my research here, youth 
clubs play a role as for drug dealing and socializing, it implies that they also form a poten-
tial point of contact and control. 
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Education and delinquency - A study of delinquency, education 
and social background among persons in Denmark at the age of 
25-29 
Mette Foss Andersen and Laust Hvas Mortensen, Statistics Denmark  
 
The association between crime and education is well known, but not many studies of full 
populations exist. The purpose of this analysis is to study the statistical associations be-
tween delinquency and education in Denmark and the influence of social background.                                                                                        
The population is persons born in 1985 to 1989 who attended the Danish primary school, 
and the analysis is based on register data from Statistics Denmark.                                                                                                                                      
The analysis cover four themes; delinquency and the education record in primary school, 
education record in youth education, time for initial conviction and initial sentence and 
the influence from the family background.  
The study concludes that there is a strong association between delinquency and education, 
especially between discontinuous education records and delinquency. Differences in pa-
rental education, family income, origin, degree of urbanization and sex explain only a 
small part of the associations between delinquency and education.  
Population and data 
The population is persons born in 1985 to 1989 who attended the Danish primary school 
and the data is based on six different registers from Statistics Denmark: 
• ‘The Register of Convictions’: the number of convictions and type of decision  
• Highest Education Attained’ covers completed educations after primary school, and 
the highest education of both parents 
• ‘ELEV3’ covers drop-out on educations and ongoing educations (at the age of 25) 
• ‘The register of marks in primary school’ covers marks from primary school 
•  ‘The Personal Income register’ covers the disposable income of the family, when the 
persons were at the age of 15 
• ‘The CPR-register’: covers the etnical origin of the persons and the municipality the 
persons lived in, at the age of 15 
 
Methods 
The analysis compares education patterns between convicted and non-convicted persons. 
The term convicted is used when a person has one or more convictions after the Penal 
Code, the Euphoriants Act and/or the Firearms Act at the age of 25. Our data shows that 
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the chance of being convicted depends on the social background. We made an adjusted 
analysis to estimate how the education patterns of the convicted persons would have been 
if the convicted persons had had the same social background as the non-convicted. We 
used an inverse probability of treatment-weights, where the weights were estimated using 
Coarsened Exact Matching. The weights were used to construct at dataset, where family 
income, the education of the mother and father, the ethnic origin, sex and the urbanity of 
the municipality the persons have lived in had the same distribution among the convicted 
as among the non-convicted. In the adjusted analysis 9.563 persons were omitted because 
their combination of covariates made it impossible to use them in adjusted analysis.  
Delinquency and primary school 
Among persons born 1985-1989 who attended the Danish primary school 30.736 men (21 
pct.), and 8.399 women (6 pct.) have one or more convictions at the age of 25. The share of 
men with convictions varies between 6 and 31 pct. according to which municipality they 
lived in at the age of 15 year. Every third man who lived in Copenhagen at the age of 15, 
has one or more convictions at the age of 25.  
Figure 4. Men with convictions according to the municipality they lived in at the age of 15. N=30.736  
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Primary school drop-outs and delinquency 
Around 10.000 persons dropped out of primary school in 8th or 9th. grade, which is the 
last grade that is mandatory in the Danish primary school. Among convicted persons 10 
pct. dropped out, while among non-convicted only 3 pct. dropped out. If we adjust for 
social background, we estimate a dropout of 8 pct. for the convicted, corresponding to a 
difference of 5 percent point. 
Figure 5 Persons who completed or dropped out of primary school among convicted and non-convicted persons. 
N=277.331. 
 
Marks from written exams in primary school and delinquency 
Persons with a conviction at the age of 25 year have significant lower marks from the writ-
ten exams in primary school compared to non-convicted persons. A major difference is the 
marks in math where the mean of convicted men is 4.2 and the mean of non-convicted 
men is 6.1. 
Table 5. Mean values from marks from the written exams in primary school among convicted and non-convicted 
persons born 1985-1989. N= 286.894. 
 
Mean N with grades N total 
 Marks from the written exams in math, man 
 Non convicted 6.1 98 535 115 790 
Convicted 4.2 21 856 30 736 
 Marks from the written exams in math, woman 
 Non convicted 5.4 112 586 131 969 
Convicted 3.6 6 178 8 399 
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 Marks from the written exams in Danish, man  
Non convicted 5.4 98 762 115 790 
Convicted 4.1 22 063 30 736 
 Marks from the written exams in Danish, woman  
Non convicted 6.6 114 374 131 969 
Convicted 5.5 6 453 8 399 
 
The following bar chart shows the distribution of marks between convicted, non-convicted 
persons and convicted persons adjusted for social background. When we standardize the 
backgrounds, the differences in marks between convicted and not convicted persons re-
duce, but there are still large and statistically significant differences between convicted 
and non-convicted persons. Almost every four (24 pct.) of the convicted persons have no 
grade from primary school and 13 pct. have not passed the exam. For the non-convicted 
persons, 15 pct. have no grade and 6 pct. not passed the exam.  
Figure 6 Marks from the written exams in math in primary school among convicted and non-convicted persons 
born 1985-1989. N= 277.331. 
 
 
The tendency is the same for written Danish, except for fewer persons did not passed the 
exam, both for adjusted and not adjusted numbers. 
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Figur 7 Marks from the written exams in Danish in primary school among convicted and non-convicted persons 
born 1985-1989. N= 277.331 (adjustet). 
 
Youth education and delinquency 
 
There is a substantial difference between convicted and not-convicted persons who have 
completed a youth education at the age of 25.  
Under half (47 pct.) of the persons have one or more convictions at the age of 25. In total, 
82 pct. of the non-convicted persons have completed a youth education at that age. One 
third (32 pct.) of the convicted persons have dropped out of one or more educations and 
are out of the ordinary education system at the age of 25. The equivalent share of the non-
convicted persons is 10 pct. 
When we adjust, we estimate that 55 pct. would have had completed an education and 27 
pct. have dropped out if the social background among the convicted was similar to that of 
the non-convicted. There is still a substantial difference between the convicted and non-
convicted that is not explained by social background. 
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Figure 8 Youth education status at the age of 25 among convicted and non-convicted persons. N=277.331 
 
 
The initial conviction before or after the start of a youth education  
It is of importance for completion of a youth education whether the persons got their ini-
tial conviction before, or after they started on a youth education. 
41 pct. of young persons who received a conviction before they started on a youth education have 
completed their youth education and an equal share (41 pct.) has dropped out. In total 18 pct. of 
the persons at the age of 25 are still in the process of completing a youth education. 
 
Of persons who had a conviction within three years after they started on their first youth 
education, 53 pct. has completed an education and 34 pct. have dropped out and are out of 
the ordinary education system at the age of 25. 
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Figure 9. Youth education status at the age of 25 among persons that have started a youth education, according to time 
for initial conviction. N= 276.328 
Initial conviction before or after the written exams 
 
Among persons with data from data in primary school, 4.301 persons had a conviction 
before the written exams in Danish and math. Persons with a conviction before the exams 
received lower marks from the written exam in both Danish and math. 
Table 6. Mean values from marks from the written exams in primary school among convicted and non-convicted 
persons born 1985-1989 according to time for initial conviction. N= 286.894.   
 
Mean N 
 
 
Marks from the written exams in math 
 
Initial conviction before exam 3,4 4 025 
Initial conviction after exam 4,1 24 009 
No convictions 5,8 211 119 
 
 
Marks from the written exams in Danish 
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Initial conviction before exam 4.1 4 183 
Initial conviction after exam 4.5 24 340 
No convictions 6.0 213 132 
Status on youth education at the age of initial conviction 
 
The share of convicted persons who have completed a youth education increases with the 
age of their first conviction. Among young persons, who received their first convictions at 
the age of 15, 42 pct. have completed a youth education and 10 pct. have never started on a 
youth education. Among persons who had their first conviction after the age of 20, while 
the share who has completed an education is 52 pct. and 6 pct. never started. 
Figure 10. Youth education status at the age of 25 according to type of initial conviction. N= 286.894.  
 
 
Type of initial conviction and status of youth education 
Among young people who are imprisoned in relation to their first conviction, fewer com-
plete a youth education and several is out of the ordinary education system at the age of 
25 compared to young people who are receive other sanctions.  
37 pct. of the young persons who are imprisoned in relation to their initial conviction have 
completed a youth education and a higher share have dropped out rather than completed.   
It is worth noting that the numbers do not necessarily reflect a causal effect of the type of 
sanction on education. Persons who receive a severe sanction probably also committed a 
more serious crime and may differ from those who received other sanctions in other ob-
served and unobserved characteristics.  
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Figure 11. Youth education status at the age of 25 according to type of initial conviction. N= 286.894.  
 
Differences in social background between convicted or non-convicted persons 
 
There were significant differences in the social background of convicted and non-
convicted persons. The following table shows some of the differences. 
Table 7. Convicted and non-convicted persons born 1985-1989 according to social background factors. N= 286.894. 
 Convicted, pct. Non-convicted, pct. 
   
The disposal income of the family when the person was at the age of 15 
Poorest 20 pct. 31 17 
2. quintile 21 19 
3. quintile 16 20 
4. quintile 14 20 
Richest 20 pct. 12 20 
Income unknown 5 3 
   
The highest education of the mother when the person was at the age of 15 
Primary school 31 22 
Upper-secondary education 3 4 
Vocational education 28 30 
Short-cycle or Medium-cycle higher education 14 22 
Long-cycle higher education 2 4 
Unknown 20 18 
   
The degree of urbanity (EUROSTAT) when the person was at the age of 15 
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1 Densely populated area (Copenhagen, Århus, 
Odense, and suburbs of Copenhagen) 
29 22 
2 Intermediate density area > 40.000 inhabitants 15 14 
2 Intermediate density area (<40.000 and 
>=15.000 inhabitants) 
19 20 
2 Intermediate density area (<15.000 inhabitants) 3 3 
3 Thinly populated area (=> 15.000 inhabitants) 13 15 
3 Thinly populated area (< 15.000 inhabitants) 22 25 
   
 
There are modest differences in social background between the convicted and non-
convicted. The table shows that 31 pct. of the convicted persons come from families who 
were among the poorest 20 pct. in Denmark compared to 17 pct. of the non-convicted. The 
distribution is reflected by the highest education of the mother.  31 pct. of the convicted 
persons come from a home where the highest education of the mother is primary school. 
For non-convicted persons the percentage is 22 pct. 
If we look at the degree of urbanity in the municipality the persons lived in at the age of 15 
there are also some differences. 29 pct. of the convicted persons lived in an area that were 
’densely populated’ (Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense, and suburbs of Copenhagen’) com-
pared to 22 pct. of the non-convicted persons. 
Conclusions 
 
• There is an association between delinquency and education, especially between dis-
continuous education records and delinquency 
• Differences in parental education, family income, origin, degree of urbanization 
and sex, only explains a small part of the association between delinquency and ed-
ucation. 
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Transforming Cowboy Masculinity into Appropriate Masculinity 
Nina Jon 
 
In the presentation I present my chapter in “Masculinities in the Criminological Field” ed-
ited by Ingrid Lander, Signe Ravn and Nina Jon (2014), funded by NSfK.  
Criminological enquiry commonly overlooks the gendered aspects of the social control 
of men. By studying a protective school for boys with a gender perspective, I have 
found that controlling boys to a great extent means controlling masculinity. In my 
study, I have analysed empirical material from Foldin protective school (1953–1970). 
Through an analysis of the narratives about the boys employed by the school and other 
social support and control systems, I aim to uncover the masculinity discourses that 
shaped the school’s work. Is a well-documented fact in criminology that those who are 
registered as criminals and subjected to social control in the form of court orders and 
custody by the child welfare services, predominantly are working class boys (Willis 
1977, Christie 1982, Mattsson 2005). My analysis of Foldin’s effort to form a proper boy is 
therefore also an analysis of a class-specific masculinity discourse.   
When analysing Foldin’s control of the young boys with a gender perspective, it is evi-
dent that just as controlling girls means controlling femininity, controlling boys means 
controlling the boys’ gender and their deviations from accepted forms of masculinity. 
In this chapter, I will make the case that a masculinity perspective is useful for under-
standing both why young boys commit crime and why their custodians react so strong-
ly to even relatively trivial forms of crime. I will present my concept of cowboy mascu-
linity, and show why this is useful term for understanding young boys’ masculinity 
projects.  
Cowboy Masculinity  
Instead of viewing criminal activities as a matter of deviancy, I will approach them as 
part of boys’ identity formation. To conceptualise this, I draw on Messerschmidt’s in-
fluential work (1993, 1997, 1999) on the connections between crime and masculinity. 
Messerschmidt argues that crime can be a strategy for ‘doing masculinity’ (Messer-
schmidt, 1993, Jon, 2007). For boys and men with low income, limited education and 
low societal status, it may be difficult to feel and be perceived as ‘a real man’. Boys and 
men in this situation may instead achieve status, self-respect and notoriety through 
violence and a willingness to fight. By committing crime, marginalised boys and men 
uphold their identity as ‘real men’. They are utilising the one instrument available to 
them: Their bodies. Young criminal boys have at all times presented themselves and 
been regarded by others as tough guys (Whyte 1981, Cohen 1955, Ericsson et al. 1985).  
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I term this masculinity project cowboy masculinity. In this concept, the cowboy repre-
sents a plethora of mythical heroic figures of cultural importance, especially to the 
working class. This concept does not preclude that resistance can be a key element of 
such a masculinity project, but shows that it is one of several aspects. In addition to 
accentuating what young criminal boys are inspired by and not merely what they are 
opposing, one of the strengths of the term ‘cowboy masculinity’ is an emphasis on the 
boys’ style. This emphasis is in line with the so-called ‘Birmingham school’ (Resistance 
through Rituals 1975, Willis 1977, Hebdige 1979).  
In my study of Foldin protective school I find, not surprisingly, that the boys who were 
sent there by the child welfare services primarily came from poor, marginalised fami-
lies. As previously mentioned, it is a well-documented fact in criminology that the sons 
of the working class are the ones who get institutionalised because of their involvement 
in crime (Spitzer 1974, Christie 1982).  The boys of Foldin had grown up with limited 
access to resources. Faced with this situation, it seems like many attempted to ‘be a 
man’ through the display of cowboy masculinity, and by adapting the style of a tough 
guy. They were ‘doing masculinity’ by employing modes of behaviour broadcasted by 
the popular culture of the 1950s and 60s.  
At Foldin, the limelight was on the boys’ masculinity projects. For the most part the 
staff explained the boys’ problems by means of their 'toughness’ and their eagerness to 
'show off’. Even though the staff were aware of the boys’ backgrounds and their poor 
beginnings, their life stories and preconditions were pushed to the side in their day-to-
day lives at Foldin.  
The Foldin staff attempted to steer the boys’ masculinity projects away from what they 
regarded as over-compensational, anti-social toughness and crime. Teaching the boys 
the meaning of proper masculinity seems to have been one of the central aims of the 
stay at Foldin. The boys were to learn and practice that which the adults thought they 
have not yet grasped: how to be a real man.  
An Appropriate Masculinity 
Through explanation and exhortation the adults attempted to make the boys improve 
by appealing to their common sense. As previously mentioned, the aim of the stay was 
to make the boys strong and independent. This project was complicated by the fact that 
there were limits to how independent they should become. While on the one hand the 
boys must build up an inner strength enabling them to resist temptations, on the other 
hand, being working class, they must be subordinate and subservient. And this is further 
complicated by the fact that there were limits to how subordinate a boy could be while 
at the same time conforming to the idea of a proper masculinity. Too subservient, and 
they would be branded with the stigmatising label ‘unmanly’ (Liliequist 1999, Lo-
rentzen 2004, Ekenstam 2005). The Foldin staff shared the boys’ contempt of cowardice 
385 
 
and femininity, and while attempting to prune away what they regarded as unmanly 
exaggerations of masculinity, there was a thin line between too much masculinity and 
too little. According to the Foldin staff, a boy was limited by the necessity of being 
proper.  However, there also was, as we have seen, a constant risk that the boy became 
too proper - thereby breaking with the norms of what constituted a real boy.  
An appropriate masculinity, a proper boy, was in the eyes of the Foldin staff a boy of 
strong character, cleanly but not vain, dutifully obeying his superiors with a smile, but 
without being under their heels. He was a proper worker, who got up in the morning 
and earned his daily bread with joy, understanding the value of his labour. Further-
more, he supported his peers, he was decent and nice, and he shared his gifts generous-
ly. But he did not buy himself friendships and he did not suck up to people. He did not 
pick fights, but if challenged he entered the battle willingly. He stood his ground.  
The space of action for a ‘proper boy’ existed somewhere in between an exaggerated 
masculinity and a weak and puny style bordering the effeminate. Similarly, several 
studies have showed that women have to balance a proper femininity (Pedersen 1996, 
Bengs 2000, Ambjörnsson 2004). The aim of Foldin protective school was to teach the 
boys the right balance.  
Conclusion 
It is easy to get upset when reading about how the Foldin boys’ experiences and histo-
ries are being pushed to the sideline. It is also upsetting that the ‘treatment’ of the boys 
is about making them get up in the mornings, stay clean and do what they are told. It 
does not seem as if Foldin addresses the boys’ real problems. And the difference be-
tween the Foldin that I studied and today’s institutions is not all that great. Studies 
highlight that the goal of contemporary institutions is to achieve ‘behaviour correction, 
socialisation and strengthening responsible behaviour’ (Venås 2005,  Mattsson 2005, 
Laanements and Kristiansen 2008). The goal, like at Foldin, is building inner strength, 
and the means are almost identical: strict routines combined with positive role models.  
The Foldin staff did not see that the social arena created by institution did not enable 
the boys to alter their masculinity projects. Neither did they recognise that the boys, the 
way I see it, were already skilled at being ‘men’ - given their circumstances. The majori-
ty of the Foldin boys had grown up in troubled environments, lacking resources. They 
responded to this situation by adopting a tough style and employing cowboy masculin-
ity. The boys were ‘doing masculinity’ by utilising their contemporary resources, com-
municated by the popular culture of the 50s and 60s (Bjurström 1982). The staff, how-
ever, merely saw immaturity, irresponsibility and a lack of character, to be addressed 
by longer stays at Foldin. 
The idea of Foldin was not merely storing the boys somewhere while waiting for them 
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to grow up, but to foster a proper masculinity.  As argued by Holter and Aarseth in this 
line of thinking, ‘gender identity [is] a package of sorts, a concrete but somewhat inde-
terminable good’ (Holter and Aarseth 1993:77). Gender identity becomes something a 
boy inherits from his father.  In the eyes of the Foldin staff, the boys’ fathers had either 
been missing, or otherwise failed in this task. Hence, they themselves must step into 
the fathers’ shoes as male role models.  
To this day, the work of the child welfare system is not marked by a strong gender per-
spective. It could benefit from recent studies of gender and in particular of masculini-
ties. Increased awareness about gender as practice, relations and processes will reduce 
the risk that child welfare workers undermine their own project - like the Foldin staff 
did.  
The norms for accepted and hegemonic masculinity have undergone great transfor-
mations compared to the time when Foldin protective school was operative (e.g. Holter 
and Aarseth 1993, Ekenstam et al 2001, Reinicke 2002). In particular, men’s increased 
involvement in child care and the changing role of fathers have been monumental 
(Holter and Aarseth 1993, Johansson 1998, Brandth & Kvande 2003). Moreover, socie-
ty’s understanding of violence, including its definitions, has changed dramatically 
since the 50s and 60s. While it is evident from the Foldin archives that avoiding all 
forms of violence was tantamount to cowardice, avoiding violence is a central norm of 
our time.  
In many ways, traditional masculinity has gone out of fashion, and will in most settings 
be regarded as archaic. At the same time, some traditional masculinity ideals are very 
much alive and kicking (Whitehead and Barett 2001). The ideals of ‘the new man’ live 
side by side with the values that guided Foldin’s effort to form a proper masculinity.  
Even in the wake of great societal changes, my conclusion is that that which defined the 
space of action for a proper boy in the 50s and 60s, still affect the boys of our time. One 
must not be too tough - but neither must one fall into the pit of unmanliness. Any asso-
ciations with cowardice, weakness and lacking self-control are undesirable. For the 
boys of today, like the boys of the 50s and 60s, stories of dangerous missions, courage, 
toughness and independence are still amongst the most easily accessible. 
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WORKSHOP I 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CHALLENGES AND TRENDS 
 
The unequal crime drop  
Anders Nilsson & Felipe Estrada 
 
Since the 1990s, many countries, including Sweden, have seen declining crime levels. 
However, few studies (for recent reviews see e.g. Baumer & Wolff, 2014; Tonry, 2014) have 
examined the question of whether this trend differs for different social groups, and if so in 
what way. The literature appears to be subject to an underlying assumption that the 
decline in crime is quite general in this respect. In this paper we problematize this 
assumption. Against the background of increasing inequality in other areas of welfare, as 
described primarily in sociological research (see e.g. Nolan et al. 2014), our objective is to 
analyse changes in the distribution of crime. In contrast to the few studies that have to 
date examined the issue of inequality in the crime drop, we focus on the social background 
of offenders rather than crime victims. By using register data relating to entire Swedish 
birth cohorts, in which convictions data have been linked to data on parental incomes, we 
are able to examine changes over time in the distribution of crime among individuals from 
different socioeconomic backgrounds.  
 
The paper proceeds by first presenting a short review of crime trends (the crime drop) and 
of the trend in income inequality since the mid-1980s, with a focus on Sweden. Thereafter 
we present the mechanisms that we would argue lead to an expectation of increased 
inequality in the area of crime. This is followed by a presentation of our data and methods. 
The results sections presents an analysis of convictions (up to age 25) by socioeconomic 
background (parental income) in three birth cohorts born in 1965, 1975 and 1985. This 
allows us to describe the trend in convictions and at the same time to study the extent to 
which the changes that have occurred are general or specific, viewed on the basis of 
socioeconomic background.  
 
The “Crime Drop” 
Figure 1 describes convictions per 100,000 of population for the period 1950-2014. As can 
be seen, the general decline in convictions is quite dramatic, with the convictions rate 
being halved over the period since the 1980s, with a clear decline during the 1990s. The 
trend varies across different types of crime, however. Theft offences, which constitute a 
dominant category of crime, largely follow the general pattern. The number of convictions 
for assault, however, continued to rise during the 1990s, and it is only during very recent 
years that assault convictions have started to decline. A similar trend – with declining 
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levels of registered theft crime and an increase in violent crime – is common to a number 
of European countries (Aebi and Linde, 2012). The trend for violent crime is difficult to 
assess, however, since different data sources point in different directions (Estrada, 2001; 
2006; Aebi and Linde, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1. Rate of convictions: all penal code offences (all BRB-crimes), theft (excl. robbery) and assault. 1950-2014, per 
100,000 age 15 and over. Sweden.  
 
Another element in the picture of declining crime trends is found in Sweden’s surveys on 
self-reported crime among 15-year-olds, which show clear declines since the studies were 
initiated in 1995 (Estrada et al. 2012). By studying convictions in different birth cohorts, it 
has also been shown that the proportion of the Swedish population that is convicted of 
crime has declined over time (von Hofer, 2014; Bäckman et al. 2014).  
Explaining the crime drop 
Although a range of hypotheses have been proposed as possible explanations for the fall-
ing crime rates (see e.g. Farrell, 2013; Baumer and Wolff, 2014; Tonry, 2014) the European 
research has primarily focused on how the more widespread use of more and better secu-
rity measures has made the commission of crime more difficult, increased the risk for de-
tection and reduced the value of the objects of crime. The so-called security hypothesis, 
with its roots in routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), is also the explanation 
that has to date found most support in the research (Farrell et al. 2014). One example of an 
offence type that points to the significance of opportunity and security is car theft, which 
constituted an important part of the crime increase in the western world during the post-
war period (more cars), and which has now instead (thanks to better locking and security 
systems) contributed significantly to the decline in crime witnessed since the 1990s. While 
changes in the opportunity structure appear to constitute a reasonable explanation for 
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trends in property crime, there is some debate as to how the decline in serious violent 
crime might be understood (Aebi and Linde, 2014). The research, which is often based ex-
clusively on aggregate crime data or victim surveys, has furthermore failed to examine, 
and thus also to seek explanations for, the socio-demographic structure of the decline.   
Mechanisms underlying inequalities in crime trends 
We would argue that there may be reason to expect inequalities in crime trends across dif-
ferent social groups as a result of three factors: A) Increased inequalities in other areas of 
society, B) Biased security, and C) Biased tough on crime policies. We regard the first of 
these factors as having a general effect, whereas the second would primarily be linked to 
theft crime and the third to violent offences. 
A) The period during which society has experienced a declining crime trend has been 
characterised by increased inequalities in other areas of welfare (Nolan et al. 2014), both in 
Sweden and elsewhere. In fact, the OECD income inequality update on Sweden in 2015 
concluded that although Sweden still belongs to the group of OECD countries with the 
highest levels of equality, it is also the OECD country with the largest growth in income 
inequality since the mid-1980s (OECD, 2015).  
The fact that income inequality is increasing at the same time as crime is decreasing is 
interesting. There has long been an assumption within criminology that relative poverty 
and social disadvantage are linked to traditional forms of crime. This is a view that Hagan 
(2012), in a critical analysis of theoretical developments in the field of criminology, argues 
has in part been abandoned in favour of explanatory models that place greater weight on 
individual characteristics, but also on the opportunity structure. Part of the explanation for 
this shift lies in the fact that post-war increases in levels of wealth were matched by 
parallel increases in crime levels (Cohen and Felson, 1979). It is now widely accepted that 
the powerful increase in theft offending witnessed during the post-war period can largely 
be explained by increases in the opportunities for crime. Against this background, it is 
perhaps not surprising that current research has chosen to ignore how the crime drop 
might be linked to inequality. On the basis of explanatory models that look to the 
relationships between economic resources, inequality and crime, such as strain theory and 
social disorganisation theory, however, we would argue that offending and exposure to 
crime in different social groups may be assumed to be linked to the way living conditions 
and life chances develop over time. At the individual level, there is actually nothing to 
indicate that the importance of these relationships has diminished over time (Bäckman et 
al. 2014). This means that increasing inequalities in living conditions and a polarisation of 
life chances may be assumed to lead to crime becoming more highly concentrated to social 
groups with lower levels of resources.  
B) The currently dominant explanation for the crime drop is the so-called security 
hypothesis (Farrell, 2013). Access to various kinds of security devices has also been noted 
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to be of significance for differences in victimisation (Hope, 2001). This is an area that has 
witnessed rapid developments during the period covered by our study. And since the 
installation of electronic locks, alarms and so forth involves costs, it is also reasonable to 
assume that in this regard too there will be differences between affluent and poor 
households. Since resources are required to “buy ourselves out of risk and into security” 
(Hope, 2001:193), enhanced security is more accessible to better-off households (Tilley et 
al. 2011; Farrall et al. 2015). Better-resourced individuals will naturally also have better 
opportunities to choose to live in more affluent areas, which are also characterised by 
lower crime levels, which leads to residential segregation with regard to both living 
conditions and the risk of exposure to crime, a trend that has been intensified by changes 
in the housing market (Farrall et al. 2015). The question then is how these processes might 
generate increased inequalities in crime? Besides the fact that crime is unequally 
distributed in cities, to the disadvantage of poorly resourced areas, we know from crime 
pattern theory that crime is clustered to a significant extent by where people live and 
spend their time. The likely location for a crime is near to people’s normal activity and 
awareness space (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2008). On this basis, increased 
residential segregation may mean that potential offenders who live in poorly resourced 
areas have been less restricted by the effects of enhanced security, since the residents in 
these areas do not have the same levels of resources to protect themselves. It may further 
be assumed that these areas, as a result of residential mobility patterns, will develop a 
greater concentration of individuals at high risk of offending. Such a concentration of 
high-risk individuals may also in itself facilitate the transmission of various learning and 
neutralisation techniques that promote crime, while at the same time the reverse occurs in 
more affluent areas. This process would not least affect the risk for offending among 
youths who grow up in these different social environments (Wikström and Loeber, 2000) 
and thus lead to increased inequality in terms of the socioeconomic backgrounds of those 
convicted of crime.  
C) Biased ‘tough on crime’ policies are more directly linked to changes in the 
socioeconomic composition of those convicted of offences. There is much to indicate that 
society has become increasingly intolerant in its reaction to crime over recent decades (e.g. 
Garland, 2001). The range of acts that are viewed as requiring a justice system reaction has 
expanded, which has led to minor forms of crime, particularly of violence, being reported to 
the police increasingly often. The increase that is visible in the crime statistics for certain 
offence types could therefore be seen as an effect of net-widening (Estrada, 2001). This 
might have affected the social background of convicted offenders. There are both policy 
(e.g. Burnley, 2005; Hagan, 2012) and empirical studies (e.g. Stevens et al. 2010; Irwin et al. 
2013) indicating that harsher tough-on-crime measures tend to be directed towards less 
affluent groups of individuals. In Burnley’s words (2005:13-14), “The development of the legal 
instruments devised to control bad behaviour and how they are applied/…/leaves no doubt that the 
marginalised poor have been the main objects of control and the consequences often disproportionate 
to the actions that triggered the intervention.” While Sweden lacks policies that clearly parallel 
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the zero tolerance initiatives of Anglo-Saxon countries, the trend in Swedish crime policy 
has been in a similar direction, i.e. towards a decreasing tolerance of crime (Shannon et al. 
2014). What is unclear, however, is to what extent this Swedish trend towards increased 
control has been biased in its focus. There are however indications that both the police and 
other agencies are directing a greater focus at working in the most socioeconomically 
marginalised residential areas, e.g. in the form of “Social Intervention Teams” (Kassman, 
Wollter and Oscarsson, 2015). 
Previous research on trends in inequalities in crime 
Those studies that have examined the relationship between crime, victimisation and ine-
quality have primarily been based on cross-sectional data. There are however a number of 
studies that suggest there has been an increase in inequalities related to victimisation. 
Studies by Trickett et al. (1995) and Hope (1996), for example, show that the major increase 
in crime witnessed in the UK during the 1980s primarily affected disadvantaged residen-
tial areas. Levitt’s analyses of data from the USA (1999) show a similar concentration of 
registered theft offences to areas of poverty and low-income groups. Thacher (2004) shows 
that the general decline in exposure to violent victimisation reported in American victim 
surveys has not been evenly distributed within the population. In a recent study of the 
Crime Survey of England and Wales, Ignatans and Pease (2015:77) examine “whether the 
crime drop has resulted in a more or less equitable distribution of crime across house-
holds”. Their results suggest that the proportion of total victimization suffered by the most 
victimized has increased. Unfortunately their study does not allow for a determination of 
whether this finding is linked to the socioeconomic composition of this group of crime vic-
tims. Hunter and Tseloni (forthc.), however, examine this question in an analysis of the 
decline in burglary based on corresponding victim survey data from England and Wales. 
Although all population subgroups had experienced a decline in exposure during the pe-
riod 1993-2008/09, the victimisation divide between different social groups had increased. 
The groups among the most victimised that could also be labelled socioeconomically dis-
advantaged, lone parents and those in social rented housing, were those who witnessed 
the smallest decline in levels of victimisation. Instead of using survey data, Aaltonen et al. 
(2015) have examined hospital data on victimisation in Finland for the period 1988-2007. 
Their study shows clear differences between income quintiles in the risk of being admitted 
to hospital as a result of violence, to the disadvantage of those with the lowest incomes. 
These differences show only a weak tendency in the direction of an increase over time. As 
regards trends in Sweden, we have ourselves shown, on the basis of survey data, that the 
economic crisis of the early 1990s was associated with a tendency towards increased vic-
timisation among poorly resourced groups whereas for others victimisation levels re-
mained stable or declined (Nilsson and Estrada, 2003; 2006). In summary, to date there are 
a number of scattered studies, focused on certain types of crime in a number of different 
countries, which indicate that the decline in exposure to crime, as measured primarily by 
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victim surveys, has been unequally distributed  to the disadvantage of poorly resourced 
social groups.  
Thus to our knowledge, no research has to date examined the extent to which there has 
been a polarisation in crime with regard to the risk for conviction across different social 
groups. When it comes to examining trends relating to offenders, the research is largely 
restricted to presenting data from official crime statistics on individuals suspected or con-
victed of offences by age and gender (see e.g. Figure 1 above). Indicators of offenders’ so-
cioeconomic background characteristics are rarely included in different countries’ official 
crime statistics, which means that traditional studies have not been able to analyse how 
the composition of the offender population has changed over time in this respect. An 
analysis of this kind requires that convictions data are linked to register data from other 
sources, which is what we have done for the purposes of the current study (see below).  
Data and analytical strategy 
Using a longitudinal birth-cohort approach makes it possible to show how large a 
proportion of a given birth cohort has been convicted of crime at least once over the course 
of more than a single year. By extending the observation period to several years, the risk of 
being registered for crime becomes cumulative at the individual level as the years pass 
(von Hofer, 2014).  The cohort statistics employed here relate to all individuals born in 
1965, 1975 and 1985 who were living in Sweden at age 16. We have looked at convictions 
for any offence, for theft and for violent crime (including robbery) respectively. However, 
in this paper we only present convictions for any offense (for a more complete picture; see 
Nilsson et al forthc.). We have chosen an observation window which covers the year in 
which the individuals reach the age of criminal responsibility and the following ten years, 
i.e. the years in which the individuals were aged 15-25. (This means in practice that the 
data relate to convictions for the period 1980-2010).  
In addition to convictions data we also have information on the individuals’ 
socioeconomic background. In this study we utilise income data in order to produce a 
measure of the family’s net disposable income during the year when the cohort member 
was aged 16. We have produced a measure of the economic resources of each individual in 
relation to the remainder of the cohort by ranking all individuals by family income and 
then dividing the distribution into quintiles. In this way it becomes possible to see how 
large a proportion of convictions each income group accounts for in each of the cohorts 
examined. The approach employed in this study is primarily descriptive, with the 
objective being to identify empirical patterns that may require further explanation in the 
context of analyses of the crime drop.  
Results 
In Figure 1 above, we have described the decline in convictions. In the following we will 
disentangle this general trend to see whether or not this decline is of a general character. 
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Table 1 to 2 present the distribution of all convictions by income quintiles. As expected, 
the risk for conviction is not evenly distributed. Instead, those from homes with low 
incomes account for a larger proportion of convictions and those from more affluent 
backgrounds for a smaller proportion. The focus of our analysis here, however, is the issue 
of whether the distribution of convictions has shifted over time. Our analysis shows that 
the distribution has become increasingly unequal over time, i.e. those from a less well-
resourced background have come to account for an increasingly large proportion of 
registered crime, while the reverse is true for those from a more affluent background. 
Among the men born in 1965, those with parents in the low income group (the 20% with 
the lowest incomes) accounted for 25.7 percent of all convictions. The corresponding 
proportion for those born in 1985 was 34.8 percent. At the same time, the proportion of 
convictions accounted for by the high income group has declined from 15 to 10 percent. 
Even though not presented here, it can be noted that the same shift is found in relation to 
both violent crime and theft offences, i.e. both for the category of crime in which 
convictions have increased, and the category in which convictions have declined.  
 
Table 1. Distribution (%) of convictions for all offences, violent crime and theft crime at age 15-25 by income quintiles in 
three birth cohorts (1965, 1975 and 1985), and percentage difference 1965-85.  Men. 
 1965 1975 1985 Percentage 
change 1965-
85 
Inc. quintiles  All convic-
tions 
  
(low inc.) 1 25.7 30.7 34.8 +9.1 
2 20.0 20.4 21.5 +1.5 
3 20.1 18.6 18.2 -1.9 
4 19.0 17.4 15.4 -3.6 
(high inc) 5 15.2 12.9 10.0 -5.2 
N (convic-
tions) 
48,466 30,637 27,913  
N (cohort size) 63,412 54,693 54,784  
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Table 2. Distribution (%) of convictions for all offences, violent crime and theft crime at age 15-25 by income quintiles in 
three birth cohorts (1965, 1975 and 1985), and percentage difference 1965-85.  Women. 
 1965 1975 1985 Percentage 
change 1965-
85 
Inc. quintiles  All convic-
tions 
  
1 25.7 31.1 31.1 +5.4 
2 20.7 18.2 21.6 +0.9 
3 18.7 18.4 17.1 -1.6 
4 18.2 17.5 16.6 -1.6 
5 16.7 14.8 13.7 -3.0 
N (convic-
tions) 
6,946 5,081 6,478  
N (cohort size) 60,252 52,292 51,573  
 
Concluding discussion 
In this paper, we have studied whether the general crime trend is concealing different tra-
jectories for different social groups. In contrast to the few studies that have to date exam-
ined the issue of inequality in the crime drop, we have focused on the social background 
of offenders rather than crime victims. We have studied register data for three entire Swe-
dish birth cohorts born in 1965, 1975 and 1985, linking convictions data for the years 1980-
2010 to information on parental incomes. We have in this way been able to study changes 
over time in the distribution of crime among males and females from different socioeco-
nomic backgrounds. Swedish crime trends are largely similar to those of other western 
countries. The decades following the Second World War witnessed a powerful increase in 
crime levels. At the beginning of the 1990s, however, this increase ceased, and was re-
placed by a decline in relation to a number of types of crime. When we examine the pro-
portion convicted at least once at age 15-25, we also see a clear decline across the three 
birth cohorts included in the study. This trend is not general, however, but rather differs 
on the basis of crime type and gender (Estrada, Bäckman and Nilsson, 2015). To this al-
ready familiar picture, we have been able to add the insight that the trend also differs by 
socioeconomic background. Among men, we have shown that decreases in crime (theft 
offences) are stronger among the more affluent, and increases (violent crime) are primarily 
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located among the lower levels of the income distribution. This produces an increasing 
inequality in the conviction risk, primarily among men.  
How should this inequality in crime trends be understood? Why have individuals who 
grew up with parents in the lowest income quintile seen their conviction risk decline so 
much less markedly, or even, in relation to violent crime, to have increased? We have sug-
gested three different mechanisms that could lead to such an increase over time in the so-
cioeconomic skew of the distribution of individuals with registered convictions. The first, 
and for us the most important, inequality in crime is linked to increased inequalities in 
other areas of welfare, which we would argue are of general significance for the conviction 
risk of different groups. During the period examined in this study, for example, there have 
been increases in the levels of both income inequality and residential segregation. The cor-
relation between inequality and crime has previously been identified in studies focused on 
victimisation rather than convictions. These studies have found that during periods of in-
creased inequality in living conditions, the risk of  exposure to crime has increased among 
the poor but remained more stable or declined risk among the affluent (Nilsson and Estra-
da, 2003; 2006). This has led to groups that were already characterized by low levels of re-
sources having to bear a larger part of the burden associated with the crime problem (see 
also Thacher, 2004; Hunter and Tseloni, 2016). Why should we expect a similar pattern for 
convictions? It would seem reasonable to assume that increased inequality has meant that 
the improvements, or deteriorations, that have occurred in relation to life conditions in 
childhood will not have been evenly distributed across different groups. We would argue 
that differences in life conditions and life chances can also be assumed to have led to crime 
becoming more concentrated to more poorly resourced groups in society. In order to de-
termine what the underlying processes look like, and how they have influenced one an-
other over recent decades, however, more detailed analyses are required than those pre-
sented in the current study.   
This is the first study from a new project entitled “inequalities in crime” and we intend in 
future studies to continue to examine both the questions we have discussed above and 
changes in the population’s exposure to and worry about crime (the latter on the basis of 
victim surveys). Something that we do not have plans to do ourselves, but which we 
would welcome, given the trend towards increasing inequality in the western world, 
would be comparative studies. At the present time, the research literature on inequalities 
in crime is dominated by studies from the USA and the UK. We would argue that the 
mechanisms we have highlighted are also likely to constitute reasonable explanations for 
crime trends in other countries.  
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INLEDANDE INRAMNING 
Konferensens tema är applicerbart även på den nordiska kriminalpolitiken. Liksom i 
många västerländska samhällen anses svensk kriminalpolitik ha blivit alltmer inriktad 
mot hårdare straff och moraliska fördömanden (Bondesson 2005, Demker & Duus-
Otterström 2009, von Hofer & Tham 2013). Samtidigt existerar den kontrasterande berät-
telsen om svensk kriminalpolitik som exceptionellt human och Sveige, liksom de övriga 
nordiska länderna, används fortfarande ofta som exempel på länder med en återhållsam 
kriminalpolitik (Lappi-Seppälä 2007, Loader 2010, Pratt & Eriksson 2013). I min avhand-
ling undersöker jag den svenska kriminalpolitiska debattens symboliska dimension. Ge-
nom att studera ett land som ofta porträtteras som motsatsen till de punitivt präglade ang-
losaxiska samhällena, är syftet med min forskning att vidga vår förståelse för vad symbol-
politik kan innebära. Jag menar att svensk kriminalpolitisk debatt består av en dubbelsidig 
retorik, där moraliska och känsloladdade fördömanden och tal om krafttag mot brottslig-
heten går hand i hand med en mer lågmäld och reformistisk retorik. Tidigare forskning 
har givit oss en god förståelse för dessa fördömande utsagor, där de utifrån Garlands 
(2006) begreppsram har tolkats som en form av symboliskt förnekande och som ett sätt för 
politiker att visa sig handlingskraftiga (Andersson, 2002a). De mer reformistiskt präglade 
utsagorna fyller en något annorlunda funktion. Samtidigt som de reformistiska utsagorna 
förstärker bilden av det exceptionell humana Sverige, fungerar de även legitimerande av 
en punitiv kriminalpolitik. Denna dubbla, och till viss del motstridiga, funktion fyller även 
politikers tal om trygghet i den kriminalpolitiska debatten. Begreppet signalerar oskulds-
fullhet och godhet medan det även, till viss del, legitimerar repressiva åtgärder.  
TRYGGHET SOM BEGREPP I DEN KRIMINALPOLITISKA DEBATTEN 
Medborgarnas upplevelse av trygghet har, vid sidan av målsättningen att minska brotts-
ligheten, kommit att bli en central och explicit målsättning för den svenska kriminalpoliti-
ken (Andersson 2010a, Heber 2011, Sahlin 2010). Jag menar att för att förstå dagens krimi-
nalpolitik måste vi ta hänsyn till den mening som tillskrivs begreppet trygghet. Internat-
ionell forskning har identifierat hur rädsla för brott har kommit att få allt mer uppmärk-
samhet i den kriminalpolitiska debatten i många västerländska samhällen de senaste de-
cennierna (Garland 2006, Lee 2007). Det tilltagande fokus som har riktats mot trygghet i 
den svenska kriminalpolitiken kan delvis förstås i linje med denna internationella utveckl-
403 
 
ing. I dagens politiska debatt i Sverige används ofta begreppet trygghet för att beskriva 
allmänhetens upplevelse av rädsla och oro inför brott. Samtidigt som det till viss del kan 
sägas innefatta och kanske till och med likställas med ”rädsla för brott” har begreppet 
trygghet en något annorlunda innebörd än enbart ”avsaknad av rädsla för brott”. Begrep-
pet har exempelvis en historiskt stark koppling till den svenska socialdemokratin och till 
uppbyggnaden av välfärdsstaten (Andersson 2002b, Ljunggren 2015), och det har en mer 
personlig och emotionell laddning än de engelska begreppen “security” och “safety” (Er-
iksen 2006). Begreppet trygghet är slutligen både vidare och mer diffust i sina konturer än 
begreppet rädsla vilket skapar utrymme för politiker att fylla begreppet med den mening 
som de önskar, något som gör det till en användbar symbol.  
TEORETISKA OCH METODOLOGISKA UTGÅNGSPUNKTER 
Andersson (2010) beskriver allmänhetens upplevelse av trygghet som en central legitime-
ringsgrund för 2010-talets kriminalpolitik och menar att ”vårt förmodade behov av trygg-
het har kommit att bli ett okränkbart politiskt värde som kan ställas emot i stort sett vilka 
andra värden som helst” (Andersson 2010, s. 141). Samtidigt som trygghet i den kriminal-
politiska debatten beskrivs som något som alla har rätt till, menar Andersson att det är en 
mycket specifik form av trygghet som åsyftas då trygghet uppmärksammas i dagens poli-
tiska debatt. Liksom Bacchi (2009) poängterar, är det utifrån ett diskursanalytiskt perspek-
tiv viktigt att analysera de förhållanden och de värden som framstår som självklara och 
naturliga. Detta för att även om trygghet av politiker beskrivs som en känsla som alla har 
rätt att förvänta sig kan de materiella konsekvenserna av en viss form av trygghetsdiskurs 
innebära att befintliga ojämlika maktrelationer förstärks. I linje med Edelmans (1971) syn 
på symboler och symbolpolitik, liksom med den marxistiska förståelsen av begreppet ide-
ologi, analyseras i denna artikel konsekvenserna av den politiska diskursen om trygghet 
för att på så sätt blottlägga de ojämlika maktrelationer som diskursen döljer. Analysen 
kommer ta sin utgångspunkt i den politiska debatt som föregick 2014 års riksdagsval i 
Sverige. Partiledartal, partiernas valmanifest och debattartiklar formulerade av företrädare 
för de politiska partierna kommer att analyseras med hjälp av Bacchis (2009) föreslagna 
form av diskursanalys.  
NÅGRA TIDIGARE REFLEKTIONER KRING RESULTAT 
Tidigare forskning har analyserat användandet och förståelsen av begreppet trygghet 
inom ramen för lokalt brottsförebyggande arbete (Andersson 2010a, Sahlin 2010, Wahl-
gren 2014). Dessa studier har, i linje med Garlands (2006) analys av det tudelade brotts-
problemet, visat hur trygghet konstrueras som ett förhållande som medborgarna själva 
blir ansvariga att skapa. I en valkampanj är det rimligt att anta att fokus från politikers håll 
snarare är politikens möjligheter att bidra till trygghet hos befolkningen. Utifrån Garlands 
begreppsanvändning skulle denna studie således kunna ses som ett sätt att analysera hur 
trygghet hanteras och bemöts genom ett symboliskt förnekande från politikers sida. Ut-
gångspunkten i min forskning är att trygghet har kommit att bli en effektiv kriminalpoli-
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tisk symbol i Sverige, speciellt för partier till höger på den politiska höger-vänsterskalan. 
Samtidigt har trygghet som begrepp tidigare i flera studier relaterats till Socialdemokra-
tisk välfärdspolitik. Givet denna dubbelhet, hur kan användandet av begreppet trygghet i 
den kriminalpolitiska debatten förstås? Vilken symbolisk funktion fyller begreppet? Utö-
ver den dubbla funktion som nämndes inledningsvis som begreppet trygghet kan tänkas 
ha, kommer jag att utforska två tendenser som jag hittills har uppmärksammat i materi-
alet. Jag menar att introducerandet av begreppet trygghet innebär att den förändring som 
politiker utlovar vidgas. Kriminalpolitiken antas nu inte bara kunna påverka brottslighet-
en, utan genom att utlova trygghet som ett resultat av den förda politiken lovar politiker 
att säkerställa ett för många grundläggande existentiellt behov. Medborgarnas, och då sär-
skilt arbetarklassens, behov av trygghet har tidigare ansetts kunna säkerställas genom den 
socialdemokratiska välfärdsstaten (Ljunggren 2015), och genom att nu beskriva rättsvä-
sendet som lösning på otrygghet blir, liksom Andersson (2010) uppmärksammat, krimi-
nalpolitiken en arena att föra välfärdspolitik på. Samtidigt kommer jag utifrån min teore-
tiska och metodologiska ingång vara intresserad av just hur den förändring som följer av 
dagens trygghetsdiskurs begränsas av de problemrepresentationer som är knutna till be-
greppet trygghet. En annan tendens som är intressant i den debatt som fördes inför riks-
dagsvalet 2014 är det faktum att Sverige återkommande beskrivs som ett i grunden tryggt 
land. Hur trygghet kan användas som nationsskapande är en annan frågeställning som jag 
anser behöver uppmärksammas för att förstå begreppets symboliska potential fullt ut.  
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Traditionally, the law has been considered as devoid of emotions, however recent research 
has begun to analyze the courtroom as an emotional scene. The emotion norms of the 
courtroom are thus interesting to explore and, as the courtroom work and emotions of de-
fense lawyers have received little sociological attention, this will be the focus of this paper. 
The aim here is to show the emotions that are present in the courtroom and how they are 
managed using the case of anger and I will also discuss the use of niceness. The paper will 
also explore the ways in which anger and niceness should be displayed in order to both 
conform to the emotional regime of the courtroom and in order to show loyalty to the cli-
ent, loyalty comprising the guiding principle of defense lawyers in Sweden. The paper will 
also discuss the background to the recent shift from viewing courtrooms as unemotional 
arenas to a move in sociological and legal research aimed at uncovering the emotions lying 
beneath. I aim therefore to explore what defense lawyers actually do in the courtroom, that 
is, the interactional and emotional strategies used to represent clients in order to give the 
impression of being loyal to the client. By studying this in a context where the scope for 
expressive gestures is limited, namely the Swedish courtroom, it is possible to gain a 
greater understanding into the prevailing emotional regime of the courtroom and the 
ways in which legal representation is performed. This paper draws on ethnographic field-
notes from courtrooms in Sweden and interviews with defense lawyers. The emotional 
regime in the courtroom is also discussed, outlining the emotional parameters of the 
courtroom. 
Law and emotion 
 
The law is typically and traditionally associated with neutrality, objectivity  and impartial-
ity (Bladini, 2013; Deflem, 2008; Jacobsson, 2008), however the current turn towards the 
“emotionalization of law” (Karstedt, 2002, p. 299) has seen the re-introduction of emotions 
(chiefly shame, disgust and anger) in criminal procedures. The focus of this paper will be 
on the emotions of defence lawyers. The courtroom can be a scene of strong emotions, 
both sincere and insincere, involuntary and staged (Dahlberg, 2009; T. A.  Maroney, 2011; 
Roach Anleu & Mack, 2005) although they are typically withheld, contained or only dis-
played subtly. In this paper I will highlight and discuss the emotional undercurrents hid-
ing beneath the calm veneer of the courtroom (see Adelswärd, 1989) and I will attempt to 
answer the following questions: Which emotions are present in the courtroom? How are 
emotions displayed and managed? How does a defence lawyer represent a client using 
emotionally motivated or charged interaction? 
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This study considers emotional labour as “the effort, planning and control needed to ex-
press organizationally desired emotion during interpersonal transactions.” (Morris & Feldman, 
1996, p. 1996, authors own emphasis). By this rationale, defence lawyers may be expected 
to perform emotional labour. This means not only managing their own emotions but also 
the emotions of others, for example, the client’s emotions or the plaintiffs, or witnesses’. 
Managing the emotions of the client can be useful for ensuring that the impression given 
by the client is in line with overall impression the defence lawyer is attempting to accom-
plish. (see Thoits, 1996)  
Emotional displays can be analytically divided into three types (Wharton & Erickson, 
1993) defined as positive (to build enthusiasm), negative (to emphasis anger or hostility) 
and neutral (aimed at demonstrating fairness and professionalism) (Morris & Feldman, 
1996). For example, a positive emotional display would be “strategic friendliness” (Pierce, 
1995, p. 72) which Pierce suggests that trial lawyers employ in order to influence the jury. 
Professionalism is linked to concepts such as disinterestedness (Parsons, 1954), detach-
ment neutrality and credibility (Shulman, 2000) and the suppression or expression of emo-
tional expression (Lively, 2000) which may lead to or result from the socialization into “af-
fective neutrality” (Smith & Kleinman, 1989). Displays of strong emotions are thus often 
linked with being out of control (Gibson & Schroeder, 2002) and should therefore be 
avoided according to the emotional regime.  
The role of social interactions and emotions in the courtroom require attention as the trial 
outcome may be dependent on the interactive work conducted by the communicating par-
ties (Aronsson, Jönsson, & Linell, 1987, p. 114) Despite this, there is limited research look-
ing at such interactions in Swedish courtrooms, and very little conducted on an interna-
tional level. Until recently the focus in Sweden has instead been on how one presents one-
self linguistically or discursively (Adelswärd, 1989; Aronsson et al., 1987; Jacobsson, 2008). 
However a recent turn towards emotions has focused on the emotions of the courtroom, 
judges and prosecutors (Bergman Blix & Wettergren, 2015; Törnqvist, 2013; Wettergren & 
Bergman Blix, 2016) and the general courtroom climate (BRÅ, 2013). 
On an international level, there has been greater focus on emotions of legal actors (judges, 
prosecutors, defence lawyers, and juries) in the courtroom (Harris, 2002; Lange, 2002; 
Lively, 2000; T. A. Maroney, 2011; Pierce, 1995; Roach Anleu & Mack, 2005; Westaby, 2010) 
or on factors influencing decision-making (Cowan & Hitchings, 2007; Gathings & Parrotta, 
2013; Kaufmann, Drevland, Wessel, Overskeid, & Magnussen, 2003). One study looking at 
the impact of “offstage observations” on decision-making by juries (Rose, Seidman 
Diamond, & Baker, 2010) found that jurors were aware when lawyers or defendants were 
performing by using strong emotions or attempting to generate support. Rafaeli and Sut-
ton (1987) state that “the courtroom is an organizational context that is brimming with 
emotions.” (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987) making it an excellent site for study. 
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But what is an emotion? 
 
As this is an area of research that is beginning to emerge, I will now briefly discuss how 
emotions have traditionally been viewed along with defining the term. 
The exclusion of emotions in rationality is based on the view that emotions are “anarchic, 
unbounded and associated with a lack of control” (Lange, 2002). However, research on the 
role and importance of emotions in rational decision-making is growing (Bechara, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 1999) with growing support for the argument that 
calm and supportive background emotions sustain the performance of rational action both 
consciously and subconsciously. (Barbalet, 2001) Rational action and thought is therefore 
possible because of emotions (Fineman, 2006; Williams, 2001). The law is considered to be 
rule-oriented and value-neutral (Conley & O'Barr, 1990, p. 60) with defence lawyers ex-
pected to be able to set aside personal interests or opinions so that the legal process is per-
ceived as “sustaining a systemic process which does not depend on the frailty of human 
judgement.” (Rogers & Erez, 1999, p. 267). 
All this begs the question, what is an emotion? One starting point is the difference be-
tween feelings and emotions which can be seen as the division between private experienc-
es (feelings) and public performance of feelings (emotions) (as discussed by Fineman 1993 
in Vince, 2006, p. 346)12. Emotions are thus the way in which we communicate feelings. 
Emotions and emotion rule systems or “emotional regimes” (Reddy, 2001) are socially sit-
uated and role-related (Barbalet, 2001; Coupland, Brown, Daniels, & Humphreys, 2008) 
and can therefore be seen as “socially sustainable practices” (Coupland et al., 2008, p. 328). 
Emotions are thus “both socially responsive and socially efficacious.” (Williams, 2001, p. 132 
original italics), that is, they are produced in interaction and also produce an interaction. 
Such an interactionist approach (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Harris, 2002) sees the con-
struction of emotion as contextual; it enables a wide array of permitted emotional displays; 
furthermore it differentiates between the experience and display of emotions (Harris, 
2002). In this paper then, I am mainly interested in both the display of emotions: how de-
fence lawyers perform loyalty in the courtroom and also the emotional experience, for ex-
ample, how emerging feelings of anger or irritation should be managed. 
Theoretical framework 
 
I will combine the sociology of emotions, looking at “how emotions  are regulated by 
culture and social structure and how emotional regulation affects individuals, groups 
                                                 
1 See Vince (2006) for a discussion surrounding the link between feelings and emotions as well as the inter-
play between the social, political and psychoanalytic. 
2 Moods differ to emotions as moods are slower-changing, less intense, and not necessarily in response to a 
situation, unlike emotions (Briner, 1999) 
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and organizations” (Wharton, 2009, p. 148) with a symbolic interactionist approach fo-
cusing on the social processes of interaction through which identities are created, main-
tained, reproduced and communicated. The branch of sociology known as symbolic 
interaction is based on the work of Erving Goffman who was interested in “the ways in 
which the individual in ordinary work situations presents himself and his activity to  
others, they ways in which he guides and controls the impression they form of him, 
and the kinds of things he may and may not do whilst sustaining his performance be-
fore them.” (Goffman, 1956, p. Preface). This paper will thus look at the performance of 
defence lawyers which is intended to give the impression of loyalty to the client as de-
fence lawyers in Sweden are supposed to follow the guiding principle of loyalty (see 
below). Such impression management strategies are used to maintain “face” (Goffman, 
1956) that is, to appear in a certain way in line with how we wish to be perceived by 
others. This can be done, in part by drawing attention towards certain confirmatory 
facts which reinforce the impression we are attempting to give (Goffman, 1956) but 
may even entail withdrawing attention in order to reduce the impact or importance 
given to certain facts (Flower, 2016). Impression management strategies therefore entail 
the performer acting in order to convince the audience and him/herself of the reality of 
the impression that is being displayed. In this paper, the performer is the defence law-
yer who is attempting to present himself or herself as loyally representing the client’s 
interests. The defence lawyer must also present the client’s version events as being ac-
curate and plausible account, no matter how unlikely it may appear in the eyes of oth-
ers.  
 
This performance includes emotion management strategies; techniques used to adjust 
one’s emotions to fit the current situation. Hochschild’s  (Hochschild, 2003) work on 
emotion work shows that there are emotion rules present in society which guide our 
emotional performances: which emotions to show and how to show them. Emotion 
work entails adjusting our outer countenance in order to produce a certain feeling in 
someone else. For example, even if we are having a terrible day at work, we should still 
smile and nod and be polite to the customer in order to make the customer feel good. 
Similarly, emotion work can also entail producing fear in another, as Hochschild writes 
regarding the emotion work of debt collectors (Hochschild, 1983). When such emotion 
work is controlled by an employer or organisation, it is classed as emotional labour. 
The vast majority of research on emotional labour has looked at traditional service in-
dustries as emotional labour takes place in face-to-face (or voice-to-voice) interactions. 
However, more research is starting to looking at the emotion work conducted by pro-
fessionals such as doctors, teachers and even lawyers.  
The Swedish district courts 
 
I will now give a brief description of the Swedish courtroom and criminal trial in order to 
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set the scene for the ethnographic work conducted. In a Swedish courtroom, the judges 
and clerk sit in a row at the front of the courtroom whilst the defence lawyers sits on the 
right hand side of the room at a table with the defendant to their left. The prosecution sits 
opposite, on the left hand side with plaintiffs sitting to their left. The witness sits in the 
middle of the courtroom when they give evidence and spectators sit at the back of the 
courtroom. In a criminal trial the main actors are the judge, lay judges, clerk, prosecutor 
and defence lawyer along with the plaintiff, defendant and witnesses. Proceedings are rel-
atively informal and less adversarial than the Anglo-Saxon system and the judge may be 
fairly active during proceedings (Aronsson et al., 1987). Trials are open to the general pub-
lic although spectators are rare. Defence lawyers in Sweden must the follow the code for 
professional conduct as decided by the Board of the Swedish Bar Association3. The main 
purpose of the above Code of Conduct is to protect the public from unqualified practition-
ers, the secondary purpose is to act as a professional guide for lawyers (Ebervall, 2002, p. 
47).  
Method 
 
This paper is based on my ethnographic fieldwork which was conducted at two district 
courts in southern Sweden on over 40 occasions, each lasting between two and six hours.  
Fieldnotes were written during proceedings and therefore allowed me to focus on the in-
teraction between defence lawyer and client, including small, subtle gestures. I have also 
conducted interviews with 16 lawyers (14 criminal lawyers, one business lawyer and one 
focusing on civil law), ranging in length from 45 minutes to over two hours long.  Other 
material has also been gathered, including informal observations and conversations, re-
ports in the media, and autobiographies written by defence lawyers. Fieldnotes from 
courtrooms written by criminology students studying at university have also been consid-
ered in the analysis. 
Emotional regime of the courtroom 
 
The court is like a living theatre and when you come to court you should have a 
professional attitude towards the court. We should not raise our voices, we 
should not display too much emotion… we should be confident, self-assured, 
                                                 
3 “The principal responsibility of an Advocate is to show fidelity and loyalty towards the client. As 
an independent adviser, the Advocate is obliged to represent and act in the client’s best interests 
within the established framework of the law and good professional conduct. The Advocate must not 
be influenced by possible personal gain or inconvenience or by any other irrelevant circumstances.” 
(Association, 2008, p. 4) 
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put things in front of the court like a news anchor more or less. This I think, is 
the facade you should have.      Interview with Per M. 
The above extract from an interview with a criminal defence lawyer summarises how de-
fence lawyers are to appear in the courtroom. Professionalism is expected and implicit in 
this is the assumption that emotional displays should be muted. The performance there-
fore of a defence lawyer must remain within the confines of the courtroom theatre: the 
emotional regime of the courtroom.  I will now discuss how defence lawyers accomplish 
this by using exemplifying how they describe dealing and using one emotion: anger. I will 
first show how defence lawyers display loyalty before moving on to the role of anger; and 
finally exploring how anger may be legitimately used in the courtroom in order to give the 
impression of loyalty. 
Loyal lawyers 
 
I begin by showing the importance of the duty of loyalty for defence lawyers by using 
Martin’s viewpoint, an opinion repeated by all defence lawyers in the interviews: 
 
I have only one criterion: loyalty towards the client…I have a very strong duty 
of loyalty towards my client and should basically do everything within my 
power, within the scope of the rules for what a lawyer may do. (…) My working 
hypothesis is the client’s position or version of a certain course of events, I do 
my job based on that.       Interview with Martin 
The question follows, how does this loyalty show itself in the courtroom? We begin with 
an excerpt taken from my fieldnotes on the final day of a murder trial where the prosecu-
tion is pushing for a charge of premeditated murder, claiming that the defendant inten-
tionally killed the victim. The defendant denies the charges: 
The defence lawyer begins her closing argument. She takes off her glasses and 
states that “the prosecutor is WRONG in making these claims!” She leans for-
wards, forearms on desk, hands clasped and asks the judges to experiment 
themselves in holding the weapon in the way the prosecution claims the de-
fendant was holding the weapon before the incident. Her voice becomes louder 
and there are large hand gestures. She shakes her head, uses an even louder 
voice and speaks faster when explaining that it would have been impossible for 
the incident to have occurred in the way claimed by the prosecutor. She points a 
finger on the desk and then waves it up in the air, reiterating her point. She then 
speaks even more loudly, pointing at the prosecutor and stating that there is no 
evidence for the accusations. Her voice becomes slightly higher in pitch with 
lots of emphasis on certain words when claiming that the client was in SHOCK 
after the incident which explains his reactions afterwards. The defence lawyer 
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goes on to state that “I don’t claim that this IS what happened, rather than it 
COULD be what happened” whilst pointing a finger at the judges, speaking 
quickly and loudly. She continues that the claims of the prosecution “are pure 
speculation” which she says in a tone of voice implying incredulity. Her voice 
then becomes much softer stating, “my client is not the same person now as she 
was when she was taken into custody” which makes the defendant’s mother 
start to cry. She states that the charges will never be accepted and looks to the 
mother when she says this, before stating in the softest tone of voice yet that her 
client should be released immediately.  Extract from fieldnotes 
We see here how the defence lawyer aligns herself as being loyal to her client by support-
ing the client’s version of events. The client claims that the accusations are untrue, there-
fore the defence lawyer must react as though the judges may agree with the evidence pre-
sented by the prosecution, indicating that the client is guilty. It is a team performance 
aimed at over-communicating or drawing attention to certain facts such as weaknesses in 
the prosecution’s case, whilst under-communicating others (Flower, 2016; Goffman, 1956, 
p. 87), for example, any evidence incriminating the client or destructive information. As 
seen above, this may be achieved by using rhetorical tools such as tone of voice, pace of 
delivery and emotional tone, the result highlighting the flaws in the prosecution’s case and 
underlining the emotional impact of events. 
Angry lawyers 
 
The defence lawyer in the above extract gives the impression of anger. Of course it may be 
the case that the defence lawyer is actually emotionally experiencing anger which is then 
expressed. This may be the case if it is perceived by the defence lawyer that the prosecutor 
has broken the courtroom rules by not following their duty of objectivity or in cases where 
they feel strongly that a client should not be convicted as described by Martin an experi-
enced criminal case lawyer who is talking about the feelings that can arise when represent-
ing a client one strongly believes should not be found guilty: 
If you feel that, this is wrong! Sometimes you are so convinced that the client 
can’t be judged on the evidence and the poorer the evidence, the more con-
vinced I am and then I get emotional, you can see it on me.. it more than likely 
shows on me as I really believe in what I am saying. But you can’t be so damn 
engaged all the time, it’s impossible I think.                         Interview with Martin 
However, the display of anger may also be an impression management strategy, aimed at 
drawing attention to the inaccurate accusations of the prosecution because anger is an 
emotion that should, for the most part, be avoided in the courtroom. As Dan, a criminal 
defence lawyer notes in an interview, getting angry can lead to a misstep, saying some-
thing unintentionally or saying something incorrect. Instead a defence lawyer should pref-
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erably discursively display anger for example by saying “I was really surprised with what 
(the plaintiff or witness) was saying today”, rather than emotionally expressing it by visi-
bly displaying anger. This instrumentality is supported by Erik who states, “you’re out to 
get a reaction, it’s rational emotional expressions aimed at supporting the client.” Visible 
anger is thus viewed by defence lawyers as an “unbecoming emotion” (Averill, 1994, p. 
265) which should be re-formed into something more becoming, for example, into relevant 
questions or into a protestation regarding the prosecutor’s lack of objectivity. One of the 
defence lawyers interviewed, Linda, says the following when we are discussing what 
happens when one feels oneself starting to get angry: 
If you get angry, which happens more often than getting sad (…) you try and 
think of a suitable counter-question or you try and think about how I approach 
this in my summing up, point out that I think the prosecutor overstepped the 
mark.     Interview with Linda 
However, displays of anger should be handled with care. Misdirected or too intense anger 
may risk breaking the emotional regime of the courtroom and endanger, in turn, angering 
the court as Linda goes on to explain: 
I know that if I start to shout and get angry, it can reflect badly on my client. If I 
stand up and shout, and it happens, there are lawyers who have done it, but it 
doesn’t benefit my client if I act like that.  Interview with Linda 
Research has shown that “incidental emotion” (Litvak, S., Tiedens, & Shonk, 2010) that is, 
emotion that arises in one situation and which spills over into the next situation can lead 
to misdirected allocations of blame based on already-present feelings of anger (see 
Fiegenson, 2016 and; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006 for an overview). It could therefore be argued 
that angering the judge could lead to him or her allocating too much blame to the client 
and even lead to harsher punitive attributions and punishment (Lerner, Goldberg, & 
Tetlock, 1998). 
Another aspect to anger being viewed as an unbecoming or inappropriate is based on the 
roots of anger: it is an emotion that arises when one’s self (or someone near) has been of-
fended or injured (Litvak et al., 2010) therefore the display of anger by a defence lawyer 
could also risk being viewed by the court as the defence lawyer having crossed the per-
sonal/professional divide which is supposed to be upheld between lawyer and client, that 
is, that the professional role of defence lawyer has fallen, as Per M. states discusses below: 
It’s like showing that you don’t have a professional attitude (…) You are there 
to represent your client as a lawyer. You’re not his or her twin.     Interview 
with Per M 
All of this shows that defence lawyers must rely on emotion management strategies in or-
der to draw forth the appropriate emotional impression of loyalty. Discursive emotion 
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management strategies are a way of giving the impression of anger whilst maintaining a 
professional role by using emotion management strategies to conform to the normative 
order of emotions in the courtroom.  
Dramatic subtlety 
 
So we know that defence lawyer get angry. We also know that they are not always able to 
show this anger as they risk breaking the emotional regime of the courtroom which may in 
turn lead to harsher judgments regarding their client or indeed reprimands from the judge 
or being reported to the disciplinary board as Andreas discussed in an interview. So how 
should anger be shown? We have seen in the fieldnote extract above that anger may be 
displayed in the closing argument in order to direct attention to weaknesses or inaccura-
cies in the prosecution’s case. However, it is also possible to see anger throughout the trial, 
anger which is appropriately managed and displayed.  
In the following extract we see an example of outrage in the Swedish courtroom. In the 
interaction the prosecutor is presenting the facts of the case at the start of a trial and is 
reading aloud a report written by an expert witness regarding the extreme temperatures 
that can be reached inside a car on a warm day. The findings of this report are of im-
portance for the defence’s case and when the exact temperatures are read out: 
The defense lawyer look up sharply and says, very quietly but also very forcibly 
“what?!?” He looks sharply at the prosecutor, then the judge and then his client 
and shakes his head. Later on when it is the defense lawyer’s turn to talk, he sits 
up straighter in his chair, speaks rapidly and in a loud tone of voice states that 
he became quite outraged when hearing the report which he claims includes in-
correct details.                     Extract from fieldnotes 
Here we see a performance of outrage and loyalty, in the Swedish courtroom. The perfor-
mance is both verbal and non-verbal aimed at giving the impression of outrage, as stated 
by the defence lawyer himself. The defence lawyer can thus be seen to be following the 
corresponding affective line for the team performance, in this case, outrage that infor-
mation that the defence perceives to be inaccurate is being given by the expert witness. As 
this information in turn could make the client look bad (i.e. guilty), this can be seen in 
terms of being a face-threat to the client. A face-threat occurs when the impression or face 
one is trying to portray is threatened, in this case, that the client is claiming that he is inno-
cent therefore the face-threat is aimed at his claims of innocence. The defence lawyer must 
therefore act to save the client’s face by appearing outraged. However, as the Swedish 
courtroom is a non-confrontational one where emotions should remain muted, the scope 
for responding to such face-threats is limited. As the defence lawyer and client are a team, 
the defence lawyer is acting on behalf of the client who has even greater limits on perfor-
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mance. Once again the performance is designed to draw attention (over-communicate) to 
the flaws in the prosecution’s case.  
The defence lawyers interviewed state that interrupting a prosecutor’s presentation of 
facts is seldom done, as Dan states “I don’t want to lose points.” Such interruptions are 
thus considered as a technique for antagonising the prosecution therefore a verbal inter-
change at this stage may be frowned upon and may lead to the court being negatively po-
sitioned towards the defence lawyer, a position that is not wished for (Blomkvist, 1987; 
Mellqvist, 1994). The defence lawyer must thus use other non-linguistic methods com-
bined with a muted verbal response (“what?!?”), this is a response seen in numerous ob-
servations. As mentioned above, whilst the given culture can open up opportunities for 
display, it also puts constraints in place for what is or is not permitted as may be seen 
here. In this way s/he is able to show the appropriate front of outrage whilst still conform-
ing to the emotional regime of the courtroom, which dictates that muted emotions should 
be shown at the appropriate time. According to Blomkvist, the rule to be followed by de-
fence lawyers in the Swedish courtroom is that of Foriteter in re, suaviter in modo – resolute-
ly in fashion, gently in manner (Blomkvist, 1987). This emotional regime also includes ci-
vility as Erik points out that “you can achieve a great deal with objectiveness (saklighet) 
and courtesy” in the courtroom. Maria also states that defence lawyers “can be really diffi-
cult (besvärlig) but nevertheless polite.” Maria goes on to state that: 
It’s often a better result if you can stay calm and nevertheless get the other per-
son or whoever is being questioned to say something wrong or stupid. You can 
get exactly the same effect of getting something to sound completely crazy or 
unlikely by saying in a calm voice, “when you said this and this and this, but 
we know it was like this, then I can’t quite understand it, do you have any 
comment on this?” Instead of sounding angry or aggressive when you say it.   
                       Interview with Maria 
Therefore, maintaining a calm demeanour or poise whilst using “selective stubbornness” 
according to Erik, is an approach that ensures that one remains under control. This emo-
tion work (Hochschild, 1983) is thus aimed at adjusting ones emotions in order to achieve 
the desired result in someone else. In the above examples, the defence lawyers adopt a 
calm, friendly countenance in order to make the person being questioned feel at ease. 
However, there is an undercurrent to this amiable façade as although defence lawyers 
want to keep a pleasant tone in the courtroom to conform to the emotional regime, it is a 
case of strategic niceness (cf Pierce, 1995) aimed at extracting the relevant information 
which may even include making the person being questioned appear less credible. 
Subtle dramas in the courtroom 
 
In conclusion, we see that emotions are ever-present in the courtroom and that defence 
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lawyers must use various emotion management strategies in order to ensure that the emo-
tion displayed remain subtle in order to conform to the emotional regime. This regime en-
sures that emotions remain controlled and displayed in appropriate ways and at appro-
priate moments in the proceedings. Anger and strategic niceness may serve to exemplify 
this as defence lawyers may use emotional expressions of anger and niceness instrumen-
tally in order to achieve certain goals, however displays must remain within the confines 
of what is appropriate for the courtroom. Emotionality is often deemed by defence law-
yers to be undesirable as it may lead one to lose ones train of thought or committing an 
error. Frequently it is the consequence of the emotion that is unwanted, rather than the 
emotion itself. 
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Scaling Penalty: In Pursuit of a Global Sociology of Punishment 
 
Kjersti Lohne 
 
Introduction 
 
A post-national penality is emerging. At the global level, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) promises global justice in the case of what is considered ‘failed’ national justice. At 
the international level, a system of international organisations, donor states, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), offer ‘penal aid’ and rule of law ‘capacity-building’ 
to ‘transitional’ or so-called ‘weak’ states. At the regional level, there is a plethora of trans-
border police cooperation and internationalised court and judicial fora. The establishment 
of a joint EU prosecutorial office is underway. International prisons are emerging, not only 
for those convicted by international criminal courts, but also under universal jurisdiction 
for crimes such as piracy. After being brought before trial in The Seychelles, Somali pirates 
are now being transferred to a newly built prison in Somaliland – funded by the UN. At 
the transnational level, the UK is planning to transfer its Jamaican prison population to a 
newly built prison on Jamaica, built by UK aid funding. Norway rents prison cells in The 
Netherlands, transferring prison population and jurisdictions alike into foreign territory. 
In global society, penality, it seems, take on different forms.  
In tandem with the theme of this year’s conference on new challenges in criminology, a 
question can be asked whether the classical theories of punishment and society – the lega-
cies of Durkheim, Elias, Marx and Weber, and we might add Garland too – are applicable 
to these new and globalised penal landscapes, or, alternatively, if we need new tools to 
think with. This paper is an early attempt to grapple with these issues. In doing so, the 
inquiry engages two lines of critique: First, to transgress ‘the national’ as the scale of anal-
ysis from which to approach the study of punishment, and second, to transgress ‘the 
metropole’ as the object of analysis. As criminology generally, sociology of punishment 
has been a discipline of the West (Agozino 2003, Aas 2012, Carrington, Hogg, and Sozzo 
2015). Empirical studies and analytical insights on the penal states of the UK and the US in 
particular has been taken to define the penal field in general, whereas studies on penal 
practices elsewhere too easily are defined as ‘exceptional’ whose relevance are contained 
as enticing case studies of the particular, rather than of bearing to ‘mainstream’ analyses of 
punishment and society. However, while the critique of punishment and society’s episte-
mological frames are not new, what is needed now are conceptual tools that enable us to 
rethink the relationship between punishment and the nation-state, conceptual tools that 
enable us to see the exceptional, the particular, the periphery as relevant to the study of 
penal power and culture in global society.  
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To do so I lend insight from globalisation studies in an attempt to develop a global sociol-
ogy of punishment. However, a caveat: The intention here is not to argue for an expan-
sionist grasp on punishment, as if scaling up to the global produces bigger and better 
modes of reasoning – that would be what Burawoy (2008: 437) would call a ‘global sociol-
ogy as universalism from above’. My intention is quite the contrary: my point of departure 
is the recognition that elements of this emerging global penality are being looked at in iso-
lation, without much thought given to how globalisation processes fundamentally pro-
duces new penal assemblages. My intention is thus to globalize our research imagination 
in the way we approach the study of punishment.  
In the following analysis, I examine the ‘main underlying philosophical “building blocks” 
around which theories of globalization as a phenomenon…are being constructed’ (Jones 
2006, 2010: 5), and I use these philosophical building blocks as tools to think with. These 
conceptual tools are (i) space and time, (ii) territory and sale, (iii) system and structure, 
and (iv) process and agency. Drawing examples from the field of international criminal 
justice, and specifically, research carried out as part of my doctoral work on the global and 
permanent International Criminal Court with jurisdiction to punish genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, in what follows I begin to flesh out how thinking in 
terms of i) space and time, (ii) territory and sale, (iii) system and structure, and (iv) process 
and agency can inform the study of penality in global society. 
Space and time 
 
A widespread way of conceptualizing globalisation is that it alters notions of space and 
time, for example by a ‘shortening’ of time and ‘shrinking’ of space. Ideas and events and 
decisions made in one part of the world influence individuals in another. We can therefore 
say that with globalisation, the social is no longer necessarily confined within the borders 
of one’s immediate physical surroundings (e.g. Giddens 1990, Aas 2013). An institution 
such as the International Criminal Court adjudicates over events and individuals ‘at a dis-
tance’: Conflict and mass violence in one part of the world are transported into the court 
rooms in another; here they are rendered intelligible through law and legal experts who, 
with reason and logic, search for justice in the form of individual accountability. This tra-
jectory of global justice-making is imagined to come full circle when the deliberations are 
over, when blame has been attributed, and ‘justice’ dispersed back to the site of conflict 
and mass violence. 
However, a common critique of international criminal justice is that it is too far away from 
where the crimes took place; it is too distant. For example, the Court’s locality in The 
Hague, in the midst of the European heartland, makes it difficult for journalists, victims 
and interested parties to observe the proceedings – The Hague is not only an expensive 
city, it is also guarded by strong visa regulations for people visiting from situation coun-
tries such as Kenya and Uganda, Libya, Mali, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire (Lohne forthcoming 
424 
 
2016). On the other side of this global justice-chain; the ICC has a very small presence in 
situation countries. In northern Uganda, where I did my research, the ICC had never actu-
ally had permanent representation.  
In some sense, international criminal justice is supposed to be distant – an international 
recourse when national justice fails. But apart from individual criminal accountability, 
there is little room for the individual at the global level – there are no citizen rights at the 
global level. In the move to ‘the global’, Nils Christie’s (1977) thoughts on how the crimi-
nal justice system ‘steals’ conflicts takes on an additional dimension, as the conflict is not 
only ‘appropriated’ by the state, but by the ‘international community’ embodied in the 
ICC. In this ‘elevation’ of conflict appropriation, victims are further removed from their 
conflicts – physically and politically – as the ‘international community’ reflects the rela-
tionship between states.  
Territory and scale 
 
A slightly different conceptual approach to globalisation is concerned with notions of ter-
ritory and scale (Jones 2010). Critical geographers, for instance, approach globalisation as a 
multi-scalar phenomenon, taking place within the local, the national, the regional and 
global (e.g. Massey 1992, Sassen 2001). Lending insights from these, the study of interna-
tional criminal justice and international punishment does not only entail an analysis at the 
global scale. Rather, it can be approached as a multi-scalar project, meaning with attention 
to how it is constituted at local, national, regional and global levels. One example is how it 
impacts domestic criminal justice systems, such as when Norway increased its maximum 
penalty from 21 to 30 years because of its normative obligations to an international system 
of criminal law, or similarly, how it is heavily intertwined with rule of law development 
and ‘penal aid’ (Brisson-Boivin and O’Connor 2013) in the global south, thus merging with 
a ‘penal field’ that is often approached as a separate research domain. A multi-scalar ap-
proach therefore enables insight into how the ICC has become a vehicle for unleashing a 
number of criminal justice ‘exports’ (see Aas 2011). In this manner, attention might be giv-
en to how international criminal justice, rule of law development and penal aid are not 
only examples of how punishment is no longer the exclusive domain of a sovereign’s 
power of one’s citizens, but also how punishment has become part of a nation state’s for-
eign affairs’ toolbox.1  
Because importantly, the ‘deterritorialised’ notion of penality and transborder penal land-
scapes does not imply a withering of the penal state (Bauman 1998), nor its separation 
from nation state formation. Rule of law development and penal aid to so-called ‘failed’ 
states are precisely a state building project. However, a question can be asked about what 
type of ‘penal state’ is constituted (Garland 2013), and to what extent one can talk about 
                                                 
1 The author’s postdoctoral research will look further into this aspect in particular.  
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‘penal import states’ and ‘penal export states’? Here, critical attention to how these pro-
cesses turns space into time might also offer insights, and particularly to the language of 
how penal transfers flow from developed to underdeveloped criminal justice systems; and 
in so doing, converts differences into one single historical trajectory (Massey 1992). There 
is an assumption here that there is only one way forward, one type of penal progress, of 
penal development. In my mind, then, such ‘penal mobililities’ create a need to rethink 
what it entails to be sovereign state – and what it entails to be a penal sovereign.  
System and structure  
 
A third way of thinking about globalisation is as global order-making, of being about sys-
tem and structure.2 This captures the thinking expressed in Immanuel Kant’s theory of 
cosmopolitanism, according to whom people have entered ‘into a universal communi-
ty…where violations of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere’. This is the mental-
ity of many of those advocating international criminal justice, human rights and humani-
tarian interventions in general. When national justice fails, the ‘international’ or ‘global’ is 
meant to provide recourse. It reflects a Hobbesian world-view scaled up to the global; 
global order mediated through global institutions such as the ICC and the UN.   
Understood through this theoretical approach, the pursuit of a global sociology of pun-
ishment is the pursuit of the meaning of crime and punishment in the making of global so-
cial order. One may therefore ask: how do international criminal justice, transborder land-
scapes of penal transfers and other forms of penal cosmopolitanism shape the process of 
globalisation – shape the particular form of the developing global social order? 
Process and agency 
 
This brings us to the final concepts of thinking about globalisation and the global, namely 
the one that approaches it through the notions of process and agency. If the previous sec-
tion dealt with the role of punishment in constituting the global order; here we would ask, 
whose order? For example, what does it mean that a international human rights organisa-
tions advocate for ‘ICC justice’ in spite of the opinions of large segments of local civil soci-
ety in contexts of mass violence? In recognition that laws have to be made, and that How-
ard Becker’s (1991 [1963]) moral entrepreneurs operate on the transnational level and 
global levels too, we need to examine those involved in seeking to create a global criminal 
order. This type of research would yield insight into how punishment is shaped by broad 
social and cultural forces in global society. Because in spite of the universal and humani-
tarian claims to legitimacy made by penal cosmopolitanism, international interventions 
still follow the beaten track of colonial relations. As concerns international criminal justice 
                                                 
2 For an early sociological account of the ‘world-system approach’, see the body of literature following 
Wallerstein (1974).  
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particularly, there is a spectre of selectivity – of winner’s justice – that has characterised 
the field since Nuremberg. In this manner, a global sociology of punishment may pay fo-
cus to how crime and justice function to include and exclude on the global level too, and 
how representations of victims and criminals of international crimes can be seen to paral-
lel cosmopolitan dichotomies of insider and outsider, civilisation and barbarity, good and 
evil (see also Sagan 2010).  
Conclusion 
 
This paper is thus an early attempt to reflect on the ways in which alternative modes of 
thinking about the social can inform analysis of new penal assemblages. A lot of what is 
done at the international levels – whether international justice or rule of law development 
– are legitimised by terms such as ‘doing good’, ‘efficiency’, ‘humanitarianism’, ‘reform’, 
and ‘progress’ (Aas 2011).  However, just as treating punishment as an index of civiliza-
tion makes for uncritical sociology at the domestic level of analysis, the same is true for the 
global level. Indeed, much of criminology’s distinctiveness is found in its critical engage-
ment with notions of crime and justice, in its critical engagement with abstract and univer-
sal claims by the criminal justice system. So while decades of research on the social func-
tions and meanings of punishment at the national level has revealed it as a practice in-
grained in the rationalities and techniques of power and government, it would be naïve to 
think that these processes and insights bear no relevance to the study of criminal punish-
ment gone global.  
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WORKSHOP J 
EMERGING CRIME RISKS 
Virtual punishment in the making: When citizen journalism ena-
bles processes of shaming and online victimization  
 
Agneta Mallén 
 
Film clips and still pictures captured by civilians, or citizen journalists, are increas-
ingly used as evidence by judges or the police to prove specific accounts of events. 
This kind of visual data is, however, not without problems. The aim of this paper is 
to analyse how viewers perceived a mobile phone film clip as naturalistic data, ena-
bling processes of shaming and eventually a ‘justice’ process on the Internet, includ-
ing virtual punishment of the person filmed by the photographer. In the clip, a taxi 
driver records video of an agitated female customer whom he hinders from leaving 
the taxi. The film is then distributed on YouTube, where it attracts remarkable nega-
tive attention. However, the film clip is only one of several possible accounts of the 
filmed incident, as demonstrated by the police report about the incident as an alter-
native account showing that viewers cannot rely on the citizen journalistic film clip as 
objective, naturalistic data. 
Introduction 
 
A growing part of our daily lives takes place on the Internet - in online-communities, on 
social media and discussion sites. The advantages with communities online are that they 
can help in problem solving, information sharing, and provision of mutual support and 
empathy (Savolainen, 2011). As seen in this paper, online comments can, however, also 
provide a scene for harassment, bullying, stigmatization and labelling (Sengupta & Chud-
huri, 2011; Svensson & Dahlstrand, 2014). 
This paper analyses a citizen journalistic film clip on YouTube where a taxi driver hinders 
a female customer from leaving the premises. The customer in the film clip is referred to as 
‘Crazy Granny’ in two introductory texts to the film clip on the Internet. The video attract-
ed considerable attention on both YouTube and Internet discussion sites from 2006 to 2013, 
and several versions have existed on YouTube. Because the original version of the film clip 
has been removed, the analysis in this paper is based on a version with English subtitles 
(the conversation in the video is in Finnish), posted on YouTube in August 2008. This ver-
sion exists at two different URLs on YouTube and is also available on a British discussion 
site and was downloaded over 129 000 times, receiving almost 600 viewer comments. By 
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March 2014, there were 14 different remix versions of the clip also available on YouTube 
that were downloaded over 300 000 times in all.1 
What is citizen journalism? 
 
During the last decade, the mobile phone and emergence of Web 2.0 technologies, espe-
cially YouTube, have enabled a veritable explosion of pictures and film clips posted on the 
Internet by ‘citizen journalists’. The term ‘citizen journalism’ has a variety of meanings but 
today always includes individuals whom Dan Gillmor (2004) has termed ‘the former audi-
ence’: listeners, viewers, and readers who now act as citizen journalists by blogging, creat-
ing websites, and compiling email lists (Gillmor, 2004; Mallén, 2012). According to Gillmor 
(ibid.), they provide an important source of news for others, including professional jour-
nalists and traditional mass media, who publish the citizen journalistic material. In this 
paper, the term ‘citizen journalism’ is used in a yet broader sense, presented by, for exam-
ple, Luke Goode (2009), including practices such as current affairs–based blogging, photo 
and video sharing, and posting eyewitness commentary on current events, as well as re-
posting, linking, tagging, and modifying or commenting on news material posted by other 
users or by professional news outlets (Goode, 2009; Lasica, 2003).  
Citizen journalism as an unmediated form of bottom-up surveillance or ‘sousveillance’, 
where members of the grassroots monitor those in power, has been applauded as an in-
verse Panopticon, where anyone can take photos or videos of any person or event and 
then disseminate the information freely around the world, and where panoptic technology 
helps individuals monitor those in authority (Ganascia, 2010; Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 
2003). The case analysed in this paper, however, complicates this traditional image of citi-
zen journalism because the monitored person is not a person of authority. 
Method and material 
 
The material analysed in this paper consists of: 
1. The 7-minute film clip, filmed in a Finnish city by the taxi driver/citizen journalist and 
posted on YouTube; it includes utterances and/or movements by the taxi driver, the fe-
male customer, and the eyewitness.  
2. 568 posted viewer comments on the film clip; 543 of these are posted on YouTube, and 
25 comments are on a discussion site. Because the individual 568 comments occasionally 
discuss several matters and combine diverse standpoints, they can be divided into 597 
separate comments. 
                                                 
1 The case discussed in this conference paper is also analysed in the following article: Mallén, A. (2016) Stir-
ring up virtual punishment: a case of citizen journalism, authenticity and shaming. Journal of Scandinavian 
Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 17: 3-18. 
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3. The police crime report of the case, which is based on police phone interviews with the 
taxi driver and the female customer. 
The first category of data is film collected by a taxi driver, which I have analysed in its ca-
pacity as a third-party video: videos that people who are not social scientists have record-
ed and preserved (Jones & Raymond, 2012). The advantage with third-party videos is that 
they can capture the persons directly involved in interactions along with facial expres-
sions, gestures, and body movements. They are thus a uniquely informative source for 
empirical data that enable the researcher to study subtle micro-interaction (Jones & Ray-
mond, 2012; Schlegoff, 2005). For the social scientist, citizen journalistic film clips and pic-
tures provide an unprecedented opportunity to build a sociological record of cultures and 
micro-interactional practices (Heath, Hindmarsh, & Luff, 2010). 
Citizen journalistic material is frequently re-posted (compare Goode, 2009), and the up-
loading of the clips may therefore have been done by a person other than the taxi driver. 
According to the comments on the film clip, the taxi driver uploaded the very first version 
of the clip, which is now, however, removed from YouTube and not analysed in this pa-
per. It can also be assumed that the customer was not able to check the film clip material 
before it was made public on YouTube. As Emmeline Taylor (2010) argues, the explosion 
of social networking sites such as YouTube makes the individual’s control over what is 
made public even more important. Individuals who are photographed or filmed by citizen 
journalists seldom have the opportunity to check the citizen journalist’s material before it 
is broadcast and therefore feel that they have lost control over the media material in which 
they are involved. 
The second category of empirical data to be analysed consists of the comments in the 
online discussions of the ‘Crazy Granny’ film clip on YouTube. By March 4th 2014, 543 of 
the comments were posted on YouTube, and 25 comments were posted on a discussion 
site. YouTube is the third most popular website globally today, an online social space that 
facilitates both passive consumption of content and more dynamic interaction (Thelwall, 
Sud, & Vis, 2012). Ethnographical studies concerning the Internet mostly use text as their 
empirical material (Scaramuzzino, 2014). This empirical material consists primarily and 
sometimes only of threads and comments posted by participants in network sites, online 
games, virtual pubs, blogs, or personal homepages (Scaramuzzino, 2012). I analyse the 
online comments on the film clip studied in this paper narratively, using analytic bracket-
ing (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997) as I alternate in studying what the commentators say and 
how they express themselves.  
Because of the detailed information about the female customer’s identity in the commen-
tary fields and discussion threads, I was able to obtain a copy of the police report of the 
events depicted in the film clip. The police report is based on police interviews with the 
taxi driver and the female customer. The taxi driver reported the incident to the police. 
This third category of empirical data is used in its capacity as an alternative account be-
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cause the taxi driver’s account, the film clip, shows only parts of the whole incident be-
tween the taxi driver and the female customer. The idea of analysing the film clip and po-
lice report as accounts emanates from Dorothy E. Smith’s article (1978) where she focuses 
on verbal accounts that co-operate in the construction of deviancy. I have analysed the 
film clip as an account that enables construction of deviancy, while using the police report 
as a totally divergent account about the incident depicted in the video. 
What does the video clip show? 
 
The video clip analysed in this paper starts abruptly, showing a woman who is gesticulat-
ing and trying to get past the person behind the camera. She is an elderly, elegant woman 
with immaculate hair, expensive clothes, and big jewellery. Although she is well-dressed, 
her fur cape is hanging askew, and she is moving unsteadily and pronouncing some of the 
words she utters with difficulty. During the 7 minutes, she alternately mumbles, talks, 
shouts, howls, screams, and yells. Five times on the clip, the female customer quite unex-
pectedly turns away from the taxi driver she is speaking to, turns towards the street be-
hind her, and starts howling. Once she even holds her hand beside her mouth to magnify 
the sound. The woman is filmed from a distance of a maximum of one to two meters. In 
the clip, the taxi driver is clearly showing her face, which facilitates identification.  
Behind the woman, on the street, stands a taxi cab with the motor running. Although the 
footage shows the colour of the taxi cab, its license plate is not visible. Further behind the 
taxi cab, the film shows an affluent housing area with detached houses from the early 20th 
century. First, the only person the film clip shows is the female taxi customer who is com-
municating with the male driver, whom we can only hear. The taxi driver who is filming 
the incident repeatedly says “We’ll just stand here and wait for the police” To this, the cus-
tomer repeats nine times that she has the right to go home. The taxi driver is not shown 
because he stands behind the camera. The viewer cannot see his moves but only whether 
he approaches the customer or stands still. Then, 4:45 minutes into the clip, a passer-by 
first becomes audible and then also visible in the film clip. The first lines by the passer-by 
is “Everyone has to pay for service”. 
The people who have uploaded the film clips on the Internet have laid down the broad 
outlines for how the commentators should view them. The outlines are drawn with the 
help of texts that introduce the videos: This is what we as commentators should see in the 
film clips. Of the three similar versions of the film clip analysed in this paper, two have 
introductory texts and the third, the YouTube version from 2010, is uploaded without it. 
On the British discussion forum, the customer is introduced as follows:  
Crazy granny (…) trying to slip out without paying the taxi driver for her 
ride. 
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The female customer is in the introductory text defined as crazy and seen as trying to get 
away without paying for her taxi ride. The film clip from 2008 on YouTube presents the 
woman in a similar way: 
There’s this crazy granny (gipsy?) who’s trying to slip out without paying the 
taxi driver for the ride. The driver is filming the whole thing. 
Here, the definition of the customer is described as deviating in two ways. First, she is cra-
zy; second, her ethnicity is defined as ‘gypsy’ – in this case probably referring to a negative 
stereotyped term representing ‘the others’ (c.f. Mallén, 2005, p. 115); and third, she is try-
ing to leave the premises without paying for the ride. The taxi driver is described only as 
someone trying to film the events.  
What the viewers thought had happened 
 
Out of the 597 comments on the film clip analysed in this paper, 43% or 248 comments are 
negative comments about the customer. Only 3 comments, 0.5% out of 597, are positive 
about her. The 248 negative comments discuss the female customer in terms of, for exam-
ple, negative metaphors, negative age stereotypes, and shaming. The negative metaphors 
stem from the folklore (the customer cries like ‘a Banshee’), from the animal kingdom (the 
woman looks like a ‘chicken’, ‘deer’), or from history or culture (she moves like ‘Hitler’ or 
‘Tarzan’). These negative metaphors can here be seen as symbols, used to communicate 
the customer’s deviancy (Charon, 2010): By using the metaphors as symbols, the commen-
tators share a common understanding that the customer’s actions are violating the bound-
aries of normative behaviour. 
The female customer’s age and looks are also recurrently used negatively in several of the 
comments. She is referred to as ‘granny’ and ‘old bag’. It is, however, difficult to define 
whether this is a result of the young age of the commentators on this YouTube clip. On 
Facebook, ageism has been explained with social identity theory according to which nega-
tive stereotypes about the out-group (the older individuals) generate a positive social 
identity for the in-group, the younger Facebook users (Levy, Chung, Bedford, & Nav-
razhina, 2013). Whether this construct is accurate considering commenting on YouTube is 
not that evident: Commentators may belong to all age groups because young and old per-
sons have been found to be equally active in posting comments onto Internet sites such as 
YouTube (Findahl, 2014). 
In some of the comments, the possibility of the customer’s being a criminal, not insane, is 
discussed:  
She doesn’t seem crazy to me. She tried to sneak away without paying for the 
taxi (…) and screams with the purpose to deceive passers-by and get sympa-
thy from them (…) (British discussion forum, comment number 6). 
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Here, the customer is presented as a fraudster who is trying to trick passers-by and as 
someone who tries to deceive people. The comment above, however, is not as outspoken 
about the customer’s deviancy as those below, where the customer is presented as a crimi-
nal, not a victim, only pretending to be insane:  
The granny is essentially a criminal in this case. She is not the victim 
(YouTube 2008, comment number 460). 
Some comments targeting the female customer are simply vile. One possible explanation 
for this low level of discourse is that the absence of face-to-face communication in social 
media may produce a sense of anonymity, which removes the fear of consequences and 
may result in more extreme thinking, manifested in comments such as these (Levy et al., 
2013). The vile comments represent what Emma A. Jane (2014) defines as e-bile – a hostile 
misogynist rhetoric on the Internet that is laced with expletives and explicit imagery of 
sexual violence. Of the 597 comments, 34 comments are openly sexist or violent. Many of 
the comments about the customer’s howl or scream are sexist. Several  commentators also 
use the term ‘bitch’ about the female customer whereas others mention sexually violent 
acts as the commentators wish that someone would rape the female customer or kill her.  
Fuck that bitch, you should show her some justice (…) Should take her home 
and cut her into one kilo pieces (YouTube 2008, comment number 503).  
The two last comments can be interpreted as a way for the spectators to correct the cus-
tomer’s behaviour – they think that she has violated the norms and therefore must be cor-
rected.  
The incident eventually, using Kingsley Dennis’ terminology (2008), expands into a case of 
‘virtual-vigilantism’ on the Internet. The comments show that the commentators examine 
the film for clues to the customer’s identity. It does not take long for the elderly woman to 
be identified and her personal information, such as name, profession, and place of work to 
be exposed. The revelation of her identity can be seen as an attempt to punish the custom-
er for her ‘offence’ in the form of community humiliation that is similar to how earlier 
close community neighbourhoods operated (compare Dennis, 2008). 
The film clip and the comments on it contain an interesting multi-dimensionality about 
who is the perpetrator and who is the victim in the incident filmed. On the one hand, the 
commentators perceive the taxi driver as the victim of fraud, or as one commentator points 
out: ‘The female customer is a criminal, not a victim’ (YouTube 2008, comment number 
460). On the other hand, the customer can be seen as the victim of Internet shaming (com-
pare Braithwaite, 1989) and even as a victim of virtual punishment as her personal details 
have been made public (Cheung, 2014; Dennis, 2008). The shaming processes occur as the 
spectators are posting insulting comments towards the female customer whose actions do 
not represent the commentators’ own reality but seem to transgress or violate the com-
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mentators’ social norms (compare Cheung, 2014, p. 302; Smith, 1978). She is therefore 
tracked and ridiculed and has her personal information spread publicly on the Internet. 
This new kind of shaming is, however, only disintegrative, not reintegrative, because ac-
cording to Cheung (2014), it is executed for the purpose of humiliation, social condemna-
tion and punishment. 
The shaming of an individual in a citizen journalistic film clip can eventually turn into a 
virtual punishment or trial by media (Chagnon & Chesney-Lind, 2015; Cheung, 2014; 
Dennis, 2008). The latter is defined as a form of multi-dimensional, interactive, populist 
justice in which individuals are exposed, tried, judged, and sentenced in the ‘court of pub-
lic opinion’ (Greer & McLaughlin, 2012). As Chagnon and Chesney-Lind argue, trial by 
media may function as a discursive flashpoint upon which moral boundaries may be 
formed and reformed (Chagnon & Chesney-Lind, 2015, p. 42). Trial by media involves not 
only traditional journalistic coverage of crime but also participation of bloggers and an 
audience on the Internet. As seen in this paper and also found by Chagnon and Chesney-
Lind (2015), the individual may not even have committed a crime while still being virtual-
ly punished for it. 
What actually had happened: The Police crime report 
 
According to the police report, the customer had paid her taxi bill without any purpose of 
deceiving the taxi driver for economic profit or to harm the taxi driver. The argument be-
tween the taxi driver and customer started because the parties could not agree on who 
would pay for the cleaning of the car because the customer’s food had been leaking in the 
cab. This incident was not shown in the video clip. The taxi driver also wanted compensa-
tion for the working time spent on straightening out the matter with the customer. Ac-
cording to the police report, the leakage of food was not intentional on the customer’s part, 
which means that the female customer’s actions were not criminal but considered to be an 
accident. The events are not to be treated as a criminal act, states the police report, and the 
police thus closed the preliminary investigation. 
Discussion: How was the virtual punishment stirred up? 
 
Citizen journalism has been applauded for exposing the elite or those in power and for 
making visible the abuse that can target the weakest in our society (Ganascia, 2010; Mann 
et.al, 2003). This paper, however, discusses a case that enlightens two weaknesses of citi-
zen journalism: The first weakness is how the film clip is perceived as showing the ‘truth’ 
by its viewers, an authentic representation of reality, although it shows only one version of 
an incident. The second is how the citizen journalistic film clip enables stigmatization, la-
belling, shaming, and eventually virtual punishment of a person who is perceived to be 
crazy or deviant (compare Chagnon & Chesney-Lind, 2015).  
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As shown in this paper, the citizen journalist’s film clip gives only one version of an inci-
dent. Still, the viewers tend to perceive it as the truth. Why, then, is the film clip treated as 
naturalistic data by its viewers? One reason would be that the viewers perceive the taxi 
driver as the teller of the tale (Smith, 1978). Because he is the teller of the tale, the taxi driv-
er’s account is authorized and not questioned by the majority of the commentators. An-
other reason would be that the viewers see the shaky and blurry film clip as a mirror, a 
real representation of the incident (compare Kukkonen, 2014). A third reason would be the 
texts that introduce the videos on YouTube: In these texts, the female customer is present-
ed as a crazy granny, as someone representing ‘the others’ and as someone who is trying 
to trying to get away without paying for her taxi ride. A fourth reason are the paratextual 
markers in the film clip, which are perceived as the sender’s (citizen journalist’s) clues in a 
message (Kukkonen, 2014). These show the viewers how they should interpret it.  
The taxi driver’s account is authorized and not questioned by the majority of the commen-
tators. The presence of an alternative account in the form of a police report suggests that 
the citizen journalist’s film is only one of several possible accounts about the incident. Still, 
it is treated by the commentators as the proper collection of events. As Smith points out, if 
something is to be constructed as a fact, it must appear the same way to everyone, and 
everyone’s recognition of it as a fact must be based on direct observation (Smith, 1978, p. 
35). The material analysed in this paper would, however, show that to be constructed as a 
fact, the observation of something can also be made through film, not only through direct 
observation; the viewers treat the film as direct observation, as if they were getting close-
up, naturalistic data about the taxi customer. They provide accounts for the ‘crazy granny’, 
typify her, laugh at her, and express sympathy for her, as if sharing an experience directly 
from the place of the event.  
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Social media as a platform for crime 
 
Hanne Stevens 
 
Abstract 
As part of the police response to street level drug dealing, a prevalent method consisting 
of sales adds on the social media platform, Facebook, has been exposed. This paper de-
scribes the magnitude of the problem in the Police District of North Jutland, Denmark, and 
relates the findings to implications for police work pertaining to both investigative and 
preventive strategies.  
Background 
In recent years, an increasing amount of interaction, especially amongst young people, is 
taking part using online communication. This trend is also apparent when it comes to the 
sale of illegal drugs. While there is a budding literature dealing with narcotics trade on the 
Dark Web (e.g. Martin 2014, Demant et al. forthcoming), the role of social media seems yet 
to be largely unexplored. It must be assumed that the problem is relevant across a variety 
of different platforms, however, the empirical parts of this paper deals exclusively with 
Facebook. This website is considered the largest social media site in the world (Europol 
2014: 53), and an estimated 70 % of Danish children and youngsters aged 9-16 years have a 
profile there (Livingstone et al. 2014).  
In the latter part of 2014, the Special Patrol1 in North Jutland Police, began to notice a shift 
in methods when it came to street level drug dealing. Whereas end-user drugs sales are 
traditionally conducted in open or closed markets, where potential buyers must be knowl-
edgeable about physical locations for drugs sales in public areas (Harocopos & Hough 
2011) or private residencies (Sampson 2001), sales are increasingly facilitated through 
postings on Facebook. This approach allows for flexible arrangements regarding the actual 
exchange of drugs and money.  
In the opinion of the Special Patrol, this method of selling was becoming highly prevalent. 
And although they had continuously gathered information for use in their daily work, the 
information was largely unstructured and unvalidated. So a decision was made to assess 
the magnitude of the problem in a systematic way. 
 
                                                 
1 The special patrol are plain clothed police, and have street level drug dealing as a primary responsibility. 
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Methods 
Data were collected during the period from late April to early June, 2015, where the pri-
mary source was information gathered by the Special Patrol during searches of known 
drug dealers. In addition to information from searches, some information was also 
achieved through tips from the public and in one instance from a search of a mobile phone 
conducted as part of a criminal investigation (for an unrelated crime). A key consideration 
in the data collection process was to obtain valid information in a way that was compatible 
with the workflow of the Special Patrol, which can be fairly fast paced. A pragmatic solu-
tion to this issue was to have them take screen shots of mobile phones, showing the rele-
vant information.  
Legality 
Since data was collected as part of police business, and ultimately for police purposes, it 
was necessary to take heed of legality issues. The Danish Attorney General has outlined 
specific guidelines for social media (Rigsadvokaten 2010). This includes covertly gaining 
access to both content and basic subscriber information (IP-addresses etc.), however, this 
necessitates cooperation from Facebook and requires international warrants, which can be 
a bureaucratic and lengthy process. In addition, the police can legally gain access to con-
tent in one of three ways: 
1. By searching a suspect’s phone or computer. In these cases there must be a search 
warrant (or conditions for searches without a warrant must be met) 
2. By creating an alias and thereby bypassing privacy settings through being admitted 
to groups or establishing connections (“friends”). In these cases the same rules ap-
ply as for physical observation and infiltration, i.e. it is legal to interact with sus-
pects as long as there is no entrapment. 
3. By gaining access through the profile of a victim, informer or suspect. In these cases 
there must be consent from the person in question. 
 
Communication on Facebook 
In order to describe the mechanisms, it is useful to first take a look at the structure of 
communication on Facebook. Users must first create a profile; these are usually thought of 
as personal (such that there is a time-stable one-to-one relation between a person and a 
profile). However, it is entirely possible for several people to use the same profile, or for 
the profile to change hands over time. This is probably most relevant in relation to profiles 
that are not connected to a specific person’s identity.2 Profiles can connect to other profiles 
                                                 
2 Alias profiles can have names that are obviously not the identity of a real person (e.g. “The Snowman”), but 
can also have a random name (e.g. “Pete Smith”). 
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(as “friends”) or join groups.3 Communication can take place directly between two or 
more profiles in private messages, through postings on the wall of a profile, or through 
postings on the wall of a group. The majority of the drug dealing we uncovered happened 
in this latter fashion.4 
The groups on Facebook can have the following privacy settings: 
1. Public groups: Content and members are visible to all. Membership by invite or re-
quest. 
2. Private groups: Members are visible to all, but con-
tent is only visible to members. Membership by in-
vite or request. 
3. Secret groups: Only visible to members, i.e. even if 
the name of the group is known, it cannot be found 
in a search by non-members. Membership by invite 
only. 
 
The drug sales were mainly happening through secret 
groups that had been created for that very purpose. Some 
of the groups had names and group pictures with very ex-
plicit drug references, while others were more discrete. In 
either case, the group walls would be used for posts where 
narcotics were offered for sale. Most typically, an add 
would contain pictures of the drug(s) in question along 
with prices for different quantities and a telephone number 
where orders could be placed. Many sellers were offering 
delivery in a large geographical area on a 24/7 basis, and in a few instances, sellers were 
advertising different telephone numbers for different geographical areas.  
During police operations, the Special Patrol would extract relevant information (e.g. phone 
numbers or identities) directly for their own use. And although the groups contained a 
host of interesting information for analytical purposes, such as prices and slang terms for 
various drugs, at this point the main aim was simply documenting the prevalence and size 
of the groups. To this end, each group was photographed (see figure 1) and sent to the 
analyst who could then extract relevant information from the picture itself and from 
metadata.  The collected information included: Name of group, size of group, privacy set-
tings of group, recency of activity in the group (latest post) and date of documentation 
(from metadata).  
                                                 
3 Facebook has a third category of content named ”Pages” – these are predominantly used by businesses, 
celebrities and organizations, and will not be further elaborated in this report.  
4 Due to the collection method, we did not have access to direct communication between users in private 
messages.  
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Results  
During the 1½ months of collection, a total of 34 groups that were active in the North Jut-
land area were documented (see table 1). Some groups were documented more than once, 
which provided the possibility to see if the member count changed. Incidentally, most of 
the groups grew during data collection; some modestly, others quite rapidly. A few of the 
groups also decreased in size, but none with more than just a few members, and only one 
group had an overall decrease in members over the entire period. In addition to the doc-
umented groups, the Special Patrol were knowledgeable of 17 other groups, however they 
had not recorded information about the size of these groups, any time reference to the 
groups, or information on whether or not they are still active. In more than half of the 
documented groups (20 of 34), it was apparent that harder drugs (primarily cocaine, am-
phetamine and MDMA) were offered for sale along with various cannabis products.  
Table 1: Groups by size 
Group size  N of groups  
More than 1000 members  3  
500-1000 members  9  
100-500 members  15  
Less than 100 members  7  
Total  34  
Summing all the membership counts, there were 15 796 members in the groups combined. 
From the data collection it was apparent that some drug dealers were members of multiple 
groups, and while we were unable to test the hypothesis that this is also true for some 
buyers, it must be assumed that the combined reach of the groups is considerably smaller 
than this number. Relatedly, the recording of the most recent post was added to the infor-
mation collection in order to assess whether groups existed consecutively rather than sim-
ultaneously. The majority of the recorded groups (27 of 34) had activity within minutes or 
hours of the time the screen shot was taken, whereas only in 3 groups weeks had passed 
since the last posting.  
Due to the data collection method, many of the documented groups were active in Aal-
borg, which is the main city in the police district. But some sellers were advertising deliv-
ery in all of North Jutland, and recently we have documented groups that are catering 
specifically to relatively small rural communities. In some of the groups, sales adds related 
to other parts of the country (Capital area, Western Zealand and East Jutland) were found, 
just as there were examples of sales adds posted in public groups with membership counts 
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in the thousands, thereby being visible to people who had shown no active interest in 
drugs.  
The findings point to a need to gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms in the 
groups, i.e. the degree of organization, the patterns of communication, the link to other 
parts of the country or to transactions on the dark web, the potential for recruiting new 
sellers etc.  
Police implications 
Some of the investigative challenges that have emerged, concerns linking a social media 
profile to one or more people. For one thing, it is common for the dealers to use aliases 
rather than their real name. Also, a profile is not necessarily personal – often a group of 
people share a profile, so they can take shifts and have a 24/7 operation running, or pro-
files are sold for drugs or money. Finally, the easy access to buyers through the Facebook 
groups facilitates the possibility of frequent changes of phone numbers without loss of 
business. This means that there is potentially a lot of extra work if the police want to inter-
cept their communication.  
In terms of prevention, there is a pressing question of whether the shift to online facilitated 
sales will result in more active users. For alcohol and tobacco there is a consistent finding 
that decreased availability is associated with decreases in use and conversely that increas-
es in advertisement are associated with increased use (UNODC 2015: 25-26). Although 
these findings probably do not apply directly to the use of illegal drugs, certainly, this new 
method of sale with a high level of convenience means that the buys can be more impul-
sive, compared to having to physically go to the location of the seller and subsequently 
carry the drugs for long distances. As such, there is potentially a shorter distance from 
thought to action.  
While the focus in this project has been on documenting the sale of drugs on Facebook, a 
variety of other illegal content, such as doping, prescription drugs, illegal fireworks, 
weapons, and stolen goods were also found. Especially in the case of selling stolen goods, 
there is a mixing of the white and black market. This points to a general need for police to 
consider strengths and limitations in using social media as part of investigations. It also 
remains to be established, to what extent information gathered in this way can be used as 
evidence in court.  
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How widespread is cybercrime: Types and Volume of Public Vic-
timization in Iceland 
Jónas Orri Jónasson and Helgi Gunnlaugsson 
 
Abstract 
 
In recent years police authorities worldwide have noted a growing shift of crimi-
nal activity from the “real world” to the Internet. Criminals have started to use the 
web more as a source to target suitable victims all over the globe. By using the In-
ternet criminals are able to connect to people worldwide which offers all kinds of 
new opportunities for deviant activities. Recently a variety of internet-related 
threats have been reported in the mass media, e.g. computer fraud, cyber vandal-
ism, cyberbullying and most recently cyberwarfare. This is the first study in Ice-
land examining cybercrime victimization among the Icelandic public. A question-
naire was sent out to a sample of 2000 individuals via e-mail asking about Internet 
use and cybercrime victimization. According to the findings about 13 percent of 
the respondents reported having been victimized by cybercrime in the past three 
years. Respondents aged 30-44 years old were most likely to have been victimized. 
Slander and consumer fraud were the most common types of victimization. 
 
Introduction 
 
Nowadays, everyday life happens more and more online, especially for those of us in 
westernized societies. Everyday routine tasks are more often taking place online, we pay 
our bills online, communicate with friends and family, order food, plan holidays, book 
flights, hotels etc. According to Eurostat (2015), about 96 percent of Icelandic households 
had internet access in 2014. This was the highest percentage of homes in Europe along 
with Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Close by were Denmark and Norway where 93 
percent of households had access to the internet. Icelandic users are also the most likely to 
use the internet regularly. About 97 percent of internet users in Iceland reported to use the 
internet at least once per week. This figure is the highest percentage of regular internet 
users in Europe (Sigurðsson, 2015). 
 
The fact that people spend more time online has offered a vast range of new opportunities 
for criminal and deviant activities. Such risks have become a part of everyday life and are 
something that people are increasingly more aware of. Reports of some form of cyber-
crime are becoming a daily occurrence. The social media group at the Reykjavik Metropol-
itan Police has for example posted at least 15 warnings on their Facebook page this year to 
warn people about online scams and cybercrime related activities. According to the local 
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police, criminal violations increasingly take place online such as buying and selling stolen 
goods, fraud and sexual related offences (Haraldsson, 2015).  
 
Making sense of cybercrime is challenging for criminologists, mainly because of the lack of 
a consistent definition. The term cybercrime has no specific reference in law, yet it is often 
used in political, criminal justice, media, public and academic discussions (Yar, 2013). Cy-
bercrime is also almost non-existent in official data. Few offences are reported to the Ice-
landic police and studies have shown that a large proportion of offences remain unreport-
ed for a wide variety of reasons. Victims, for example, may be unaware of that an offence 
has been committed, they do not consider the incident to be serious, believe the police 
would not react or they might be embarrassed.  
 
Another challenge of defining cybercrime is that targets can range from governments and 
multinational corporations to individuals. Therefore it can be difficult to grasp cybercrime 
as a single phenomenon, it should rather be seen as a range of illegal activities. A typical 
definition for different forms of cybercrimes is that it has been committed using computers 
or other online platforms (Yar, 2013). Rather than looking at cybercrime as a single phe-
nomenon it should be seen as an umbrella term used to describe two closely related crimi-
nal activities: cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes. As stated in the term, cyber-
dependent crimes depend on computers, computer networks or other forms of infor-
mation communications technology (ICT). Cyber-dependent crime can therefore only exist 
online and cannot be committed without the use of computer technology. These types of 
offences include for example hacking, spread of viruses, i.e., which are directed against 
computers or network resources via other computers. Cyber-enabled crimes on the other 
hand, are traditional crimes which are amplified in their scale or reach by the use of com-
puters or computer networks. Unlike cyber-dependent crimes they can be committed 
without the use of the internet or computers, for example fraud, data theft and sexual of-
fending (McGuire and Dowling, 2013). 
 
The focus in this study is on the individual level as we examine victimization among the 
Icelandic public. Our main focus is on experiences which are considered as cyber-enabled 
crimes and deviant activity that can have an impact on the victim. Very little is known 
about how widespread cybercrime is in Iceland. The objective in this study is to provide 
new information concerning internet use in Iceland and perceived exposure to cybercrime 
victimization. What is the actual scope and scale of such crimes in Iceland? What fraction 
of society is most likely to be victimized and what is the most common form of cyber vic-
timization in Iceland? Moreover, we also ask participants about their own criminal and 
deviant activity. How many admit to have knowingly broken the law by downloading 
illegally copyrighted material? And how many admit to have visited websites  
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Previous research and theoretical framework 
 
According to earlier research, identity theft, phishing, sexual offences and fraud are 
among some of the most common types of cybercrime (e.g. Oksanen and Keipi, 2013; 
Wolak, Mitchell and Finkelhor, 2006; Yar, 2013; Ybarra, 2004). Cyber victimization tends to 
be low among the general public but higher among younger online users when compared 
to older age groups (e.g. Norton, 2016; Wolak et. al, 2006). It has also been reported that 
children who use social media to a great extent are more likely to be victimized than chil-
dren who do not use social media as much (Staksrud, Ólafsson and Livingstone 2013). 
Residents living in rural areas are also less likely to become victims of cybercrime than 
those living in larger cities (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999).  
 
One study showed that more than 3 million new malicious softwares, such as viruses and 
Trojans, appeared in the first half of 2015 alone (G Data Securitylabs, 2015). Furthermore, 
data from the US indicate that about 10 percent of internet users in 2012 reported being 
victims of online scams or phishing (Norton, 2012) and that in 2014 more than 348 million 
identities were exposed by hackers (Norton, 2016). Data from a recent National Crime Vic-
timization survey in the United States has also shown that about 7 percent of all house-
holds had been victims of identity theft (Harrell, 2015). In a Näsi, et al. (2015) survey study 
about 6.5 percent of young people, aged between 15 and 30 years, living in Finland, the 
US, Germany and UK reported having been victims of cybercrime during the past three 
years. 
 
Research in the field of cybercrime is often built on the routine activity theory (RAT) de-
veloped by Cohen and Felson in 1979. It has been shown to be capable of adaptation to 
cyber victimization and what influences the likelihood of becoming a victim of deviant 
behaviour online (e.g. Näsi, et al, 2015; Marcum, Higgins and Ricketts, 2010; Pratt, Holt-
freter and Reisig, 2010). Social behaviour is believed to influence the likelihood of victimi-
zation according to the routine activity theory. Those who engage in risky behaviours, are 
poorly guarded and are exposed to groups of motivated offenders are more likely to be 
victimized then others (Siegel, 2016).  RAT has mostly been used to understand violent 
crime but it can also be used to shed light on online victimization. Those who report using 
the internet frequently are more likely to become victims of deviant or illegal behaviour 
online than users who use the internet less (e.g. Reyns and Henson, 2015; Näsi et al. 2014; 
2015). Also those who use the internet for deviant activity such as looking at pornographic 
material or downloading copyrighted material tend to be more likely to become victims of 
cybercrime (e.g. Buzzell, Foss and Middleton, 2006). Yet not all scholars agree. Yar (2005) 
has for example argued that cyber victimization is substantively different from being vic-
tim of ‘traditional’ crime, in that the online environment, unlike physical space or the ‘real 
world’, can be spatio-temporally disorganized and relatively unstable. 
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Data and Methods 
 
The data is derived from a web-based survey with participants aged between 18 and 76 
years old from Iceland. The questionnaire was only available in Icelandic thus only Ice-
landic speaking participants could take part in the research. Data collection was adminis-
trated by the Social Science Research Institute affiliated with the University of Iceland and 
the data was collected in March of 2016. All participants had agreed to be members of the 
institutes’ panel. We used a stratified sample mirroring the population in terms of basic 
socio demographic variables of age, gender, residence, education level and income. The 
sample size was a total of 2001 members of the panel and the response rate was satisfacto-
ry or about 60 percent.  
 
First it was examined what the respondents had used the internet for, in the past three 
months. For example if they had read news online, used online banking, social media or 
an online provider of streaming movies, TV series or music such as Netflix and Spotify. 
The respondents were also asked if they had bought or sold goods online. Furthermore we 
wanted to see how many had knowingly broken the Icelandic law by downloading copy-
righted material or visited pornographic websites. The main focus was to distinguish be-
tween legal and illegal online activity. 
 
The second objective of the study was to examine how many of the respondents had been 
victims of cybercrime. This was measured by asking the respondents the following ques-
tion: Have you been the victim of any of the following offences online in the past three 
years. The options given were slander or defamation of your character, threat of violence, 
identity theft, sexual harassment, blackmail, consumer fraud or had your photos shared 
online without your permission. With the last question we were trying to grasp the extent 
of revenge porn in Iceland. 
 
Finally it was examined how different background variables influenced the likelihood of 
becoming a victim of online crime. Several different independent variables were included 
such as gender, age and residency, i.e. if participants lived in or outside the Reykjavik cap-
ital area. Participants were divided into four age groups, 18 – 29 years old, 30 – 44 years 
old, 45 – 59 years old and 60 years old and older. Fewer younger members of the panel 
answered the survey and also more participants with university degrees participated. 
Therefore, the data had to be weighted for age, gender, education level and residency in 
order to satisfactorily reflect the Icelandic population. 
 
Results 
 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of participants who had illegally downloaded copyrighted 
material in the past three months. About one-third of the participants admitted to have 
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done so. The data did not show any significant difference between men and women. 
However, looking at the difference between age groups the difference was statistically 
significant. About two-thirds of participants aged 18 to 29 years old and about half of re-
spondents aged 30 to 44 year old had illegally downloaded copyrighted material, com-
pared to only four percent of participants aged 60 years or older, and about ten percent of 
45 to 59 year olds. The difference between participants living in the Reykjavik metropoli-
tan area and those living outside of Reykjavik was also statistically significant. About one-
third of residents in Reykjavik had illegally downloaded copyrighted material, but only 
about one in four living outside of Reykjavik. 
 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of participants who reported having downloaded copyrighted mate-
rial in the past three months, based on gender, age and residency.  
* marks significant difference between groups (p < 0,05) 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of participants who stated they had deliberately visited 
pornographic websites in the past three months. About one in four Icelanders admitted to 
having visited pornographic websites in the past three months. The gender difference was 
statistically significant. About 39 percent of males but only 12 percent of females admitted 
to have looked at pornographic material online in the past three months. There was also a 
significant difference between different age groups. About half of the younger participants 
stated they had visited pornographic websites in the past three months and about one-
third of participants aged 30 to 44 years old. Fewer of the older participants admitted to 
have done so, about 17 percent in the age group 45 to 59 and about six percent of respond-
ents 60 years and older. Residency had no impact. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of participants who had deliberately visited pornographic websites in 
the past three months, based on gender, age and residency.  
* marks significant difference between groups (p < 0,05) 
 
As shown in figure 3 about 13 percent of respondents had been victimized by any of the 
cybercrimes we asked about. Gender had no significant impact on cybercrime victimiza-
tion. Age on the other hand had a significant influence. Unlike previous research cyber 
victimization was not highest among the youngest online users but in the next age group 
above, i.e. those 30 to 44 years old. About 18 percent of the participants in that age group 
admitted to victimization, and about 16 percent of the younger group. Fewer of the older 
participants reported being victimized in the past three years. There was also a significant 
difference between those living in bigger cities compared to those in rural areas. About 15 
percent of the participants living in the Reykjavik area reported being victimized com-
pared to about 11 percent of those living outside of the Reykjavik area.  
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Figure 3. Percentage of participants who reported having been victimized by cybercrime 
in the past three years, based on gender, age and residency.  
* marks significant difference between groups (p < 0,05) 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of participants who reported having been victimized by cybercrime 
in the past three years, based on legal online activities.  
* marks significant difference between groups (p < 0,05) 
 
Figure 4 shows cyber victimization based on various legal online activities. About 14 per-
cent of the participants who had used online banking and about 15 percent of those who 
had sold or bought items or services online had been victims of cybercrime of some sort, 
compared to only about five percent of respondents who had not used online banking and 
about ten percent of those who had not used the internet to sell or buy goods. About 16 
percent of the participants who had used the internet to stream TV shows, movies or mu-
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sic in the past three months had been victims of some sort of cybercrime compared to 
about nine percent of those who did not use the internet to stream. 
 
As figure 5 shows participants who had illegally downloaded copyrighted material in the 
past three months were most likely to have been victims of some sort of cybercrime. And 
there was a significant difference between those who had downloaded illegally and those 
who did not. About one in five participants who had downloaded copyrighted material 
had been victimized compared to about one in ten of those who had not. Interestingly, 
there was not a significant difference between those who had visited pornographic web-
sites and those who had not. About 15 percent of pornographic users had been victimized 
and about 12 percent of those who did not visit such sites in the past three months. 
 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of participants who reported having been victimized by cybercrime 
in the past three years, based on illegal online activities.  
* marks significant difference between groups (p < 0,05) 
 
According to the data of those respondents who had been victims of cybercrime, slander 
or defamation of one’s character was stated as the most frequent type of crime as shown in 
figure 6. About one in three reported this as the type of crime victimization they had expe-
rienced. The second most frequently mentioned victimization was consumer fraud, that is, 
receiving the wrong product or one’s credit card had been charged without receiving the 
product. Just over a quarter reported having been victims of consumer fraud online in the 
past three years. About 17 percent of respondents had been victims of credit card fraud; 
i.e. having their credit card number stolen and used without their permission. About nine 
percent stated they had been victims of identity theft; that is, misuse of personal data such 
as their social security number. 
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About 18 percent of respondents who reported begin victims of cybercrime had been 
threatened by violence in the past three years and about 12 percent had been sexually har-
assed online. It is interesting to note that only about three percent reported being threat-
ened with sharing personal data or personal pictures of them. Yet, almost one in five re-
spondents reported that someone had shared a picture of them without their permission.  
 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of participants who reported having been victimized by cybercrime 
in the past three years, based type of cybercrime.  
 
Discussion 
 
The number of households with internet access has increased drastically in the past few 
years. Almost every Icelandic household is connected to the internet (Eurostat, 2015) and 
about 97 percent of Icelandic internet users connect at least once per week (Sigurðsson, 
2015). With increased internet use online victimization apparently also has increased. The 
objective with this article was to provide new data on cyber victimization among the gen-
eral public in Iceland. The results showed that about 13 percent of Icelandic internet users 
had been victimized by cybercrime of some sort. Therefore cyber victimization appears to 
be more frequent in Iceland than has been reported in earlier research (Harrell, 2015; Näsi, 
et. al., 2015). Still, these figures cannot be fully compared because our survey asked about 
a wider range of victimization experiences and the focus was more on crime which can be 
categorized as cyber-enabled crime rather than focusing on cyber-dependent crime, such 
as phishing, spread of viruses, etc. 
 
Previous research had shown that younger online users tend to be the most likely victims 
of cybercrime (e.g. Oksanen and Keipi, 2013). This tendency did not show up in our data 
where middle aged Icelanders appear to be slightly more likely to have been victimized 
than other age groups. Yet, the difference between respondents aged 18 to 29 years old 
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and 30 to 44 years old was not great. Gender had no significant effect on cyber victimiza-
tion. The most common form of cybercrime reported in this survey was slander and con-
sumer fraud. Our findings appear on the whole to be somewhat in line with prior research 
(e.g. Oksanen and Keipi, 2013; Wolak, Mitchell and Finkelhor, 2006; Yar, 2013; Ybarra, 
2004). 
 
This study was not set up to test whether the lifestyle-routine activity theory originally put 
forward by Cohen and Felson could be used to explain cybercrime. Yet it can be safely 
stated that more online activity, especially online piracy, increases online victimization. 
About one in five participants who had downloaded copyrighted material had been vic-
tims of cybercrime of some sort. Online behaviour can therefore be a predictor of cyber 
victimization. That is when engaging in risky behaviour online, such as online piracy, us-
ers tend to be more exposed to motivated offenders and therefore increase the risk of be-
coming a victim of cybercrime. Cybercrime might just be new wine in old bottles; that is 
old or traditional criminological theories can also be used to explain new crimes.  
 
The reported data is brand new and offers many possibilities.  Cyber victimization in Ice-
land has not been studied like this before. This study is therefore important to shed a new 
light on the extent of cybercrime in Icelandic society. Yet further work is clearly needed in 
this field. Our next step is to run a logistic regression analysis model to calculate the odds 
ratios of being victimized by factors which have been found to be influential. The findings 
will also be compared with other Icelandic crime victimization surveys to examine if there 
is any difference between those victimized by cybercrime and those victimized by more 
traditional forms of crime. 
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Homicide and social marginalization 
 
Karoliina Suonpää 
 
Introduction 
Violent offences have severe consequences for victims and their families. They cause bodi-
ly harm, material damage, and various health problems. In 2014, approximately 33,000 
assault offences and 327 attempted homicides were reported to the police in Finland 
(Salmi, Lehti, Danielsson, Aaltonen, & Kuitunen 2015). The severity of violent assaults var-
ies from minor assault to lethal violence which is the most severe of all crimes with the 
most serious consequences for the victims and their families. In 2014, 114 homicides were 
reported to the police in Finland (Lehti 2015). Compared to other Scandinavian countries, 
the annual homicide rate is exceptionally high. Offenders usually come from the lowest 
social strata and have a severe criminal history (Kivivuori & Lehti 2011; Lehti & Kivivuori 
2005).  
This paper is based on my ongoing doctoral dissertation on lethal violence. In my first 
sub-study, my goal is to examine whether or not homicide perpetrators are generally the 
most socially disadvantaged group with the most severe criminal history. In other words, 
my aim is to evaluate whether or not homicide is the culmination of social marginaliza-
tion. The empirical results of my own study will be submitted later in a refereed journal. In 
this paper I present prior research, which considers the differences between lethally and 
non-lethally violent offenders. By contrasting events with a lethal and non-lethal outcome 
I aim to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of lethal violence and produce infor-
mation relevant for building efficient preventive policies.   
Prior research 
Various empirical studies have shown that a person’s criminal history is one of the strong-
est predictors of future offending (Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990; Nagin & Paternoster 1991; 
Sampson & Laub 1997). Considering lethal violence, earlier empirical research has shown 
that a majority of lethal perpetrators have a criminal history (Dobash, Dobash, Cavanagh, 
& Medina-Ariza 2007; Farrington, Loeber, & Berg 2012; Soothill, Francis, Ackerley & Fli-
gelstone 2002). Moreover, among the lethal offenders with a criminal history, many of 
them had a history of violent crimes (Dobash et al. 2007; Farrington et al. 2012; Ganpat, 
Liem, Van der Leun & Nieuwbeerta 2014). Besides a criminal history, violent offending is 
also associated with many other forms of social marginalization and deprivation, such as 
low socioeconomic status (e.g. the meta-analysis by Ellis & McDonald 2001; Farrington et 
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al. 2012), parental incarceration (Weijer, Bijleveld & Blokland 2014), and various problems 
during childhood (Farrington et al. 2012).  
It appears that lethal and non-lethal violence have at least partly similar social determi-
nants and are linked in many ways. Lethal violence could be seen as an extreme manifes-
tation of various risk factors (e.g. Hardwick & Rowton-Lee 1996). However, not all violent 
encounters end lethally. In the literature, studies explicitly comparing the criminal history 
and other social determinants of lethally and non-lethally violent offenders appears both 
to be scarce and to have somewhat mixed results. Next I present some relevant findings 
from the empirical studies comparing these groups.  
Smit, Bijleveld, Brouwers, Loeber, and Nieuwbeerta (2003) used the Dutch Homicide Da-
tabase for examining the differences between perpetrators who had been convicted for 
homicide (N=142), attempted homicide (=1,054), aggravated assault (=604) and attempted 
aggravated assault (N=1,437). Surprisingly, offenders of attempted and completed homi-
cide had more previous criminal offenses in total, but fewer violent offences than offend-
ers of attempted and completed aggravated assault. When contrasting only the perpetra-
tors of completed and attempted homicide, the differences in their criminal careers did not 
reach statistical significance.  
Dobash et al. (2007) compared lethal and non-lethal violence against an intimate female 
partner in England, Wales, and Scotland. The group of lethally violent perpetrators con-
sisted of men (N=106), who were convicted for the murder of a current or former partner 
in a marital, cohabiting, or serious dating or engaged relationship. The group of non-
lethally violent offenders consisted of men (N=122) convicted of an offense relating to do-
mestic violence. In regards to criminal history, the authors found that lethally violent per-
petrators were less likely to have had at least one previous conviction or previous violent 
conviction. Results were similar considering other risk factors as well: lethally violent of-
fenders were more conventional with respect to their childhood backgrounds, education, 
and employment.  
DiCataldo and Everett (2008) contrasted two groups of young males who had committed 
lethal (N=33) or non-lethal violence (N=38) and were confined in the same secure deten-
tion program in the USA. Non-lethally violent offenders had significantly greater numbers 
of total offenses, and also more violent offenses. Considering the family history during 
childhood, there were no statistically significant differences in parental criminality or pa-
rental death, separation, or divorce but non-lethally violent perpetrators reported signifi-
cantly more frequent sibling delinquency and out-of-home placements. Overall results 
suggested that non-lethal offenders seemed to be more problematic, based on many of the 
variables of analysis. However, the authors warned that some of the differences identified 
in the study may have been caused due to the sampling bias: the number of subjects was 
small and all of them were confined within the same secure detention program.  
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Ganpat et al. (2014) compared the criminal history of lethally (N=3,678) and non-lethally 
(=4,788) violent perpetrators in the Netherlands. The former group consisted of offenders 
whose index crime was manslaughter or murder, while the latter group of offenders were 
convicted for attempted manslaughter or attempted murder. Results suggested that alt-
hough the majority of both groups had a criminal history, non-lethally violent offenders 
had a more severe criminal history than lethally violent perpetrators. An individual’s his-
tory of prior violent crimes seemed to decrease the probability of lethal violence compared 
to non-lethal violence. However, the results were somehow ambiguous: there were no sta-
tistically significant differences when compared to the mere existence of a prior criminal 
record, and the total number of all crimes (not only violent crimes) in one’s criminal histo-
ry had a positive association with lethal versus nonlethal outcomes. 
Discussion 
Lethal violence occurs in the context of non-lethal violence (Dobash et al. 2007) and all vio-
lent encounters do not necessarily end lethally. Based on the studies presented here, le-
thally violent offenders do not seem to constitute the most problematic group as differing 
clearly from the non-lethally violent offenders: compared to non-lethal perpetrators, lethal 
perpetrators did not have the most severe criminal history, the most problematic child-
hood, or the lowest socioeconomic status. Rather, criminal history and other forms of so-
cial marginalization seemed to predict various kinds of violent offending. Future studies 
should also consider the role of other factors explaining lethal violence, for instance, the 
situational factors such as the spatial location and the social context of the violent encoun-
ter, the availability of weapons, the role of alcohol and other substances, and the relation-
ship of the subjects involved in the encounter.  
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Governing security in spaces of flows 
Martin Nøkleberg 
PhD- candidate, Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of 
Oslo. 
This paper is based on a PhD- project description. 
Introduction: 
The globalized world has been characterized, to borrow Inda and Rosaldo’s (2002) words, 
as a ‘world in motion’. Despite globalization is not a historically new phenomenon as such 
(Aas 2013, p. 24) various global flows are now shaping and influencing a range of aspect of 
our life more than ever. The increasing flows of people, good, cargo, capital and infor-
mation we have witnessed during the last couple of decades may have led to new oppor-
tunities for crime – ranging from smuggling of humans, drugs and other illegal goods, to 
financial fraud and cyber-crime. Accordingly, one can argue that new risks and vulnerabil-
ities have been added to the security agenda – an agenda that has been substantially 
broadened during the last 50 years (see e.g. Buzan, 1991 on the widening and deepening 
debate within the IR- tradition; Buzan, Wilde, & Wæver, 1998; Krause & Williams, 1996; 
Tarry, 1999). In order to capture this fluidity and motion of people and things, the concept 
of flows has been presented as a fruitful point of departure. The perspective of flows and 
in particular the policing of flows has now become an upcoming and important field of 
inquiry within the criminological literature. Moreover, a range of topics have been ex-
plored empirically; e.g. border control and the use of surveillance at ports of entry (Aas & 
Gundhus 2015; Cote-Boucher, 2008, 2013; Pellerin, 2010; Wilson & Weber, 2008). However, 
I will present the argument that the notion of policing of flows should not be perceived as 
a new phenomenon as such. Histories of policing from the English speaking world, for 
instance, suggest that policing of flows is a historical activity dating back to the middle 
ages, but is particular seen within the activities of the police during the 18th and 19th centu-
ry (Foucault, 1978/2007). Similar tendencies can also be observed within the continental 
tradition of policing histories, particular of France and Germany.  
The topic of this paper is the insecurities and securities of flows of a particular category, 
namely, flows that runs through airport and maritime ports. The new risks and vulnerabil-
ities that have arguably been added as a result of (global) flows can manifest themselves in 
a variety of fields and sites. It is argued by Mark Salter (2008) that few sites are more icon-
ographic of the vulnerabilities derived from globalization than the international airport. 
The transportation of people by air has seen a vast increase in recent decades. In 2014, for 
instance, around 3.3 billion passengers were transported by the global aviation industry 
(IATA, 2014). Despite the explosive growth in the aviation industry during the twentieth 
century, most of the world trade still remains highly dependent upon maritime transport. 
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For instance, about 80 per cent of global trade by volume is carried by sea (UNCTAD, 
2014). Furthermore, a vast number of people travel by seas and thus uses ports as points of 
entry. Moreover, there is a high circulation rate at both sites, that is, a large number of 
people and things flow through these areas every day at a high pace. Airports and ports 
are thus perceived to be highly important, but at the same time vulnerable nodes within 
the global mobility regime. Consequently, airports and ports are sites that clearly need to 
be secured; both the sites themselves and the flows within the sites. Following this per-
ceived necessity to create safe(er) environments, governing of security within the port and 
airport are placed high on the international community’s agenda.  
Research issue and questions: 
Over the years I have developed a great interest in two different concepts which makes the 
starting point of the project. First is the concept of flows of people and things (i.e. migra-
tion flows, informational flows, financial flows, electrical flows). During the last decades 
one can identify significant changes and transformations concerning all spheres of govern-
ance (Burris, Kempa, & Shearing, 2008; Kersbergen & Waarden, 2004), as traditional mech-
anisms of governance have been challenged and new arrangements have emerged. One 
important dimension of the transformation is concerning the structure of governance. In 
order to capture the fluidity of governance, the structure is often described in relation to 
the concept of network (Marcussen & Torfing, 2003; Rhodes, 1996; Sørensen & Torfing, 
2005), giving rise to network governance. A significant theoretical contribution regarding 
network is found in the seminal work of Manuel Castells on the network society. Castells 
(1996, p. 398) suggest that the network society is ‘a new society, based upon knowledge, 
organized around networks, and partly made up of flows’. This point is also highlighted 
by Aas (2013) as she argues that information, capital, objects and humans are moving 
through flows. Moreover, it is argued that the developments toward a network society 
have implications for how the concept of space and time is interpreted. Thus, Castells out-
lines a new perception of space, as ‘space of flows’ compared to the more common used 
perception of space, as ‘space of places’. Such an interpretation of space, as presented by 
Castells, seems to have important consequences for how one conceive the spatial bounda-
ries in society. Within the space of flows the ‘objects’ (people, capital, goods, information) 
are in constant motion and may thus challenge the idea of the permanent jurisdictional 
boundaries in societies. What I am particular interested in, regarding the notion of flow, is 
the possible consequences these flows may have on the society. That is, to elucidate the 
responses made by both public and private bodies in order to meet new challenges that 
originate from the risk and vulnerability of flows.  
The second concept is security and in particular security governance. Contemporary un-
derstandings of security often highlight the importance of the distinction between objec-
tive and subjective security (G. Aas, Strype, Bjørgo, & Runhovde, 2010; Egge, Berg, & 
Johansen, 2010; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Wood & Shearing, 2007; Zedner, 2003, 2009). 
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Security can therefore refer, first, to the objective state of being without, or protection 
against threats (i.e. the absence of threats), and secondly, used to describe the subjective 
condition of freedom from anxiety originating from threats. In this project, it is crime that 
is considered to be the threat against security; that is what Baker (2010) describes as ‘per-
sonal or citizen security’. It is emphasized that the subjective condition of security is as 
important to most of us as any objective state of security (Johnston & Shearing, 2003). 
Thus, in order to effectively govern security, measures must both meet the subjective per-
ception as well as the objective threats to security. This project is seeking to combine these 
two aspects – flow and security – which leads to the research issue that the project ad-
dress:  
How is security governed in areas characterized by flows and circulations and what are 
the normative implications thereof? 
Following the research issue, I would argue that the project has two particular objectives. 
First, to provide an empirical account of how plural security governance assemblages 
functions and operates in areas influenced by flows and mobility, and secondly, the pro-
ject aims to enter into the normative debate concerning issues of legitimacy and accounta-
bility in times of plural security governance. It has been argued that the pluralized security 
governance may challenge democratic values. For instance, questions concerning whether 
democratic values are being threatened and compromised by the plurality and hybridity 
of actors have been raised (see e.g. Kempa, 2012; Wood & Dupont, 2006).  
In order to highlight the mentioned research issue and to investigate the empirical sites of 
airports and maritime ports, three sets of research questions will be explored. The under-
lying research questions are: 
1. How do the various actors work and think in order to govern security at airports 
and maritime ports in Norway? What are the underlying mentalities of the in-
volved actors? 
2. Are there differences in the ways which security is governed between airports and 
maritime ports? Further, in what way does the international regulation of the avia-
tion and maritime industry influence how local security is governed? 
3. How, if any, are the cooperative relations between the actors involved in the securi-
ty governance at airports and maritime ports in Norway? Can differences in men-
talities be a hinder to successful and effective cooperation? 
The first question is mainly concerned with the exploration and investigation of security 
actors’ perceptions of their work by focusing on the notion of mentalities. The nodal gov-
ernance framework, as it is developed by Clifford Shearing and colleagues through a 
range of works (Burris, 2004; Burris, Drahos, & Shearing, 2005; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; 
Shearing, 2006; Shearing & Wood, 2003; Wood & Dupont, 2006; Wood & Shearing, 2007), is 
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a way of capturing the plurality in the governance of security. A mentality refers to a men-
tal framework that shapes the ways in which we think about the world and the way we 
decide to act. Within the nodal approach a mentality, then, refers to the ways of thinking 
about the matters and issues that the actor has emerged to govern (Burris et al., 2005). 
Moreover, since not all actors are created equal, actors will vary in their accessibility and 
their efficacy. Thus, by placing the emphasis on the internal characteristics of the actors 
one is capable of capture and investigate how a whole range of actors work and think in 
order to govern security within areas characterized by flows. 
The second question is oriented towards a comparison of the security governance at air-
ports and ports. As suggested above, airports and ports may be affected by similar risks 
and vulnerabilities. Both sites of inquiry possess important places within the global trade 
and mobility regime. Consequently, to secure and protect the infrastructures and individ-
uals at these sites have, according to Russell Brewer (2014), become a priority for govern-
ments around the world, including Norway. There are different aspects that may be of 
relevance in order to explore this second question. Though airports and ports are both 
concerned with the flows of people and things, it is still possible to discern a difference. In 
general, airports are more oriented towards the transportation of people (passengers) 
whilst ports are more concerned with the transportation and handling of cargo and goods. 
This point is also highlighted by Braithwaite and Drahos (2000). But of most interest, in 
terms of comparison, for this project is the influence of international regulation of the avia-
tion and maritime industry. That is, in what way do the regulations and standards devel-
oped at the international level influence how local security is governed.  
Network and relations are significant for the above-mentioned nodal approach. One im-
portant element seems to be that actors may be linked to one another through networks 
but they also may not be (Fleming & Wood, 2006; Wood & Shearing, 2007). Hence, it is an 
empirical question whether or not actors are connected through networks. Furthermore, 
one assumption in the nodal perspective is that the characteristics of the actors affect the 
developments of network relations and collaborative ties. However, as Ayling, Grabosky 
and Shearing (2009) stresses, the characteristics of the actors have also the potential of be-
ing affected by the relations that are developed. This means that there is a dynamic aspect 
between the characteristics of the actors and the developments of relational ties among the 
actors. The third and last question is thus concerned with the collaboration among differ-
ent actors involved in the security governance. One particular aim is to explore and cap-
ture the possible driving forces or factors behind these relationships.  
Theoretical contribution: 
The theoretical framework of nodal governance holds an important position within the 
project. However, this is not what I want to focus on now (see Nøkleberg, 2016 for an 
elaboration of the framework). I would rather direct my attention towards one particular 
theoretical framing of the project, that is, a theoretical contribution.   
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The project aims to examine the dynamics between the securitization of the border as a 
barrier to mobility on the one side, and the economic imperatives of free flow and move-
ment of people and goods at the other hand. One aspect of this is that the understanding 
of borders has been changing within the last decades. For instance, the notion of ‘virtual’ 
borders have been introduced and explored (see for instance Lyon, 2008). The notion of 
virtual borders has in particular been brought about by developments in communication, 
surveillance and related technologies. Moreover, it is possible to argue that borders are 
being moved abroad through the deployment of liaison officers operating in other coun-
tries. These developments seem to have altered the traditional physical, geographical bor-
ders, that is, new understandings of borders are presented. Through the 1990s it was even 
suggested by some scholars that a borderless world would arise as a result of globalization 
(Ohmae, 1999; Pellerin, 2005). However, this may not be the case, as the securitization of 
the border has now become a fundamental aspect of the globalizing condition (Aas 2013). 
As a result, global flows of people and things are now constantly checked at a range of 
different points of entry. It can even be argued that the border policing have become in 
many respect stricter in the age of globalization. Following this, then, it seems possible to 
claim that the securitization of the border function as a barrier to mobility and flow, not 
everyone and everything can move freely around the world.  
Even though border policing may have become stricter in recent years, contemporary gov-
ernments are struggling with one particular aspect in relation to controlling and regulating 
the flows that runs through and cross borders. One can also identify a beneficial potential 
of different flows of people and things, particular of relevance of the national and even to 
the world economy. Accordingly, governments across the (western) world seem to be 
trapped in a dilemma: the need to regulate the flows of people and things are being chal-
lenged by the importance of easing movement of certain groups of people and goods, 
which could have vast beneficial impacts on the economy. It is the task of both public and 
private policing agents to balance between these two contradicting impulses. One can thus 
argue that the objective of policing and regulating flows that try to cross borders is not to 
seal off the border completely but rather to manage them efficiently. 
Methodological considerations: 
Following the discussions above, a pressing question now is concerned with the methodo-
logical framework, that is, how can one go about and research and collect data on these 
issues I have outlined above? Are there some methods that are more suitable than others? 
As the purposes of the project is to provide an empirical account of how plural security 
governance assemblages functions and operates in areas influenced by flows, and to ex-
plore the cooperative relations and the driving forces behind them, I need to develop a 
framework that are capable of capturing such aspects. To elucidate the research issue at 
hand, the project will make use of both qualitative and quantitative methods/data.  
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The qualitative data foundation for this project will first and foremost be derived through 
interviews with representatives (key informants) affiliated organizations that belong to the 
categories of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, regulatory authorities, business, 
labor. It is expected that the data gathered through this approach will reveal much about 
the nature of operation of the various actors; how do they act and think in regard of crime 
and security at the different sites of inquiry. The second data foundation of this project, 
quantitative data, will be derived through a survey of the relational ties that link actors 
together. This mapping of structural relations will reveal how the various actors are con-
nected and thus explore the collaborative ties between them. Through this combination of 
research methods and data one will be able to investigate both single actors in-depth and 
to map and analyze the overall network structures. Such a combination draws inspiration 
especially from Dupont (2006) and Brewer (2014). 
However, as I have experienced some difficulties of getting access to the field, in particular 
to the police I have had to reconsider some of my initial plans of how to go about to collect 
data in order to overcome this challenge. The solution is to expand the use of quantitative 
data sources in order to measure and explore the cooperation among policing agents at the 
airports and on the waterfront and to identify significant factors contributing to these rela-
tionships. The main reason is that collaboration among policing agents has been highlight-
ed as an important feature both by policy makers and academics (Brewer, 2014; Justis- og 
politidepartementet, 2005; Politidirektoratet, 2005).  
Within the policing literature, some scholars have speculated that successful partnerships 
are a product of trust and an abundance of social capital amongst partners. The concept of 
social capital has been much debated across the social sciences (Coleman, 1986, 1988, 1990; 
Fukuyama, 1995, 2002; Lin, 2001; Putnam, 1995). While there has been some disagreement 
regarding how to interpret this phenomenon, it is possible, according to Brewer (2014), to 
draw linkages between some of the conceptual discussions. Thus, social capital can be un-
derstood, rather broadly, as ‘a process by which social relations are used to facilitate indi-
vidual and collective action, or outcomes for mutual benefit’ (Brewer 2014: 15). By review-
ing the literature on social capital, the concept seems to consist of two significant elements: 
networks of relationships (structural dimension), and norms of trust and reciprocity. It is 
argued that these two elements represent the building blocks of social capital. As a result, 
these two core elements are crucial to all productive social relationships (Brewer 2014).  
To first measure the networks of relationships amongst the numerous public and private 
actors involved in security governance at the airport and on the waterfront, the analytical 
tool of social network analysis will used. The very idea of (social) network analysis is to 
map the distinct patterns of relationships which exist between different actors, and then 
analyze what implications this may have on the network itself. The main purpose of the 
network analysis is to identify who are the most central actors within the boundaries of 
the network. The reason for this is that centrality is tightly coupled with the concept of 
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power and how power is distributed in the network (Borgatti, 2005; Borgatti, Everett, & 
Johnson, 2013; Freeman, 1979). It is argued that the more central an actor’s position is the 
more opportunities it will have, the fewer constraints it will experience, and the more in-
fluence it will derive from its position in the network. Accordingly, actors with a central 
position will therefore have a greater potential of influencing the course of events. This 
mapping of structural relations will reveal how the various actors involved in the security 
governance are connected and thus explore the collaborative ties between them. The idea 
is to conduct such a mapping across the largest airports and ports in Norway.  
The relational and structural dimension may indeed be influenced by how collaboration is 
perceived by the actors. That is, actors may view collaboration as a threat to traditional 
ways of operating, which has the potential effect of weakening the collaboration processes. 
However, it seems possible that collaboration can also be perceived and understood as an 
opportunity to increase the organizational operation, for instance by improving the alloca-
tion of scarce resources. I would argue that actors’ perception of collaboration may be in-
fluenced by the notion of norms of trust, which constitutes the second core element of so-
cial capital. What follows from this, then, is how to measure security actors’ perceptions of 
collaboration? 
By reviewing the theoretical literature I have identified numerous quantitative research 
models and instruments which explore different features of collaboration as perceived by 
individual actors, mostly derived from the field of psychology and organizational theory. 
One such instrument is the Perception of Interprofessional Collaboration Model (PIN-
COM) (Strype, Gundhus, Egge, & Ødegård, 2014; Ødegård, 2006; Ødegård, Hagtvet, & 
Bjørkly, 2008; Ødegård & Strype, 2009). This model seems to be of great importance for 
this project. The PINCOM consists of twelve constructs (ranging from actors motivation to 
engage with others to organizational cultures), and each of the twelve constructs are oper-
ationalized by four indicators or items. Moreover, PINCOM, as highlighted by Strype, 
Gundhus, Egge, and Ødegård (2014), has shown good results regarding reliability and 
validity scores. However, some work is needed in order to adapt the instrument to fit the 
field of security governance, in particular to incorporate and develop measurements of the 
notion of norms of trust. Again, data will be collected through a questionnaire sent to ac-
tors involved with security governance at the largest airports and ports in Norway. In or-
der to analyze the data retrieved from this particular survey, the analytical tool of factor 
analysis will be used. 
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At the Threshold 
 
"Du tror att det är himlen som är blå, men det är inte den.  
Det är dina ögon som är blå, deras svar på ljuset som är blått.  
Det blåa är ett eko av den ensamma partikelns lockrop, av hur den i ordlös längtan kastar sig 
mot ögats bråddjup. 
Himlens blå är inget annat än en färgseendets blåtira, ett hematom efter fotoners hjärtslag 
mot pupillen. Sådana är de, dina ögon: blinda skalders enfaldiga skönsång.  
Det du tror är himlens blå är bara ljudet av din kropp som sjunger för dig."1 
(Granström, 2010:5) 
 
The problems identified by Granström (2010) are ones of science and of being in itself. We 
cannot escape the limits of our measurements, as little as we can escape misinterpretations 
rooted in the ways of which the world appears to us when we observe it, always endowed 
with our pre-understanding. There are different ways to respond to these problems. 
 
                                                 
1 Authors translation: 
“You believe that it is the sky that is blue, but it is not it. 
It is your eyes that are blue, their response to the light that is blue. 
The blue is an echo of the particles’ lonely calling, of how it in wordless longing throws itself towards the depth of the 
eye. 
The blue of the sky is nothing but a blue-eye of color vision, a hematoma of the pupil from the heartbeats of photons. 
Such are they, your eyes: fatuous songs of blind poets. 
What you believe is the blue of the sky is nothing but your body singing for you.” 
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Rosenberg (2008) wrote that causality is uninteresting, and presented the sinking of the 
Titanic as an example. He argued that causality is void of content and that the only infor-
mation it provides is that the ship sunk because it hit an iceberg (ibid.). I myself see quite 
different things in the same example. I see wonders, powers that should perhaps be be-
yond our comprehension as they are largely beyond our senses; only available through 
abstract explanations and mathematical formulas. I understand that the mechanisms of 
motion, pressure and velocity might appear empty if you cannot see them.   That they be-
come void of content when the underlying mechanisms escapes your hands without leav-
ing traces, much like the dark matter that travels through our instruments of measure-
ment, elusive on its journey through the universe (CDMS II Collaboration 2010). So in-
tensely present, so fundamental and entangled with our existence, yet so otherworldly. 
 
Needless to say, it is the otherworldly things that fascinate me the most. Those that cannot 
be directly caught by observations or counting and those that are unspeakable when you 
only speak of experiences. The following paper consists of an interrogation of three classi-
cal criminological theories. Unlike Weber (1994), I do not apply these theories as approxi-
mate models capturing regularities, but as points of departure that along with empirical 
studies and careful analysis can bring us closer to understanding bits and parts of certain 
phenomena of this world, in this case hate crime. 
 
Introduction and Aim 
 
Hate crime is an umbrella term, usually employed when referring to crimes that are in 
part or whole founded on prejudice towards the real or perceived group belonging of the 
victim. Countries that acknowledge hate crime as a category usually incorporates it as an 
aggravating circumstance but the regulation is far from uniform across contexts (Brax & 
Munthe 2015). In Swedish law, hate crime includes threat and harassment, violent crime, 
vandalization, theft and burglary, unlawful discrimination and hate speech insofar they 
are, in part or whole, funded upon prejudice towards the perceived race, skin colour, na-
tional or ethnic origin, confessions of faith, sexual orientation and transgender status of the 
victim (BRÅ 2015). Hate crimes thereby includes a broad array of actions targeting objects 
as well as individuals. Additionally, it encompasses a wide array of incentives as the law 
does not only include several protected grounds but also states that it is enough if the 
prejudice is a partial motivator: it does not have to be the main motive. It can be concluded 
that hate crime as a phenomenon place high demands on explanatory models. 
 
The present paper reviews the applicability of three classical criminological theories with 
different ontological positions; a) Sutherland’s differential association that trace the origins 
to criminal behaviour in social interaction, b) Merton’s strain that holds that the causes of 
criminal behaviour is to be found in societal structure and culture, and lastly, c) Becker’s 
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labelling theory which has a relativist approach to criminalization and primarily focuses 
on repeat offending. 
 
More specifically, I am concerned with the predictions and knowledge-claims made by 
these theories and the extent to which they concur with empirical research on hate crime 
from a critical realist perspective (Bhaskar 1998, Sayer 1999). Consequently, available data 
on hate crime are not treated as truths by themselves, but taken together they can provide 
us with guidance to the Actual and the Real (ibid.). I do not mean to propose that critical 
realism comprise an approach that is free from faults; it has its quirks and perks as theo-
ries of science in general does. However, a detailed discussion on the benefits and draw-
backs of critical theory falls outside of the scope of this paper. 
 
Differential Association 
 
I have chosen Sutherland to represent the beginning of modern criminology due to several 
reasons. Firstly, his work Principles of Criminology (Sutherland, Cressey & Luckenbill 
1992) marks a shift in thinking; from eugenically understanding the criminal as inherently 
bad by nature (Foucault 1999, Lombroso & Lombroso-Ferrero 2014) to tracing the origins 
of criminal behaviour to learning processes in primary groups (Sutherland, Cressey & 
Luckenbill 1992). Further, while the theories of earlier sociologists, such as Durkheim, has 
been applied widely, Sutherland was the first to present an influential theory with a focus 
on criminal behaviour specifically. Lastly, the propositions (Prop. 1993/94: 101, Prop. 
2001/02: 59) and official reports (SOU 1991:75, SOU 2000:88) on hate crime in Sweden is 
evidently influenced by the ideas of Sutherland though it is not stated explicitly. It be-
comes particularly clear in the official reports in which hate crimes are presented as a 
problem of learnt attitudes (alike differential association, attitudes are collapsed with ac-
tions) that develop in peer groups, primarily during adolescence (ibid.). The latter brings 
us upon the first question we ought to ask ourselves when considering the applicability of 
differential association on hate crime, namely, is prejudice learnt? 
 
The construction of difference seem to be an innate part of our functioning; we come to 
understand ourselves not only in terms of what we are, but also in terms of what we are 
not (Foucault 1994, Goffman 2014). As pointed out by Derrida (1997), the same process of 
defining not only through what something is but by what something is not, is also incor-
porated in the linguistic practises that give meanings to the signs which we use in our dai-
ly communication. By merely observing our daily practices of constructing our individual 
boundaries and selves we can swiftly draw the conclusion that the construction of differ-
ence in itself does not need to be, and rarely is, prejudiced. Differences are mostly the 
source of curiosity and interest between individuals, and sometimes a source of admira-
tion. Social constructivists have argued that the grounds upon which we construct differ-
ences are arbitrary and that the meaning-making assigned to these grounds are variable in 
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time and space, but it does not logically follow that the construction of difference in itself 
is not an innate part of how we as human beings come to make sense of our existence 
(Bhaskar 1998).  
 
When it comes to prejudiced attitudes, neurological research on racism (for an overview 
see Amadio 2014), which avoids the bias of social desirability, indicate that out-group 
prejudice is commonly manifested in mid-adolescence and moderated by the context of 
which the individual grow up in (Telzer, Humphreys, Shapiro & Tottenham 2013). Indi-
viduals who grow up in diverse neighbourhoods, who have friends of racial out-groups 
and parents who endorse diversity are less likely to develop unconscious neurological fear 
responses to racial out-groups, in comparison to individuals who grow up in homogene-
ous environments (ibid.). Similarly, sociological research have shown repeatedly that rac-
ism tend to be higher in homogeneous environments (SOU 2005:56). 
 
At first glance, this research seems to confirm differential association as prejudice does 
indeed seem to be learnt during adolescence, but the learning process that these studies 
imply are of a different kind than the one proposed by Sutherland (Sutherland, Cressey & 
Luckenbill 1992). The social ecology and inter-human relationships during childhood ap-
pear to play a larger role than the meaning-making taking place in intimate groups during 
adolescence. The results suggests the presence of a latency period between the learning 
and the emergence of attitudes that make it appear as if though the learning takes place in 
adolescence (Telzer, et al 2013, Amadio 2014). Intimate groups, such as family and peers, 
do seem to play a significant role, but so does the neighbourhood ecology – a factor that 
Sutherland deemed irrelevant for learning (Sutherland, Cressey & Luckenbill 1992). 
 
Sutherland further placed great weight on definitions, proposing that belief in definitions 
favourable to certain behaviour will steer individuals to behave in that particular way. 
However, when Kornhauser (1978) conducted a review on studies focusing on the link 
between attitudes and criminal behaviour she concluded that adolescents who engage in 
criminalised behaviour still premier and value law-abiding behaviour higher than crimi-
nalized ones. Such results challenge the practice of assigning great weight to the link be-
tween attitudes and acts. Further, little is known of the link between prejudiced attitudes 
and prejudiced behaviour. As Green, McFalls and Smith have pointed out: 
 
“It might take the better part of a lifetime to read the prodigious literature on preju-
dice, particularly if one were to include studies that investigate the manner in which 
institutions, organizations, and social groups have introduced, perpetuated, or dis-
mantled discriminatory practices and policies throughout the world. Yet, scarcely any 
of this research examines directly and systematically the question of why prejudice 
erupts into violence.” (Green, McFalls & Smith 2001:480) 
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Despite being written 15 years ago, the statement still holds true, and studies that do treat 
this link are often weak in methodology. One example is Franklin2 (2000) who claims to 
have found a significant link between homophobic attitudes and homophobic acts. 
Though the link is significant it was found to be small in effect size and the index used to 
measure homophobic attitudes had an α-value of .41 (Franklin 2000), making the results 
unreliable as it is unclear what kind of attitudes that are expressed by the index. 
 
In spite of the limits of studies examining the direct relationship between attitudes and 
actions on an individual level, we can conclude that the prejudiced attitudes themselves 
are not a sufficient cause of hate crime as the number of individuals who hold prejudiced 
attitudes are far greater than the number of individuals who engage in hate crime. It is 
possible to draw such conclusion by comparing hate crime victimization rates in self-
report studies, such as the Swedish annual crime victim survey (BRÅ 2015), with the re-
sults of studies focusing on prejudiced attitudes among the Swedish population (FRA 
2009, SOU 2005:56). 
 
Consequently, there is currently no support for a direct association between prejudiced 
attitudes and violent acts. On a theoretical level, one needs to be able to distinguish the 
concept of hate crime from its predictors. The latter is a common thought error in theory 
development, and can for example be seen in Messershmidt (2014) who explains the high 
criminality among men by the mere fact that they are men (critique explained in detail by 
Hood-Williams 2001). Similarly, Sutherland has also been critized for making circulatory 
arguments and collapsing concepts such as culture, attitudes and acts (Kornhauser 1978). 
 
Strain 
 
Strain theory on the other hand proposes that individuals commit criminal acts as a conse-
quence of the discrepancies between materialistic goals of society and the institutionalized 
means to achieve those goals (Merton 1938).  The greater the discrepancy, the greater the 
strain and thereby predisposition to commit criminal acts. There are, naturally, differences 
between the societal structure of contemporary Sweden and the late 30’s United States 
which comprised the object of Mertons (1938) analysis. In difference from the USA, Swe-
den has had a history of free education, strong labour movement, and strong social safety 
net. On the other hand, the accessibility of institutions such as higher education and/or the 
labour market has proven to be governed by more complex social orders, rather than 
purely financial matters, making these institutions unequally available to minority and 
majority populations in contemporary Swedish society (Hällgren 2005, SOU 2005:56, SOU 
2014:34, Folkhälsomyndigheten 2015). Further, differences in income within the Swedish 
                                                 
2 Factors with strong α -values and greater effect sizes were high levels of alcohol consumption, thrill-
seeking, deep dynamics and self-defense. 
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population have increased since the 1990’s (Salonen 2015); an indicator that the level of 
strain in the socio-economically weak strata of Swedish society is increasing. 
 
When applying strain theory on hate crime, we need to ask ourselves if hate crime offend-
ers are under strain. In particular, we need to ask ourselves: are they marginalized and do 
they lack institutionalized means to achieve the materialistic ideals of society? To the 
knowledge of the author, there are currently no studies directly assessing the association 
between marginalization and hate crime offending. In order to approach the question I 
will resort to summarize studies on the crime patterns and demographic composition of 
hate crime offenders. Though these studies do not directly examine the link between mar-
ginalization and hate crime offenders, they can still provide us with information about the 
potential presence of strain within the group. 
 
Offenders of hate crime appear to belong to the group of offenders that Moffit (1993) refers 
to as life course persistent offenders. Studies on convicted hate crime offenders show that 
they are likely to be repeat offenders; 55% had previous convictions according to a Swe-
dish study (Roxell 2011) and 58% in an American study (Dunbar, Quinones & Crevecoeur 
2005). The actual crime rate within the group is likely to be notably higher due to the high 
threshold for convictions and it is well established that the repeat offender group is char-
acterized by various forms of marginalization (Laub & Sampson 2003). One study has fo-
cused more specifically on the background of hate crime offenders. The authors found that 
substance abuse was common, as were educational problems and broken families with 
parental separation and domestic violence (Dunbar 2003). However, the precision of the 
study is limited by a small sample size, n = 58 (ibid.).  
 
The background of hate crime offenders is clearly an under-researched area, and yet, the 
results (Dunbar 2003, Dunbar, Quinones & Crevecoeur 2005, Roxell 2011) do suggest that a 
large proportion of hate crime offenders are strained. They appear to be so both in the 
sense of having a low socio-economic status and having other vulnerability factors that 
contribute to marginalization and inhibit individual capacity to fulfilling cultural material 
goals through institutionalized means. The generalizability of the studies presented above 
need to be discussed as it is evidently limited. As mentioned previously, the threshold of 
convictions is a high one – the results might therefore have differed if the subjects of study 
had been suspects or self-reported offenders. Perry (2001) have justly pointed out that hate 
crimes and hate incidents committed by structurally privileged individuals, such as offi-
cial authorities or middle class students, cannot be accounted for by strain theory (Perry 
2001). The presence of such experiences among hate crime victims (Perry 2011, Wigerfeldt, 
Wigerfeldt & Kiiskinen 2014) along with the absence of such incidents in hate crime con-
victions (Dunbar 2003, Dunbar, Quinones & Crevecoeur 2005, Roxell 2011) illustrates that 
hate crime reporting and hate crime policing are not neutral practices. 
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The latter calls one further aspect into question; the relationship between offenders and 
victims, and the social position of the victim group. At my presentation at the NSFK 2016, 
I illustrated this question by asking ”Where are all the criminal lesbian and transgender women 
of color?”. Strain do propose a linear correlation between the level of structural marginali-
zation and criminal propensity (with the development of strain in the middle, functioning 
as a consequence of the marginalization and cause of crime), but the individuals who are 
most commonly targeted by hate crimes are, in relation to their offenders, often more 
structurally marginalized (Perry 2001, Iganski 2001, Funnell 2014). Consequently, the 
group that strain predicts as the most motivated offenders are instead the victim group 
when it comes to hate crime3. 
 
Merton (1938) does leave space for differences in individual responses to strain, and all of 
these responses do not result in acts that are criminalized. It can be reasoned that the ten-
dency to react in certain ways could differ between social groups. Such a difference may 
stem from having different social outlooks and expectations, and thereby explain the rela-
tionship between hate crime victims and offenders. Merton (1938) has been criticized by 
Kornhauser (1978) for assuming that all individuals are equally socialized into conven-
tional norms and values. I concur in the problem, as the only theoretical possibility to var-
iation in degree of socialization that Merton (1938) directly treats is on a societal level. At 
the same time, when discussing the responses to strain he acknowledges that “To treat the 
development of this process in various spheres of conduct would introduce a complexity unmanage-
able within the confines of this paper” (Merton 1938:676). The latter indicates that he never 
implied that the theory should be understood in solely in the crude simplicity in which it 
was presented. 
 
When assessing strain as a model for hate crime, we also need to ask ourselves to what 
extent the marginalized in society are prejudiced. Studies conducted in a Swedish context 
have indeed found that low income is associated with higher levels of racist attitudes (In-
tegrationsverket 2005, Hjelm 2009). The differences in racist attitudes across income levels 
is primarily true for men who, in general, are more racist in comparison to women 
(ibid.).The results thereby suggests that it is not the individuals that are the most margin-
alized that most extensively develop bigoted attitudes. 
 
In summary, judging from what is currently known about racism and hate crime in a 
Swedish context, it does not seem to follow the pattern suggested by strain theory (the 
most strained are most likely to become hate crime offenders). Instead, the social structure 
seems to operate in a different way in which individuals need to hold a place of relative 
privilege in relation to the victim in order to offend and develop prejudice. 
                                                 
3 Note that other types of crimes are not handles in this analysis – hate crime victims may very well committ 
other forms of offences in high extent but these are not the particular object of this paper. 
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At the same time, societal structure and culture cannot be entirely discarded if one aims to 
understand contributors to the phenomenon of hate crime. Victims of hate crimes are often 
marginalized populations (Perry 2001), and visible minorities are at significantly higher 
risk for such victimization (Andersson, Mellgren 2016). Perry (2001) argues that the struc-
tural origin of hate crimes reside in the institutions of labour, power, sexuality and culture. 
She argues that labour contributes by excluding stigmatized Others from entering the la-
bour market, power by granting an order in which one group can set the terms for dis-
course and action at the expense of other groups, sexuality by proclaiming the ways in 
which individuals are allowed to form inter-human relationships, and culture by provid-
ing the meaning-making around the roles that we ascribe to ourselves and others (ibid.). 
Culture, according to Perry (2001), can thereby be viewed as a super-structure, piercing 
other social institutions by providing the ground for assuming differences upon socially 
constructed groups, such as gender and race. It is also evident that social structure and 
culture cannot alone account for the causes of hate crime as the majority of the most visible 
minorities are not subjected to hate crime victimization (Andersson & Mellgren 2016). 
Chakraborti and Garland (2012) provides a further discussion on situational, temporal, 
and individual factors that contribute to hate crime victimization for the interested reader. 
 
Labelling Theory 
 
According to Becker (1997), labelling theory has been widely misused and misinterpreted. 
In his text “Labelling theory reconsidered” he makes the following statement; 
 
“Further, the act of labelling, as carried out by moral entrepreneurs, while important, can-
not possibly be conceived as the sole explanation of what alleged deviants actually do. It 
would be foolish to propose that stick-up men stick up people simply because someone has 
labelled them stick-up men, or that everything a homosexual does results from someone 
having called him a homosexual.” (Becker 1997:179) 
 
As such, labelling theory never intended to propose an aetiology of criminal behaviour, 
nor did it aim to explain crime recidivism as a practice of identity making stemming only 
from the mere descriptions that some people make about some other people. In short, the 
causal chain that many has taken labelling theory for suggesting (linguistic practice causes 
identity, identity causes behaviour) is wrong according to its author (Becker 1997). Instead, 
the aim was twofold; 1) to describe how institutionalized labelling results in practical cir-
cumstances that encourage recidivism and discourage law-abiding behaviour and 2) to 
move focus from the criminal individual to the practice of criminalization which is held to 
be arbitrary (ibid.). The second aspect will be examined first, as it expresses the relativist 
core of the theory, one that often goes unmentioned by researchers applying it. 
 
482 
 
Becker (1997) defines criminal acts and other deviant behaviour as rule-breaking. These 
rules are held to be non-universal and variable cross contexts. Their sole commonality is 
that they are primarily constituted by influential individuals in positions of power. As 
such, criminal acts are understood as acts that break group rules with no other inherent 
quality of their own (Becker 1997). 
 
The first question one needs to ask oneself when applying the theoretical prerequisites for 
labelling theory on the phenomenon of hate crime is thus if hate crimes constitute a phe-
nomena without any intrinsic qualities. Though many have argued that usage of violence 
has been regulated across time and cultural contexts, I believe that the answer to the ques-
tion is ultimately one of ontological positioning. 
 
I would argue that hate crimes, along with any violent acts4, do have intrinsic qualities and 
that the rejection of these qualities is a symptom of a naive misunderstanding of the phe-
nomenon of violence as such (for a more extensive debate see Dupré 2007). Taking a posi-
tion that acknowledge the existence of an essence of certain phenomena does neither mean 
taking an uncritical stance to meaning-making practices and to treat these as inherent 
truths of things, nor does it mean rejecting the notion that certain phenomena are socially 
constructed (Bhaskar 1998, Sayer 1999). Quite the opposite – I would argue that this posi-
tion opens for the possibility to critically assess norms and meaning-making. It encourages 
responsibility for the structures that we reproduce as individual scientists and scientific 
community, while simultaneously ridding us of contextual immunity (Merton 1942). Fur-
ther, these possibilities are direct consequences of the acknowledgement of the intrinsic 
qualities of certain phenomena and cannot be attained through the relativist stand-point 
proclaimed by Becker (1997). By acknowledging that violence has intrinsic qualities, I do 
not mean to argue that criminalization is always based on inherent qualities in the acts 
that are criminalized, or to propose the existence a common quality of all criminalized 
acts. The phenomenon presented by Becker (1997), marijuana usage, is one example that is 
much more ambiguous both in nature and consequences in comparison to hate crimes. 
 
Secondly, I would like to turn to the practices of criminalization. Becker (1997) proposes 
that law is created upon the initiatives of moral entrepreneurs on a mission to save society 
from some form of vice, such as moral decay or threats to equality. In the documents pre-
ceding the legislation in Sweden, hate crimes are indeed presented as a threat to the dem-
ocratic state as the practices that constitute hate crimes are perceived as targeting funda-
mental principles of equality (SOU 1991:75, Prop. 1993/94: 101, SOU 2000:88, Prop. 2001/02: 
59). The penalty enhancement of these incidents is further presented as a measure taken to 
counter-act the rise of extreme right wing groups (ibid.). The juxtaposing of hate crimes 
next to right wing extremism persists in official reports despite research showing a weak 
                                                 
4 Regardless of being physical or verbal 
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link between these two phenomena (Ryan & Leeson 2011): a strong incentive for including 
sexual orientation as a protected ground was that right wing groups were found to be 
quite vocal in their homophobic opinions (SKR 2000/01:59). 
 
Though clearly morally endowed, the documents that I have cited above indicate a less 
evangelistic debate than the one proposed by Becker (1997). This could be due to cultural 
differences in the political climate between Sweden and the USA of the 1960’s. It could 
also be due to the nature of the material as the conclusion might very well have been an-
other one if one were to study the narratives in political debates within the parliament or 
media, but to my knowledge there have been no such studies in a Swedish context. 
 
Lastly, we turn to the first aim of Becker’s (1997) labelling theory, namely, the question of 
whether labelling results in practical circumstances that encourage recidivism and dis-
courage law-abiding behaviour. The studies on convicted hate crime offenders (Dunbar, 
Quinones & Crevecoeur 2005, Roxell 2011) do suggest higher levels of recidivism in com-
parison to the Swedish average which is approximately 40% over the course of three years 
(Kriminalvårdens utvecklingsenhet 2010). When applying labelling theory we may there-
fore feel tempted to assign the higher rates of recidivism to the sentence enhancement that 
characterize hate crime legislation. Once again we have come across an error of thought; 
the lack of adequate control groups by which we can control outcomes (Sampson 2010). 
Indeed, the practical circumstances following a prison sentence, such as loss of housing, 
family and an extended network of other criminals, can pose practical problems even for 
individuals with high motivation to leave their criminal activities behind (MacKenzie 
2002, Sampson & Laub 2003). However, the problem of comparability between the indi-
viduals who receive harsher sanctions, such as incarceration, and individuals who receive 
minor sanctions persists as they are ultimately different populations wherefore one needs 
to be cautious to draw such conclusions (Sampson 2010). 
 
I believe that it is safe to say that there is not support for assuming that the practice of 
sanctioning unwanted behaviour in itself necessarily results in practical circumstances that 
encourage recidivism. Instead, research clearly shows that the outcome of a given sanction 
depends on the nature of the sanction (Kriminalvårdens utvecklingsenhet 2010, MacKen-
zie 2002) as well as individual factors such as treatment receptiveness, motivation and ear-
lier expereinces of the offender (Sampson & Laub 2003). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Though none of these theories can fully account for hate crime, critically assessing them 
does inform us about the phenomenon of hate crime. From the assessment of differential 
association theory we can conclude that the practices of doing differences in part become 
prejudiced due to lack of multicultural stimuli and openness to differences during critical 
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periods of personal development. At the same time we need to acknowledge that our un-
derstanding of the underlying processes of why prejudice occasionally erupts into vio-
lence is at best modest. 
 
From assessing strain we learned that offenders need to hold a position of relative privi-
lege in relation to their victim. I do not mean to propose that these hierarchies expressed in 
hate crimes exclusively mirror the more general hierarchical order of society; such struc-
tures are clearly temporally and spatially bound. Further, we can conclude that hate crime 
offenders are likely to be repeat offenders who commit a multitude of crime types where 
hate crimes constitute one of these expressions. We also learned that socialization into 
common cultural goals is likely to vary between different groups. 
 
Lastly, labelling theory informs us of the implications of the political processes prior to 
legislation and after sanction. Along with research on repeat offending it illustrates the 
importance of evaluation and careful consideration when sanctions are determined by 
moving focus from penalty to treatment. 
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Connecting structure and emotions, connecting Bourdieu’s field 
theory and cultural criminology  
Annick Prieur 
Presentation at the NSfK research seminar May 2016.  
 
The gross part of criminological theorizing - as presented in standard textbooks - seeks to 
answer why some people commit crimes while most do not (or, if we include non-reported 
crimes, at least do not commit serious crimes). Traditional theoretical approaches answer 
the question with emphasis either on structure or on agency, while some more recent con-
tributions seek to bridge agency and structure in different ways. A particularly interesting 
theoretical development was made by Jock Young (2003) who in his version of cultural 
criminology integrated Robert Merton’s strain theory with Jack Katz’ account of the emo-
tional rewards provided by criminal acts. Young did not, however, provide much of an 
explanation of how individual agency and structural conditions are linked. This is where 
some of Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts may be helpful. While Bourdieu is among the most 
cited social scientists, even within research fields quite distanced from his own, his influ-
ence on criminology has remained quite limited. As Bourdieu’s theoretical approach 
aimed at overcoming the cleavage between agency and structure, his possible contribution 
to criminology might be of high value.  
Many criminologists are more interested in understanding punishment and social control 
than in answering the “why-question”. Within studies of social control, Bourdieu has had 
more influence, first and foremost through prominent scholars like Wacquant (2008) and 
Garland (2001), who have both relied on Bourdieu in analyses of the expansion of crime 
control in the Western world. Bourdieu would probably not have wanted to be involved in 
answering the old “why”-question of criminology. The question takes for granted a social 
construction of “crime” that already, through the criminal law’s definitions, reflects this 
world’s injustices and unequal distributions (here Bourdieu would be aligned with the 
critical criminological tradition, combining constructivist and Marxist perspectives). Fur-
thermore, he was far more interested in understanding the sociological mystery of why 
people conform and maintain social order than in understanding the cases where they 
don’t (Bourdieu 2001). But as rule breaking is not that exceptional and cannot be explained 
simply (and structurally) with deprivation, as most deprived people do not recur to illegal 
means, the question of why some do still merit attention.  
Cultural criminology 
Ferrell (1999 p. 396) explains the term cultural criminology as « …less a definite paradigm 
than an emergent array of perspectives linked to sensitivities to image, meaning, and rep-
489 
 
resentation in the study of crime and crime control». Hayward & Young (2004), drawing 
on British cultural studies, advance that the particularity of cultural criminology is to see 
crime and control as cultural products and creative constructions that should be under-
stood from the meaning they carry. The approach is juxtaposed on the one hand to a posi-
tivist tradition looking for causal explanations in quantitative data and on the other to ra-
tional choice theory. While the former is criticized for not accounting for the actors’ moti-
vations, the latter is criticized for a thin narrative of this motivation.  
Young (2003) claims that while Merton has a good grasp on structural issues, but not on 
motivation (or energy, as Young terms it), Katz (1988) has a good grasp on motivation 
through his emphasis on the emotional rewards, or sensual pleasures, crimes provide. 
Katz claims he does not disregard structural explanations; only claims also poor people 
have sensual experiences when stealing. Young still holds that Katz’ account for structural 
factors is too weak. Young introduces Carl Nightingale’s (1993) study of the ghetto in 
Philadelphia. A common view on ghettos is that they are spatially and socially segregated 
places where people also have different moral values. Supported by Nightingale Young 
objects, as ghetto residents share a general American consumption culture to which they 
are just as exposed as everybody else, for instance through TV commercials. Applying 
Merton, Young claims ghetto residents share dreams and aims with people outside the 
ghetto, but lack opportunities to fulfil them. Applying Katz, Young asks which emotions 
this discrepancy between aims and opportunities leads to. His answer is humiliation, for 
not getting what other people get, and for being subjected to a stigmatizing discourse on 
ghetto residents. Humiliation is a structurally produced emotional force – or energy – be-
hind crimes. This is therefore a theory about how social structures enter people’s minds, 
and push some people toward some forms of crimes.  
To me, Katz’ point that the emotions involved in an act should be part of an explanation is 
crucial, and Young’s Mertonian way of explaining the emotions with structural circum-
stances is a creative way of coupling agency to structure. It would be hard-core structural-
ism to claim such difficult emotions were structurally caused or produced. Considering 
them structurally conditioned is slightly softer, and an additional softening would be fine, as 
there can be no strict determination. The point is simply that the living conditions and 
stigmatization the kids are exposed to fuel the mentioned emotions – provides the energy 
in Young’s terms - and that these emotions in turn serve as motivations or justifications for 
some criminal acts.  
As emotions are at the basis of all forms of relationships and communities, the emotional 
path is definitely promising for criminology, but to attribute them such a key position may 
demand both stronger foothold within the sociology of emotions (i.e. Burkitt 2014) than 
Young provides and a discussion of the interplay between emotions and rationality (Exum 
2015). But the most important is perhaps that Young follows the Durkheimian way of re-
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garding emotions as collective entities: They are collectively coded even if they are experi-
enced individually.  
It is basically an empirical question which feelings are involved in crime. It remains to be 
shown that the feelings are felt by those who commit crimes, and that those in the same 
situation who do not recur to crime do not have the same feelings to the same degree. Or 
is the triggering feeling, like humiliation, to be seen as a group experience rather than as 
an individual feeling? Then the term energy is less appropriate, and the connection be-
tween structure and individual agency becomes opaque.  
Cultural criminology may, however, also be criticized for taking the structural part of the 
balance somewhat easily. Webber’s (2007) reworking of Runciman’s relative deprivation 
theory seems to be a promising way of combining an understanding of structural inequali-
ties that includes the structural threads both from Marx and from Durkheim with an un-
derstanding of agency. Webber discusses how the experience of relative deprivation in-
volves the choice of somebody to compare oneself with, and also supplements Runciman’s 
theory with Bourdieu’s understanding of the relationship between the social agents’ aspi-
rations and their perception of the objective possibilities. Webber makes a convincing criti-
cism of the cultural criminological tradition in pointing to its neglect of “the pain, tragedy 
and even tediousness of much crime” (p. 115). A usable approach to crime ought to ex-
plain not only why people seek obvious rewards, but also why they may make choices 
that from the outside may seem illogical, destructive and self-destructive. This is where a 
Bourdieu-inspired field approach may provide a somewhat better explanation.   
A field-theoretical approach to crime 
For Bourdieu, the social world is a space organized by the distribution of different socially 
valuable resources. While class analyses formerly depicted one-dimensional social hierar-
chies, Bourdieu paints a complex picture of how economic and non-economic assets work 
together or against one another in the formation of social groups. He shows how non-
economic assets, especially cultural capital, work when social groups acquire status and 
indulge in practices of domination and exclusion. Another main point is that the percep-
tion of the social world depends on position in the social space, which, working through a 
person’s habitus, will influence everything from social aspirations to moral judgments. So 
Lemert’s (1967: 52) saying that choice tends to be a “compromise between what is sought 
and what can be sought”, might be reworked by Bourdieu into seeing choice as a com-
promise between what is sought and what is perceived as possible to seek and as desirable 
to seek, or as appropriate for oneself to seek. This shaping of aspirations and judgments is 
how structural conditions work through the social agents’ minds.  
Symbolic capital is an overarching form of capital in Bourdieu’s framework. In traditional 
societies, like the Kabylian villages Bourdieu studied in his earliest works, honour was the 
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symbolic capital all (men) strived for. Honour equals social recognition. Bourdieu (2000, 
chapter 6) argues that the basic drive for human beings is the quest for social recognition 
or symbolic capital. The justification of one’s existence is to be found in the judgments of 
others.  
Modern, differentiated societies are composed of different fields or sub-universes (Bour-
dieu and Wacquant, 1992). A field is a space of forces, where social agents in different po-
sitions strive to gain recognition from other participants, struggling over a field specific 
symbolic capital. For instance for social scientists our symbolic capital is the recognition 
from peers through publications, citations etc. – signs of recognition that seem meaning-
less and valueless for people outside our field, but for the insiders the evaluation from 
peers within the field matters far more than the evaluation from people outside. Therefore, 
understanding agency means understanding the agents’ particular outlook on the world: 
why they see the world as they do and make the evaluations they make. In a literary field - 
one of Bourdieu’s (1998) own examples - the recognition from other authors is what mat-
ters the most, and the recognition from an external public of readers may actually hamper 
the recognition within the field, as authors who sell many books are deemed “commer-
cial”.   
Fields are arenas for struggles over both the distribution and the definition of the forms of 
capital that are specific to them. Participants in different positions and with different tra-
jectories will have an interest in either maintaining or challenging the distribution of sym-
bolic value and patterns of recognition. To be working truly according to this logic a field 
needs to be relatively autonomous from the outer world. The definition of the specific cap-
ital and the attribution of positions should be decided by the fields’ participants and not 
by external actors. This autonomy is frequently limited or threatened. In the academic 
field this might for instance be in situations where religious, political or economic powers 
have influence over the attribution of academic positions.  
A few scholars have brought field-theory to criminology through the use of capital terms. 
Bourgois (2003 [1995] p. 135) puts simply ‘cultural capital’ in quotation marks in his im-
pressive ethnography about East Harlem crack dealers. His references to Bourdieu are 
scarce, but his approach seems close, especially in his thorough contextualisation of the 
crack dealers in general social and economic conditions in East Harlem and in his histori-
cal analysis of the Puerto Rican immigration to the US. Bourgois sees the destructive sub-
culture as a compensation for the lack of access to traditional sources for masculine pride 
among Puerto Ricans, when they cannot even provide for their families. The crack dealers’ 
daily lives are full of deceptions, abuse and violence, among them as well as against wom-
en and children. Bourgois is put on a challenge when seeking to understand as repulsive 
acts as gang rapes (Bourgois 1996: 425): “While all of the crack dealers are victims from a 
social structural perspective, they are also agents of destruction in their daily lives.” The 
challenge is to keep the structural perspective without denying the dealers’ agency. They 
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have a space of manoeuvre, which they use in destructive and self-destructive ways – un-
derstandable to Bourgois as these acts provide them with a sort of masculine pride. The 
book’s second edition (Bourgois 2003) contains an update on the main participants. Most 
of them have actually moved out of the drug economy. Bourgois explains this first and 
foremost with an improved national economy, which has provided some new opportuni-
ties also for the poorly qualified. Drug fashions have also changed, with crack becoming 
less popular, reducing the economic gains from dealing. In Bourdieu’s terms, these exter-
nal forces have impeded on the field’s autonomy.  
If we reread Nightingale’s (1993) study with the lens of Bourgois, the inner-city kids’ cul-
ture appears also to be a compensating culture, which provides access to respect and self-
respect. Money and consumption goods are not simply values in themselves, but have an 
added sign value (“conspicuous consumption”), being both aims and means (which points 
to a somewhat problematic distinction in Merton’s theory). Adding Bourdieu’s field-
theoretic approach explains why the kids’ quest for respect is oriented towards each other, 
and how their self-respect stems from the respect gained from their peers.  
Thornton (1995) coined the term ‘subcultural capital’ to account for observations made at 
British techno and house music clubs, where certain competences and stylistic features 
served as a capital recognized by other participants. This capital is linked to being “under-
ground” and opposed to being “mainstream”, paralleling Bourdieu’s (1998) French poets 
who distinguished themselves by inverting the outer world’s evaluations. She has, how-
ever, not much interest for the more structural conditions for the subculture. After point-
ing to Thornton’s limited interest for class, ethnicity/race and gender, Jensen (2006) pro-
vides a use of the concept subcultural capital that is more loyal to Bourdieu in an analysis 
of subcultural practices of marginalized young men of immigrant descent in Denmark. 
Their acts are understood as ways of gaining respect from each other through expressive 
masculinity and bodily capital, within the frame of a society that provides them with few 
opportunities and even fewer sources of positive recognition.  
Building on Bourgois’ conception of ‘street culture’, Sandberg & Pedersen (2009) have 
coined the term ‘street capital’, based on extensive fieldwork among drug dealers in Nor-
way. The concept not only serves to connect agency and structure, but also to bridge be-
tween economic and cultural explanations of poverty and crime (Sandberg 2008 p. 157), 
and it gives a meaning to the violence Sandberg witnessed or heard bragging tales about 
during his fieldwork. A reputation for violence provided respect and thereby also a certain 
protection from robberies and assaults. Fraser (2013) uses instead the concept of ‘street 
habitus’ in order to highlight how marginalised young men in an inner-city area of Glas-
gow are adapted to the space they live within, while Ilan (2013) opts for ‘street social capi-
tal’ in a quite parallel analysis from Dublin.  
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In the mentioned works, a subcultural capital (or whatever term is chosen) is linked to 
specific capacities (for instance physical force, street smartness), a specific style (clothes, 
jewellery, tattoos …), specific positions (within a gang or a drug economy) or specific re-
sources. This capital has usually a limited value outside the field, but may in some cases 
be convertible (like when ex-drug users find employment in drug desistance projects, or 
graffiti artists in advertising agencies). The subcultures may have specific forms of capital 
and criteria for recognition that may differ sharply or even invert the judgments in the 
surrounding society. Thereby these works may explain why people may make choices that 
are difficult to understand outside the field, but seem perfectly rational, logical and natu-
ral for the peers within.  
These works might, however, benefit from more explicit accounts of the criminal events, 
and in particular of the emotions involved in them. I will now present an example where I 
combine the field perspective from Bourdieu with the emotional perspective from cultural 
criminology.   
Clever thieves 
In a fieldwork among Mexican cross-dressing and feminine looking homosexual men (Pri-
eur 1998), among themselves termed jotas (a pejorative word for male homosexual put into 
a feminine form), I observed many breaks of laws, even if my research focus was else-
where (on gender constructions). The fieldwork took place in the outskirts of Mexico City, 
in a poor and rough neighbourhood with a bad reputation. I lived in a house that served 
as a meeting place for homosexually oriented young men. Most of them were between 15 
and 25 years old, most had left school at an early age, most lived without a regular income 
and many were also on bad terms with their families. The house was a welcoming place, 
where there always would be a bit of food and some joints to be shared, possibly a bed, 
too, for those who were not welcome in their family homes any longer. It was also a place 
for sexual encounters, as quite a few young men who were curious about sexual encoun-
ters with jotas also were hanging around here. For the jotas such ordinary, masculine look-
ing young men, who did not self-identify as homosexuals, were regarded as the most at-
tractive sexual partners.  
The atmosphere among the jotas was friendly and joyful, but with a rude humour ap-
proaching bullying. Looks and sexual encounters were the most frequent subjects of con-
versation. Hierarchical relationships were quite explicit, expressed in order of seating and 
serving and in who might command and who should receive orders, run errands, clean up 
etc. The host (a somewhat older homosexual man) was at the top, and the others were at-
tributed a position first and foremost based on whether they were able to provide for 
themselves, maybe even for others, or whether they were dependent on others’ generosity. 
The most successful sex workers were, together with those who ran their own hair dress-
ing parlour, at the top of this hierarchy, and the glue-sniffing, 15 year old run-aways at the 
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bottom. To sell sex was seen as risky, demanding, but also as a business requiring compe-
tences and talent: the ability to capture good clients, judge them well in order to not be 
cheated or assaulted, protect oneself against other sex workers as well as against the police 
and last, but not least, to not waste the gains on drugs and partying. There was nothing 
shameful about sex work - on the contrary being a successful sex worker was a source of 
pride and respect.  
I heard about or witnessed many thefts, which was not surprising from a more structural 
perspective. Why should these poor guys not steal? Besides, when sex workers take ad-
vantage from the physical intimacy to steal from their clients, it may be explained both by 
the fact that the earnings from selling sex may come at a high price while the risk for po-
lice prosecution are low, as the clients usually want to avoid attention. I noticed, however, 
that jotas not only stole from clients, but also from other sexual partners, and they seemed 
to enjoy telling stories about these thefts, as these stories always incited a lot of laughter. 
These stories made me think the meaning of the stealing surpassed the gains.  
The storytellers typically positioned themselves as smart and the victims as stupid. For 
instance, Patricia told about a Saturday night’s raid at a discotheque, where a man paid 
her some drinks (Patricia is a pseudonym, and I use female pronouns about jotas who used 
female pronouns about themselves). She had spotted his thick wallet, but then another 
transvestite passed the table, gave the man a hug and picked the wallet. Patricia went over 
to another table, choosing an in her eyes rather unattractive man as her target. He was 
drunk and bragged about his earnings. Embracing him, Patricia put a hand into his left 
pocket and found the first wad of bills, which she hid in her wig – an ideal hiding place for 
hot goods. He did not notice, drove her home, and when embracing her again, he lost an-
other wad from his right pocket. Everybody laughed as Patricia told the story.  
In an interview, Gata described herself a kleptomaniac: “I say to myself ‘why shall I accept 
that we touch each other?’ - and zip! That it costs him something! I charge.” Sometimes 
jotas reported stealing useless objects, only stolen because the stealing was perceived as a 
joyful experience. Stealing seemed to be a kind of risk sport; demanding skills, training, 
audacity and nerves. In addition to gains stealing provided entertainment and the satisfac-
tion of having proved to possess the required skills. A “Katzian” (1988) analysis fits well.  
Structural aspects should, however, also be part of the explanation. These thefts may be 
connected to the unequal relations between thieves and victims. The latter are positioned 
above the former due to money and social status (employment, perhaps education and 
marriage), usually also age and last but not least due to a vision of masculinity. The jotas 
embody a highly stigmatized identity as feminine and homosexual men, supposed to have 
the passive position in sexual encounters. Thefts serve to compensate and regain dignity: 
The victim may be richer and socially more respected, but the thief proves to be the smart-
est.  The thief gets the money, the peers’ admiration and also some self-respect.  
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Flaca’s story may illustrate this. This is also a story that is told several times, as new peo-
ple arrive, and they all get a good laugh. Flaca, at the time 16 years old, tells she was at a 
disco where she met a man who bragged about working for the prosecution authorities. 
He was wearing a suit and Flaca noticed a wad of bills in a packet of cigarettes in his 
pocket. She followed him to a hotel, and while penetrating him, Flaca reached out to grab 
the wad, but it fell on the floor. The sound made the man jump up, grab a bottle, threaten 
Flaca and search her, but he did not find anything. While he searched the room, Flaca re-
trieved the wad and hid it in the foam-rubber padding she always carried to hide her 
skinny hips. Their quarrelling got the proprietor to the room, and the client asked the pro-
prietor to call the police because “this whore” – puta – had stolen his money. Flaca indig-
nantly responded he ought to know Flaca was a puto (whore in male gender), as he had 
just been penetrated. Embarrassed, the man pulled Flaca out of the hotel and into his car, 
telling her they should wait for the police. But Flaca knocked him down with one of her 
high-heeled shoes and ran away. Not only had she robbed him, knocked him down, pene-
trated him (without a condom, although she believed herself to be HIV-positive) and ex-
posed him to the proprietor’s contempt; she also placed some hickies in his neck, enjoying 
the thought that the man’s wife would discover the marks. A whole series of aggressive 
acts toward a man who represented everything that Flaca was not herself: adult, mascu-
line, married and well-off. Also a whole series of acts that may seem irrational as they ex-
posed Flaca to more dangers than the gained wad of bills would merit.  
Concluding discussion 
In this example criminal acts were understood against a backdrop of structural factors that 
put the perpetrators in deprived positions and limited their opportunities for achieving 
social success following socially desirable routes. The economic deprivation, possibly sup-
plemented with discrimination and stigmatization, is a source of a series of emotions, like 
humiliation or frustration. The emotions are the energy, as Young put it; they fuel the acts. 
Crimes become compensatory acts providing access to a positive self-image through the 
positive evaluation from peers. The subcultures are in many ways cut off from the sur-
rounding society, with their own forms of symbolic capital or sources of recognition, oper-
ating to a certain degree as fields in the sense of Bourdieu. These fields are, however, not 
perfectly autonomous, as they may be altered for instance by a changing economy, as in 
Bourgois’ case. The participants are also parts of other social universes, like their families, 
which may also at a certain moment succeed in pulling them out of the subculture (the 
‘aging out’ phenomenon described in life-course criminology).   
What does this field-theoretic approach achieve, one might ask, that is not already 
achieved by cultural criminology? Cultural criminology has made the great achievement 
of putting emotions in as the linking of agency and structure, but the structure, or culture, 
remains rather unclear. The framing within a Bourdieusian understanding of social space 
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and fields provides a stronger account of the structural aspects, and also of how social 
structure enters people’s minds.  
But is this then a theoretical model that only explains subcultural crimes? I think we may 
stretch it a bit further. If we accept Goffman’s (1959, 1963) basic anthropological insight 
that people strive to protect their dignity in social interactions, the observations give good 
sense also on a more general level. We strive to present a positive image of ourselves to 
others, also in order to maintain a positive self-image. In the cases presented above, the 
image of the self is threatened by social and economic conditions, by discrimination and 
stigmatization. What is at odds for those involved, is how to keep up a sense of dignity in 
a vulnerable position.  
Similar interpretations will probably work well in many other and quite different cases – 
like illegal hacking or hooliganism, where the perpetrators also are part of a group and 
their acts get known by this group. Other kinds of law-breaking acts may also be source of 
some (masculine) pride – like speeding, or illegal gambling – even if they do not occur 
within a peer group and the acts do not get known. A real audience is perhaps not needed, 
but an imagined audience is: people who would be impressed, if they knew... The imag-
ined audience counts for a self-image: “I’m a daredevil”, or “I’m smart”. This explanation 
works then not only for subcultural crimes, but for crimes that are or could be bragged 
about (which may perhaps explain perpetrators’ sometimes quite irrational bragging that 
police investigations so often benefit from). Perhaps this goes for a wider range of crimes 
than those one would at first think of. Sutherland (1983) reports of how frauds became 
sources of pride for vendors in different businesses, and quotes a repentant from the used 
car business (p. 242): “The thing that struck me as strange was that all these people were 
proud of their ability to fleece costumers. They boasted of their crookedness and were ad-
mired by their friends and enemies in proportion to their ability to get away with a crook-
ed deal: it was called shrewdness.” But it will not give sense for sexual offences or child- 
and wife-battering. So this is not an explanation for all forms of crime. Pointing to these 
limits is not a severe criticism, as I actually think criminological theorizing suffers from 
being too ambitious: What a society has chosen to label criminal acts, are a range of ex-
tremely different acts that cannot all be explained by the same factors.  
The value of this approach needs, however, to be shown by challenging it empirically: new 
studies with open eyes for what the triggering mechanisms actually are as well as for how 
the linking of agency and structure is made in a concrete practice.  
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Green criminology and wildlife trafficking, theories and perspec-
tives1   
Ragnhild Sollund 
 
In this paper I will start by giving a brief introduction to the field of green criminology 
including its theoretical perspectives, before I proceed to present ongoing research about 
illegal wildlife trade in Norway, Colombia and Brazil, ending with a discussion of findings 
from the project in perspective of the philosophical underpinnings of green criminology. 
Green critical criminology 
As shown by South (2014), green criminology arose as a field when researchers more or 
less simultaneously at different places on earth shared the same concern about environ-
mental harms and crimes (See also Lynch and Stretesky 2014:3). Although Michael 
Lynch’s (1990) article The greening of criminology  is often referred to as a starting point for 
the field, many were not made aware of this article and research on environmental crime 
had been going on, about pollution at sea (Christophersen and Johansen 1991), e.g. in 
Norway, and of corporate environmental crime (Pearce and Tombs 2009) and pollution, 
although not clearly defined as belonging to any specific field of criminology apart from 
being critical criminology. As South says;  
“[But] in an important sense, a green criminology is justified because it was inevita-
ble and necessary. It reflected scientific interests and political challenges of the mo-
ment, carried forward the momentum of critical non­conformist criminology, and 
offered a point of contact and convergence” (2014: 8).  
The umbrella under which green criminology topics are gathered is wide, and includes 
according to Beirne and South (2007) […]the study of those harms against humanity, 
against the environment including space) and against nonhuman animals committed both 
by powerful institutions (e.g. governments, transnational corporations, military apparat-
uses) and also by ordinary people” (2007: xiii). Researching what is legally understood as 
crimes – breaches of law –  has therefore been expanded to include studies of harms that 
are not currently criminalized or only criminalized under certain conditions, and the con-
cept of crime is conceptually changed to encompass a normative element when it includes 
                                                 
1 Parts of this paper has been previously published in; Sollund, R (2015) “Introduction: Critical criminology – 
an agenda for change” , p. 1-27, “Animal trafficking and trade: Abuse and species injustice.” In  P. Walters, R., 
Westerhuis, D.S: and Wyatt, T. (eds 2013). Emerging issues in green criminology. 72-93. “The use and abuse of 
animals in wildlife trafficking in Colombia: Practices, and injustice” In Rodriguez Goyes, D., Mol, H., South, N., 
and Brisman, A., (eds) in print) 'Environmental Crime in Latin America: The Theft of Nature and The Poisoning 
of the Land' (All at Palgrave Macmillan)   
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those harmful acts which are actually not crime, legally defined,  but yet are as harmful as 
any act which is breach of law or regulation (Beirne and South 2007, Sollund 2008, Walters 
2010,  White 2007,  2013: 8, Stretesky et al 2013, Lynch et al 2014,  Hillyard et al 2004, South 
2008). Such harms may be part of daily practices (Agnew 2013) and even instigated by or-
ganizations like the IMF and the World Bank (O’Brien 2008). This marks a distinction to 
conventional, criminology with its focus preponderantly on those acts which are criminal-
ized, crime prevention, offenders and punishment.      
An important issue is thereby also the area in between the legal and illegal crimes; the justi-
fications for criminalizing some acts and not others, for punishing some and not others, 
even when the acts/crimes they commit are qualitatively the same, and correspondingly in 
regarding some as “justified” victims and not others (Sollund 2012). Given the impact of 
political activism on green criminology, an important part of the field is to show who the 
victims of environmental harms are, and propose policy implications “which would 
‘work’ legally speaking as well as being conceptually robust” (Hall 2014: 99).    
There is as such no deep divide between critical criminology e.g. with its Marxist tradi-
tions at the Institute of criminology at the University of Oslo, or in the European Group for 
the Study of Deviance and Social Control, and green criminology (White 2011). Green 
criminology is a natural and necessary prolongation and expansion of critical criminology 
(Sollund 2014, South 2014), in a world facing even larger problems now than in the 70ies 
as consequence of the capitalist order, in which colonialism cannot be talked about in a 
past tense; it has merely changed its form. It is not any longer western states which “own” 
the colonial states, they are in practice to much degree often “owned” by large corpora-
tions, and these corporations have no other purpose than to increase the wealth of their 
owners on cost of the inhabitants of these previous colonies, and harming indigenous 
peoples whether in in Greenland (Myrup 2012), Canada, Nigeria (Zalik 2010), Colombia  
(Mol 2013), or Ecuador  (Sollund 2012), or by the dumping of toxic waste  (Bisschop 2013, 
White 2008).  
Still, green criminology cannot be claimed to be a unitary field, as there are today degrees 
of how critical (radical) the writers appear to be, and the ways in which this reflects their 
research agendas. Further; the interests of criminologists writing within a critical tradition 
on “green” (e.g. Beirne and South 2007) eco-global (White 2011, Ellefsen et al 2012) topics 
are as diverse as are criminologists.   
White (2013) categorizes the different branches of green criminology as follows; radical 
green criminology (e.g. Lynch and Stretesky 2003, Stretesky et al 2013, Lynch and 
Stretesky 2014), (Eco-global criminology (White 2011, 2012), conservation criminology 
(Gibbs et al 2010) Environmental criminology, (Wellsmith 2010, Hill 2015), Constructivist 
green criminology (Brisman 2012) and nonspeciesist criminology (e.g. Beirne 2009, White 
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2013: 23-24). And one could add:  Historical criminology (Beirne 1994, 2009, Ystehede 
2012) and green cultural criminology (Ferrel 2013, Brisman and South 2014).  
One question arises; what may possibly unite all these branches of green; what do they 
have in common?  The development into different fields of green criminology suggests 
that not all authors with their different fields of interests and research agendas will agree 
on perspectives, for example in eco- and species justice (Halsey 2004).  A conventional 
criminologist could for example focus on illegal wildlife trafficking, the main problem be-
ing that animals are taken against laws or regulations, thus the discussion would circulate 
around how to prevent this as a (and because it is a) crime, rather than as a harm ( Pires 
2012,Warchol et al 2003).  Such a perspective would be regarded as too narrow for a radi-
cal, anti- anthropocentric, criminologist who would refer to such acts as crimes either way 
and be equally concerned about those who are killed or abducted legally as those who are 
abducted and killed illegally  (Rodriguez Goyes 2015, Sollund 2011).   
As South pointed out already in 1998 (and see White 2013 b), green criminology provides 
no theory which can unify the field.  This could by some be regarded as a deficiency. 
However, to believe that one grand theory could possibly unite all aspects of this rich field 
would probably undermine its content, because it would necessarily have to cover contra-
dicting interests and perspectives, e.g. those which can be implicit in environmental rights 
versus species justice. The strength of green criminology is, according to Avi Brisman, its 
inclusion of a broad set of interpretations, explanations and predictions and in this way 
the scope of green criminology is broader, its potential greater and its significance far 
more profound (Brisman 2014: 24).   As observed by Brisman, green criminologists do not 
come to the field without previous experience or theoretical baggage and have an array of 
theories to pick from in their analyses.  
Naturally, theories that are applied within more critical criminology are also used by 
green criminologists, e.g. control theory. Sykes and Matzas’ (1957) “Techniques of neutral-
ization”, can be used to discuss the various neutralization techniques people may apply to 
defend animal exploitation, to the degree they find this necessary, provided that animal 
exploitation is doxic (Bourdieu 1995), and deeply ingrained practices in most humans’ 
lives (Sollund 2012). 
Michael Lynch and Paul Stretesky, in their book  Exploring Green Criminology: Toward a 
Green Criminological Revolution, further provides an overview of major criminological theo-
ries that have been applied by green criminologists in the analysis of green harms and 
crimes: 1) Deterrence theory, 2), situational crime prevention and routine activities theory, 
for example frequently applied in the study of wildlife trafficking and illegal hunting (Hill 
2015, Pires and Clark 2011), self-control theory, social learning theory (Sollund 2011), and 
strain theory (Agnew 2012), the later in relation to climate change. Robert Agnew (2012) 
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has thus suggested that climate change will increase strain, reduce social control and in-
crease social disorganization.  
Robert Merton’s (1968) anomie theory is applied to analyse corporate environmental crime 
where a company’s success measured by its profits will pay little attention to environmen-
tal legislation (Nurse 2015); an example which may also be discussed in perspective of 
Edwin Sutherland’s (1940), differential association learning theory. Both Merton and Suth-
erland have been applied to discuss behaviors of entrepreneurs who work at the margins 
between legal and illegal business, for example in relation to wildlife trafficking (Nurse 
2015). Another theoretical perspective is fruitfully employed within green criminology, is 
theories of denial (Cohen 2001) for example in relation to animal abuse and exploitation. 
Nils Christie’s (1974) findings relating to the importance of social distance for humans to 
commit abusive acts is equally relevant in analysing humans’ treatment of those which are 
othered; indigenous groups, women and children in faraway countries and animals. 
One thing many green criminologists further have in common, at least those which will 
position themselves within critical, green criminology, is an insistent awareness of exploi-
tative relationships and injustice (Wyatt, Beirne, and South 2014). Justice perspectives, 
based in philosophical directions are therefore central in many green criminology studies, 
which may also include ecofeminism (Sollund 2012). 
In the human rights and environmental justice stance, environmental rights are seen an exten-
sion of human or social rights so as to enhance the quality of human life, now and in the 
future. From the ecological citizenship and ecological justice perspective, humans are merely 
one component of complex ecosystems that should be preserved in their own right in light 
of the rights of the environment. Finally in the animal rights and species justice stance, envi-
ronmental harm is constructed in relation to the role nonhuman animals play within envi-
ronments, and their intrinsic right not to suffer abuse, whether this be one-on-one harm, 
institutionalized harm or harm arising from human actions that affect climates and envi-
ronments globally (White, 2013, p. 6). 
An empirical study of illegal wildlife trade 
 
In my current research I study wildlife trafficking in Norway, Colombia and Brazil, with a 
specific focus on practices, control and law enforcement. Trade in endangered species, in-
cluding 5600 animal species, is regulated under  CITES; The Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), now with 181 parties to the 
convention.   
Many species are threatened because of trade or the combination of loss of habitat and 
trade (WWF 2014). Parties to the convention, e.g. Norway, Brazil and Colombia, must en-
sure CITES is fulfilled in their own legislation/regulation. The convention operates with 
three appendices; appendix one lists species which are critically endangered and therefore 
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trade is banned with a few exceptions, on appendix II are listed species with which trade 
must be controlled in order to avoid utilization incompatible with these species’ survival, 
and species that are threatened in at least one member state are listed on appendix III 
(CITES-Secretariat, n.d.; Wyatt, 2013; Zimmerman, 2003). Despite the large number listed 
at CITES’ appendices, a considerable number of species is not subject neither to ban, nor to 
regulation. The logic behind CITES is that when the trade in a species (or in combination 
with habitat loss) has entailed a critical threat to its survival, the trade in individuals of 
that species will be banned. It is important to underline that CITES is a trade convention, it 
is not banning wildlife trade, except under special conditions; i.e. when a species has be-
come critically endangered; which is the case for the rhinoceros, pangolins and various 
parrot species which are examples of species that are heavily trafficked.  
Methodology, data 
 
The study is based on qualitative methods. From Norway I have in total 17 interviews  
with the Police,  Customs, Norwegian Environment Agency, veterinarians and reptile 
keepers/smugglers. In addition I have roughly 50 Confiscation reports concerning animals 
or animals products that have been seized by Customs,  87 penal cases coded as 2510: Ille-
gal importation of alien wildlife species (the Wildlife law § 47), 723 penal cases coded as 
5901 Illegal  importation/dealing with exotic species § 30 nr.76 (Under the animal welfare 
act) in addition to statistics from Customs over CITES confiscations.  
From Colombia I have 14 interviews with experts in wildlife traded and wildlife working 
for  state authorities and NGOs. From Brazil I have four interviews with experts and po-
lice. 17 of the interviews from Colombia were conducted by David Rodriguez Goyes. 
 
Findings 
 
I will briefly present some findings from the project. In none of the countries does the con-
trol and prevention of wildlife trafficking seem to be a prioritized field, and even less in 
Norway than in Colombia and Brazil, where wildlife trafficking and exploitation have 
long traditional, cultural roots.  
Seizures from Customs from 2008-2014 include 1839 CITES listed animals /animal2 prod-
ucts.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The number of animals seized by Customs that are not CITES listed, is much larger but will not be detailed here. 
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Norway: 
Year Live 
Birds 
Live 
Reptiles 
Other3 Dead/Stuffed/parts Product Total 
N 
2008 44  8 27 35 2 44 
2009  5  2 2266 238 
2010 47 2 2 3 118 22 
2011 339 1 23610 6711 612 343 
2012  5  1013 4814 59 
2013  1 56715 1916 15717 744 
2014 1418  24219 11420 2021 390 
Total 55 22 1074 218 470 1839 
 
According to the  Norwegian Eco-crime police overview of 87 cases coded as keeping and 
smuggling of exotic species, in the time span of 2000-2010, 28 were concluded with a fine, 
31 cases were dismissed for different reasons, including because the case had grown too 
old. When I go through the police files I find that a fine is independently of how the cases 
                                                 
3 Includes corals, butterflies, crickets, spiders, 
4 Parrots 
5 Includes wolf, primate, hippo, predator birds 
6 Incl.200 tiger bone pills and armadillo plasters, turtle shell, bird neck (fish hooks 
7 4 African Greys (Not in statistics overview, but according to confiscation report and verdict 
8 Incl. Whisky with Python snake and Musk tablets 
9 8 including African Greys (Not in statistics overview, but according to confiscation report and verdict 
10 230 fish and 6 spiders for zoo shop 
11 Including bear pelts with head, predator birds, crocodile teeth, snake skins, claws, 
12 Including leopard plasters 
13 Including brown bear, crocodile head, predator birds 
14 Including sea horse tablets, rope form hippo, 33 ivory artefacts all sent to the same man and crocodile 
purse 
15Including 557 Corals, tarantella and butterflies 
16 Including entire Siberian tiger, 15 alligator heads, seahorses and buzzard 
17 Including boots, wallets, bags  etc from crocodile skin and 148 Musk plasters, and ivory 
18 Six African Grey, 8 parakeets 
19 Corals and 35 leeches  
20 Including a lion pelt with head, 110 sea horses, two  falcons,  
21 Including ivory items, snake skin bracelet, crocodile wallet, Jungle cock fish flies, crocodile head 
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are coded,  the usual reaction to the smuggling of wildlife to Norway, however normally 
between 5 and 10 thousand NOK. 
I will now present two penal cases from Norway in more detail, showing the consequenc-
es of low priority and lack of competence by judges. These are cases I have tracked since I 
received seizure reports. One offender has been convicted several times for parrot traffick-
ing and wildlife crime. There are four verdicts pertaining to this man concerning three in-
cidents, but the man has, according to a note made on one of the confiscations reports 
from Customs, also been caught for trafficking parrots in 2000 (27 individuals) and in 
Gothenburg in 2007.   In the verdict from Halden Tingrett from 3rd of December 2013 [13-
156198MED-HALD], he was sentenced for, on Nov. 21st 2010 trafficking four African Grey 
parrots, on Nov 20th 2011, he trafficked eight. For the offence he was first fined 25000 
NOK which he apparently did not accept as this case was added to the second in the sen-
tence.  It must be mentioned that in this first fine, the birds were not mentioned, only the 
alcohol he smuggled together with them, and in another document from Customs, the 
birds were listed as another species with less monetary value, 200 rather than 5-7000 NOK.   
In 2010 the African Greys were all killed by the authorities after order from the Norwegian 
Environment Agency; the reason being they were only CITES II species.  Although the 
Court argues in this verdict that for preventative reasons unsuspended prison sentence 
should be applied, the delay in the judicial system entailed the judges argued that the 30 
days prison sentence should rather be suspended for two years. In addition he was con-
victed to pay a fine of 5000 NOK and the birds and the alcohol were confiscated.  
What happened to the birds who were seized in 2011 is not revealed in the verdict, but 
according to data, some were saved, others killed. That the destiny of the victims in the 
case is not clarified in the verdict is an interesting point in itself.  
 In the second verdict pertaining to the man, from 20th of January 2014 [13-175645MED-
DALA + 13-175658MED-DALA], he was convicted for breach of the Wildlife law and also 
for breach of the Law of biodiversity for taking a sea eagle egg from the nest. In this ver-
dict, it is regarded as aggravating that he had been convicted before for similar crimes, and 
thus he got an unsuspended prison sentence of 45 days, in addition he had to pay 2000 
NOK for procedural expenses.  
The third and fourth verdicts pertaining to the man concern sentences from 2nd instance 
Courts as both the parrot and sea eagle egg cases were appealed by the offender.  
In the verdict regarding the parrots from Borgarting lagmannsrett [14-093257AST-
BORG/03], the judges have a lengthy discussion of whether the parrots are or are not 
‘wildlife’, and consequently which law would apply in this case. They end up concluding 
that the trafficking of the parrots is not a breach of the Wildlife law due to these parrots’ 
incapacity of surviving were they to be liberated in Norway, they are not ‘wildlife’ but 
‘cage birds’ hence the offender must be convicted after § 5  of the  CITES-regulation and 
thus according to § 18, jf. Law about Import and Export of  6  june 1997 nr 32 § 4, which 
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dictates a maximum of six months prison, rather than for breaching the Wildlife Law 
which dictates a maximum of two years prison. The trafficker was convicted to 60 days 
prison, of which 45 were suspended, 15 days were already passed in Custody so the man 
went free.   In the verdict from Gulating lagmannsrett [13-175645MED-DALA + 13-
175658MED-DALA] regarding the sea eagle egg, the man had his prison sentence reduced 
to thirty days suspended prison due to delay in the judicial system.  
Findings from Colombia and Brazil 
Categories of animals and motivations for use in and from Colombia:  
 
The interviews in Colombia and seizure data provided a foundation for a typology relat-
ing to the various motivations for the exploitation of different kinds of animal species, 
whether they are trafficked alive and are meant to be kept alive, or whether they are sub-
sequently killed.  
Pet trade: Primates, like the titi gris, and parrot species, are often used as pets in Colombia 
and are the most trafficked species for this purpose. The pet trade also deals in other spe-
cies, such as the tigrillo (ocelot), reptiles (turtles/tortoises), fish and poisonous frogs that are 
trafficked from Colombia to be used for ornamental purposes in Germany, Japan, and the 
Netherlands, for example.  
Animal experimentation and biopiracy22: Nonhuman primates have frequently been traf-
ficked for experimentation because they bear physiological resemblance to human pri-
mates. According to interviewee Luz Rodríguez, this use has declined as there has been a 
development in other experimental methods23 that do not require the use of animals. All 
primates are listed in Appendix I or II of CITES. Despite this, in Colombia, the Aotus vocif-
erans (night monkeys) have for decades been trafficked from the Amazon basin, including 
from Peru and Brazil, to be used in malaria research experiments by Manuel Elkin Patar-
                                                 
22 The concept of biopiracy refers to the appropriation of knowledge and nature, describing the ongoing glob-
al and local corporate practice of asserting the right of ownership over genetic materials taken from living 
organisms (Mgbeoji 2006, in Rodríguez Goyes and South 2015, p. 3), including the patenting of medicines, 
seeds, plants and even other forms of life. Adherents of such processes would rather refer to these practices 
as ‘bioprospecting’. All use of biological material may, from the perspective of the ‘donor’ or rather, from the 
victim from whom the genetic material was taken, be regarded as biopiracy because such activities normally 
include an invasion of personal integrity, provided the human or animal in question is a sentient being, even 
when samples may be taken with the donor/victim’s consent. Consequently, the term biopiracy should not 
only include the appropriation of knowledge about how different genetic compositions may be applied to 
develop medicines, but also refer to the process of taking genetic material directly from individuals. This 
broader definition of biopiracy helps avoid tacit acceptance of animals as property, and even human beings as 
exploitable resources, who may be used for that purpose.  
23 These are known as the three Rs: reduction, replacement and refinement, and include computerized mod-
elling and audio visual alternatives (Norecopa 2015, accessed on 4 January from http://norecopa.no/about-
norecopa).  
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royo in Colombia (Maldonado et al. 2009; Maldonado and Lafon, this volume; Rodríguez 
Goyes 2015). Amphibians are abducted and used to find metabolites by the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. 
Furs and skins: Taken from reptile species, including crocodile species and cats, such as 
panther and ocelot. Reptile skins that are exported illegally have been seized in Spain, 
Germany and the US.  
Food: Icotea turtles, iguana eggs, the Capybara [chigüiro] and eagles are hunted and used in 
Colombia and Venezuela because they are considered ‘white meat’ and thus allowed in 
festive seasons when red meat is regarded as unacceptable.  
Handicraft: Turtles, conchs and corals are used for this purpose, for example jewellery, 
combs, and music instruments.24   
Witchcraft: Serpents are used in witchcraft and black magic.25 The tail of the rattlesnake is 
used in amulets. Owls are trafficked a lot for such purposes. They are, for example, con-
sidered to bring good luck and are therefore used as ‘mascots’.  
Traditional medicine: Meat from raptors, such as eagles and hawks, are regarded as aph-
rodisiacs, or believed to possess special properties. Vultures’ blood is believed to cure 
asthma and cancer.  
Breeding purposes: The zoocriaderos (breeding facilities for species in demand) also buy 
free-born animals for breeding purposes. Therefore, breeding facilities are not alleviating 
the market; they may themselves be based on trafficking as well as facilitating WLT.   
Brazil 
Features of the destinies of trafficking victims in Brazil are that they are used as «pets», to 
entertain and be of adornment to a house as «songbirds», they are used as medicine and 
food.   
Like in Colombia there are long traditions for keeping wild animals in private homes. The 
Sao Paolo military environmental police, Robis, states that Sao Paolo is the state where 
most wildlife seizures are done in Brazil. 90% of the animals they confiscate are small 
birds, in addition to turtles and snakes. In Sao Paolo in 2012 they confiscated 22 thousand 
                                                 
24 Another example from Boliva is the use of armadillo to produce the string instrument, charango.  
25 In an article from 1991, Guillermo Trujillo confirms the use of animals in witchcraft and the superstitious 
use of animals in medicine in Colombia. There are numerous academic articles referring to the traditional 
use of witchcraft in Colombia, including (Franco, 2001, and Uribe, 2003). The categories of traditional medi-
cine and witchcraft are overlapping. A google picture search also reveals several photos of shamans using 
feathers of endangered Amazon parrot species. Presumably these birds have not been trafficked but killed so 
as to be used as adornment that forms part of such cultural practices. 
https://www.google.no/search?q=cascabel+magia+negra&biw=1280&bih=597&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X
&ved=0ahUKEwiT5JHLr__LAhUrGZoKHeSTDK0Q_AUIBigB#tbm=isch&q=chamanes&imgrc=JkYw4CE2SIJ
-EM%3A.  
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birds, and 4 thousand other animals, while in  2013, 24 thousand birds and 3 thousand 
others. 
Like in Norway and Colombia most offenders involved in wildlife trafficking who are 
punished in Brazil, receive a fine. The Sao Polo police imposed fines worth  $27 millon rea-
les in 2012 (about 12 million USD),  and 29 millones reales (13 million USD) in 2013.  This 
money goes to the Ministry of Environment. It must be added that according to Robis, the 
environmental police in the other states of Brazil are far from working as effectively and 
with the same priorities against wildlife trafficking, as they do in Sao Paolo.  He says; 
quote: “it is like a story without an end, because as long as the police in the states where the ani-
mals are caught do nothing to prevent it, I will stop more animals all the time”.  
According to him, many are trafficked from the North eastern state of Bahia, and when 
they are stopped by the Sao Paolo police, and like in Colombia, death rates are high. Inter-
viewees both form Colombia and Brazil reckon up to 90% of animals (birds) that are taken 
from the forest die before they reach their destination, e.g. due to injuries like broken 
wings and legs, dehydration and starvation, or over sedation. Eg. birds are stuffed sedated 
into PVC tubes and trafficked in boxes, suitcases etc. The large amount of confiscations 
done by Sao Paolo military environmental police  is a huge problem, as they do not have 
the equipment, the logistic and the resources to adequately deal with such large numbers 
of stressed and injured animal victims.   Often, they do not know where the animals came 
from as some species may be endemic to the entire country.  When confiscated they are 
sent to the Ibirapuera park; the wildlife reception centre in Sao Paolo.  
Wildlife trafficking in perspective of neutralization techniques   
 
We all remember Sykes and Matzas’ five techniques of neutralization: The Denial of Inju-
ry, The Denial of Responsibility, The Denial of the Victim, The Condemnation of the Con-
demners and The Appeal to Higher Loyalties. Acts may be mal per se and mal prohibita.  
Before I turn to these, I will explore briefly the protection the animals may have in legisla-
tion. As previously clarified, although there is legislation prohibiting wildlife trafficking, 
the CITES convention itself does not entail prohibition. Wildlife are still protected under 
legislation in Norway, Colombia and Brazil, but at least in Norway the logic e.g. in the 
Wildlife law, which is basically an Act regulating hunting, animals are only protected as 
belonging to a species, and their degree of protection will therefore depend on how threat-
ened the species is (Sollund 2015). Animals have individual protection under Animal wel-
fare legislation, but again this protection is also strongly related to them being property 
(e.g. Francione 2008) and is therefore very limited. However; whether the legislation that 
could protect wildlife, e.g. through its normative message, seems not to fill this function in 
the case study locations. For example,  based on the number of animals that are trafficked 
in Colombia, 58 000 animals are seized per year, this implied that the dark figure of animal 
trafficking victims likely by far exceeds this, due to lack of control. Consequently it is un-
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likely that the law succeeds in sending a normative message and that this message is ac-
cepted by the public.  
I cannot here examine all wildlife exploitation practices in relation to all the neutralization 
techniques, but will briefly sketch how these may be employed in the analysis of wildlife 
trafficking. As mentioned the exploitative practices related to wildlife in Colombia and 
Brazil are deeply ingrained practices, covering many aspects of human life. For legislation 
to contribute to change these practices enforcement of the law would be important and 
thus its deterrent effect and this would have to weigh heavier than the cultural practices 
itself, e.g. the use of turtle meat during Easter in Colombia. For people who make a living 
from trapping birds or other animals to profit from them; the crime is near at hand, and 
the profit easy: Also these offenders can likely find support both in the denial of the vic-
tim; animals are food or profit, or in the appeal to higher loyalties; taking the animals may 
be regarded as a necessity, or as something they are entitled to.    The denial of responsibil-
ity is also near at hand; since these are widespread practices, most people are complicit in 
these kinds of exploitation.  Concerning pet keeping, keeping a chained monkey or a par-
rot in a cage in the patio, is widespread, and thus “normal” practice that needs not be ex-
cused, and therefore responsibility needs not even be denied, it is hardly questioned. Even 
though various wildlife exploitation practices are  mala prohibita, they are unlikely to be 
regarded as mala in se, and the intervention by authorities, for example when wildlife is 
seized in private homes or during trafficking, or when fines are imposed may even entail 
condemnation of the condemners. This specific technique of neutralization is much more 
clear in this field, however, when the authorities persecute animal rights activists for con-
demning animal abuse through political activism and protest (Ellefsen 2015).  
In Norway; the offender typologies; pet keepers, parrot sellers, tourists who buy souve-
nirs, consumers of Traditional Asian Medicine or collectors; will likely also apply tech-
niques of neutralization should they be aware of the illegality of their crimes. They will 
likely deny any injury of an animal that is used for medicinal purposes and if necessary 
appeal to higher loyalties; i.e. the need for a cure. The parrot salesmen unlikely see the an-
imals as individuals, but rather as merchandize and moreover; keeping “cage birds” is 
even in Norway so normalized that even the judges in the Norwegian Court denied that 
African Grey Parrots were wildlife, but stated they were cage birds, and therefore illegal 
goods rather than wildlife, and victims of trafficking.  The collector of ivory items, similar-
ly unlikely sees his hobby as committing any kind of injury, and there is a long distance 
between the living elephant on the savannah and the decorated ivory items in his post 
packages that he has bought on eBay auctions. The tourist who buys his crocodile skin 
purse or shoes, his dried sea horses, his cobra on a liquor bottle, or other curiosa, is unlike-
ly to draw the connection between these items and the living individuals they were pro-
duced from, and far less likely to see the harm that was done to them. They are unlikely to 
feel the need to recur to neutralization techniques, whether denial of injury, of the victim 
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and of responsibility – after all these items may have been purchased e.g. at the air port 
shop, consequently they do only what tourists usually do.  
Animal abuse, species and eco justice   
 
Important perspectives in green criminology relate to justice and rights (Benton 1998, 
White, 2007, 2008, and 2011).    As mentioned, Ecological justice implies that humans are but 
one part of complex ecosystems, which should be preserved for their own sake. A concern 
is for planetary well being and the rights of other species to live free from abuse and tor-
ture (White, 2007, p. 38, 2011, p.23). Environmental justice is seen as a prolongation of hu-
man rights or social rights to enhance the quality of human life, now and for the future 
(White, 2007, p.38-39, 2008, p. 18-21, 2011, p.23). Species justice  implies that harm is seen in 
relation to the place non human species have in their environments and their intrinsic 
right not to suffer from abuse, whether one to one or institutionalized, or as consequence 
of human action harming habitats, the climate and the environment on a global scale. This 
means taking an ecocentric perspective (Halsey and White, 1998). 
Wild animals’ important roles in ecosystems enhance why they, particularly, should be 
secured ecological citizenship and rights to their habitats. A consequence of ecological citi-
zenship and ecological justice, would be that individuals of all species should have envi-
ronmental rights, and consequently, should have both individual rights and species relat-
ed rights. 
This brings me to a discussion of the rationale behind CITES, in light of ecological justice 
and species justice. The abduction, trafficking and killing of animals is legitimated through 
CITES as animals are consistently regarded as ‘natural resources’ which can be ‘harvested’ 
for human benefit (Sollund, 2011).  To ‘over’-exploit them, though, is unacceptable, princi-
pally because this will eventually harm humans, and can as shown also be illegal.    Being 
illegal or not, the abduction and killing of animals which CITES indirectly encourages, has 
tremendous consequences in terms of individual (and species) suffering.  When species 
are driven to extinction, this not only harms the individuals who form the species, but also 
the ecosystems to which the individuals belong.    
When the ecosystem where the parrot belongs is drained, this is a breach of ecological jus-
tice, and when the species suffer as consequence of the reduction annual ‘harvesting’ of 
parrots causes, this is also breach of species justice, as it is when species go extinct due to 
loss of habitat because of humans’ logging (Halsey and White 1998).  The abduction 
and/or killing of the parrot are not the least a breach of what should be an individual right 
to live unharmed by humans.  
We can thus distinguish between individual rights, which should be, but not necessarily 
are, connected to species specific rights, meaning; those rights pertaining to the specific 
needs of one particular species, for example to dig, crawl, fly, migrate, run or search for 
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food. It is a breach of both species specific rights and individual justice for example when 
the last remaining individuals are abducted from their habitats to be bred on in captivity, 
deprived of their freedom and habitat.  A species can survive in a zoo, but this survival 
can be in contrast to individual and species specific rights. From this we can deduce that 
even if the species survives, and the species thus from one dimension is given justice, this 
may be inconsistent with ecological justice. Species survival can be, but is not necessarily 
connected to the right of the species to continue its existence in its natural environment 
and consequently species justice, just as humans who for no reason are held captive will 
feel they are unjustly treated, and regard it as a breach of human rights even though the 
human species is not at risk.  It is also a question if species justice can at all be fulfilled if 
this is only accomplished at the cost of the individual rights of individuals of that species, 
for can a species be more than the individuals who form it? 
Conclusion 
 
I started this paper by providing a brief introduction to green criminology and theories 
that are applied within the field, showing that this has its deep roots within critical crimi-
nology as well as in the theories applied within more conventional parts of the discipline. I 
thereby proceeded to sketch some empirical findings from a research project about wild-
life trafficking, showing that this is a harm that is both legal and illegal, and harming vic-
tims that are seldom recognized as such, which is partly the reason why these harms are 
seldom prioritized and may be hard to combat.  Thereafter I applied perspectives that are 
important in green criminology such as species justice and eco-justice to analyse the harms 
that are committed in relation to wildlife trafficking, and consequently that green crimi-
nology benefit from both its firm fundament in critical criminology but also from new 
ways of perceiving harms, e.g. in relation to philosophical terms.  
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WORKSHOP L 
COLLECTIVE EFFICACY AND SUB-CULTURE STUDIES 
 
Collective efficacy and out-doors arson 
 
Manne Gerell 
 
Abstract 
 
Burning cars and containers during social unrest have become a topic of both scholarly 
and public interest in Sweden during the past decade. Studies have suggested that social 
disorganization theory, or its modern expression collective efficacy, may be important to 
explain why some neighborhoods experience elevated levels of arson and unrest while 
others do not (Malmberg et al 2013; Guldåker & Hallin 2013). To date no study has explic-
itly studied the link between arson and collective efficacy on the neighborhood level. The 
present study attempts to fill that gap by analyzing the association of arson and collective 
efficacy in the city of Malmö, Sweden. Data over collective efficacy from 104 neighbor-
hoods were collected in 2012 in the Malmö Community Survey (N=4095). Arson data was 
collected from the rescue services which employ GPS-receivers to accurately record the 
place of incidents. Arson data was aggregated to neighborhoods using ARCGis 10. Multi-
variate regression models were fitted against number of arsons/capita (logged) controlling 
for concentrated disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity and residential stability. Results show 
there is no significant link between collective efficacy and arson after appropriate controls. 
This suggests that arson may depend on other mechanisms than collective efficacy, at least 
on the neighborhood level. 
Keywords: Arson, Collective efficacy, Social disorganization 
Introduction 
 
The combination of social cohesion and expectations for common action within a neigh-
borhood, collective efficacy, has been linked to a number of outcomes, notably violent 
crime, disorder and fear of crime (Sampson et al 1997; Sampson & Wikström 2008; Gibson 
et al 2002; Swatt et al 2013). Collective efficacy is typically found to mediate a large portion 
of the association between neighborhood levels of disadvantage, heterogeneity and resi-
dential instability and outcomes of crime or similar (Sampson 2012; Sampson et al 1997). In 
contemporary Swedish academic discussion collective efficacy has also been discussed as 
a potential mechanism explaining the high prevalence of arson and riots in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods (Malmberg et al 2013; Hallin et al 2010; Guldåker & Hallin 2013). The 
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above mentioned studies note that there appears to be an association between disad-
vantage, segregation and similar structural level characteristics of neighborhoods and the 
outcome of arson. Only one small case study of four neighborhoods divided into 12 micro-
neighborhoods has tested the association of collective efficacy with arson formally, noting 
a nonsignificant association (Gerell 2013). The present study attempts to further our 
knowledge on the association of collective efficacy with arson by formally modeling it 
with data from the city of Malmö. As such the present study will be the first study to ex-
amine the issue properly on a city-wide scale. This is of interest for our understandings of 
the neighborhood level mechanisms associated with arson, in Sweden and elsewhere. In 
addition, it is of interest in relation to the theory of collective efficacy as this is a new ven-
ue of investigation regarding the scope of collective efficacy. Arson can also be considered 
a form of disorder, and the present study thus contributes to the ongoing discussion of 
broken windows theory and collective efficacy (Wilson & Kelling 1982; Sampson & Raud-
enbusch 1999).  
Collective efficacy theory 
 
Although collective efficacy is a fairly new concept, its roots can be traced back to the early 
Chicago school of urban sociology (Park & Burgess 1924; Shaw & McKay 1969; Korn-
hauser 1978). The theoretical notion of social disorganization theory was based on the 
finding that neighborhoods characterized by low socio-economic status (SES), low residen-
tial stability and high ethnic heterogeneity tended also to suffer from crime and other 
problems. A possible mechanism that could explain such associations was how neighbor-
hoods with low SES and related risk-factors would have difficulties maintaining a socially 
organized community, and how the social disorganization in turn would help explain the 
occurrence of crime (Kornhauser 1978). In early studies the focus was on correlates of so-
cial disorganization in the form of SES, population turnover and immigrants concentra-
tion, but in the 1980s a shift towards actually measuring the level of social organization 
took place. Sampson & Groves (1989) measured social organization through a survey 
which included items on the presence of organizations, social networks and unsupervised 
youth.   Their findings broadly confirmed the theory; neighborhoods with low SES tended 
to have a lower degree of social organization, and social organization mediated the associ-
ation of SES with crime.  
The theory was further developed by Sampson et al (1997) in a seminal paper that estab-
lished the concept collective efficacy. Collective efficacy builds on the theory by noting 
that the mere presence of social networks or organizations is not sufficient, rather it is the 
content of networks and the agency it promotes that is key (Sampson 2012; Sampson & 
Graif 2010). Organizations and social networks may help promote social cohesion and 
trust (Sampson & Graif 2010), and cohesion in turn is the basis upon which informal social 
control, agency, can be generated to achieve common goals in a neighborhood such as se-
curity and order (Sampson et al 1997). Collective efficacy does encompass two dimensions 
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of social capital, mutual trust and expectations to intervene for the common good, and the 
combination of the two is hypothesized to be important for our understanding of crime. It 
was noted that the structural variables of concentrated disadvantage, immigrant concen-
tration (heterogeneity) and residential stability explained 70% of the variation between 
neighborhoods levels of collective efficacy (ibid). Concentrated disadvantage was an index 
constructed from variables related to SES, public assistance and unemployment, combined 
with other measures of disadvantage, female headed families, density of children and per-
cent black residents. Consistent with theoretical expectations concentrated disadvantage, 
immigrant concentration and residential stability was associated with violence, however, a 
large share of such associations, in particular in relation to concentrated disadvantage, was 
mediated by collective efficacy which in itself had a strong negative association with vio-
lence net of controls (Sampson et al 1997).  
The findings that collective efficacy is negatively associated with crime has since been con-
firmed in studies from several parts of the world, including Stockholm, Sweden (Sampson 
& Wikström 2008), Peterborough, UK (Wikström et al 2012) and Brisbane, Australia (Ma-
zerolle et al 2010). Recently, two European studies noted very weak associations of collec-
tive efficacy with crime, highlighting the importance to further examine the issue. In the 
Hague, Bruinsma et al (2013) found no association of collective efficacy with crime. In 
London, Sutherland et al (2013) found a weak association of collective efficacy with police 
reported violent crime, and no association with ambulance call outs of knife injuries. For 
London it was also noted that ethnic heterogeneity was positively associated with collec-
tive efficacy, and some part of the discrepancy in findings may be attributed to the differ-
ing contexts of cities and countries. Another potential explanation rests with the defini-
tions of neighborhoods which have differed dramatically between studies of collective 
efficacy, ranging from below 100 residents per neighborhood up to several thousand (Ger-
ell 2015). More broadly it has been shown that a higher share of variance can be attributed 
to smaller types of neighborhoods, with arguments such as “smaller is better” (Wikström 
& Oberwittler 2009; Gerell 2015), or even “smallest is better” (Gerell 2016). Although the 
evidence over all points towards effects of collective efficacy, it is more uncertain in a Eu-
ropean context.  
Collective efficacy, disorder and arson 
 
Although the bulk of collective efficacy studies have focused on violent crime, the rela-
tionship of collective efficacy with disorder, as discussed in the frame work of the broken 
windows theory (Wilson & Kelling 1982), has also received some attention (Sampson & 
Raudenbush 1999; Xu et al 2005; St Jean 2009).  Broken windows theory states that disor-
derly behavior, social disorder, or the visible cues that such behavior result in, physical 
disorder, lead to more crime through signaling that no one cares, thus inviting criminal 
activity and discouraging crime preventive efforts of residents (Wilson & Kelling 1982). 
While some disagreement exists as to whether disorder has an independent effect on crime 
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or whether both crime and disorder is best seen as related to collective efficacy is a topic of 
debate, but studies tend to find significant negative association of collective efficacy with 
disorder either way (Sampson & Raudenbush 1999; Xu et al 2005).  
Studies on disorder typically include vandalism as a key component of disorder, but while 
arson can be seen as a form of vandalism it is rarely explicitly included in operationaliza-
tions of disorder. Arson is explicitly mentioned as a key type of disorder by Wilson & Kel-
ling (1982), and some studies have discussed it as such (Gerell 2016; Drucker 2011). More 
generally, a key component of physical disorder is the visual cue it sends, and arguably a 
burnt out car wreck sends a very strong visual cue. A small case study of four neighbor-
hoods in the city of Malmö has also shown that arson and (other forms of) physical disor-
der has a similar geographical distribution and clustering (Gerell 2013). The same study 
however noted a non-significant association of arson with collective efficacy, but a signifi-
cant association for other forms of observed disorder with collective efficacy. Although not 
formally shown, the association of collective efficacy with arson has received scholarly 
attention, not least in relation to riots in Sweden (Hallin et al 2010; Malmberg et al 2013; 
Guldåker & Hallin 2013). Malmberg et al (2013) noted that car arson was associated with 
residential segregation, share of youth and share of welfare recipients in a nation-wide 
Swedish study, and discussed how such associations may indicate mechanisms of collec-
tive efficacy to explain riots. Guldåker & Hallin (2013) found a strong association of arson 
with poor living conditions, measured as an index of share of youth, number of residents 
per room, share with no higher education, share unemployed and share foreign born for 
the city of Malmö and discussed collective efficacy as a potential preventive measure. Hal-
lin et al (2010) finally noted that a lacking collective efficacy may be one contributing fac-
tor to the emergence of large scale riots in the city of Malmö in 2008 and 2009. The present 
study will be the first to formally test the association of collective efficacy with arson, and 
while doing so also giving a tentative answer to whether social unrest in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods can be understood through the lens of collective efficacy theory.   
The setting 
 
The city of Malmö is the third largest city in Sweden with over 300 000 residents (Malmö 
stad 2014). It is situated in the southernmost parts of Sweden in the region of Skåne, and 
has a bridge connecting Sweden with Denmark. Malmö has a higher unemployment rate 
and a higher share of foreign born than Sweden as a whole (Malmö stad 2014; Statistics 
Sweden 2013). It has been described as a city with high crime (BRÅ storstadsrapporten), 
but the level of crimes reported to the police has dropped steadily since 2009 (Malmö stad 
2016). The city was troubled with large scale rioting in the Rosengård district in the years 
2008 and 2009 (Hallin et al 2010). Levels of arson are high compared with other Swedish 
cities, and increased rapidly in the early 2000s, but started decreasing in 2010 (Guldåker & 
Hallin 2013). Arson of motor vehicles, which is commonly associated with riots, show a 
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similarly increasing trend for the first half of the 2000s, and some decrease in the past few 
years (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Intentional motor vehicle arson per capita in the city of Malmö. Source: MSB/IDA.  
 
The city of Malmö is divided into 136 city parts, most of which including residential areas, 
but some also consisting of parks, industrial areas or other non-populated areas. Map 1 
show the city parts, with neighborhoods excluded from the study due to low population 
or few community survey respondents marked (see below) and the remaining 96 neigh-
borhoods labeled according to the 2013 count of motor vehicle related arsons.  
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Figure 2. City parts in Malmö used to operationalize neighborhoods. Excluded neigh-
borhoods have few residents and/or few community survey respondents. Remaining 
neighborhoods show number of motor vehicle related arsons registered in the neigh-
borhood in 2013.  
 
 
Research design 
The present study departs from established methods of modeling the association of collec-
tive efficacy with neighborhood level crime after controlling for concentrated disad-
vantage, (ethnic) heterogeneity and residential stability (Sampson et al 1997; Bruinsma et 
al 2013). Models were fitted using multivariate linear regression in SPSS.  
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Data 
 
Arson data is drawn from the Rescue Services in southern Sweden (Räddningstjänsten 
Syd), and is based on incidents where the rescue services have responded to a fire that a 
fire inspector deems to have been intentionally started with malicious intent (“brand an-
lagd med uppsåt”). Only arsons coded as “not in building” have been used as they are 
hypothesized to better capture riot-like incidents and similar. The rescue services employs 
GPS-devices to accurately capture the location of the incident which gives a high geo-
graphic precision compared to police data which commonly uses an address that needs to 
be geocoded, and which sometimes is incomplete. Data for the year 2013 was plotted in 
ARCGIS 10 and aggregated to the neighborhood level (min =0, max = 6.59 per 1000 resi-
dents, mean .86, standard deviation 1.23), and separately for vehicle related arson sepa-
rately defined through the object of arson coded as motorcycle, trailer, car or similar 
(min=0, max = 3.83 per 1000 residents, mean = .362, standard deviation .596). Due to the 
highly skewed distribution of the outcome the natural logarithm was used in the main 
analysis. Models have also been fitted against the same types of arson for the time period 
1st of January 2012 to October 31st 2014 to reduce the risk of potential bias from single years 
(bivariate correlation with 2013 = .848, p=.000).  
Collective efficacy was measured in a community survey from 2012 with 4195 respondents 
over 104 neighborhoods, but only 96 neighborhoods were used in the present study. The 
excluded neighborhoods had less than 200 residents and/or less than 20 respondents in the 
survey. Five items each for cohesion1 and informal social control2 was used (Ivert et al 
2013). Respondents with less than two items each for cohesion and informal social control 
was dropped, and missing values on the remaining respondents were set to the mean of 
given responses for the respondent to calculate indexed values for cohesion and informal 
social control. The cohesion and informal social control indexes were then combined into a 
collective efficacy index with a high reliability (alpha=.89).  
Concentrated disadvantage is an index based on a factor analysis of variables commonly 
used to operationalize neighborhood level disadvantage (Sampson et al 1997; Bruinsma et 
al 2013). The index includes share of households on public assistance, share of unem-
ployed, median income (reverse coded), share foreign born, and number of residents per 
room (all based on municipal registry data from 2011). All variables were standardized, 
                                                 
1 The extent of agreement with i) “people in my neighborhood generally get along well”, ii) “people in my 
neighborhood are helpful”, iii) “people in my neighborhood can be trusted”, iv) “my neighborhood is char-
acterized by a strong cohesion among neighbors”, and v) “people in my neighborhood share common val-
ues” (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree). 
2 Willing to do something about i) “a group of children were skipping school and hanging out in the neigh-
borhood”, ii) “a group of children spray-painting graffiti on neighborhood walls”, iii) “a child acting disre-
spectful towards an adult”, iv) “a fight broke out in front of their house”, and v) “an ongoing car burglary in 
front of the house” (very likely, likely, neither likely nor unlikely, unlikely, very unlikely). 
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and weighted by their factor score. Share of youth, which was included in the original col-
lective efficacy study (Sampson et al 1997) had a factor loading below 0 .6 and was exclud-
ed.  
Heterogeneity is calculated through a Herfindahl index (Gibbs & Martin 1962) yielding the 
odds of two randomly drawn individuals in the neighborhood having the same coun-
try/region of origin (birth). The factor analysis showed that heterogeneity was strongly 
associated with concentrated disadvantage, and for the main analysis in this paper hetero-
geneity has been included in the index of concentrated disadvantage (re-weighted with 
new factor score). Due to theoretical concerns all models have been fitted with heterogene-
ity separately as well.  
Residential stability is measured through an index of the share of owned homes in the 
neighborhood (municipal registry data from 2011) and the share of people that have lived 
in the neighborhood for at least one year according to the community survey. All inde-
pendent variables were standardized before models were fitted.  
Results 
 
Table 1 shows the main results of the study. The combined concentrated disadvantage and 
heterogeneity index shows a strong association with arson, while collective efficacy and 
residential instability has no association with arson. Indeed adding collective efficacy to 
the model barely affects the explained variance at all. The substantial results hold when 
using the longer time period for the outcome variable (2012-01-01 to 2014-10-31), but nota-
bly the explained variance increases a lot (to .46) suggesting a better model fit (results not 
shown).    
Table 1. Multivariate linear regression results with the natural logarithm of arson 2013 not in 
building per 1000 residents plus one.  
 M1   M2   
 Coeff Std er-
ror 
P Coeff Std error P 
Disadvantage 
with hetero-
geneity 
.315 .066 .000 .340 .094 .000 
Residential  
stability 
-.115 .075 .125 -.096 .092 .221 
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Collective 
efficacy 
   .033 .089 .715 
       
R square .203   .204   
 
Table 2 shows the same models run on the outcome of motor vehicle related arson only. 
Results are substantially the same, there is no association of collective efficacy with arson 
in cars, motorcycles, trailers and similar on the neighborhood level in the city of Malmö.  
Table 2. . Multivariate linear regression results with the natural logarithm of arson 2013 on a 
motor vehicle related object per 1000 residents plus one.  
 Model 1   Model 2   
 Coeff Std er-
ror 
P Coeff Std error P 
Disadvantage 
with hetero-
geneity 
.276 .040 .000 .281 .057 .000 
Residential  
stability 
-.088 .045 .055 -.084 .056 .138 
       
Collective 
efficacy 
   .007 .054 .895 
       
R square .349   .349   
 
All models were also fitted with the heterogeneity variable separately as it theoretically is 
an important variable in itself. This has no impact on collective efficacy, but in some mod-
els render concentrated disadvantage to be non-significant as well. It should be noted 
however that those models suffer from multicollinearity, with variance inflation factor 
scores in the range of 4-6 for collective efficacy, concentrated disadvantage and heteroge-
neity (results not shown).  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study shows that there is no neighborhood level association of collective efficacy with 
outdoors arson after appropriate controls are included. This suggests that disadvantage 
and segregation, which previously have been suggested to be associated with arson 
through the mechanism of collective efficacy (Malmberg et al 2013; Hallin et al 2010), op-
erate through some other mechanism to explain arson in the city of Malmö. It should be 
noted that previous research from the city of Malmö has suggested that both arson (Gerell 
2016) and collective efficacy (Gerell 2015) are better understood at smaller scales of geog-
raphy such as micro-neighborhoods. It is possible therefore that an association exists on 
smaller scales, but considering the relative stability of correlations across different geo-
graphical levels noted by Robert Sampson (2012), it would appear likely that other theo-
ries are better at explaining arson.  
Perhaps arson, for instance, is best explained by institutional anomie, or similar theories, 
that show some promise in explaining neighborhood crime while the empirical basis has 
been considered as relatively thin (Pratt & Cullen 2005). A recent macro-level study by 
Chamberlain and Hipp (2015) showed that strain theory (Agnew 1999) was better at ex-
plaining property crime than social disorganization theory. Although no large quantitative 
studies on arson or rioting are known from such a theoretical perspective it makes sense to 
look in that direction now that social disorganization/collective efficacy appear to not be a 
key mechanism.   
It should also be noted that although there is no direct association of collective efficacy 
with arson in the city of Malmö, collective efficacy may be of importance in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods in other ways. Collective efficacy has been linked to fear of crime in the 
city of Malmö (Ivert et al 2013), and if levels of fear could be reduced it may well also im-
prove the functioning of the local community and help facilitate the work of authorities 
such as police in the neighborhood. Collective efficacy has also been linked to public envi-
ronment violent crime in the city of Malmö (Gerell & Kronkvist, unpublished), mediating 
the impact of disadvantage and heterogeneity on neighborhood levels of public violence. 
The large variation in findings regarding collective efficacy highlights a need for better 
insight into how collective efficacy functions. Furthermore, little is known on how collec-
tive efficacy can be strengthened. In the future there is a need for experimental studies that 
can help shed some light both on how and when collective efficacy functions, but also how 
it can be strengthened. If experiments would be successful in increasing collective efficacy 
the effects on different times of crimes could be examined too, and help us further our un-
derstanding of neighborhood levels mechanisms and crime.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The link between neighbourhood characteristics and various social outcomes, including 
crime, was famously proposed in the ecological models conceptualised by the Chicago 
school in the first half of the 20th century (Park, 1936; Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1925). 
Since the 1980’s, a newly found interest in neighbourhood-level processes has emerged, 
most notably in the body of research that focuses on collective efficacy, operationalised as 
a combination of informal social control and social cohesion and trust among neighbours 
(Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Using varying levels of geographic scale, the 
scholarly research on the subject has demonstrated the association between high levels of 
collective efficacy and lower violent crime rates and other criminal activity across neigh-
bourhoods. 
While the research tradition on collective efficacy is fairly established and numerous stud-
ies have found support for the hypothesis, the generalisation of the findings remains a po-
tent problem. To this day, the bulk of the studies has been done in the U.S., and it remains 
unclear whether the findings are replicable in areas with differing social, cultural and eco-
nomic settings. Indeed, in Europe, the results have thus far been mixed (Bruinsma, 
Pauwels, Weerman, & Bernasco, 2013; Sutherland, Brunton-Smith, & Jackson, 2013; 
Wikström, Oberwittler, Treiber, & Hardie, 2012). Some of this ambiguity might owe to the 
varying measures used (for example, the use of police- recorded crime or other adminis-
trative data versus survey-based measures), the choice of scale for the geographical units 
and the quality of the available data. Yet, as the concept clearly lends itself to universal 
application, absence of supportive evidence outside the U.S. would downplay its analyti-
cal significance. 
The current paper focuses on collective efficacy and neighbourhood-level measures of so-
cial disadvantage in a sample of suburban housing estates in Finland. The survey data 
used in this study was collected in 2013 under the auspices of the PREFARE project (New 
Urban Poverty and the Renovation of Prefabricated High-Rise Suburbs in Finland), fund-
ed by the Academy of Finland, with a specific aim to study the attitudes and living condi-
tions of the residents living in post-war housing estates across Finland. Additional neigh-
bourhood-level administrative data were obtained from the Grid Database courtesy of Sta-
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tistics Finland, while point data on violent crimes were obtained from the Finnish Data 
System for Police Matters.  
This paper presents a short overview of the relevant literature on collective efficacy and 
neighbourhood effects, touching on the debate on the level of aggregation and the defini-
tional issues of “neighbourhood”. Furthermore, this paper details how the PREFARE 
study was operationalised and how the study areas were defined. Some descriptive results 
concerning the study areas will be presented, however the results from the statistical mod-
els, as well as detailed conclusions, will be published in a separate paper. 
Theoretical background 
 
In Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Area (1969) Shaw and McKay argued that three neigh-
bourhood-level structural factors, namely low economic status (SES), ethnic heterogeneity 
and residential mobility, led to the disruption of local community ties and social organisa-
tion, which resulted in social disorganisation within the neighbourhood. Social disorganisa-
tion, in turn, accounted for the spatial variation in crime and delinquency rates. Instead of 
focusing on individual factors, Shaw and McKay posited that disadvantaged neighbour-
hoods were characterised by enduring structural deficiencies that undermined the ability 
to realize the common values of its residents and to maintain effective social control 
(Bursik, 1984; Sampson & Groves, 1989). 
The contemporary research on social disorganisation and its derivate paradigms generally 
includes the original components of low socioeconomic status, residential mobility and 
ethnic heterogeneity, while the chosen measures vary, often dictated by the available data. 
However, most studies typically experiment with a myriad of structural indicators and 
variables that broaden the focus on dimensions of social ties (Bruinsma et al., 2013). Using 
family disruption, defined as the proportion of families run by single mothers, as a predic-
tor of violent crime and robberies, Sampson (1987) argued that single-parent households 
are less capable of executing effective social control, and thus cities with high levels of 
family disruption have higher rates of police-recorded violent crime. Utilising survey-
based measures of violent and property crime, Sampson and Groves (1989) measured so-
cial (dis)organisation using measures of local friendship networks, participation in volun-
tary organisations and youth-supervision. The authors found that the association of the 
structural characteristics of the community and violent crime was largely mediated by the 
three dimensions of social disorganisation as well as neighbourhood-level rate of family 
disruption. 
Building on the earlier work on social disorganisation and social capital, Sampson et al. 
(1997) introduced the concept of collective efficacy, defined as “the process of activating or 
converting social ties among neighbourhood residents in order to achieve collective goals, 
such as public order or the control of crime” (Sampson, 2010), which attempted to combine 
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the neighbourhood-level mechanisms of social cohesion and shared expectations for the 
informal social control (Sampson, 2012, p. 152). Expanding the focus on structural charac-
teristics, the theory of collective efficacy posits that neighbourhoods vary in their ability to 
build and sustain prosocial ties, trust and solidarity, and in their ability to activate infor-
mal social control, which would influence the opportunities for interpersonal crime in the 
neighbourhood (Sampson et al., 1997). Thus, high levels of collective efficacy, i.e. a high 
supposed capacity of the residents in a given geographical area to intervene for the com-
mon good, is assumed to be inversely correlated with the crime rate between spatial units.  
Defining neighbourhoods 
 
All studies that use geographical units either as units of analysis or as a defining boundary 
are susceptible to the so-called modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP), which states that 
the choice of geographical scale and zonation can have an effect on neighbourhood esti-
mates (Lloyd, 2014; Openshaw, 1984). In recent years, research in geographical criminolo-
gy has increasingly stressed the importance of the “proper” level of aggregation, often ad-
vocating the use of micro-places in favour of large-scale neighbourhoods (Oberwittler & 
Wikström, 2009; Steenbeek & Weisburd, 2015), while others stress the importance of mul-
tiple scales (Boessen & Hipp, 2015). The move towards the smallest possible scale of analy-
sis has been bolstered by the strong evidence that crime is generally highly clustered and a 
small number of buildings, street segments and other crime hotspots are responsible for 
most of the recorded crimes, especially thefts and violent crimes, a phenomenon Weisburd 
(2015) has called “the law of crime concentration”. 
Research on collective efficacy has generally tended to favour meso-level neighbourhood 
units, a solution that could be considered more in terms of practical decision (due to the 
survey instrument) rather than a solution based on theoretically oriented judgement. In 
the initial studies on collective efficacy, Sampson et al. (1997) combined census tracts in 
Chicago to form “natural” neighbourhood clusters that were geographically contiguous 
and homogenous on key census indicators, resulting in neighbourhoods that had on aver-
age 8 000 residents (see also Sampson, 2012, p. 79). In the study, a total of 8 782 residents 
were interviewed in their homes, with a net sample size of at least 20 residents to generate 
reliable neighbourhood estimates. A recent study by Sutherland et al. (2013), conducted in 
London, employed Lower-layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) to represent neighbour-
hoods, which resulted in substantially smaller geographical scale compared to many pre-
vious studies with each “neighbourhood” consisting of 1 500 residents on average. Even 
smaller scale was achieved in the study by Wikström et al. (2012), who used UK Output 
Areas (OAs) with an average of 300 residents per neighbourhood “setting”. 
An emerging consensus among criminologists posits that when studying spatially de-
pendent phenomena, research should aim for the smallest practical scale (Oberwittler & 
Wikström, 2009). However, as Hipp (2007)  has argued, different aggregation levels might 
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produce different outcomes, and there might not be a single “proper” level of aggregation, 
as some constructs work on one level of aggregation and others on another level. Regard-
ing collective efficacy in particular, research has produced mixed results. Studies in the 
U.S. have typically found supportive evidence for collective efficacy even in larger study 
areas (Armstrong, Katz, & Schnebly, 2015; Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001; 
Sampson et al., 1997), while studies conducted in Europe have so far shown that collective 
efficacy appears significant only on very detailed levels of analysis (Bruinsma et al., 2013; 
Sutherland et al., 2013; Wikström et al., 2012). Gerell (2015), in a study conducted in the 
Swedish city of Malmö, argued that there was little evidence of collective efficacy operat-
ing on large-scale neighbourhoods, as originally suggested by Sampson et al. (1997). At 
best, neighbourhoods could be considered as aggregates of micro-places or micro-
neighbourhoods. 
DATA AND MEASURES 
Data 
The study combines 1) data derived from a community survey, 2) point data on police-
recorded violent crimes and 3) block-level aggregated data on population, employment, 
income and education. Due to the restrictive nature of the survey instrument, the choice of 
the study areas was dictated by the survey design.  
The community survey. The community survey, conducted in 2013 within the auspices of 
the PREFARE project (New Urban Poverty and the Renovation of Prefabricated High-Rise 
Suburbs in Finland), had a specific aim to study the living conditions and attitudes of the 
residents residing in suburban housing estates built between years 1960 to 1979, a period 
characterised by the post-war rural flight and rapid urbanisation in Finland. This required 
a detailed identification of high-rise clusters, which was conducted using GIS-coded statis-
tical data from the Building and Housing Register (data courtesy of the Population Regis-
ter Centre), YKR 250 metres by 250 metres grid data (Finnish Environmental Institute and 
Statistics Finland) and data for identifying Finnish city centres (Finnish Environmental 
Institute). 
First, the housing data was used to identify multi-story residential buildings built between 
1960 and 1979 and further narrowed down to buildings that resided outside city centres, 
using the Finnish Environmental Institute’s classificatory system. In order to be able to 
identify wider housing areas, and to distinguish housing areas from each other, buffer 
zones were calculated around the individual buildings, thus allowing identifying building 
clusters. Buffer zones were calculated for all cases where there were at least five buildings 
which were located within 250 metres from each other. An additional criterion was that 
the cluster had to include at least 300 residents. This resulted in 318 high-rise clusters in 
the vicinities of cities. (Stjernberg, 2013.) 
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The community survey was based on a stratified cluster sample where the primary sam-
pling unit was a housing estate identified with the aforementioned procedure. At the first 
stage, five housing estates were hand-selected to the study. Of the remaining clusters, a 
stratified sample of 66 housing estates was drawn based on city size and unemployment 
rate, resulting in a sample of 71 housing estates across Finland. At the second stage, 19 844 
residents aged 25 to 74 years were sampled from the Finnish Population Register using 
housing ID’s. The total response rate in the survey was 38,9 percent with an average of 109 
respondents per housing estate. 
Violent crimes. Point data on crime were obtained from the Finnish Data System for Police 
Matters (Poliisiasiain tietojärjestelmä, Patja). For the analysis, violent crimes (homicides, ag-
gravated assaults, assaults, minor assaults and robbery) recorded by the Finnish police 
between 2012 and 2013 were used. Each incident was geocoded in ArcGIS version 10.3.1, 
using information on the street address and the county where the incident took place. The 
reference database for geocoding procedure was the Road network with addresses ele-
ment from the Topographic database, maintained by the National Land Survey of Finland. 
A dataset consisting of all property and violent crimes registered in Finland between years 
2012 and 2013 was used for the geocoding procedure. A total of 341 707 crimes out of 454 
260 were successfully geocoded, resulting in a 75,2 percent match, which is lower than 
usually suggested in criminal justice research. Some of the low matching rate is explained 
by incidents taking place in remote areas that have no proper street address nearby or 
where the actual street address of the crime was ambiguous. The resulting point data was 
delimited to violent crimes and aggregated to each housing estate using a buffer. Incident 
that took place within 125 metres of the buildings was categorised as belonging to that 
particular cluster. This procedure resulted in a total of 2 262 recorded incidents within the 
71 study areas. 
Block-level administrative data. As the housing data contains little statistical information 
about income, employment or population, the resulting survey data was combined with 
block-level grid data courtesy of the Finnish Environmental Institute and Statistics Fin-
land. The Grid Database contains data by selected key variables describing the popula-
tion's structure, education, main type of activity and income, households' stage in life and 
income, as well as buildings and workplaces on 250 metres by 250 metres grids. As the 
grid structure is shaped differently to the housing clusters, only grids where at least 50 
percent of the population lived in that particular type of housing were included in the 
study data. The resulting clusters were further aggregated to create uniform polygons 
overlapping with the housing estates.  
Dependent variables 
The measure for police-recorded violent crime was derived from the geocoded violent inci-
dents that took place between years 2012 and 2013 (see the description of the data). Rec-
orded incidents were aggregated to the neighbourhood level and adjusted to 1000 persons 
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living in each housing estate. This resulted in an average rate of 11.8 violent crimes per 
1000 residents among the 71 study neighbourhoods (table 1). 
Other dependent variables were obtained from the community survey. Self-reported victim-
isation was measured as being victimised by any violence or threat of violence in the re-
spondent’s own neighbourhood in the past 12 months. Threats of violence were included 
in the measure as there were very few respondents reporting violent victimisation taking 
place in their own neighbourhood. The neighbourhood rate for self-reported violent victimisa-
tion or experience of threats was calculated as the share of respondents reporting any violent 
victimisation or threat of violence in the neighbourhood in the past 12 months. 
Independent variables 
Collective efficacy was measured following Sampson et al. (1997) by calculating a sum vari-
able from the items used and aggregated to the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhood stabil-
ity was constructed using items from both the community survey and administrative data. 
In the survey, each resident was questioned about the length of their residence in their 
current neighbourhood with categorised responding options. This was recoded into the 
proportion of respondents who had lived at least six years in the same neighbourhood. 
Following Sampson et al. (1997), a measure of home ownership was also utilised in for-
mation of neighbourhood stability. Information on home ownership was available from 
the Grid Database maintained by Statistics Finland. The composite measure of neighbour-
hood stability was then formed using factor analysis. 
Other neighbourhood-level measures were based on administrative data obtained from 
the Grid Database. Immigrant concentration was measured as the share of the population 
that spoke other than Finnish or Swedish as their native language. Neighbourhood disad-
vantage was constructed using unemployment rate, the share of residents with no higher 
than elementary or primary education (peruskoulu) and the share of low-income residents 
(whose household's disposable money income per consumption unit was lower than 60 
per cent of the equivalent median money income of all households). The measure for con-
centrated disadvantage was derived from these measures using factor analysis. Other po-
tentially crime-generating factors were controlled for by constructing a measure of the 
presence of restaurants and bars. The measure was similarly derived from the grid data, us-
ing the absolute number of jobs in that sector as the independent variable. 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
 
The following results are meant to highlight key operationalisations as well as some de-
scriptive results, without dwelling into the results from the statistical models. The results 
from the statistical models and the related  conclusions will be presented in a separate pa-
per. 
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The PREFARE-project had an explicit aim to study the living conditions and attitudes of 
the residents residing in suburban housing estates built in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Due to 
this aim, the survey targeted a specific population living in fairly similarly structured 
neighbourhoods. The survey employed a clustering sample design, where suburban high-
rise clusters formed the first level sampling unit and 25 to 74 year old residents formed the 
second level sampling unit. Contextual register data were derived from the Grid Database 
maintained by Statistics Finland. Data on violent crime incidents were derived from the 
Finnish Data System for Police Matters and geocoded using street address information. 
The resulting neighbourhood structure is illustrated in figure 1. The “surveyed neigh-
bourhood” is formed by the high-risers in the area (marked with dots), while the “contex-
tual neighbourhood” is the area marked with blue squares, where each 250 metre to 250 
metre square denotes a unit from the Grid Database. Grid units where over half of the 
population lived in the sampled high-risers were included in the contextual data. Violent 
crime incidents were aggregated using a buffer (thick black line in figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. An illustration of the neighbourhood operationalisa-
tion in the study. Dots mark high-risers with respondents, X 
marks violent crime events. 
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The size of the study neighbourhoods varied greatly due to the identification method 
(high-rise clusters), as some housing estates had a lot of neighbouring high-risers while 
some had only a few. 40 percent of the housing estates were formed of either 3 or 4 grid 
units, equalling to 0,19 and 0,25 square kilometres. The mean number of grid units on each 
housing estate was 6,7, equalling to 0,42 square kilometres, while the median was 5 units 
and 0,31 square kilometres (table 1). One of the housing estates was a clear outlier with a 
size of 1,88 square kilometres and a population of 13 488 persons – the second biggest 
housing estate was only two thirds of that in terms of both size and population. The aver-
age population in the study areas was 2 279 with a median of 1 534 residents. In compari-
son to other studies conducted on the relationship between collective efficacy and crime, 
the classificatory scheme employed in the current study falls somewhere between the 
larger (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2015; Bruinsma et al., 2013; Sampson et al., 1997) and smaller 
neighbourhood categorisations (Wikström et al., 2012), most resembling the operationali-
sation used in the study by Sutherland et al. (2013). Although not ideal, the somewhat 
smaller size of the study areas could be considered reasonable in relation to the current 
trends of focusing on a smaller geographic scale. One additional advantage of the current 
operationalisation is the ability to study historically and spatially uniform areas, as all are 
situated outside city centre, are of equal age and are built employing roughly similar ar-
chitectural ideas. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the study areas, per housing estate (N=71)  
 Mean Median Min. Max. 
Number of respondents 109 93 14 298 
Population1 2279 1534 408 13488 
Area size (km2; based on grid units) 0,42 0,31 0,06 1,88 
Dependent variables     
Violent crimes per 1000 residents 
(2012–2013)2 
11,8 10,3 0,0 32,4 
Self-reported victimisation rate (%) 4,5 4,0 0,0 11,3 
Structural variables     
Unemployment rate1 0,16 0,15 0,03 0,37 
Residents with no post-primary ed-
ucation1 
0,34 0,35 0,17 0,54 
Low-income residents1 0,23 0,24 0,12 0,38 
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Immigrant population1 0,10 0,07 0,01 0,36 
Residents in owner-occupant 
homes1 
0,49 0,52 0,00 0,90 
Jobs in the hotel and restaurant sec-
tor1 
12,6 3 0 146 
1 Based on grid data. 
2 Calculated using a buffer around the housing estate and divided by 
population derived from the         Grid Database. 
 
Regarding variables on crime as well as neighbourhood structure, some preliminary ob-
servations can be made. First, variation in violent crime rate between neighbourhoods is 
fairly substantial, as the difference between neighbourhoods with the lowest and highest 
rate was around 32 crimes per 1000 residents and 436 violent crimes in total (table 1). Simi-
larly, the interquartile range was 10 violent crimes per population and 32 crimes in total. 
On average, the violent crime rate in the study areas was a little over 10 violent crimes per 
1 000 residents. Self-reported last year victimisation rate (percent of respondents) ranged 
from 0 to 11 percent with a mean of 5 percent. The correlation coefficient of victimisation 
rate and violent crime rate was 0,460 (p<0,001), which is somewhat low considering that 
the measure is essentially the same but with police-recorded crimes vs. a survey-based 
outcome. There are, of course, several factors that could contribute to this. Obvious expla-
nations for the disparity are, for example, different understanding of what constitutes a 
neighbourhood (resident perspective vs. technical definition), clustered/multiple victimi-
sation and victimisation among non-resident visitors, who show up in police-recorded 
crime but not in the community survey. 
Neighbourhood disadvantage varied considerably between the study areas. In regards to 
unemployment and the share of residents with no higher than primary education, there 
was a considerable difference between the most disadvantaged and the most well off 
neighbourhoods. The average unemployment rate in the study areas was 16 percent, al-
most double the national average, indicating that the study areas as a whole were relative-
ly disadvantaged compared to other neighbourhoods – a finding that is not surprising, 
considering that the focus of the study project itself was on housing estates with supposed 
social problems. Most striking differences were found in home ownership, as some of the 
neighbourhoods had no owner-occupant apartments at all, while some had as high as 90 
percent. Another fairly striking difference concerned the share of immigrant population, 
as the immigrant rate was as high as 36 percent in one neighbourhood, while the rate on 
average was around 10 percent. Some of this disparity, however, is explained by regional 
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differences, as immigrant population in Finland is highly concentrated in the capital re-
gion and few other large cities in the southern Finland. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
While the theory of collective efficacy has been one of the central theorems in geographical 
criminology, the findings remain very much disputed. The findings in the U.S. have gen-
erally found supportive evidence of the association between collective efficacy and crime, 
even in geographically large neighbourhoods. Findings in Europe, however, have been 
somewhat mixed, as studies have typically found little to no evidence in favour of collec-
tive efficacy, especially on a larger scale. 
Using a novel method for identifying neighborhoods, this study combines survey 
measures with police-recorded crime and block-level administrative data sources, focus-
ing on suburban housing estates built in the post-war period. The unique nature of the 
study design allows a more detailed analysis of the association between collective efficacy 
and crime, broadening the geographical focus of the research tradition to a Scandinavian 
setting. 
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“For Some Other Reasons?” – Ethnographic study of an interna-
tional outlaw motorcycle club. 
Jussi Perälä 
 
The title of this paper is taken from a multi-year study in which I examine an international 
outlaw motorcycle club from an ethnographic perspective. The study quotes a working 
title from the newest Finnish government proposal which ended up suggesting that the 
group accused of organized crime could originally be organized for some other reason 
than committing serious crimes. So far the Finnish criminal law has stated that the group 
accused of organized crime should originally be organized for committing serious crimes. 
This paper however is based on my seminar presentation in which I concentrated on dif-
ferent forms of control towards this community. First I shortly describe the construction of 
the need for the prevention of organized crime in Finland. Then I shortly describe data 
and methods and continue to actual results risen from the data. I present how this com-
munity and people around it is being controlled by the society in the name of fight against 
organized crime both in national and international level in order to prevent also their legal 
actions. I finish this paper with a short discussion.  
The construction of organized crime groups 
Even at best the majority of the Finnish drug trade can be defined as quite an unorganized 
business. Despite this the law enforcement officials have defined some actors as organized 
crime groups in the local drug market. The most suitable subjects for this have been cer-
tain motorcycle clubs. Signs of organized crime have been the longevity of these gangs 
and visible hierarchy in the vests the gang members are using. These vests with patches 
have been seen as a sign of threat of violence which in turn facilitate the actual crimes.  
The term ”criminal motorcycle gangs” began to take form in Finland some 20 years ago 
when the local motorcycle clubs violently acquired the patches of international outlaw mo-
torcycle clubs of Hells Angels and Bandidos. Soon after this, the discourse of drugs and 
gangs was brought to Finnish discussion. This discourse originated from United States 
and the main theses was that when talking about gangs and drugs we are actually talking 
about professionally organized drug markets (Kuure & Parkkonen 1996.) According to 
law enforcement these motorcycle gangs have been taking care of large scale drug traffick-
ing ever since particularly as professional, organized crime groups. During the 2000s the 
law enforcement started to underline that the gangs have infiltrated more deeply into so-
ciety and in addition to drug crimes also started to take care of white-collar crimes. Several 
cases against motorcycle gangs as organized crime groups have been dealt in court. Actual 
sentences in different courts (district court & court of appeals & highest legal authority) 
543 
 
compared to charges have been petit. The actual sentences have most of all concerned in-
dividuals in these clubs.  
During this 20 year history the actual research on organized crime in Finland has been ra-
re. No statistical data on the organized crime hasn’t been published neither by the police 
nor by the research institutes. Some research can be criticized for not fulfilling the criteria 
of research since the data and sources are from the law enforcement and the media fea-
tures based on these law enforcement views. In addition, the preliminary investigation 
papers without court decisions can’t be regarded as reliable sources in researches (see 
From Illegal Markets to… 2015). Critique has been few. Only few researchers have asked 
e.g. if the amount of oc is being oversized (Junninen 2006; Bäckman 2006; Viuhko & Jok-
inen 2009). The United Nations Palermo Protocol is the only universal agreement on the 
conception of organized crime. Regarding Finland, in this Protocol the minimum sentence 
of 4 years fulfills easily concerning drug crimes. Still, the EU Council recommendation in 
2001 has affected to the fight against organized crime most (Palo 2010). Junninen (2006) 
actually came to a conclusion that the conception of organized crime has been constructed 
from threat politics which has been transferred from different times and different societies 
to Finland. 
During the whole 20 years the police has been active in pointing out the organized crime 
actors through media. Appealing to fight against organized crime the law enforcement 
want to have the legal right to secret house searches and the procedure of anonymous 
witnesses. The continuing increase of control resources and even fraction of rights for pri-
vacy has been justified by the need to prevent organized crime. Drug crimes and especial-
ly the part of motorcycle gangs in drug crimes have been a central argument when increas-
ing the rights of police in telephone surveillance and person registers. Lastly in 2014 in the 
largest reformal of police law (Perälä & Ruuska 2016).  
Before this reformal of police law the government resolution stated in 2013 that to prevent 
organized crime it is necessary to take in use new methods. Similar measures have been 
attempted internationally. Despite the lack of research and public knowledge the govern-
ment solution in prevention against organized crime stated that one specific objective is to 
prevent the organizing of criminals and to underline that participation to action associated 
to organized crime is not a tempting option. Among this and other things the solution also 
stated that in the prevention against organized crime it is necessary to put in operation 
new methods, such as powerful use of administrative techniques and tight cooperation 
with the law enforcement and private sector. This demands the development of coopera-
tion models between law enforcement and private sector and by some parts also the 
changing of legislation amongst other things in part of information exchange. 
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Data & method 
Data for this paper is gathered from interviews with the hang arounds, prospects, mem-
bers and people around the motorcycle club. The club is classified as outlaw motorcycle 
gang (OMCG) by the law enforcement internationally and regarded as organized crime. 
However, this categorization is not based on court decisions since there are none (Lauchs, 
Bain & Bell 2015). The club has several chapters and clubhouses in Finland. The member-
ship is pursued by different stages (hang around – prospect – member). Only men are al-
lowed as members and the median age is around 40 years. The club is nonpolitical. 
I have been gathering the data through ethnography. While writing this I have been par-
ticipating over two years with the club. During the field work I have been visiting chapters 
and clubhouses on different occasions. I have been in different kinds of parties, motorcycle 
runs, repairing bikes and visiting homes of the club members, to mention some of the par-
ticipation done. During this I’ve been writing a field journal in addition to interviewing 
people.  
One might ask why to research control among this community. Firstly, it is a good way to 
start for both the researcher and interviewee. One can speak about control to a researcher. 
Experiences about the control is also a topic of the day in the international level. The ex-
panding control unites members internationally and it will be discussed when meeting 
members from other countries. Also, the community is an excellent research subject re-
garding the unconventional police methods. The members are used to it, some have expe-
rienced it for over 25 years. Lastly, the extent of control has also been a surprise to me.  
How to make the action associated to organised crime not a tempting option.  
Firstly, how does the law enforcement prevent the organizing of criminals and underlines 
that participation to action associated to organized crime is not a tempting option? Basics 
are in the harassment and unconventional police methods. Tailing and interception in traf-
fic without a reason can be expected around every corner and on every highway. When 
stopped and asked what for the answer is most often a “routine check”. This normally in-
cludes the checking of personal identification and bike or car identification, alcohol and/or 
drug testing. If one refuses of drug testing, driver’s license is confiscated for the duration 
of inspection.   
Regarding some, confiscation of gun & bouncer licenses are being confiscated already in 
the hang around phase. Phone calls to work places and relatives are also being done to 
some candidates. In some cases visiting work places or even outside preschool is being 
done by the police. These kinds of police methods are done mostly on hang around and 
prospect stage. Still, control can be expected at any time. The most common place for the 
control is when leaving the clubhouse, especially during the weekend. The club houses are 
also being monitored. In one case an interviewee told that the neighbors came to tell him 
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that the police had come to ask if they can put surveillance equipment in their promises in 
order to monitor the club house. Among the community these methods are not called as 
unconventional police methods, they are simply called as psyching and stressing.  
Some members told that they have seen police inside their cars, apartments and work 
places. Some say that in some cases they have seen “a mark telling that we have been 
here”. Some have found strange electrical wirings in their cars. Among the community it is 
a common belief that also the phones and other electronic equipment are being tapped 
without any official permission from the court.  
Methods and cooperation models between law enforcement and private sector  
Then, how are the tight cooperation with the law enforcement and private sector and their 
cooperation development perceived by the community. In some cases the cooperation 
means denial or ending of insurances for companies. This is being done without any pay-
ment problems or criminal register of the partners in companies. The club membership is 
reason enough. In some cases these companies have been under inspection by the tax au-
thorities for several years. The tax authorities had found no evidence of misuse within this 
company.  
Since the club is international, also the cooperation operates on international level. The 
most visible cooperation is being done during runs. These runs are international yearly 
motorcycle meetings. During runs there are stops at the borders and on highways but also 
on the run sites. These include inspection of motorcycles, checking residential addresses, 
taking up other personal data, photographing persons and their vests, in some cases strip-
ping down and taking photos of tattoos. These are done by international law enforcement 
cooperation.  
Club members are also denied of entry to certain countries. They are also denied of apply-
ing citizenships to some countries and even returned to a birth country after years of resi-
dence in another country. People around the club are also denied working in certain plac-
es (e.g. factories and harbors). Support for club or associating with the club members is 
reason enough for denial. 
From preliminary investigations to trials and prison 
Thirdly I describe how the juridical system operates with the community members. The 
preliminary investigations are the first stage. Sometimes these investigations are being 
kept open as long as possible. In one case a hang around became a prospect member. Al-
most immediately after this he got a phone call from the police. He had been suspected of 
a serious tax fraud and after 5 years he was told to come for interrogation again. He was 
told that his case is being kept open for 10 years. According to law the case can be kept 
open for 10 years.  
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In other case a suspect had gotten non-prosecution from the prosecutor regarding an as-
sault. Almost after two years the prosecution started again. This was done after he became 
a prospect member. According to law the case can be kept open for 2 years. The prelimi-
nary investigations are also opened even after court decisions. In one case a member was 
arrested for 2 months for a reopened case which had had a court decision almost two years 
ago.  
In the interrogation the suspects are asked to give passwords to phones. If one refuses, the 
phones are cracked and data is taken out. Some suspects told that they have been asked to 
talk about things without writing them on the paper a suspect is signing in order to agree 
what he has said. This is being done to get the suspects to act as informants. 
Probably in most cases the investigation leads to a trial. These concern individuals or 
whole chapters. If the case is against a chapter, the charge is about being an organized 
crime group. If one charge doesn’t succeed the investigation starts with other chapter. At 
the court there are same specialized prosecutors, same witnesses by the police. The evi-
dence as organized crime comes from the international police reports which are translated 
from English into Finnish. So far the trials concerning acting as an organized crime group 
has lead to discharge. Trials may also lead to discharge concerning individuals in the club 
and vice versa. In some cases the juridical system is being criticized for giving wrongful 
sentences. One example is when a member got a sentence as being a one man organized 
crime group.    
Some community members also get harsher punishments when judged. This is called as 
gang or club add-on. For assault and battery one prospect member got 1 year and 8 
months. In another case the police was listening to phones and this brought for one man a 
sentence of 11grams drug trade using coded language. He got 5 months served full time 
for this. Sentences are always served full time in a maximum security prison. Members 
having prison experience told that in the beginning of sentence a paper is brought for sign-
ing. If you don’t deny the criminal organization you are in by signing you don’t get the 
leave.  
Personal experiences 
Fourthly some of my personal experiences during these two years. I have been photo-
graphed by the police. My motorcycle and cars I have used (which two have been on loan) 
have been photographed. I’ve seen police checking my motorcycle on the street. During 
the parties I have seen drones flying in the air. At least during that time they were not offi-
cially in use. However, I was personally in contact with the law enforcement officials face 
to face when I was abroad with the club members and crossing border. In the first encoun-
ter (in addition to checking our personal identification and a car we were using) we were 
asked where our guns were and if we had any drugs. The second encounter happened 
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during run. Our bikes were checked and everybody was asked our addresses and status in 
the club.   
Discussion 
When an individual starts to associate with the club, basic harassment should not be a 
surprise at the individual level. Basic harassment has been used against different kinds of 
clubs ever since their birth (e.g. Wolf 1991). In a way the overwhelming use of control is 
not surprising. To law enforcement and public these motorcycle gangs are simply actors in 
illegal market with illegal substances. Especially when the ones suspected are being re-
ported as motorcycle gangs in the media, visible to the public, criminal acts are easy to 
perceive done by organized crime. The police has been active in promoting this view 
through media. According to governmental solution this is done in order to prevent fear 
among citizens.  
Police methods aren’t alike nationally nor internationally. They vary between cities and 
between countries. Not all have had such experiences of police methods, some say they 
have had “just basic harassment”. Some say they haven’t experienced basic harassment for 
years. They say they are so called “lost cases” which have a certain ”do not stress” status 
among the law enforcement. 
According to interviewees the stressing is hardest when a new chapter is being formed. 
After years of existence comes the prosecution of being an organized crime group. Still, the 
interviewees have brought up that at the individual level the law enforcement is not unan-
imous. Not every police officer probably would agree that this community can be regard-
ed as organized crime group. Neither are universal nor national the cooperation methods 
between law enforcement and private sector. However, we are talking about a subject 
which is under coersive means. This is justified by the threat politics, not actual court deci-
sions.  
How then do these new methods affect in the community? Some may leave, most don’t. If 
exclusive policing makes legal working impossible it isn’t quite hard to figure out what 
will happen. Exclusive policing also increases tightness in the community which on the 
other hand may also be the purpose of these methods. Control and preliminary investiga-
tions naturally have functions in the club. At least some members have to use a lot of their 
time for the forthcoming events. Community members have to have access to legal aid and 
they have to collect data for the court cases. On the other hand it’s a community with mor-
al codes which ”partly and within certain preconditions tolerates certain criminal acts”. 
From this point of view certain control is acceptable but one has to keep in mind that there 
is also control within the community. The social control and moral codes also decrease 
criminality. One thing to consider about the control is the attraction of control and the 
need for the enemy. This may affect both ways, for the law enforcement and the club.  
548 
 
Literature 
Bäckman, Johan (2006): Itämafia. Uhkakuvapolitiikka, rikosilmiöt ja kulttuuriset merkityk-
set. Poliisiammattikorkeakoulun tutkimuksia 25/2006. 
From Illegal Markets to legitimate Businesses: The portfolio of Organized Crime in Eu-
rope. Final Report of OCP. Transcrime 2015. 
Järjestäytynyttä rikollisuutta koskevan käsitteistön yhtenäistäminen. Mietintöjä ja lausun-
toja 23/2014. Oikeusministeriö. 
Kuure, Tapio & Parkkonen, Asko (1996): Jengi organisaatiomuotona: Uhmakkaiden indi-
vidualistien yhteenliittymä? Teoksessa: Kenen ongelma? Hyvinvointivaltion murros ja 
sosiaaliset ongelmat. Stakes tutkimuksia 71/1996. 
Lauchs, Mark & Bain, Andy & Bell, Peter (2015): Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs: A Theoretical 
Perspective. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Perälä, Jussi & Ruuska, Arto (2016): Rikollinen talous ja järjestäytynyt yhteiskunta. Teok-
sessa: Talous ja moraali. Gaudeamus 2016. 
Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös järjestäytyneen rikollisuuden torjunnan strategiasta 
7.3.2013. 
Viuhko, Minna & Jokinen, Anniina (2009): Human trafficking and organised crime: traf-
ficking for sexual exploitation and organised procuring in Finland. HEUNI Heuni Publica-
tion Series  62/2009. 
Wolf, Daniel, R. (1991): The Rebels. A Brotherhood of Outlaw Bikers. University of Toron-
to Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
549 
 
List of participants 
 
Participants from Finland: 
Creutz, Karin 
University of Helsinki 
karin.creutz@helsinki.fi 
Danielsson, Petri 
Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy, University of Helsinki 
petri.danielsson@helsinki.fi 
Henriksson, Karolina 
NSfK Contact Secretary 
kontaktnsfk.fin@gmail.com 
Järg-Tärno, Regina 
Ministry of Justice 
regina.jarg-tarno@om.fi 
Kaskela, Teemu 
A-Clinic Foundation 
teemu.kaskela@a-klinikka.fi 
Kinnunen, Aarne 
NSfK Chairman/ Ministry of Justice 
aarne.kinnunen@om.fi 
Kostiainen, Aura 
University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law, Legal History 
aura.kostiainen@helsinki.fi 
Kotanen, Riikka 
University of Helsinki 
riikka.kotanen@helsinki.fi 
Kronstedt-Rousi, Johanna 
University of Helsinki, Department of Social Research 
johanna.kronstedt@helsinki.fi 
Mynttinen, Laura 
NSfK Secretariat / Ministry of Justice 
laura.mynttinen@om.fi 
550 
 
Ollus, Natalia 
NSfK Council / The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with 
the United Nations (HEUNI) 
natalia.ollus@om.fi 
Perälä, Jussi 
University of Helsinki 
jussi.perälä@helsinki.fi 
Saarikkomäki, Elsa 
Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy, University of Helsinki 
elsa.saarikkomaki@helsinki.fi 
Suonpää, Karoliina 
Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy, University of Helsinki 
karoliina.suonpaa@helsinki.fi 
Viuhko, Minna 
The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Na-
tions (HEUNI) 
minna.viuhko@om.fi 
Participants from Åland Islands: 
Agneta Mallén 
Department of Sociology, Lund University 
agneta.mallen@soc.lu.se 
Participants from Sweden: 
Andersson, Mika 
Department of Criminology, Faculty of Health and Society, Malmö University 
mika.andersson@mah.se 
Estrada, Felipe 
NSfK Council / Kriminologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet 
felipe.estrada@criminology.su.se 
Flower, Lisa 
Department of Sociology, Lund University 
lisa.flower@soc.lu.se 
Flyghed, Janne 
Kriminologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet 
janne.flyghed@criminology.su.se 
551 
 
Gerell, Manne 
Malmö University 
manne.gerell@mah.se 
 
Gålnander, Robin 
Kriminologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet 
robin.galnander@criminology.su.se 
Heber, Anita 
Kriminologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet 
anita.heber@criminology.su.se 
Hedlund, Erika 
Kriminologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet 
erika.hedlund@criminology.su.se 
 
Hermansson, Klara 
Kriminologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet 
klara.hermansson@criminology.su.se 
Lander, Ingrid 
Kriminologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet 
ingrid.lander@criminology.su.se 
Nilsson, Anders 
Kriminologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet 
Anders.nilsson@criminology.su.se 
Stenström, Anders 
Kriminologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet 
anders.stenstrom@criminology.su.se 
Schoultz, Isabel 
Rättssociologiska institutionen, Lunds Universitet 
isabel.schoultz@soclaw.lu.se 
Torstensson Levander, Marie 
NSfK Council / Malmö högskola, Institutionen för kriminologi 
marie.torstensson.levander@mah.se 
 
 
 
552 
 
Participants from Norway: 
Giertsen, Hedda 
NSfK Council / University of Oslo, Department of Criminology and Sociology 
hedda.giertsen@jus.uio.no 
Jon, Nina 
Politihøgskolen/ Norwegian Police University College 
ninajo@phs.no 
Lohne, Kjersti 
PRIO – Institutt for fredsforskning 
kjersti.lohne@jus.uio.no 
Lomell, Heidi 
Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, Oslo University 
h.m.lomell@jus.uio.no 
Nøkleberg, Martin 
Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of Oslo 
martin.nokleberg@jus.uio.no 
Rodriguez Goyes, David 
University of Oslo 
d.r.goyes@jus.uio.no 
Rønning, Olaf 
Institute of criminology and sociology of law, University of Oslo 
o.h.ronning@jus.uio.no 
Sollund, Ragnhild 
University of Oslo 
ragnhild.sollund@jus.uio.no 
Sunde, Inger Marie 
Politihøgskolen/ 
inger.Marie.Sunde@phs.no 
Ystehede, Per Jørgen 
NSfK Contact Secretary / University of Oslo, Department of Criminology and the Sociolo-
gy of Law 
p.j.ystehede@jus.uio.no 
 
 
553 
 
Participants from Denmark: 
Abrahamsen, Marie Herping 
Københavns Universitet, Det Juridiske Fakultet 
marie.herping@jur.ku.dk 
Andersen, Mette Foss 
Danmarks Statistik, Kontoret for befolkning og uddannelse 
mfa@dst.dk 
Attermann, Cecilie Vivienne 
Justitsministeriets Forskningskontor 
cec@jm.dk 
Bislev, Maria 
Rigspolitiet, Nationalt Forebyggelsescenter 
mbi007@politi.dk 
Eriksen, Dorthe 
NSfK Contact Secretary 
dortheeriksen2@gmail.com 
Laursen, Julie 
Aalborg University, Department of Sociology and Social Work 
Laursen@socsci.aau.dk 
Møller, Kim 
Aalborg Universitet 
km@socsci.aau.dk   
Ørting, Mia Lund 
The Danish National Police, Operational strategy and analysis 
mlo015@politi.dk 
Pedersen, Anne-Julie Boesen 
Justitsministeriet 
abp@jm.dk 
Prieur, Annick 
NSfK Council / Aalborg University  
ap@socsci.aau.dk 
Rasmussen, Katrine Barnekow 
University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law 
katrine.barnekow.rasmussen@jur.ku.dk 
554 
 
Søgaard Tolstrup, Pernille 
Institut for Sociologi og Socialt Arbejde, Aalborg Universitet 
ptolstrup@socsci.aau.dk 
Stevens, Hanne 
Nordjyllands Politi 
hst010@politi.dk 
Storgaard, Anette 
Juridisk Institut, Aarhus Universitet 
as@law.au.dk 
Participants from Greenland: 
Engbo, Hans Jørgen 
Kriminalforsorgen i Grønland 
hje@kriminalforsorgen.gl 
Lauritsen, Annemette Nyborg 
Ilisimatusarfik/Grønlands Universitet 
anla@samf.uni.gl 
Participants from Iceland: 
Arnason, Snorri 
NSfK Contact Secretary / Reykjavik Metropolitan Police 
snorri.arnason@lrh.is 
Benediktsdóttir, Kolbrún 
NSfK Council / Rigsadvokaten 
kolbrun.be@tmd.is 
Bernburg, Jón Gunnar 
University of Iceland 
bernburg@hi.is 
Bragadóttir, Ragnheiður 
Faculty of Law, University of Iceland 
rb@hi.is 
Gunnlaugsson, Helgi 
University of Iceland, Faculty of Social Sciences 
helgigun@hi.is 
 
 
555 
 
Gunnsteinsson, Skúli 
NSfK Council / Innanríkisráðuneyti 
skuli.gunnsteinsson@irr.is 
Hreiðarsdóttir, Marta Kristín 
Reykjavik Metropolitan Police 
marta.kristin@lrh.is 
Jóhannesdóttir, Guðrún Katrín 
University of Iceland 
gkj2@hi.is 
Jónasson, Jónas Orri 
Reykjavik Metropolitan Police 
Jonas@lrh.is 
Þorisdóttir, Rannveig 
NSfK Council / Reykjavik Metropolitan Police 
rannveig@lrh.is 
Þorvaldsson, Björn 
The Office of the Special Prosecutor, Iceland 
Sveinsdóttir, Þorbjörg 
The District Prosecutor´s Office in Iceland 
thorbjorg.sveinsdottir@hersak.is 
Participants from other countries: 
 
Akunjee, Tasnime 
Waterfords Solicitors, United Kingdom 
akunjee@gmail.com 
 
Nalla, Mahesh 
Michigan State University, United States 
nalla@msu.edu 
 
Tombs, Steve 
Open University, Faculty of Social Sciences, United Kingdom 
steve.tombs@open.ac.uk 
 
